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General introduction 
 
 
I.1. ABOUT THIS BOOK 
 
i.1.1. The main question 
Please take a moment to look at the picture below.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you see? When I saw it for the first time, I immediately saw ‘a 
conscience in distress’, so to speak. But then I was searching the internet for 
pictures relating to conscience, and besides, when you spend years writing a 
book about conscience and conscientious objections, it is hardly surprising 
that conscience is the first thing that springs to mind in a case like this. 
Maybe someone else will see distress of another kind. Maybe the kid is 
simply scared out of his wits, unable to stand the sight of blood, let alone 
internal organs. Or maybe he has a mouse or a rat for a pet at home, and the 
thought of dissecting the same kind of animal disturbs him so much that he 
cannot do it. So there are different reasons why the boy might refuse to 
dissect the animal. Some might be grounded in conscience; for instance, the 
boy might feel that it is morally wrong to use animals in this manner. 
Animals like these have a life of their own, which they can enjoy. For this 
reason, the boy might think that we have no right to take their lives for our 
own purposes, and as a consequence he might have conscientious objections 
                                                 
1 I once found this picture on the internet, but unfortunately I have not been able to 
find it again, so I do not know who to thank for it, or who owns the copyright. 
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against participating in this practice.2 But other reasons (need) have nothing 
to do with conscience. That he cannot stand the sight of blood provides a 
powerful reason not to dissect an animal for the boy, but it is not grounded 
in conscience. 
 Are refusals to dissect for any of these reasons on an equal footing 
for the teacher, who has to decide how to react to them? Is a conscientious 
objection to be taken more seriously than a nonconscientious one? 
Traditionally, in Europe and the United States, people have thought so for a 
long time; many still do. But why is it that when someone conscientiously 
objects to a generally accepted demand made of everyone in a particular 
situation or meeting established criteria, this is seen as at least a potential 
ground for exemption? What power does the word ‘conscience’ possess that 
the words, say, ‘I don’t feel like it’ do not?3 To pose these questions is to 
inquire about the legitimacy of conscientious objection. This question can be 
posed in special contexts, and for conscientious objection in general. In the 
latter case, we want to know whether conscience can ever provide a 
legitimate ground for exemption from a generally accepted demand, the 
legitimacy of which is not itself a matter of dispute. 
Some people feel that there is (virtually) no place for conscientious 
objection(s) in certain contexts, like medicine, for instance.4 The cartoon 
below states the point beautifully.5 
 
                                                 
2 See http://www.animal-law.org/srco/stdrts.htm, and the book by Gary L. 
Francione and Anna E. Charlton referred to there, Vivisection and Dissection in the 
Classroom: A Guide to Conscientious Objection, American Anti-Vivisection Society, 1992 
and 1996 (supplement). 
3 Or, instead of ‘I don’t feel like it’, some stronger reason. 
4 See Savulescu (2006). 
5 The cartoon is by Stuart Carlson and comes from the May 20, 2005 editions of the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, at 
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=327357. 
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But is conscientious objection something that can be confined to specific 
spheres? Do we want people to switch their conscience on when entering 
one sphere, and off when entering another? Even if we admit that 
conscientious objection may be more problematic in certain contexts than in 
others, can we say a priori that it has no place in certain contexts? It cannot 
be maintained that conscientious objection in medicine will always conflict 
with (other) human rights, let alone in such a way that the latter must 
necessarily prevail. If it is true, then, that particular conscientious objections 
may be legitimate in any context, this also means that to deny the legitimacy 
of conscientious objection as such in particular contexts is in fact, indirectly, 
to question the legitimacy of conscientious objection in general. 
 ‘Context’ is an ambiguous term. We may speak of conscientious 
objection in the context of medicine, or that of civil service, or the military. 
But we might also speak of conscientious objection in the context of 
abortion, gay marriage, or compulsory military service. We then come closer 
to what is objected against. There are people who doubt the legitimacy of 
conscientious objections in particular contexts in this sense. For instance, 
they may feel that civil servants do generally have a right to conscientious 
objection, but not in the context of gay marriage. It was the Dutch case of a 
registrar refusing on grounds of conscience to marry a gay couple, 
incidentally, that more or less gave rise to the project of which this book is 
the result. This case provoked fierce reactions. Some argued that as a civil 
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servant, the registrar simply had to execute the law. But it was quite clear that 
it was the fact that the conscientious objections concerned gay marriage from 
which disapproving reactions drew their force and inspiration. The new law 
allowing gay marriage had been hailed as a victory over unenlightened 
discriminatory thought and practice – how could we then allow a registrar 
not to marry gay couples because of conscientious objections? Like doubts 
concerning the legitimacy of conscientious objection in certain general 
contexts, doubts such as these indirectly question the legitimacy of 
conscientious objection as such. 
 Finally, people may be concerned about the contents of particular 
conscientious objections. It has often been claimed that in the twentieth 
century a ‘new’ kind of conscientious objection developed, that posed (and 
still poses) an unprecedented challenge to the state. This conscientious 
objection is supposed to be new in three senses: 1) it is mostly secular, rather 
than religious; 2) it is practised on a far greater scale; 3) it is not confined to 
the context of military conscription, but may occur in any context.6 The 
observation that we are now faced with a ‘new’ kind of conscientious 
objection – an observation which can be challenged in various ways, but I 
will come to that later – does not of itself lead those who make it to the 
conclusion that the legitimacy of conscientious objection has become 
problematic. But many authors agree that conscientious objection has 
become harder to define and harder to distinguish from other kinds of 
objection.7 Even if the legitimacy of conscientious objection is not in 
question, its privileged status is. 
 All this asks for a philosophical foundation of conscientious 
objection. The concept is still used, perhaps more than ever; it is embodied 
in legislation – but what is its foundation? How pressing this question is has 
much to do with changes not just in the practice or the perception of 
conscientious objection, but also, more fundamentally, with changes in 
people’s conception of conscience. I will expand on this in the next section. 
                                                 
6 Moskos and Chambers (1993), 3: “What we call the ‘new conscientious objection’ 
differs from the old in motive, size, and extent.” Many other authors than these or 
the contributors to Moskos and Chambers (eds.) (1993) have made similar 
observations. On 
http://www.ipas.org/english/press_room/2006/releases/04032006.asp, ‘new 
conscientious objection’ is spoken of to refer to a change in what Moskos and 
Chambers call ‘extent’. 
7 And not just authors on the subject find conscientious objection an elusive 
concept. In 2003, the Dutch Secretary of State for Social Affairs declined to include 
a clause on conscientious objection in a law (Wet Werk en Bijstand) defining, among 
other things, what kind of work unemployed would have to accept if it were 
available to them. The reason was that “a concept like ‘conscientious objection’ is 
strongly subjectively coloured, and therefore hard to define”. See http://www.st-
ab.nl/wetwwbks86.htm. 
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For now, it is enough to establish that the legitimacy of conscientious 
objection is (indirectly) challenged by certain reactions to conscientious 
objections in particular contexts, and that this situation gives rise to the 
question as to a philosophical foundation of conscientious objection. 
 This is what this book is about. The book is the product of my 
search for a philosophical foundation of conscientious objection. The 
question whether there is such a foundation requires interpretation; it is not 
self-evident what we should understand by it. I have interpreted it as follows: 
 
is there some characteristic of conscientious objections that sets them apart from other kinds 
of objection, such as to earn conscientious objections a special respect and corresponding 
treatment? 
 
If I find a characteristic that distinguishes conscientious objections from 
other kinds of objection, and justifies a privileged treatment of conscientious 
objections, I have found a philosophical foundation of conscientious 
objection. In the course of this book, I answer the above question by 
answering three more specific questions out of which it is built up: 
 
1) what are conscientious objections? 
2) is there something about them that sets them apart from other kinds of 
objection?; if so, 
3) is this something that calls for a special respect and treatment, or can 
justify such respect and treatment? 
 
 To be able to answer the first of these, it is essential (I will argue) to 
have an understanding of both conscience and freedom of conscience. For 
this reason, the book is divided into three parts, one about conscience, one 
about freedom of conscience, and finally a part about conscientious 
objection. The latter contains the concluding chapter of the book, in which I 
will formulate my answer to the question as to the philosophical foundation 
of conscientious objection. A more detailed plan of the book will follow 
later, but first I will turn to an explanation and justification of the 
uncommon approach I have taken. 
 
i.1.2. (Why) my approach(?) 
It may be thought that it cannot be too difficult to determine what 
conscientious objection is, or that at least the method of finding a definition 
of conscientious objection should be easily ascertained. Is it not merely a 
matter of finding the best possible (but at least an acceptable) definition of 
conscience, so that conscientious objection can then be defined as objection 
on grounds of conscience, so-and-so understood? If we forget for a moment 
that there is more to the phenomenon of conscientious objection than being 
objection on grounds of conscience, this suggestion is not far off the mark. 
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An adequate understanding of conscience (which is not necessarily a 
‘definition’) is indeed at the core of a proper understanding of conscientious 
objection. But to arrive at such an understanding of conscience is no trifle. 
Why not? 
 First of all, notice that ‘conscience’ plays no role of significance in 
either philosophical ethics or psychology in the twentieth century.8 It is still 
an important concept in Freud’s psychoanalysis, but after that its significance 
dwindles. M. Kroy rightly observes that in the twentieth century as a whole 
(or that part of it that lay behind him when he made his observation), 
“academic psychologists generally deny the term conscience (…) any 
legitimate place in their theories”.9 A slight revival of interest in conscience 
seems to be occurring in philosophy, but this interest is primarily historical in 
nature.10 Recently, in psychology, Grazyna Kochanska has breathed some 
new life in the concept of conscience.11 There have been some authors who 
pleaded for a rehabilitation of the concept of conscience.12 Others felt that 
more than an intellectual or philosophical rehabilitation was called for. Paul 
Lehmann wrote: “The semantic, philosophical and theological pilgrimage of 
conscience begins with the Greek tragedians of the fifth century before 
Christ and ends with Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). It is a moving, tortuous 
record of decline and fall which forces upon us in our time the frankest 
possible facing of a sharp alternative: either ‘do the conscience over’ or ‘do 
the conscience in’! (…) By the decline of conscience we mean the fact that the 
power of conscience to shape behavior (…) has steadily lost persuasiveness 
and force. By the fall of conscience we mean the rejection of conscience as 
formative of, or important for, ethical behavior.”13 I mention all this merely 
                                                 
8 See 7.1.1. 
9 Kroy (1974), xii. See also Klein (1930), 247: “Curiously enough, despite their alert 
interest in motivation, psychologists seem to have overlooked [conscience] in their 
analyses of mental phenomena. As a rule the topic is not even mentioned in current 
texts.” 
10 See, for instance, Kittsteiner (1995), Schalow (1998), Murphy (2001), Andrew 
(2001), Langston (2001), Feldman (2001), Kukla (2002), Van Vugt (ed.) (2003), and 
Bosman (2003). 
11 Kochanska (1991), Kochanska (1994), Kochanska and Aksan (2004), Forman, 
Aksan, and Kochanska (2004), Kochanska, Forman, Aksan, and Dunbar (2005), and 
Aksan and Kochanska (2005) (among others). 
12 See especially Hammond (1993); Langston (2001) also seeks a rehabilitation of the 
concept. 
13 Lehmann (1963), 327-328. Lehmann’s analysis is adopted by Walter Conn in the 
paragraph “Christian Conscience: Decline and Fall” of his Conscience: Development and 
Self-Transcendence (1981), and it underlies Basil Mitchell’s remark that “The man of 
traditional conscience does indeed face a dilemma. He must be prepared to choose 
between modifying his conscience and questioning his secular assumptions.” 
(Mitchell [1980], 92). The ‘decline and fall’ view of the conceptual history of 
conscience laments the ‘fact’, we might say, that what was once thought to be golden 
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to show that there have been signs of a ‘crisis’ in the (conceptual) history of 
conscience. 
 That does not mean that there is a lack of concepts of conscience to 
study, choose from, or improve upon. On the contrary, we are faced, both 
diachronically and synchronically, with a plurality of concepts of 
conscience.14 This was in fact one of the factors that led to the rejection of 
conscience by philosophers and psychologists. If one person says conscience 
is the voice of God, another that it is a natural instinct, and again another 
that it is a function of the super-ego; and again, if one person maintains that 
it is infallible, while another claims that it cannot be trusted under any 
circumstances, would it not be better to abandon the concept altogether? 
That is tempting, but it is not self-evident that this is the most sensible 
course of action. What to do depends on the causes of the plurality of views 
of conscience, and on the nature of this plurality. Perhaps we can come to 
understand how this plurality (especially in its ‘synchronic’ form) came 
about, in a way that affects the seeming incompatibility of the diverse 
concepts. A first, intuitive, sign that a diversity of concept(ion)s of 
conscience need not lead to despair regarding the possibility of finding an 
adequate concept, is the fact that we can virtually always recognize 
something in those diverse conceptions – we can relate it to our own 
experience of conscience. This holds true even for sarcastic definitions of 
conscience like: “Conscience is the inner voice that warns us somebody may 
be looking” (Henry Louis Mencken), or this one, which I found on the 
internet as a t-shirt design: “Conscience: that part of the psyche that 
dissolves in alcohol”.15 When we come to philosophical definitions of 
conscience, we see that these tend to (over)emphasize (a) certain aspect(s) of 
the experiential phenomenon of conscience at the cost of others. Butler 
placed extreme emphasis on the authority of conscience; some 
Enlightenment philosophers on reason, the social nature of conscience, or 
both; and Romantic philosophers exaggerated the heroism of the individual, 
anti-conventional conscience. Sometimes the stress on a particular aspect is 
                                                                                                               
was subsequently held to be silver, and finally discarded as tin. The curious thing 
about this view is that it seems to confuse the level of thought with that of the reality 
of conscience; as if conscience itself was divine when people held it to be divine – as 
if conscience lost its value when its concept was devalued. Lehmann does indeed 
seem to think so. (Note, by the way, that conscience was longer held to be sacred 
than divine.) 
14 ‘Synchronically’ must not be taken too literally. I only mean to draw attention to 
the fact that we do not have to go further and further back in time to gather 
concepts of conscience, but that there is also a variety of recent concepts (from the 
second half of the twentieth century). In other words: there is a variety of non-
outdated concepts of conscience. 
15 I have not checked whether Mencken really said or wrote this, or whether the 
remark is merely attributed to him, but that does not really matter here. 
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primarily a theoretical oversight, or a reaction against other, equally one-
sided, concepts; more often there will be a relation to the (author’s) time- 
and context-dependent experience of conscience, in which case a concept 
may be more or less adequate to a particular time, place, and social class, but 
thereby also a victim of parochialism. However this may be, that concepts 
emphasize different aspects of a phenomenon does not mean that there is no 
such phenomenon. I have not yet demonstrated that this is what different 
concepts of conscience tend to do, but I believe the history of expressions of 
and thought about conscience I present in the first part of the book will 
vindicate this view. 
 I am not the first to remark upon the tendency of concepts of 
conscience to overemphasize, even absolutize, one aspect of conscience. 
Erhard Mock, after his study of the history of thought about conscience, 
states: 
 
“Die Beispiele aus der Begriffsgeschichte des Gewissens verweisen zwar 
sämtlich auf die Spezifikation einer allgemeinen Anlage des Menschen, 
Sollensforderungen zu erleben und sich so zu verwirklichen, sich selbst 
darzustellen, aber sie tun dies jeweils unter einem wesenhaften und 
definierenden Aspekt. Bald ist das Gewissen göttliches Orakel, bald 
höchste Verstandesinstanz, dann allein dem Gefühl, dem Willen oder Trieb 
unterworfen, dann aber wird es wie ein Instinkt gesehen. Man sagt, es sei 
unfehlbar, oder aber man könne ihm weniger trauen. Angesichts solcher 
Disparitäten der Begriffe empfiehlt sich zur Beschreibung des Phänomens 
‘Gewissen’ eine weitgehende Formalisierung und Funktionalisierung.”16 
 
He makes a double point: 1) concepts of conscience tend to overemphasize 
one aspect of conscience at the cost of others, and 2) this aspect is taken to 
be the essence of conscience. But note that Mock also takes all these concepts 
together as an indication of “the specification of a general disposition of man 
to experience ‘oughts’, and to realize and constitute themselves through 
these”. His suggestion is that we replace essentialism by functionalism. People 
may differ about what constitutes the essence of conscience, but we can 
acquire a unified view of conscience by looking at its (psychological) 
function. Formalism is a concomitant of functionalism: instead of focusing 
on the contents of conscience (which is what essentialists also tend to do) we 
focus on formal characteristics, e.g. the fact that in conscience people 
experience an ‘ought’, whatever this may be, and wherever it may come 
from. So functionalism tries to solve two problems: that of the theoretical 
disagreement about the nature of conscience, and that of the divergence in 
the contents of different people’s consciences. If we define conscience, 
essentialistically, as the voice of God in man, this divergence presents a huge 
problem. If, on the other hand, we define conscience as a function of the 
                                                 
16 Mock (1983), 61. 
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personality (as the most important advocate of a functionalist concept of 
conscience, Niklas Luhmann, does), the problem evaporates. 
 There is much sense in functionalism. However, it falls victim to one 
of the problems it tries to avoid. Whereas it is meant to improve upon the 
situation that there is a plurality of one-sided concepts of conscience – 
which, in one sense, it still does – it also adds its own one-sided definition of 
conscience to the already existing pile.17 Functionalist concepts of conscience 
are one-sided, in that they place exclusive emphasis on the aspect of the 
function of conscience. But conscience is not exhausted by its function; not 
even things designed for their functionality are exhaustively defined by their 
function, and conscience is not of that kind. Art may be functional in many 
ways, but it is certainly more than that – and sometimes it is hard to see how 
it is functional, which is also true of conscience. 
 Another problem with functionalist concepts of conscience has to 
do with their background in the psychology of conscience. (Psychological 
views of conscience figure in this book mainly through their influence on 
functionalist concepts of conscience. I will explain the reason for this further 
on in this introduction.) Because they focus on the function of conscience in 
the personality (in a ‘personal system’), they tend to place too much stress on 
the connection between conscience and the self; an appeal to conscience is 
then described as an attempt to preserve the integrity of the self. This is not 
altogether wrong, but in my view it does not capture what is most ‘essential’ 
to such appeals, and it does not do justice to people’s self-understanding. I 
will argue for this in chapters 8 and 15. 
 “Of course it does not capture what is most ‘essential’ to appeals to 
conscience,” an advocate of functionalism might object; “we wish to avoid 
essentialism.” I would say that we should take care to avoid a particular kind 
of essentialism, while also avoiding the problems of functionalist approaches. 
                                                 
17 Functionalism improves somewhat upon other concepts of conscience, but not 
enough. Many authors on conscience start by commenting on the enormous variety 
of concepts of conscience. Some do not take this problem seriously enough; others 
take it too seriously. The first gladly write about the conceptual history of 
conscience, saying that for A conscience was this, and for B conscience was that, 
without attempting to seek unity in the diversity. But what is the constant in all these 
concepts? This question is raised in Kittsteiner (1995), 289 (see chapter 8). But 
Kittsteiner takes the problem too seriously, reaching relativist conclusions. Unlike 
Kittsteiner, I believe that ‘syneidesis’ in Philo and ‘conscience’ in Adam Smith are 
connected by more than just etymology. Those who do not take the problem 
seriously enough feel free to simply add their own concept to the plethora of 
existing concepts, thus adding to the problem, rather than addressing it. 
Functionalism does address the problem, in the sense that it seeks a constant in all 
manifestations of conscience; something that all concepts should be able to 
accommodate. Yet it is one-sided in its own way, and in that sense merely another 
concept of conscience that overstresses a single aspect. 
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At the same time, any new approach to conscience should learn from the 
advantages functionalist approaches have over ‘traditional’ ones. That means 
that we must accept formalism – to a certain extent. We need to avoid 
identifying (the essence of) conscience with some aspect of some concrete 
manifestation of conscience; we must also avoid identifying conscience with 
particular contents of conscience (e.g. a specified set of moral principles). 
That said, we should realize that conscience becomes a meaningless notion if 
we cannot at least tentatively delineate a certain class of experiences that we 
can call experiences of conscience.18 For instance, we must note that these 
are moral-religious experiences.19 This is still a formal characteristic, but one 
that encroaches upon ‘substantial’ territory – that of the contents of 
conscience. But it is hard, if not impossible, to work towards a new approach 
of the subject by working away from existing approaches one step at a time. 
In view of the plurality of concepts of conscience (with all their problems) 
on the one hand, and the rejection of the concept of conscience by 
mainstream philosophy and psychology on the other, I believe it is best to 
start anew, from a radically different perspective. A rejection of the concept 
of conscience is, logically, a rejection of conscientious objection.20 Many 
twentieth-century concepts of conscience cannot support legal provisions for 
conscientious objection, but would rather destroy its legitimacy if they were 
adequate.21 The remaining concepts, I will argue, are unable to provide 
conscientious objection with the right kind of foundation (if with any at all). 
                                                 
18 It is doubtful whether such an identification could be accomplished by means 
solely of the criterion of the function of conscience in the personal system, but even 
if this were possible, other disadvantages still cling to this method. For instance, it 
will tend to locate the importance of conscientious objections in the wrong place. 
This is discussed in chapters 15 and 16. 
19 I say ‘moral-religious’, because conscience is not confined to the sphere of either 
morality or religion, narrowly conceived. In this book I will use a broad notion of 
morality and Paul Tillich’s broad notion of religion. Conscience as a moral 
phenomenon is then also a religious phenomenon. 
20 Someone who rejects the concept of conscience may still defend (on pragmatic 
grounds, for instance) that it is best to exempt ‘conscientious objectors’ from that to 
which they object, but this view would then have to be supported on grounds wholly 
unrelated to the ‘conscientiousness’ of the objections. It is likely that the class of 
people eligible for exemption would then include others than ‘conscientious’ 
objectors – a term which would have become redundant. 
21 For example, Klein (1930), 261-262, argues on the basis of his analysis of the 
psychology of conscience that conscientious objectors (to military service) have no 
stronger claim to exemption than other objectors: “Given irrational conditioning, 
the resulting motivation of conscience will be irrational or at least non-logical. (…) 
An individual objecting to war on the purely logical grounds of its stupidity and 
wastefulness should be entitled to just as much consideration by a patriotic draft 
board as the conscientious objector on religious grounds.” 
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For this reason, it is of critical importance to approach conscience in the 
right manner. 
 So we start at the beginning – or, better put: a beginning, for there is 
not just one place of departure for where we wish to arrive. Let us start with 
‘conscience’. Forget all you know or think you know about conscience for a 
moment; that is, do not attend to these things. ‘Conscience’ is, first of all, a 
word. The next question is: how is this word used?, or: what kind of word is 
it? To determine this I make use of the distinction between symbols and 
signs as made by Michael Polanyi, with similar distinctions made by Paul 
Tillich and Eric Voegelin. Signs have meaning because they indicate 
something; symbols do not indicate, but symbolize something. (I will look into 
the details of Polanyi’s theory of symbols in the second part of this 
introduction.) ‘Conscience’, I claim, must first of all be understood as a 
symbol expressive of a certain class of experiences. When someone appeals 
to conscience, (s)he does not (even if [s]he thinks [s]he does) indicate a certain 
‘thing’ in existent reality, called ‘conscience’. Rather (s)he expresses 
experiences of a certain class by means of the symbol of conscience. Once 
we speak of a symbol of conscience, we can take the next step and notice 
that the word ‘conscience’ itself need not be used for us to be able to 
recognize certain expressions as symbolic expressions of conscience. 
Equivalent experiences can be expressed in equivalent symbolizations. (The 
terminology of ‘equivalences’ derives from Voegelin.) The ‘symbol of 
conscience’ comprises all symbolizations of conscience. It is a rather formal 
framework – a certain degree of formalism is necessary – which is designed 
to be able to accommodate all symbolizations of conscience. In its terms we 
ought to be able to interpret all experiences of conscience.22 But it does say 
something about the ‘contents’ of conscience. I distinguish between three 
core elements of the symbol of conscience, the first of which is the most 
important: the element of ultimate concern. The other two are in a sense 
subordinate to this one; they are the element of the witness, and the element 
of intimacy. I will elaborate on this in chapter 1. These elements are elements 
on the level of experience, as well as that of symbolization. The element of 
ultimate concern entails, among other things, that there is reference to a 
superior moral-religious standard, or that an awareness of such a standard is 
ingredient in the experience. If this is not the case, we are not dealing with an 
experience (or symbolization) of conscience. So the core elements of the 
symbol of conscience provide substantial criteria to distinguish experiences 
and symbolizations of conscience from other kinds of experience and 
expression. They also highlight the unity in the (diachronic and synchronic) 
                                                 
22 For Whitehead, the task of ‘speculative philosophy’ was to provide a coherent 
framework of concepts in terms of which all of our experiences could be 
interpreted. 
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diversity of experiences and expressions of conscience, as well as, finally, in 
the diverse concepts of conscience. 
 The claim that conscience must first of all be understood 
symbolically is joined by an historical claim, namely that in European history 
symbolic expressions of conscience gradually give way to indicative uses of 
the term. That is, there are symbolizations of conscience before the 
predecessors of the term ‘conscience’ become the standard vehicle to express 
experiences of conscience; then there is a period in which (predecessors of 
the term) ‘conscience’ is primarily used symbolically; this gradually changes, 
until ‘conscience’ is primarily used indicatively – not as a symbolic expression 
of a certain class of experiences, but as a sign indicating some existent ‘thing’. 
I speak of this transition as a development from symbol to doctrine. This 
change provides the main (background) explanation both for two waves of 
criticism of conscience and its twentieth-century dismissal, and for the 
genesis of a great range of different concepts of conscience. It is the most 
important way in which conscience lost (some of) its meaning. The entire 
first part of the book is devoted to an elaboration (and in some respects a 
qualification) of this thesis. So my approach is intended to help us 
understand not only conscience, but also the loss of meaning involved in the 
rejection of conscience and in the conceptualization of conscience. It is a 
meta-approach to conscience (in that it transcends particular historical 
manifestations of conscience), as well as to reflection on conscience (which it 
helps us interpret in terms of the history of experiences and expressions of 
conscience). 
 In chapter 8 I develop my own concept of conscience, a fluid 
concept, on the basis of the above approach. This concept entails an 
awareness of the symbolic nature of conscience, but provides us with the 
clarity of a single definition, which an analysis of the symbol cannot do. It is 
important to notice the difference between this concept and other concepts 
of conscience. It is not simply one more concept added to the heap, but ‘a 
concept to replace all others’. Of course, most concepts of conscience were 
probably intended to replace all others, but they could not do so because, 
like those others, they emphasized a single aspect of conscience.23 My 
concept of conscience is designed to avoid that danger, informed as it is by 
the symbol-approach to conscience. It should be able to cover all 
experiences of conscience. 
                                                 
23 It is no use trying to add them all up to complete the picture. Some concepts 
simply do not add up, but rather subtract from one another. Others may be added 
up, but the result is not conscience. For instance, we may add up a concept that 
pictures conscience as an intellectual power to a concept that holds it to be a matter 
of the emotions alone, to arrive at a concept of conscience as both an intellectual 
and an emotional matter. But this still does not tell us what it is, and it does not 
transcend the level of psychology. A sum of psychologial ‘facts’ cannot exhaust the 
definition of something like ‘anger’, let alone that of conscience. 
 35 
 For now, this explanation of my approach and the reasons for 
adopting it should suffice. I will now turn to the plan of the book. 
 
i.1.3. Plan of the book 
As I said before, the book consists of three parts. Part I deals with 
conscience, part II with freedom of conscience, and part III with 
conscientious objection. The first part contains chapters 1 to 8, the second 
comprises chapters 9 to 12, and chapters 13 to 16 make up the third part. 
Parts II and III are both preceded by a short introductory text, intended as a 
transition to those parts. 
 
i.1.3.1. Part I 
Chapter 1 introduces the symbol of conscience, discusses its emergence at 
the hand of Ancient Egyptian texts and Plato’s Apology of Socrates, and 
analyzes the symbol into its three core elements. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of two imaginative (sub)symbols of conscience: the ‘worm of 
conscience’, and the ‘voice of conscience’. 
 Chapters 2 to 6 all have ‘Between symbol and doctrine’ as the first 
part of their title. In these chapters I present my perspective on the history 
of expressions of and thought about conscience from Ancient Greece to the 
nineteenth century of Bentham, Darwin, and Freud. The main concern of 
these chapters is with the gradual transition from a symbolic to an indicative 
understanding of conscience, and the loss of meaning that results from that. 
This loss of meaning can occur in radical form, as when Bentham dismisses 
conscience as a fiction, or less visibly, in the form of inadequate concepts of 
conscience. I will also attend to persistent symbolism and revivals of 
symbolism – symbolizations of conscience occur side by side with the use of 
indicative terms to define conscience. 
Chapter 2 discusses the concepts of ‘compactness’ and 
‘differentiation’, the development from a compact to a more differentiated 
language of conscience, and its relation to the development from symbol to 
doctrine. Apart from some references to Ancient Egypt, it covers the period 
from, roughly, the fifth century B.C. to the early Middle Ages. 
Chapter 3 starts by continuing the story of the development from 
compactness to differentiation with a discussion of the (origins of the) 
scholastic distinction between ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’. Despite the 
continuity, this also constitutes a break with the foregoing period. The 
influence of the scholastic verbal differentiation of conscience cannot be 
underestimated. Its impact far outlived the Middle Ages (showing the 
relativity of such periodizations); the distinction (implicitly) survived in 
Protestant casuistry, for instance, and for others scholasticism provided a 
counterposition with which to contrast their own views. 
The development of (popular) expressions of and (popular) thought 
about conscience in certain Protestant groups provides the background for 
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the first wave of criticism, launched in the seventeenth century by Hobbes 
and Locke. Chapter 4 deals with their views on language, conscience, and 
morality, as these are inextricably linked. 
The result of their critique was not that the concept of conscience 
was abandoned (though some in the empiricist tradition came to prefer the 
term ‘moral sense’), but rather that a new anchorage was sought for 
conscience. ‘Nature’ (first with a capital ‘N’, but soon enough with a small 
‘n’) and Reason took the place of God, as I will show in chapter 5. Joseph 
Butler, but especially Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, are extensively 
discussed there. It is interesting to see how conscience is geared to the 
purpose of the perfection of man and society. In this connection, we will see 
how Enlightenment thinkers made use of what we might call an ‘inverted 
Stoicism’. The Stoic withdrawal from what we cannot control (the external 
world) into what we can (arguably) control (ourselves) is turned around to 
make individual self-command crucial to the project of shaping society. 
Hobbes and Locke also provided the impetus for the development 
of a ‘science of man’, of which the ‘science of morality’ was an (if not the 
most) important part. We must see the development from ‘Nature’ to 
‘nature’ in this light. I discuss this in the first section of chapter 6, a section 
centered around David Hume. This leads up to what chapter 6 is primarily 
concerned with: the second wave of criticism, in which Jeremy Bentham is a 
key figure. He could not but think of conscience indicatively, and therefore 
he could not but dismiss it as a fiction – for there was no such ‘thing’. Unlike 
Bentham, Darwin and Freud did find something. Darwin found a ‘highly 
complex sentiment’; Freud settled for a function of the superego. Both their 
views contributed to a devaluation (and in some cases dismissal) of 
conscience. 
 Chapter 7 discusses late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century 
concepts of conscience. Most of them tend towards functionalism, if they 
are not simply exponents of it. All depart significantly from traditional views 
– in particular the ‘faculty view’ of conscience. The main thinkers discussed 
are John Dewey, Martin Heidegger, Gilbert Ryle, and Niklas Luhmann, the 
latter of whom is most important to this book. 
 In chapter 8 I introduce my own (fluid) concept of conscience, 
explain its relation to the symbol of conscience, and elucidate the various 
elements inherent in the concept. Among other things, I will attend to the 
development of conscience and postulate ‘openness’ (in two forms) as one 
of its main ends. 
 
i.1.3.2. Part II 
Chapter 9 explores the conceptual relations between conscience and freedom 
of conscience. In particular, it points out a double inversion of meaning that 
occurred in the conceptual history of conscience. This was crucial to the rise 
of notions of freedom of conscience. 
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 Chapter 10 deals with the two-dimensional problem that is at the 
core of both the concept and the practice of freedom of conscience. This is 
the problem of order, which divides into the problem of political order and 
that of order in people’s minds. The latter can also be called the problem of 
subjectivity. While the first dimension is quite stable, the second is not. The 
problem of subjectivity starts out as a problem in its own right; then it 
becomes subordinate to the problem of political order. In the twentieth 
century it becomes psychologized. Because of that, it can be seen both as 
subordinate to the problem of political order, and once again as a full-
fledged second dimension. The problem of order is highly important for the 
subject of this book, because any theory of conscientious objection will have 
to address it. 
 In chapter 11 attention goes to the dynamics of order; that is, to the 
interplay between ideas, ideals and ‘stubborn fact’, the historical 
contingencies that played their part in aiding or obstructing the advent of 
notions of freedom of conscience. The first part of the chapter (after the 
introduction, so 11.2) deals with the balance of the influence of idealist and 
pragmatic considerations with respect to the transition from a negative 
concept of toleration to a positive concept of freedom of conscience. The 
second part (11.3) is devoted to the question how freedom of conscience 
became the powerful symbol it still is today. 
 (Twentieth-century) solutions to the problem of order are the topic 
of chapter 12. Luhmann’s conception of freedom of conscience takes centre 
stage, but despite its merits it is one-sided, it is flawed insofar as his concept 
of conscience is flawed, and in my view it does not provide us with the most 
desirable kind of foundation for conscientious objection, namely a principled 
rather than a pragmatic one.24 Therefore, the chapter ends with a short 
section on how we should understand ‘freedom of conscience’. 
 
i.1.3.3. Part III 
Chapter 13 deals with what I call ‘identifying aspects’ of conscientious 
objection. Chapter 14 discusses further aspects of conscientious objection, in 
particular in relation to the state and the law. I present my understanding of 
conscientious objection, regarded from different perspectives. The crucial 
question here is what distinguishes conscientious objections from other 
kinds of objection. Historical examples (Socrates and Thomas More, among 
others) are used to show the presence of core elements of the symbol of 
conscience in conscientious objections, and to illustrate different aspects of 
conscientious objection. 
 In chapter 15 I turn to two case studies. The first case is that of 
conscientious objection to military service in the Netherlands, in the last ten 
                                                 
24 Luhmann’s theory of conscientious objection is, basically, his theory of freedom 
of conscience. 
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years of conscription. The second is also a Dutch case, namely one of a 
registrar who conscientiously refused to marry a gay couple. The case studies 
should deepen our understanding of conscientious objection, and bring us 
closer to finding a philosophical foundation for it. 
 Chapter 16 is the final chapter. Here, I answer the question(s) posed 
in the first section of this introduction. It summarizes and brings to a 
conclusion the findings of the foregoing chapters. 
 
 
I.2. REALITY, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND LANGUAGE 
An unusual approach must come from somewhere. In my case, it is rooted 
in views about reality, man’s place in reality, and man’s relation to it through 
language, that depart from our usual habits of thought. Alfred North 
Whitehead’s metaphysics, or ontology (or whatever one prefers to call it) 
provides the main background. This is further filled in by reference to 
thinkers whose work breathes largely the same atmosphere, like Henri 
Bergson and Eric Voegelin. With respect to language, Michael Polanyi’s 
work is of particular importance. It is his theory of symbols that underlies 
my approach of conscience as a symbol. Paul Tillich’s work also provides 
some useful insights into the nature of symbols, but in the course of this 
book it will soon enough become clear that my main indebtedness to his 
work lies elsewhere. 
 I do not expect every reader to accept all of what must here remain 
basic assumptions.25 I cannot argue for them here, nor would I be able to 
argue for them as the authors above themselves have done. The final test for 
such views lies in the clarity they produce. If we are able to interpret much 
(preferably all) of our experience in terms of Whitehead’s thought, this 
strongly speaks for it. But we must be willing to leave entrenched positions, 
to bracket ‘common sense’ insofar as this takes all kinds of things for 
granted, and to look beyond what only seems self-evident simply because we 
are used to it. The whole book is an invitation to look at conscience and 
conscientious objection in a particular way, to attend to it in such a way that 
we see things we would otherwise not notice. This entails an effort that is 
easily underestimated. The psychologist as well as the theologian will readily 
find himself back in his own trenches, because they prefer it to what appears 
to them to be no man’s land. 
                                                 
25 They are not mere assumptions to me, but as it would take another book to argue 
for the views I will briefly present here, they are assumptions in the sense that they 
remain unargued for. (Except in the sense in which they argue for themselves by 
means of the insights they might occasion.) What I present here is not, at any rate, a 
set of assumptions underlying the rest of the book in the sense that if one of them is 
challenged, the whole building is in danger of collapsing. Rather, what I present here 
are some basic elements of a particular philosophical attitude and outlook on the 
world, one that I share, and from which my approach to conscience has sprung. 
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 The danger of remarks such as the above is that it puts readers off. 
Let me assure them that there is no need to be put off. On reading the book 
one may also find that there is nothing unusual about the approach taken at 
all. At any rate, there should be much of interest in it even for those who 
cannot (entirely) go along with the views outlined below. 
 
i.2.1. Reality as process 
Walking around in the world, it often feels like a giant room without ceiling, 
furnished with all kinds of ‘things’. This is what the world seems basically to 
be made off: things of all shapes and sizes. In school we are taught that all 
things consist of even smaller, indivisible, things: atoms. This is good news, 
for some substances, like water or other fluids, or gases, seemed to evade 
‘thing-ness’. With our knowledge of atoms, however, we are able to see that 
fluids and gases, too, are made up of things. This is reality: a large collection 
of material things, made up of small, round, balls called atoms. This is 
tangible. Real and tangible are virtually synonymous. We, human beings, as 
well as other animals, are special, because we move around in this world, 
which seems otherwise (on the surface of it) rather static. 
 This picture, familiar though it may be, is an illusion, and a remnant 
of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century physics and philosophy. It is illusory 
not just because there are in fact earthquakes, tsunamis, wind, and other 
dynamic phenomena that belie the static appearance of things, but also 
because everything is dynamic. Reality has the character of a process.26 Reality is 
process. Its basic units, Whitehead suggests, are not small ‘things’, but events. 
(He also speaks of ‘actual occasions’, or ‘actual entities’, among other terms.) 
Unlike ‘things’, events can interlock. Hume notoriously denied the existence 
of causality, because he could not see it. In his (later published) Abstract to 
the Treatise of Human Nature he presents the famous example of the billiard 
balls.27 One ball ‘hits’ another, which then starts moving. We can see that the 
first ball is, at any further point in time, in a position closer to that of the 
second ball than its previous position. Then, they ‘touch’, after which the 
positions of the balls at any further point in time are such that the balls are 
further apart than the previous moment. We see all this, but what we cannot 
see is causality, which is a construct of the human mind.28 Hume writes: “in 
no single instance the ultimate connection of any objects is discoverable, 
either by our senses or reason, and (…) we can never penetrate so far into 
the essence and construction of bodies, as to perceive the principle, on 
                                                 
26 The picture of Whitehead’s thought I am about to sketch draws on that in 
Schinkel (2004). 
27 Undoubtedly his hope was that at least some people would read that in its entirety. 
His strategy seems to have been successful; the example of the billiard balls is often 
referred to, though it is usually said to come from the Treatise itself. 
28 Hume (2000), 409-417. 
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which their mutual influence depends.”29 In Hume’s thought, time and space 
are divided ad infinitum, leaving us with extensionless points and moments 
without duration. Not only causality evaporates in such a view, but so does 
movement. In my explanation of the example of the billiard balls, I 
deliberately avoided the term ‘movement’, because all Hume could have said 
about a ‘moving’ billiard ball is: “It is here; now it is here; and now it is here 
– but there is no such thing as movement.”30 
 Although ‘causality’ may be a common-sense notion, and its 
supposed non-existence an affront to common sense, the Humean picture of 
reality is still roughly that which we ‘inhabit’ today. Whitehead offers an 
alternative to this world-view that has dominated Western thought for the 
past centuries. Central to this worldview is the division between subject and 
object. Now, ‘object’ can have different meanings. It need not mean ‘an 
object’, in the sense of a thing. In practice, however, the division between 
subject and object has been just that: a division between the mental and the 
material, between things and perceivers-of-things. The latter (we) are also 
‘endowers-with-meaning’; we give colour and meaning to a bleak and 
meaningless world. The division between subject and object characterizes 
both modern and postmodern thought; in the latter case it is drawn to its 
extreme.31 Both use it in different ways. In modern thought, the division 
between subject and object is used to provide a foundation for the 
objectivity of knowledge; in postmodern thought it functions to demonstrate 
the impossibility of attaining objective knowledge. Whitehead rejected the 
division between subject and object, but used the distinction. To accept that 
rejection, as I do, has two consequences: it entails the rejection of the 
impossibility of ‘objective’ knowledge, but it also means that the idea that we 
passively perceive objective reality must be discarded. Instead, we must 
acknowledge that we are part of process, that we participate in reality, and 
that (despite of the degree of individuation we have reached) reality extends 
into us – we are a continuation of reality. Whitehead contrasts his own 
position on this point with Kant’s: “For Kant, the world emerges from the 
subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the 
world…”32 
 Whitehead uses the terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’ primarily to denote 
two sides of the experiential units he calls ‘events’, ‘actual occasions’, or 
‘actual entities’. Another name he uses is ‘occasions of experience’. The 
structure of such an occasion is of a subject unified with objects in an 
experience. A ‘subject’ is not necessarily a human being; any centre of 
experience is a subject. Everything that is experienced is object for a subject. 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 257. 
30 Schinkel (2004), 42. 
31 See Latour (1993). 
32 Whitehead (1985), 88. 
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What is not experienced by me is not an object for me. We can speak of 
everything that enters into an experience as the data for that experience, but 
not once it has become part of it; it has then reached the status of object for 
a subject. Every actual entity, when it ceases to be actual (that is, when it is 
no longer ‘happening’) can become object in another event. Events ‘inherit’ 
the past insofar as it is relevant to them. This enters into the ‘concrescence’ 
that constitutes the event; this is a ‘growing together’ into unity of the 
various elements that enter into the event. 
 Events enter into relations with one another. They form nexus.33 A 
nexus is a chain of events. Underlying our perception of solid things are 
chains of events. For instance, our ‘thing-chair’ is an abstraction from the 
underlying ‘chain-of-events-chair’. Chains of events that sustain a certain 
character over time form the basis of our perception of things. Thus, behind 
the veil of a seemingly static reality we find process. 
 
i.2.2. Perception, consciousness, and truth 
That we see things, not process, not only has to do with the tendency of 
events to form nexus, but also with our perception and our mental 
functioning. There are different kinds of perception. Reality consists of 
nothing but events, which means that the world is full of experience. There 
are occasions of experience on a human level, but also on a quantum-level. 
Victor Lowe, Whitehead’s biographer, recalls: “When I asked him whether 
the emission of a single quantum of energy was an actual occasion, he 
replied, ‘Probably a whole shower of occasions.’”34 Now, on that micro-level, 
neither we nor Whitehead would (have) like(d) to speak of ‘perception’ to 
characterize the experience of ‘quantum-subjects’. The same holds true on 
the already almost infinitely higher level of micro-organisms. Who has ever 
heard of perceptive plankton? But Whitehead thought that the term 
‘perception’ suggested too much even for many cases of human experience. 
Both ‘perception’ and the term ‘apprehension’ as it is commonly used are 
“shot through and through with the notion of cognitive apprehension”.35 
Therefore, Whitehead introduces the term ‘prehension’ to signify 
apprehension “which may or may not be cognitive”.36 This is a double strike. 
By using the term ‘prehension’ he avoids the danger of anthropomorphism 
in the description of non-human experience. At the same time, he draws 
attention to the fact that human experience is for the greater part 
noncognitive. 
                                                 
33 And also ‘societies’; when we should speak of a society or of a nexus depends on 
the way the events that build it are organized. 
34 Lowe (1988), 51. 
35 Whitehead (1938), 86 (my italics). 
36 Idem. 
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 Whitehead analyzes prehensions into two (nonchronological) 
phases. In the conformal phase reality, insofar as relevant to the occasion, 
enters into the concrescence. Where inorganic actual occasions are 
concerned, nothing else seems to follow the conformal phase but a causally 
determined reaction. Things are different in organic occasions. Here, there is 
a second phase in which Whitehead distinguishes two subphases, the 
supplemental and the mental phase, which he speaks of as “the two higher 
originative phases in the ‘process’”.37 In the supplemental phase, a certain 
emotional value is added to the contents of the first phase; for example: 
“shape acquires dominance by reason of its loveliness”. Another possibility is 
that colours gain intensity due to the contrast with other colours (which is 
what the bits of green in between the red meat at the butcher’s are meant to 
achieve). In the mental phase, finally, eternal objects (‘pure possibilities’) enter 
the equation, as well as more complex kinds of possibilities.38 The mental 
phase is a phase in which possibilities and values are prehended; possibilities 
are evaluated as to their merits. This phase is an important source of 
creativity. 
 Prehensions are also analyzed into three elements: subject, object 
(prehended datum), and subjective form, “which is how that subject prehends 
that datum”.39 The term ‘subjective form’ is closely bound up with the term 
‘subjective aim’, the ‘goal’ of the subject (which Whitehead also calls a 
subject-superject, to indicate that the subject projects itself into the future). 
The subjective aim is the aim at a certain ‘satisfaction’, which is the 
completion of the process of concrescence, and thus of the event. The 
subjective aim determines the subjective form. There are many kinds of 
subjective form: emotions, evaluations, intentions, and also (cognitive) 
consciousness. Every prehension has a subjective form – even a negative 
prehension, in which the datum is rejected as an ingredient in the 
concrescence, in which case the subjective form of the rejection still 
contributes to the concrescence. 
 That Whitehead sees consciousness as a possible subjective form is 
important. It means, first of all, that consciousness does not characterize 
every prehension, every experience. Secondly, it means that ‘consciousness’ 
is a term denoting how we experience something. Whitehead is a bit sloppy in 
his use of the term ‘consciousness’, but in this context he intends it to be a 
characteristic of prehensions that are accompanied by a particular kind of 
                                                 
37 Whitehead (1985), 177. 
38 Eternal objects come in three kinds: mathematical shapes, sensa (red, sweet, heavy, 
etc.), and subjective eternal objects (disgust, approval, etc.); see Van Haeften (1999), 
337. Eternal objects are ‘eternal’, yet they differ in their realization in actual 
occasions. See Whitehead (1938), 186-201. In a letter to Charles Hartshorne, 
Whitehead writes that “no eternal object in any finite realization can exhibit the full 
potentialities of its nature”. 
39 Whitehead (1985), 16. 
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awareness – we look around us and register a computer, a pile of papers, 
another pile of papers, a pile of books, yet another pile of papers, some 
pencils, and so on (depending on where we are, of course). We are 
cognitively aware of all this. We are easily led to think that this is the only 
form of experience, and that this is how we experience everything. 
Whitehead maintains that this is not the case (and modern psychology and 
neuroscience would confirm that). Conscious perception is the result of our 
mental functioning. “Mentality,” Whitehead says, “is an agent of 
simplification; and for this reason appearance is an incredibly simplified 
edition of reality.”40 Our mental functioning is such that certain elements of 
experience are emphasized at the cost of others; it leads our attention. 
Hence, “consciousness is an emphasis upon a selection of (…) objects”, and 
it is “a mode of attention”.41 As a result, a difference arises between the 
contents of the conformal phase of experience and those of the mental 
phase and the final satisfaction. This constitutes appearance for the occasion in 
question. 
 While Descartes thought that the clarity and distinctness of ideas 
was the best guarantee of their reliability, Whitehead turns this around. Clear 
and distinct ideas can only be found on the level of appearance; they are the 
result of simplifying processes, which result in “a mass of presuppositions 
about Reality rather than the intuitions of reality itself”. Whitehead adds: “It 
is here that the liability to error arises.”42 
It is here, too, that ‘true’ and ‘false’ (in their common sense) become 
relevant notions. “Reality is just itself, an it is nonsense to ask whether it be 
true or false.”43 So much is self-evident. But of appearance, of 
‘presuppositions about reality’, it does make sense to ask whether they are true 
or false. “Truth is the conformation of Appearance to Reality. This 
conformation may be more or less, also direct or indirect.”44 This is not a 
statement of naïve realism. Whitehead realizes that reality differs 
fundamentally from propositions about reality; this difference lies in the 
‘mode of togetherness’ of their elements. The real greenness of the tree is in 
the tree in a totally different way from what the proposition ‘the tree is 
green’ suggests – as if there is a tree with green, as an afterthought, added to 
it. But truth does not apply to propositions alone. There is more to truth 
than the common notions of ‘true’ and ‘false’. “If we ask what is meant by 
‘truth’, we can only answer that there is a truth-relation when two composite 
facts participate in the same pattern.”45 There is a truth-relation when a baby 
                                                 
40 Whitehead (1964), 213-214. 
41 Ibid., 182; 269. 
42 Ibid., 269. 
43 Ibid., 240. 
44 Idem. 
45 Ibid., 241. 
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starts crying when another baby cries, or when a child brings a sad child its 
favourite toy for comfort. Truth-relations are relations between (the contents 
of) prehensions. When the sadness of one child enters into the experience of 
another, there is a truth-relation. Paintings, to name another example, may 
stand in different kinds of truth-relations to their subject. People with a very 
limited understanding of art may think that only a ‘realistic’ painting is true to 
its subject, but most people will realize that a Monet may have an equally 
strong or stronger truth-relation to the depicted landscape. 
 From the above it is important to keep in mind that truth-relations 
are attainable, that they vary in kind, and that they are variable in strength. 
Truth is not an all-or-nothing matter. 
 
i.2.3. Structures of consciousness and modes of communication 
Reality is not an object for us, subjects, but to think of reality in that way is a 
habit of thought that comes naturally to us. The ‘subject-object view’ 
expresses one possible way for consciousness (in a broad sense; not just 
cognitive consciousness) to relate to the world. But there is another way. 
Eric Voegelin, who attended some of Whitehead’s lectures shortly before 
Whitehead’s publication of Science and the Modern World (1926), distinguishes 
between two ‘structures of consciousness’, two ways in which consciousness 
may relate to the world (i.e. the process of reality): intentionality and 
luminosity.46 From the perspective of a human being a ‘structure of 
consciousness’ is a way of being aware of the world; the other way around – 
from the opposite perspective – it is a way in which the world makes itself 
known. 
Consciousness is always consciousness of something, and that 
something Voegelin calls reality. “And this relation between consciousness 
and reality to which it refers, that I shall call, following Husserl’s 
terminology, intentionality of consciousness. So in relation to a consciousness 
of man, the concrete human being, reality moves into [the] position of an 
object, intended subjectively from the cognitive subject.”47 This is one 
structure of consciousness; “[h]owever, consciousness is not simply 
intentional. It is also, at the same time, an ‘event’ in reality, an event more 
correctly in the ‘process’ of reality. (...) [R]eality, the object of intentional 
consciousness, is now becoming the subject, of which consciousness, as one 
of its events, has to be predicated. So, reality as a subject: Can we say that 
reality is conscious? or that reality knows? or is the subject of knowledge? I 
don’t think so. We need a different term. I am using the term that is most 
closely related to the similar treatment of such problems by medieval 
thinkers; I’m using the term luminosity. Reality becomes luminous in 
                                                 
46 Voegelin (2004b), especially 353-357. See also Voegelin (1990), 206-209, and 
Voegelin (2000), 28-31. 
47 Ibid., 354. 
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consciousness, and consciousness then intends the reality for which the 
reality has become luminous in consciousness.”48 Voegelin then introduces 
the role of language: “[A]bout all these things we would not know anything 
unless there were this consciousness [with] the peculiar gift of expressing 
itself in language.”49 
On the linguistic level, the ‘double problem’ that we saw in the case 
of consciousness repeats itself. “All language ‘breaks forth’ in the process of 
consciousness, in the sense of consciousness being a luminosity in reality.” 
Reality becoming luminous means that it lets “that man who has 
consciousness find language-terms to designate what he experiences. That is 
the breaking forth of language.”50 But when language ‘breaks forth’, it comes 
to signify, “in its intentionality function”, the intended reality. “Both 
breaking forth and intentionality, signifying reality as an object, belong to 
language.”51 This realization brings Voegelin to “a peculiar problem of 
truth”: “ ‘Truth’ is, first of all, reality becoming luminous for its structure.” 
This is truth in the Greek sense of aletheia. But secondly, “this reality that 
becomes luminous is – insofar as it becomes luminous in the consciousness 
of man in the relation of intentionality – a ‘knowledge’ of that reality.” This 
constitutes the possibility of a second kind of truth, the truth of propositions 
in Whitehead’s thought. 
 Voegelin then goes on to say that, for the reason that in language 
and truth we find the same double structure as in consciousness, “language is 
practically only possible in the plural”.52 Instead of pointing towards a 
language of intentionality and one of luminosity, however, (which is what 
one would expect), he identifies twelve languages, all of which express both 
the states of intentionality and luminosity, and emphasizing that “there are 
many more” such languages.53 But thereby he removes the inevitable 
plurality of languages from what he said to be its reason. So this is where I 
part company with Voegelin. I would say that there is a language of 
intentionality and a language of luminosity, corresponding to the two 
structures of consciousness Voegelin points out.54 The meaning conveyed 
through the former is constituted by what Polanyi would call a relation of 
indication; the meaning conveyed by the latter comes about through a 
relation of symbolization. Symbols are the natural extension of the process 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 355-356. We could rephrase this in a way that connects it to one of 
Whitehead’s remarks and say that “the subject emerges from the world, which it 
then intends as its object”. 
49 Ibid., 356. 
50 Ibid., 356-357. 
51 Ibid., 357. 
52 Idem. 
53 Ibid., 361. 
54 By these two languages, to be sure, I do not mean two separate languages, but two 
ways of using language – they use the same vocabulary and the same grammar. 
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by which reality becomes luminous to itself; they are the articulation of 
consciousness as luminosity. The various forms of indicative language are 
the natural accompaniment of consciousness in its function of 
intentionality.55 The difference between the two may be elucidated by means 
of a metaphor: while symbols, engendered by the experiences of a subject 
that, in Whitehead’s words, ‘emerges from the world’, are illuminated from 
within, concepts (and other forms of indicative language) are the flashlights 
used by a subject to light up particular objects in the external world. Symbols 
glow for as long as they are nourished; concepts cast light upon objects, 
either until the batteries run out or until they are pointed at some other 
object. Concepts, while illuminating one side of an object, cast shadows. 
Hence the tendency of concepts to absolutize one aspect of a phenomenon 
at the cost of others.56 
 It must be clear that I do not mean to say that there are simply two 
kinds of consciousness, each of which is accompanied by its own language. 
This picture of the situation is far too clean.57 Just as the symbol and the sign 
represent two poles, two extremes of a spectrum, these structures of 
consciousness are two ideal-typical forms abstracted from a complex reality. 
Symbolic and indicative language intermingle in various ways. Symbols rest 
on concepts and new indicative meanings can become the basis for new 
symbolizations; concepts acquire and retain power through their connection 
with symbols. The relation between luminosity and symbols is also not 
always straightforward; it is much more complex, for instance, in the case of 
people who consciously utilize symbols, in full awareness of their nature as 
symbols. Yet however complex all these relations may be, with regard to 
conscience I would still emphasize the primacy of symbols. Symbolism is the 
natural means of expression for ‘fresh’ experience, for everything that is new 
and unknown. It is even more for what is unknowable intentionally, as an 
object over against us. While the two structures of consciousness and its two 
corresponding modes of expression and communication may always be 
present simultaneously, it seems to me that there are gradations in 
                                                 
55 See Voegelin (1984), 50: “To the intentionality-component of consciousness there 
corresponds the idea which results from the concept of the concept. One formulates 
concepts of a reality; while the concept is thus determined by the intentionality, as 
regards the relation of consciousness back to its luminosity, I would like to speak of 
symbols.” In this text, Voegelin introduces a third element of the complex of 
consciousness: ‘reflective distance’; I will not discuss this here, but return to it in 
chapter 8. See also Voegelin (2000), 32, 52, and 98. 
56 Hence also the association of conceptual thought with clarity (due to the sharp 
outlines lit up by the flashlight), and that of symbols with vagueness (which 
accompanies their glow). 
57 For Voegelin, to separate the different elements of what he calls the ‘meditative 
complex’ would mean to attempt to resolve the fundamental tension in man as a 
creature of the ‘metaxy’. See Voegelin (2004b), 361-364. 
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dominance of the one over the other. Intentionality is usually dominant, 
which is why luminosity often goes unrecognized. But for some areas of 
reality, luminosity is the appropriate way of relating to them. In such cases 
indicative language is derived, is secondary. Conscience is such a case. As an 
experiential phenomenon, it is something of which we can become aware, 
but not primarily as an object over against ourselves. To ‘know’ conscience, 
we need luminosity, and we need symbols. 
I would also say – but perhaps Voegelin would disagree – that 
luminosity is more basic than intentionality; that intentional consciousness is 
only possible because there is consciousness in the form of luminosity. If 
there were no consciousness in the sense of a resonance of reality in an 
individual’s experience, a consciousness in which reality reveals itself, there 
could be no consciousness of reality as an object for a subject.58 
 
i.2.4. Language 
It is quite common today for philosophers to see language as that which, 
more than anything else, sets the limits for our thought and experience. What 
we cannot say, we cannot think. What we cannot express, we cannot 
experience. I submit that in its absolute form this idea is wrong. At any rate it 
is one-sided. Language is for a large part a tool, a means of expressing oneself 
– something that facilitates thought and expression. I realize, of course, that 
language is not a neutral and transparent vehicle for thoughts that are 
otherwise independent from it. But there is something beyond language. 
When I yell because I hit my thumb instead of the nail, the yell does not 
constitute the pain. Rather, it expresses it. What is ‘important’ in experience 
naturally pushes towards its expression.59 A yell of pain is in that sense 
continuous with the pain. The situation is more complicated when it comes 
to words, but the structure is basically similar. Reality extends into us, and 
what is important in us seeks expression through words and other means. 
 In a sense we use words in an attempt to say what can never be said. 
A cry of pain is, generally speaking, a much more adequate expression of 
someone’s feelings and their intensity than words could ever be; but it is 
otherwise not very informative. It does not by itself tell us anything about 
the location of the pain, nor of its cause. To communicate such details we 
need words, but when we use them, we distance ourselves from the concrete 
feelings and from the concrete situation, and abstract from it just that bit of 
                                                 
58 But it may be that my interpretation of ‘luminosity’ differs from Voegelin’s. He 
associates it with ‘revelation’, in a very exhaulted sense, which I would not think 
necessary. Evidence that Voegelin is on the same track as I am, however, is the 
following statement: “While working on the chapter on Schelling, it dawned on me 
that the conception of a history of ideas was an ideological deformation of reality. 
There were no ideas unless there were symbols of immediate experiences.” (Voegelin 
[1989], 63. Cf. Henkel (1998), 26.) 
59 See 8.6 for the Whiteheadian notion of ‘importance’. 
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information which we really need someone to have – that we are really in 
pain. What we have abstracted from is lost in the communication, though it 
can be partly restored by the contextual clues the other person also receives, 
or by an effort of the imagination on the part of the receiver. In a sense, 
then, the less we say (the less we lose ourselves in verbal descriptions), the 
more we express; and the more we say, the less. The more words we have at 
our disposal, the more we can say; but at the same time, for each word we 
use, we lose a bit of concreteness, importance, and intensity of feeling. 
 Given this inverse relation between expression and the use of verbal 
communication, it seems that there is a direct relation between verbal 
language and the intentional consciousness. Symbolic language, however, 
counteracts this general tendency. Not all symbolism is verbal, but verbal 
symbolism combines the potential for nuance of verbal language with the 
expressive power ordinary language lacks. Thus, symbolic language attempts 
to continue a line of importance that extends from the world to the subject; 
the attempt is to extend it through the subject to other subjects, so as to 
allow them to participate in the same experiential ‘pattern’. 
 Language requires imagination; hence, it is never simply or fully 
transparent to experienced reality. But this does not vitiate the possibility of 
(un)truth. Writing about the balance between the structures of 
consciousness, Voegelin writes: “[T]o be aware of the truth of reality as an 
image emerging from a balancing process means to remain aware of the 
tension between the balanced image and a power of imagination which is 
necessary to achieve symbols of truth at all but is a neutral force inasmuch as 
it can also produce imbalanced and distorted images of reality. This complex 
of awareness I shall call the balance of consciousness and introduce it as the third 
structure to be discerned in the quest of truth.”60 
 There is experience before there is verbal language, and there is 
experience beyond any language. We are continually engaged in an imaginative 
struggle for words. Whitehead wrote that “language halts behind intuition”.61 
We might also say that language lags behind experience. At the same time, 
however, it provides us with a particular window onto the world. This is 
what is usually emphasized today. There is an element of freedom and of 
limitation in this fact. Language allows us to see the world in a certain way, 
but it also prevents us from seeing it in some other way – that, at least, is the 
danger. Symbolic language allows experience to break through the surface of 
ordinary language – experience that would otherwise remain submerged and 
out of sight. 
 
                                                 
60 Voegelin (1990e), 327. Elsewhere, Voegelin speaks of ‘reflective distance’, rather 
than the ‘balance of consciousness’; also, in this text he speaks of ‘mystery’, whereas 
later he prefers the term ‘luminosity’. 
61 Whitehead (1968), 49. 
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I.3. THE THEORY OF SYMBOLS 
Whitehead, Voegelin, Tillich, and Polanyi have all written about symbols and 
symbolism. I will make use of the work of three of them to explain what I 
mean by ‘symbols’.62 Whitehead’s Symbolism discusses too general a notion of 
symbols for the present purpose.63 The same holds true for one of the most 
famous semiotic theories, that of Charles Sanders Peirce.64 I am interested in 
a specific notion of the symbol, and both Voegelin, Tillich, and Polanyi 
contribute to an understanding of that notion. 
 
i.3.1. Voegelin on the symbol of immortality 
When Voegelin speaks of immortality as a symbol, he means that the term 
‘immortality’ does not refer to an object in the external world, to be seen or 
touched, but instead relates to a complex of meaning. Voegelin speaks of 
“carriers of a truth about nonexistent reality”.65 ‘Nonexistence’ should be 
taken literally here, as nonexistence; the symbol does not refer to anything in 
the external world, but conveys truth experienced. We are concerned here 
with a reality within consciousness. To denote what Voegelin calls 
‘nonexistence’, we might also speak of insistence, to point out the ‘locus’ of the 
reality concerned, and to express the fact that insistent reality may sometimes 
be more compellingly real than existent reality. That a symbol does not refer 
to an external reality does not mean that there is no relation to anything 
outside the experiencing subject. It means that the relation between subject, 
object, and mediator (the symbol) is different. This will become clear when 
Polanyi’s theory of symbols is discussed. 
 To some people, it may be obvious, or at least acceptable, that 
‘immortality’ is a symbol in the sense in which Voegelin speaks of symbols, 
while it may be less obvious that ‘conscience’ is a symbol in that sense. They 
may think the term ‘conscience’ simply refers to an existent reality, the same 
way the word ‘chair’ does. I believe, however, that while ‘chair’ refers to an 
object, the word ‘conscience’ does not.66 It makes more sense to speak of the 
existence of chairs (again in the literal meaning of existence), than of the 
existence of conscience. It is my contention that ‘conscience’, like 
‘immortality’, is (primarily and originally) a symbol conveying truth 
                                                 
62 As Paul Tillich remarks: “In spite of the manifold research about the meaning and 
function of symbols which is going on in contemporary philosophy, every writer 
who uses the term ‘symbol’ must explain his understanding of it.” (Tillich, [1957], 
41.) 
63 Whitehead (1959). 
64 Peirce (1955). 
65 Voegelin (1990b), 52. 
66 I am speaking of the symbolic use of the term ‘conscience’, of course, but even 
where the term is (legitimately) indicatively used, it has no object of the kind referred 
to by the word ‘chair’. 
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concerning insistent reality.67 The validity of this contention will have to be 
judged by the clarity gained (or not) in the course of this analysis. 
 
i.3.2. Tillich on symbols and signs 
Paul Tillich’s discussion of symbols and signs provides some further 
elements of the notion of symbol that will be used in this book. Tillich starts 
out by saying that “[s]ymbols have one characteristic in common with signs; 
they point beyond themselves to something else”.68 Though it is true, it is 
also somewhat unfortunately formulated. The ‘pointing beyond themselves’ 
that symbols do is very different from that which signs do. One reason for 
this is that signs are arbitrary; the connection with the referent is solely based 
on convention. For example: “A red light and the stopping of cars have 
essentially no relation to each other, but conventionally they are united as 
long as the convention lasts.”69 According to Tillich, “the same is true of 
letters and numbers and partly even words” – note that words, for Tillich, 
are a special case.70 A characteristic of signs is that they can be replaced, 
whereas symbols cannot, because symbols, unlike signs, participate in the 
reality they signify – this is a second characteristic of symbols.71 Tillich gives 
the example of a national flag: “[T]he flag participates in the power and 
dignity of the nation for which it stands. (...) An attack on the flag is felt as 
an attack on the majesty of the group in which it is acknowledged.”72 A third 
characteristic of symbols is that they “open up levels of reality which 
otherwise are closed for us”, and also (which is the fourth characteristic 
Tillich mentions) the corresponding dimensions of our soul: “There are 
within us dimensions of which we cannot become aware except through 
symbols, as melodies and rhythms in music.”73 Tillich illustrates these 
characteristics by pointing to art: “All arts create symbols for a level of reality 
                                                 
67 Again, this does not preclude the possibility of a relation between experiences of 
conscience and the world outside the subject. The experiences are experiences of 
something; hence conscience (as an experiential phenomenon) relates to something 
outside itself. And also without ‘being about’ something, conscience is still 
something that, like (or with) the subject, emerges from the world. Nevertheless, 
conscience itself is not an existent. 
68 Tillich (1957), 41. 
69 Idem. It could perhaps be argued that there is an end to arbitrariness even in this 
case, given the function that the colour red often has in nature – that of a warning. It 
could be argued, then, that there is a reason (other than convention) why red, not 
blue or green, is the colour to indicate that people have to stop. Nevertheless, the 
final determinant of meaning is convention. 
70 Idem. 
71 Recall Whitehead’s description of truth-relations; a symbol has a peculiar (strong) 
kind of truth-relation to what it symbolizes. 
72 Ibid., 42. 
73 Ibid., 42-43. 
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which cannot be reached in any other way.”74 To deny this is to say either 
that these symbols have no meaning beyond themselves, or that any poem 
can be replaced by a piece of prose, without loss of meaning. As a fifth 
characteristic, Tillich states that “symbols cannot be produced intentionally”. 
Instead, “[t]hey grow out of the individual or collective unconscious and 
cannot function without being accepted by the unconscious dimension of 
our being. Symbols which have an especially social function, as political and 
religious symbols, are created or at least accepted by the collective 
unconscious of the group in which they appear.” This social dimension of 
symbols is very important in the present context.75 The symbol of conscience 
has been, and to a certain extent still is, both a religious, a moral, and a 
political symbol. The extent to which it is a shared symbol determines its 
social power. If the legitimacy of the legal category of conscientious 
objections is doubted today, that is partly because the symbol of conscience 
is by many not recognized as such, let alone widely shared as a symbol. The 
social dimension of symbols also makes them amenable for manipulative 
usage. Albert Salomon writes: “Symbols can be activated as images in a 
frame of reference in order to divert discipline, and control human souls.”76 
We will see examples of this in part II. So symbols cannot simply be 
produced, but they grow, and when the situation changes, they may lose their 
evocative power and die. This is the last characteristic of symbols mentioned 
by Tillich.77 It is of particular importance in connection with the 
phenomenon of loss of meaning, which will be the subject of section i.3.4. 
 (Non)arbitrariness, or the opposition of intentional production 
versus organic growth, is central to Tillich’s understanding of the difference 
between signs and symbols. Now, given that the production of a language is 
for the most part not an ahistorical matter, but rather a process of 
articulation in which more or less stable expressions arise, enter into 
relationships, become more solid or lose their stability again and change their 
meaning, it may seem hard to speak of arbitrariness at all. Yet there is a 
difference between signs and symbols. In the case of linguistic signs and 
symbols, the former may turn into the latter, and when that happens, they 
come to signify far more. The word ‘head’ may be used simply to signify the 
top part of the body, containing the brain, etcetera; but when it is used 
symbolically, the meaning of ‘head’ stretches far beyond that of the external 
reality. For the first use, it does not matter much whether we use the term 
‘head’, or decide to give it another name; for the symbolic use, it matters a 
lot. The meaning of the symbol rests on the ordinary meaning of the term, 
but goes far beyond that. The symbol of conscience articulates a certain 
                                                 
74 Ibid., 42. 
75 See i.3.5 on the social nature of symbols. 
76 Salomon (1963), 254. 
77 Tillich (1957), 43. 
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complex of experiences, using the combination of the elements ‘con’ and 
‘science’ (con-scientia in Latin, syn-eidesis in Greek) to evoke a meaning that 
rests on the ordinary meaning of the elements, but points beyond them to 
insistent reality – in Tillich’s words: to the depth dimension of our being.78 
 
i.3.3. Polanyi on signs, symbols, and metaphors 
Finally, I will present Michael Polanyi’s theory of symbols, which is of 
central importance for our understanding of conscience as a symbol, and of 
the practice of conscientious objection. Polanyi offers an insightful and 
elegant explanation of the nature of signs, symbols and metaphors, to which 
I will refer throughout this book.79 According to Polanyi, signs have meaning 
because they indicate something else. Polanyi explains this in terms of 
subsidiary awareness (and subsidiaries) and focal awareness (and focal attention, 
focal target). The subsidiaries bear on a focal target, for instance when 
someone points with his hand to a certain interesting object – my awareness 
of the person, in particular of his outstretched arm and hand, is a subsidiary 
awareness, that immediately leads my attention to the object, the focal 
target.80 Polanyi says that one integrates the subsidiaries to the focal target. 
This reveals what he calls the from-to structure of knowing. The important 
thing here is that the sign, the subsidiary, has no intrinsic interest; its interest 
lies in its meaning, in its function of pointing to something that is intrinsically 
interesting. The relation of indication can be formulated thus: 
 
S F, where S means ‘subsidiaries’ and F means ‘focal target’. 
Including ‘-ii’ for ‘no intrinsic interest’ and ‘+ii’ for ‘intrinsically interesting’, 
we get: 
 
S-ii F+ii. 
 
                                                 
78 As I said before, (and as we will see further on), the symbol of conscience does 
not depend for its existence on the use of the word ‘conscience’; but the meaning of 
any linguistic symbol rests on the ordinary meaning of the sign(s) of which it is 
(linguistically) made up. 
79 This explanation can be found in: Polanyi and Prosch (1975), chapter 4: “From 
Perception to Metaphor”. 
80 The same goes for words, in many cases. Polanyi points out that words can 
sometimes be replaced by roadsigns, maps, or mathematical formulas. When words 
are used in this way, they are of little interest themselves – the interest lies in their 
meaning. 
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 Now, symbols are not just signs.81 There are still subsidiaries and a 
focal target involved, but the relation between them is not one of indication. 
Instead, it is a relation of symbolization. A symbol bears on something else, but 
in a completely different way from a sign. Instead of indicating something 
else, it stands for something else – a phrase Tillich also used. This entails, in a 
sense, a reversal of the scheme we saw in the case of indication. Not in the 
sense that the positions of the S and F change; the change lies in what they 
denote. Whereas signs are subsidiaries, symbols take the place of the focal 
target. So the structure is not one from a symbol to something else, but the 
other way around: from something else to a symbol. The symbol itself is the 
focal target, though it is not intrinsically interesting. A flag is basically just a 
piece of cloth; a menhir simply a large standing stone. In the case of 
symbolization, it is the subsidiaries that are intrinsically interesting. With a 
symbol like the flag of our nation, the subsidiaries are provided by ourselves, 
our lives, our memories, insofar as they are related to the nation: “What 
bears upon the flag, as a word bears upon its meaning, is the integration of 
our whole existence as lived in our country.”82 Polanyi continues: “But this 
means that the meaning of the flag (the object of our focal attention) is what 
it is because we have put our whole existence into it. We have surrendered 
ourselves into that ‘piece of cloth’ (…). It is only by virtue of our surrender 
to it that this piece of cloth becomes a flag and therefore becomes a symbol of 
our country.”83 In a formula like the one above, the relation of symbolization 
would look like this: 
 
S+ii  F-ii. 
 
The looping in the arrow expresses that, while the subsidiaries bear on the 
focal target, this also reflects back on them; that is, we surrender ourselves to 
the symbol, and at the same time it carries us away.84 This is what gives 
symbols their great potential power, socially and politically. 
 We have seen that the relations of indication and symbolization “are 
inverse with respect to the location of intrinsic interest”. Related to this is 
what Polanyi claims to be the “essential difference between indication and 
                                                 
81 I am sketching ideal types here, the extremes of a spectrum. As I explained in the 
introduction, I do not wish to say that some things or words are just signs, and 
others just symbols. A word may be more or less symbolic in nature, and may be 
used symbolically in one context and indicatively in another. All words are 
somewhere in between the extremes of the spectrum, some closer to the one side, 
some closer to the other. 
82 This process of symbolic integration will be discussed in the context of 
conscientious objection in chapter 15. 
83 Polanyi and Prosch (1975), 72-73. 
84 Cf. Loemker (1962), 122, where he speaks of “an element of magic inherent in the 
symbol and its power” and a “total surrender of the person (…) to the symbol”. 
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the whole group of meanings of which symbolization is one kind”.85 This lies 
in the relation of the self to the process by which meaning is constituted. In 
the case of indication, the integration of ‘clues’ (subsidiaries) results in 
entities that “seem to be projected away from the self as a center”: 
‘indications are always self-centered’.86 Symbolizations, on the other hand, are 
‘self-giving’. There is no simple from-to structure between subsidiaries and 
focal target; instead, the subsidiaries are ‘surrendered into’ the focal object, 
which gives the subsidiaries a visible embodiment. In symbolization, “not 
only the symbol becomes integrated but the self also becomes integrated as it 
is carried away by the symbol – or given to it”.87 
 The examples of symbols Polanyi provides are ‘inarticulate things’, 
as he himself recognizes. It is only when he discusses metaphors that words 
come into play. I will briefly explain how Polanyi’s discussion of indication 
and symbolization is extended to metaphors. For Polanyi, ‘metaphor’ 
constitutes a third type of semantic meaning, next to indication and 
symbolization. Given his interpretation of metaphor, I would say that it is 
just a more complex form of symbolization. We have seen that, in the case 
of symbolization, the location of intrinsic interest is the subsidiaries. Now, 
metaphors are a special kind of symbols, such that intrinsic interest lies on 
either side of the ‘formula’: 
 
S+ii   F+ii. 
 
Not only the subsidiaries (oneself, one’s memories, etcetera) are intrinsically 
interesting, but the symbol in this case too. This is the peculiarity of 
metaphors, that they are symbols with intrinsic interest both on the side of 
the subsidiaries and on that of the focal object. When the focal object is (part 
of) a poem, for instance, this poem itself has intrinsic interest – not only that 
which it embodies. Finally, Polanyi distinguishes within metaphors between 
tenor (content) and vehicle (content carrier), so that on the level of the focal 
object itself, the symbolic relation with intrinsic interest on both sides (the 
metaphoric relation) is repeated.88 The full diagram looks like this: 
 
 (t+ii v+ii) 
S+ii  F+ii. 
 
To illustrate this, Polanyi uses the following lines from Shakespeare’s Richard 
II (Act 3, Scene 2): 
 
                                                 
85 Polanyi and Prosch (1975), 74. 
86 Idem. 
87 Ibid., 75. 
88 Ibid., 78. 
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“Not all the waters of the rough rude sea 
Can wash the balm from off an anointed king.” 
 
The meaning of the metaphor is that an anointed king cannot be deprived of 
his office, but that is not what it literally says. It is a meaning that the reader 
has to bring to bear upon the sentence, to make it effective as a metaphor. 
This is the subsidiary meaning, and it has intrinsic interest. Shakespeare’s 
lines themselves, however, are intrinsically interesting as well: “[T]he verbal 
projection of the seas trying in vain to wash the balm from a king, though 
fanciful, is far from meaningless. In fact it presents a tremendous spectacle 
to our imagination.”89 So we have an intrinsically interesting tenor, bearing 
on (to be schematized with a looped arrow) an intrinsically interesting 
vehicle. If we now include the relation to ourselves, bringing to bear upon 
the metaphor as a whole “all those inchoate experiences that are related to 
the two parts of the metaphor”, [t]he result is that a metaphor, like a symbol, 
carries us away, embodies us in itself, and moves us deeply as we surrender 
ourselves to it.”90 
 I have spoken of conscience as a symbol. Can I still do so, in light of 
the above? As I said, Polanyi’s examples of symbols are all ‘inarticulate 
things’. Is the word ‘conscience’ a metaphor, rather than a (normal) symbol? 
I think it is something in between.91 The relation between tenor and vehicle 
is different, or rather, the terms do not apply. I said earlier that the meaning 
of the symbol of conscience rests on the ordinary meaning of the elements 
‘con’ and ‘science’. These elements indicate certain meanings, rather than 
that they are a vehicle for them. So instead of the relation between tenor and 
vehicle from the above diagram, we have an indicative relation between a 
subsidiary and a focal target. This integration occurs within the focal target of 
a symbolic relation, thus: 
 
 (s-ii f+ii) 
S+ii  F+ii. 
 
I have pictured the F (the word ‘conscience’) here as having intrinsic interest, 
because not all meaning comes from the side of the S in this case. But given 
that the intrinsic interest of F is based on a relation of indication, not on a 
symbolic (or metaphoric) relation, its intrinsic interest is not as great as in the 
case of a (true) metaphor. 
                                                 
89 Idem. 
90 Ibid., 79. 
91 It should also be noted that the symbol of conscience as I understand it could 
never be a metaphor of the kind Polanyi uses to illustrate the nature of metaphors, 
for the reason that, as Tillich said, symbols cannot be invented. In so far as 
‘conscience’ would be a metaphor, it would have the structure Polanyi delineates, but 
with the qualification that it was not simply invented, but had grown. 
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 In whatever way the details would have to be filled in, however, the 
‘essential difference’ Polanyi draws attention to, in my view, is that between a 
relation of indication and one of symbolization, and this difference lies “in 
the relation of the self to the whole process”. So the truly important thing is 
not what kind of symbol ‘conscience’ is, but that it is a (kind of) symbol. 
Hence, I will continue to refer to conscience as a symbol. The significance of 
the difference between symbols and metaphors recedes even further into the 
background when we take into consideration that ‘conscience’ and its 
predecessors ‘conscientia’ and ‘syneidesis’ do not exhaust the symbol of 
conscience, but are only its best-known verbal forms or articulations. In 
certain periods in history, each of them crystallized as the more or less stable 
carrier of the symbol. 
 
i.3.4. Varieties of loss of meaning 
An important element of Voegelin’s treatment of symbols, which reflects the 
main elements of his entire theory of symbolization, is his (somewhat 
gloomy) exposition of the degenerative processes that lead further and 
further away from the original truth of experience. This exposition is not 
unique. Something similar can be found in the work of Henri Bergson, for 
instance in his Introduction to Metaphysics, in the work of Alfred North 
Whitehead, most clearly in Modes of Thought, in Husserl’s work (for example 
in Vom Ursprung der Geometrie) and in that of Michael Polanyi.92 Each in his 
own terms describes the process by which an original intuition or evidence is 
lost, symbols cease to be translucent and turn into doctrine and dogma, of 
which the remote origins are finally completely forgotten. In Voegelin’s 
terms: the symbols (“in the sense of a spoken or written word”) that are left 
are “the exterior residue of an original full truth comprising both the 
experience and its articulation”.93 The problem is that, while at first there is 
an intimate connection between experience and symbol, this connection 
tends to “dissociate into a piece of information and its subject matter”, 
which means that the receiver of the ‘information’ will probably not be 
moved to having a similar experience to the one that engendered the 
symbol.94 To save as much as possible of the meaning conveyed by the 
symbol, people will try to translate it in the form of propositions, which 
leads to doctrine, to dogmatic truth. The final loss of meaning occurs “when 
doctrinal truth becomes socially dominant”, and people will forget how 
doctrine was derived from symbol, and symbol engendered by experience: 
“the symbols (…) cease to be translucent for reality”.95 All that is left are 
                                                 
92 Bergson (1961), 70; Whitehead (1968); Polanyi and Prosch (1975), chapters 2 and 
4. 
93 Voegelin (1990b), 52-53. 
94 Idem. 
95 Ibid., 54. 
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propositions about things, as if those ‘things’ were objects of sense 
perception, which they are not; this invokes the sceptical reaction that 
destroys the dogmatic illusion, without restoring the connection to truth 
experienced. For Voegelin, this is a description of the development of 
Western though in general. His writing tends towards a Verfallsgeschichte. I 
reject such pessimism. Instead, I take the development from symbol to 
doctrine to be a recurring pattern in history. While certain symbolizations 
lose their vitality, equivalent others come into existence, so that there is a 
continuity in the symbol of conscience. However, I do believe that in so far 
as there is a general trend in expressions of and thought about conscience in 
the last two millennia of European history, this is best characterized as a 
development from symbol to doctrine. Indicative language gained 
dominance, as conscience came to be looked upon more and more as an 
object to be located and definitively described. History is never linear, 
however, and there are various interwoven but relatively independent strands 
of thought to be looked at. 
 The abovementioned authors point out that symbols engendered by 
certain experiences tend to lose their meaning when the original experience is 
lost. The symbols are intended to retain the experience and to make it 
accessible to others, but they can never do so completely, and certainly not 
indefinitely. In time, the symbols solidify, and (some) meaning is lost. In 
terms of Voegelin’s structures of consciousness: when luminosity (in the 
form of some revelatory experience, whether it be religious in nature or an 
experience of evidence regarding a mathematical equation) makes way for 
intentionality, and when the latter is taken to be the whole of consciousness, 
the possibility of symbolic understanding is lost. Hence, symbolic meaning is 
lost. In his Autobiographical Reflections Voegelin expresses the problem in a way 
reminiscent of Polanyi’s distinction between symbols and signs, and 
anticipating an analysis of loss of meaning in Polanyi’s terms. Henkel 
summarizes Voegelin’s point as follows: “Voegelin gelangt bei seinen 
Forschungen [for Order and History] zu der Erkenntnis, daß zwischen 
menschlichen Ordnungserfahrungen und den diese Erfahrungen zum 
Ausdruck bringenden Symbolen einerseits sowie Ideen als Konstruktionen, 
welche die Erfahrungssymbole in Begriffe verwandeln, andererseits zu 
unterscheiden ist. Während die Menschen ihre Erfahrungen, d.h. die 
erfahrene Realität, in Form von Symbolen ausdrücken und die Symbole 
umgekehrt den ‘Schlüssel zum Verständnis der ausgedruckten Erfahrungen’ 
(AR 100) darstellen, suggerieren Ideen die Existenz einer anderen als der 
erfahrenen Realität: ‘Aber eine andere als die erfahrene Realität existiert 
nicht. Deswegen besteht bei Ideen die Gefahr, daß sie die Wahrheit der 
Erfahrungen und ihrer Symbolisierungen deformieren.’ (AR 98)”96 For a 
                                                 
96 Henkel (1998), 29. 
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more precise understanding of the way loss (or distortion) of meaning may 
come about we must again use Polanyi as our starting-point. 
 
i.3.4.1. The basic types of loss of meaning for signs and symbols 
Loss of meaning does not occur in the same way with signs and symbols 
alike. In the case of signs, loss of meaning occurs when the sign (a 
subsidiary) becomes the object of focal attention. For instance, in case 
someone uses his index finger to indicate some object, and instead of 
following the direction of the finger to look at the object we keep staring at 
the finger, this finger has lost its meaning as a subsidiary. There is no longer 
a from-to structure; nothing is indicated. We have made the sign (the finger) 
our focal target, and treat it as if it were intrinsically interesting. (In a sense, it 
may be, of course, but in this case it was intended merely as a subsidiary 
without interest of its own.) The same thing occurs when we repeat a word 
several times for ourselves, in rapid succession. Mr. Bean does this with the 
word ‘big’, in one episode of the comedy series. The word loses its 
transparency and therefore its meaning; it becomes opaque, a mere (odd) 
sound. (Try ‘odd’ – it works very well.) 
 The most important way (for our purposes, at any rate) for symbols 
to lose their meaning is different. A symbol, unlike a sign, is already the focal 
point of attention. One way for a symbol to lose its meaning – one that is of 
great importance to us here – is exhibited when the relation of symbolization is 
mistaken for one of indication. We must take care to read this well: to mistake a 
relation of symbolization for one of indication does not mean that the S in 
the symbolic relation is taken to be the subsidiary in an indicative relation, 
and that the F in the symbolic relation is mistaken for the intrinsically 
interesting focal target in a relation of indication. What I mean when I say 
that a relation of symbolization is mistaken for one of indication, is that a 
symbol is thought to be (or treated as) a sign. As a result, someone who errs in 
this way, instead of surrendering himself to the symbol, or being carried 
away by it, looks for that which is indicated. He does not recognize the 
relation of the symbol to the self. Instead of keeping the symbol in focal 
awareness, allowing his experiences and himself to become integrated in it, 
he mistakes it for a sign, of which he need have only a subsidiary awareness. 
But we have seen that the nature of symbols is such that they can only be, as 
long as people surrender themselves to them; they are essentially related to 
the self. This is another way of expressing the insistent quality of the reality 
they convey. So, when we say that meaning is lost when the relation of 
symbolization is (mis)taken for one of indication, we might also say that 
people have started looking for existent instead of insistent reality. As soon as 
we mistake a relation of symbolization for one of indication, a symbol for a 
sign, we will ask what is indicated by the ex-symbol (now sign), and we will 
start looking for some existent entity that is the focal object pointed out to 
us by the subsidiary, which is the former symbol – and we will, naturally, 
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either find that there is nothing there, or find something that we are willing to 
accept as the ‘meaning’ of the word that was once a symbol, but is rejected 
by others as such. There are many ways to express this structure of loss of 
meaning. We might say that loss of meaning occurs when people no longer 
surrender themselves to the symbol, or when it no longer carries them away; 
we might say that the attitude changes from a self-giving one into a self-
centered one – but the underlying structure, at least in practice, in the case of 
the symbol of conscience (as we will see), is the same: a relation of 
symbolization is taken for one of indication, in which process the F is 
mistaken for an S, and another F is sought. In the case of conscience, many 
have found such an F; all these things that they called conscience became 
competitors in the race to become the true conscience. Others (later) drew 
the logical conclusion: there is no true conscience, because the word does 
not refer to anything at all. 
 I should point out that there is also a variant to this scheme: loss of 
meaning also occurs when someone takes a symbolic notion to be indicative, 
that is, when he takes the notion as intended to refer to some existent; while 
this person, at the same time, rejects the idea of reference for some notions 
(including this one), or for all. Conscience could thus fall victim to a 
Wittgensteinian: “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man 
schweigen.”97 While in the first case, the problem is that indication (or 
reference) is taken seriously, in this case it is that a notion is taken as 
indicative, while indication (for this type of notion) is rejected as a possibility. 
Depending on the background of this rejection, the two types of loss of 
meaning may be connected or not. 
 
i.3.4.2. Other varieties of loss of meaning 
Above are the basic structures of loss of meaning for the cases of signs and 
symbols, at least for situations where the loss of meaning is at least partly due 
to (some error, activity, or neglect of) the experiencing, interpreting, or 
communicating subject. Obviously, signs may also lose their meaning 
through the disappearance of the referent. How often does it not happen 
that one sees something special (say, a hen herrier flying off with a freshly 
caught prey), which one then points out to one’s companion, and by the time 
you have got the guy’s attention, there is nothing left to be seen. One’s index 
finger is still, but now meaninglessly, hanging suspended in the air. The sign 
has lost its meaning, and has in a sense ceased to be a sign. A similar thing 
might happen with words. Leafing through an old book, you may encounter 
a word that you do not even recognize. The reason for that might be (though 
quite often it is not) that its referent no longer exists – an object (e.g. a piece 
of technology) that is no longer in use, of which there may even be no single 
specimen left. Of course, in such a case, the word still retains its meaning, in 
                                                 
97 Wittgenstein (1993), 85 (thesis 7). Cf. Barfield (1962), 16-17. 
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one sense, and the dictionary may state it, or else it could be recovered, but 
in another sense, it has become a meaningless sign, or even ceased to be a 
sign. If it occurs in a book, you will recognize that it is a word and hence a 
sign, but it will have no meaning for you. Had you encountered it in 
isolation, you might have thought it was no word at all, but just a row of 
letters bearing some similarity to a word. In isolation, you might not have 
recognized it as a sign. So a sign may lose its meaning because its referent 
disappears in some way. 
 An interesting question is what happens to a symbol like the flag of 
a country when the country of which it is the symbol falls apart. Flags are 
signs or symbols (or something in between), depending on the context. With 
flags, the alternation between sign and symbol function is extremely clear. To 
foreigners, a foreign flag is primarily a sign referring to another country; a 
sign of which they know it is a symbol for the people of that country. So 
when that country falls apart, the flag either loses its meaning as a sign, or its 
meaning changes, if one of the newly formed countries adopts it as its own. 
The flag of a country that no longer exists is like a word whose referent no 
longer exists, except as an idea left over from the past. In some sense, then, 
the sign still has meaning, as a sign referring to a former country. (So people 
will say: “Hey, that was the flag of...”) As a symbol, it need not lose its 
meaning when the country falls apart; it may remain as a symbol of the unity 
of that nation. On the other hand, when the new situation proves stable and 
lasting, it is likely that the symbol will eventually die. 
 Symbols may lose their meaning in other ways than those described 
so far. A symbol may lose its meaning because it (the focal target) is itself 
seen as intrinsically interesting, instead of the subsidiaries. The structure is 
then similar to what we described as the basic form of loss of meaning in the 
case of signs. Loss of meaning occurs because what has no intrinsic interest 
(in the context of the intended integration of meaning) is treated as 
intrinsically interesting. In the case of signs, this means that no referent is 
sought. With symbols, it means that the person confronted with the symbol 
‘forgets’ to surrender himself to the symbol, to let himself be carried away by 
it; in other words, he forgets that he needs to integrate his experiences and 
thereby himself in the symbol. It is the experiences that are intrinsically 
interesting, and that endow the symbol with meaning. Without them, the 
symbol is an empty shell. To view the symbol itself as intrinsically interesting 
could mean to look at a flag as a wonderful (or ugly, but still interesting) 
composition of colours and (perhaps) figures. In the case of the term 
‘conscience’ (or equivalents), this is a lurking danger in virtue of the fact that 
the F in the diagram does have some intrinsic interest. On the other hand, 
once the contribution of the self is forgotten, it is more likely that only the 
relation of indication on which the symbol rests is seen, and that the symbol 
itself is then mistaken for a sign. Where an imaginative symbol (with the 
form of a metaphor) like the worm of conscience is involved, the chance that 
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the contribution of the self is forgotten is greater. The idea of a ‘worm of 
conscience’ “presents a tremendous spectacle to our imagination”, to use 
Polanyi’s words. In recent times, with regard to conscience, the contribution 
of the self is not forgotten, but overstressed in a sense. Conscience is almost 
exclusively interpreted in terms of the self and its integrity. This is not 
surprising, when one realizes that on the side of the focal target we have not 
only the symbol, but also the integrated self. But it is the contents of the 
experiences that are intrinsically interesting; in terms of intentionality: this is 
what conscience is about – it is not about the self, nor about integrity.98 
 At the same time, a symbol itself is ‘critical’ of any definite contents. 
It is a symbol, exactly because there is no exact and definite way to convey 
the meaning inherent in it. It would be a mistake for anyone to identify his or 
her personal experiences at one point with the exact meaning of the symbol. 
But the realization that no single experience or combination of experiences 
defines the symbol, and that no symbolization is ultimate, may also lead to 
loss of meaning. The religious critique of religion, which is what we are 
concerned with here, which maintains that nothing is ultimate but God, that 
‘only God is God’, is what Tillich calls the ‘Protestant principle’.99 Hammond 
notes: “Tillich holds that the greatness of Calvinist Protestantism – its 
creative principle – lies in its cultivation of the interior ethical and spiritual 
life of the individual. By implication this means its cultivation of conscience. 
But this is also its tragedy. By criticizing all objective embodiments of the 
holy and depending upon the subjective conscience, the Calvinist character 
tends towards secularization and the loss of meaning. The tendency toward 
‘a self-enclosed and self-sufficient autonomous culture’ has its correlate in a 
personality that is cut off from all meaningful contents. Through criticism of 
sanctified meaning one becomes ‘cut off from one’s own psychic depths and 
from the supportive powers of the community’.”100 The problem, then, is to 
maintain the proper balance between the enthusiastic employment of 
symbols and the criticism of symbols. 
 Finally, symbols may lose their meaning through inflation. As with a 
word that is repeated in swift repetition, any word that is used to often, 
whether it be a sign or a symbol, can become opaque. With symbols, this 
might happen due to misuse. Symbols can be powerful things, and people 
may be tempted to use that power for their own purposes. But a symbol that 
is used too often becomes too familiar to evoke the response it was meant to 
evoke; people will no longer surrender themselves to it – it will no longer 
carry them away. Misuse of a symbol may cause a strong connection between 
a relatively well-defined class of experiences and a symbol to give way to a 
                                                 
98 This is more elaborately explained in chapter 15. 
99 Hammond (1993), 52-53. See Tillich (1957), 29. 
100 Hammond (1993), 53. He quotes from Paul Tillich, Political Expectation, Harper 
and Row, New York, 1971. 
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much looser connection between a much more vaguely delineated ‘class’ of 
experiences and that symbol. But the symbol depends for its power on the 
recognizability of the type of experiences that have engendered it in the first 
place, and which it has since expressed. Misuse of a symbol, then, may 
render its meaning (if we can still call it that) idiosyncratic, that is: 
unrecognizable to others. 
 
i.3.5. The social nature of symbols 
What the conclusion of the previous section in fact comes down to is that 
symbols are social in nature; that is, they cannot exist outside a language 
community. That does not mean there can be no private symbols. Some 
trinket one has inherited from one’s grandparents may have become a 
private symbol for one’s childhood, which integrates many childhood 
experiences and memories – and probably many later experiences as well, 
but that is another matter. But the symbol of conscience is a social symbol, a 
social construct. It is a symbol shared by people socially and historically. Its 
effectiveness depends on the degree to which it is shared (i.e. the number of 
people who share it) on the one hand, and on the intensity of their reaction 
to it on the other. But even when a symbol loses its effectiveness altogether, 
its social nature prevents it from becoming entirely devoid of meaning. It has 
a social, (or cultural, if one prefers that term), existence. That means that its 
field of application is to a certain extent predetermined for any possible new 
user. The term, whether as a symbol or not, cannot be applied to just 
anything; not just any experience can be meaningfully integrated in the 
symbol. There is a certain range of experiences that it may accommodate, 
and there is a certain range of meanings which can be constituted through it 
by a relation of indication. All this is due to the social aspect of symbols. 
 Then what does it mean that experiences engender symbols? How do 
symbols arise? In a discussion session with Eric Voegelin, someone asked 
him for a definition of ‘symbol’. In his answer, Voegelin said: “[A]ll 
important language symbols (...) arise on occasion of certain experiences of 
concrete persons at a given time.” He did not give a definition, but stated 
that “[s]ymbolisms pertaining to nonexistent reality and the existential 
tensions are called symbols because we have no other word, because it has 
become conventional”.101 So, instead of giving a definition, Voegelin entered 
into the problematic of the genesis of symbols, which is what I am interested 
in here. Another participant in the discussion then asked about the constancy 
and variability of experiences and language symbols, respectively. Voegelin 
then replied that “experience isn’t so constant either. Now we get into the 
problem of history. It is one of those mysteries of history that such 
experiences [transcendental experiences] are not given to everybody at the 
beginning of known history but appear all of a sudden – say, in the thirteenth 
                                                 
101 Voegelin (2004a), 262. 
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century before Christ in the case of Moses, in the seventh century before 
Christ in the case of Jeremiah, in the case of Heraclitus around 500 B.C., in 
the case of Buddha about 500 B.C., and so on. So experience is not a 
constant. But you get a complex of experience, you might say, which 
historically differentiates and shows its structure. There is a historical 
development of experience – differentiating it, making its structure clearer – 
and on every occasion developing language for the new discovery. This is 
one of the most important sources of new language.” So, while it is often 
extremely hard to trace the origin or explain the genesis of new experiences, 
we can say that it is those experiences that call for expression; in so far as the 
experiences are new, the existing language cannot accommodate them.102 
Hence it will have to be stretched and supplemented. This may occasionally 
be the work of individuals, but new experiences tend to arise in 
communities, not single individuals, and therefore the search for new 
language is a social enterprise. 
 An individual with extraordinary experiences – extraordinary in the 
sense that they are atypical, even unknown, in the individual’s social 
environment – will have to find new language by him- or herself. Plato’s 
Socrates, whom we will attend to in 1.8, is an example of such an individual. 
The most likely avenue for such a person to take is to look for existing 
words and apply them symbolically to the matter at hand; this may or may 
not be a conscious use of metaphor. Its effectiveness; that is, whether it will 
become a symbol – more then a private symbol at any rate – depends on the 
way others react to it. It is important to note that in such cases, how someone 
experiences what he or she experiences depends to a certain extent on the 
available language. The more someone presses experiences to become 
articulate, the more they will have to adapt to the language that is at hand. 
 These are just a few remarks on a topic that could fill (and has filled) 
books. At present, they will have to do. In the course of his book there will 
be plenty of occasions where the social aspect of symbols comes to the fore. 
 
 
I.4. METHOD 
The word ‘method’ may suggest a rigidity of procedure that does not apply 
to the way I go about things in this book (nor to the way I went about 
producing it). Nevertheless, I have gone about things in a particular way in 
my research, and this does show in the book that is the result of it, so if we 
                                                 
102 Cf. Koselleck (1989), 652: “[T]here will (...) occur events (...) which are beyond 
the pale of language, and to which all words, all sentences, all speech can only react. 
There are events for which words fail us (...).” Koselleck’s perspective is narrower 
than mine, however; he is thinking of catastrophic events on a massive scale, and 
perhaps of other ‘huge’ events as well. 
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do not take ‘method’ in too narrow a sense, I may be justified in saying a few 
words about my ‘method’ here. 
 At the beginning, and in a sense at the heart, of the book is an 
analysis of the symbol of conscience. On the basis of a pre-understanding of 
conscience, certain expressions in two historical examples are singled out as 
symbolic expressions of conscience. I will distinguish between three core 
elements of the symbol of conscience. All expressions of conscience (in 
whatever period) can be interpreted and analyzed in terms of the (core 
elements of the) symbol of conscience. But when I engage in analysis, I face 
the problems of language mentioned in i.2.4. I inevitably lose something with 
respect to the symbols that are the object of analysis. It is worth looking at 
some of the problems of analysis, and possible ways of addressing them. 
 
i.4.1. Analysis 
In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson draws attention to some problems 
attaching to analysis. I will briefly explain his views on the subject. Bergson 
begins by saying that there are two ways of knowing a thing. “The first 
implies going all around it, the second entering into it.”103 Whereas the first 
depends on viewpoints and the use of symbols, the second depends on 
neither. The first ‘stops at the relative’; the second, where possible, ‘attains 
the absolute’.104 The only way of attaining the absolute is through the kind of 
sympathy Bergson calls intuition. To the other manner of knowing things, the 
name analysis is attached. 
 So analysis proceeds by ‘going around’ an object, perceiving it from 
different viewpoints, so as to describe different aspects of the object. These 
will be expressed in concepts, in abstract ideas, which means that the essence 
of the object will never be known. “Analysis (…) reduces the object to 
elements already known, that is, common to that object and to others. 
Analysing then consists in expressing a thing in terms of what is not it.”105 
Bergson illustrates this by showing how analysis will always divide reality up 
into immobile slices, easily studied, but never catching the life and mobility 
of reality in motion, in lived time, in duration. Analysis is like taking picture 
after picture of an object, but never being able to reassemble these to make 
up the real thing. Even if we would be able to put everything there is to an 
object in concepts (which is impossible), it is still the case that, if we try to 
put these concepts together, ‘the junction will be brought about in a different 
way, depending on the concept we start from’.106 Whitehead expresses a 
similar thing, when he says that the ‘mode of togetherness’ of elements in a 
proposition is different from that of elements in the actual occasions (events) 
                                                 
103 Bergson (1961), 1. 
104 Ibid., 1-2. 
105 Ibid., 6-7. 
106 Ibid., 18-19. 
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that make up reality.107 As a proposition and a nexus (a chain of actual 
occasions) ‘belong to different categories of being’, ‘their identification is 
mere nonsense’.108 
 This is why Whitehead often states that the problem for philosophy 
is language, though at the same time it is philosophy’s instrument. In Modes of 
Thought he states it thus: “The great difficulty of philosophy is the failure of 
language.”109 Language fails, because man, living in shifting circumstances, 
has to express what is new in terms of what is old, the unknown in terms of 
what is known. Which is why, for example, “in the origin of civilized 
religion, gods are like dictators”. Succinctly but adequately, and in terms that 
bring us back to Bergson, Whitehead states: “Language halts behind 
intuition.”110 In intuition, we comprehend what is self-evident, what needs 
no proof. The problem is not in the comprehension, but in the expression of 
what is self-evident. We might also say that the problem lies in the 
symbolization of experience. This is the problem I am concerned with here, 
but it is also the problem I have to face myself, in writing an analysis of a 
symbol. 
 Is there a way out of this situation? As Bergson says: “it is 
impossible to travel back to an intuition one has not had”, so this is not what 
I should aim for.111 The analysis is not meant to evoke the experiences that 
engendered the analysed symbols. But I am also not satisfied with the kind 
of analysis Bergson describes, the kind that immobilizes and solidifies reality 
– the kind that falls prey to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, as Whitehead 
famously called it. If I want to avoid this fallacy; that is, if I want to avoid 
that the terms I use in describing elements of the complex of meaning 
expressed in the symbol of conscience will be taken for the ‘thing’ 
(conscience) itself, I will have to use concepts that are less susceptible to this 
problem. Bergson, though he defined metaphysics as ‘the science which 
claims to dispense with symbols’, knew also that metaphysics could not do 
without them, but had to make use of concepts.112 So, it had to free itself ‘of 
the inflexible and ready-made concepts’ and replace them by newly created 
‘flexible, mobile, almost fluid representations, always ready to mould 
themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition’.113 
                                                 
107 Whitehead (1964), 243. 
108 Ibid., 244. 
109 Whitehead (1968), 49. 
110 Idem. Compare Voegelin (1990a), 126: “Analytically, one cannot go beyond 
propositions of this kind.” (‘This kind’; for example: “There is psyche deeper than 
consciousness, and there is reality deeper than reality experienced, but there is no 
consciousness deeper than consciousness.”) 
111 Bergson (1961), 26. 
112 Ibid., 8. 
113 Ibid., 20. 
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 Voegelin is aware of this; he begins his essay “Equivalences of 
Experience and Symbolization in History” with the remark that ‘the search 
for the constants of human order in society and history is, at present, 
uncertain of its language’.114 The language he finds is that of ‘equivalences of 
experience’ and ‘equivalences of symbolization’. Voegelin asserts that the 
‘language of permanent values’ belongs to a past era in the methodology of 
this field. His use of the language of equivalences removes the focus of 
attention from the symbols used by man to the engendering experiences. In 
different cultures, different symbols are used; we can speak of equivalent 
myths and rites, because of the sameness of the engendering experiences.115 
But Voegelin realizes that the danger of committing the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness is not yet past; the misplaced concreteness could now be 
attached to the experiences: “the experience is in danger of becoming the 
resting point in our search for constants in history”.116 This is not acceptable, 
as the experience always has to be articulated to be identified, returning us to 
the level of symbols, which cannot escape historical relativity. No symbol 
can claim to be the absolute representation of the experience that 
engendered it. Every symbol is at best ‘one more historically equivalent 
truth’.117 
 As experiences are not the resting point of Voegelin’s analysis, what 
is? The answer is that there is no resting point. We must speak of equivalent 
experiences that originate in the depth of the soul. The symbol of depth was 
articulated, among others, by Plato – and we have seen that Tillich makes use 
of it as well. This depth cannot be called a resting point, as the existential 
tension of man, at which the symbol of depth points, is not resolved. Man 
exists in the metaxy, the In-Between of the timeless and time.118 This 
existence is an existence in process, and “by the symbols ‘consciousness’, 
‘experience’, and ‘symbolization’” we “denote the area where the process of 
reality becomes luminous to itself”.119 The tension of the process is never 
resolved, as the articulation of truth will never produce more than an 
equivalent truth – and Voegelin recognizes that the search that renders such 
truth rests ultimately on faith.120 
 It is clear from the above that Voegelin’s own analysis (and mine, 
therefore, too) participates in the process it tries to articulate. So in a sense 
                                                 
114 Voegelin (1990a), 115. 
115 Idem. 
116 Ibid., 123. 
117 Idem. 
118 Reinhold Niebuhr spoke of the “amphibious situation of man, being partly 
immersed in the time process and partly transcending it” (Niebuhr [1946], 143). 
119 Voegelin (1990a), 120. 
120 Ibid., 133. Moreover, ‘philosophy (…) is not a substitute for revelation. For the 
philosopher is a man in search of truth; he is not God revealing truth’ (Voegelin 
[1990b], 79). 
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we are dealing with an act of self-reflection. The question naturally arises: 
how do we ascertain the validity of propositions like ‘man participates in the 
process of reality’, formulated by Voegelin? He answers that the test, the 
‘validating question’ will have to be: “Do we have to ignore and eclipse a 
major part of the historical field in order to maintain the truth of the 
propositions (…); or are the propositions recognizably equivalent with the 
symbols created by our predecessors in the search of truth about human 
existence? The test of truth (…) will be the lack of originality in the 
propositions.”121 Now, “tautology is the intellectual amusement of the 
Infinite”, as Whitehead says, but this is nevertheless what we have to aim 
for.122 In other (still Whitehead’s) words, our abstractions – because that is 
what our ‘almost fluid representations’ still are – have to be ‘well founded’. 
An abstraction, according to Whitehead, “is nothing else than the omission 
of part of the truth”. It is well founded “when the conclusions drawn from it 
are not vitiated by the omitted truth”.123 So the analysis must try not to add, 
nor to forget, but aim for equivalence, on a more differentiated level, with 
the symbols found in history – or perhaps I should say: the symbols that 
make up the trail we call history.124 
 
i.4.2. Levels of analysis 
A philosophical analysis of conscience cannot be conducted on one level 
alone, but has to conform itself to the levels it encounters in historical reality. 
The first level is the level of experience; it is closely bound up with that of 
symbolization. Voegelin contends that ‘equivalences of symbolization’ are 
the result of ‘equivalences of experience’, and that the language of 
equivalences (on the level of symbolization) removes the focus of attention 
from the symbols used by man to the engendering experiences. These 
experiences, too, cannot be the resting point of our analysis – there is no 
resting point, and there is no access to experiences except through symbols. 
So the levels of experience and symbolization combinedly constitute the first 
historical trail for our analysis to follow. A third level, and a second trail, is 
constituted by concepts, doctrine, and other forms of indicative language 
relating to conscience. My particular concern will be with the relations 
between this level and the first two, under which heading come the 
solidification of symbols into doctrine, but also the relation between 
concepts of, or doctrines concerning, conscience and experiences of 
conscience.125 The last trail belongs to the ‘flat’ level of the use of the word 
‘conscience’ and its (supposed) equivalents; the word is not simply to be 
                                                 
121 Ibid., 122. 
122 Whitehead (1968), 51. 
123 Ibid., 138. 
124 Voegelin (1990a), 132. 
125 On the development from symbol to doctrine see chapter 2.3. 
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identified with the symbol. There may be continuity in the use of the word 
without a corresponding continuity on the symbolic level, as for instance 
when symbols have turned to doctrine.126 Also, an equivalent symbol may be 
operative under another name. The term ‘conscience’ is the English (and 
French) form of the Latin ‘conscientia’, which is a transliteration of the 
Greek ‘syneidesis’ (συνειδησις); but Hebrew and Egyptian sources are often 
pointed out, that would give us earlier ‘versions’ of conscience. We will see 
later on to what extent they offer us equivalent symbols. 
 In looking for continuity, it must be clear that I am not looking for 
constants. In the first sentence of “Equivalences of Experience”, Voegelin 
speaks of a “search for the constants of human order in society and history”, 
but on the same page he makes clear that: “What is permanent in the history 
of mankind is not the symbols but man himself in search of his humanity 
and its order.”127 Whitehead once said that there are no ‘natural laws’, only 
‘temporary habits of nature’.128 Symbols do not come close to having the 
stability of those habits of nature. Yet, there is continuity. The continuity on 
the level of symbolization depends largely on the continuity on the level of 
experience. I have adopted Voegelin’s language of equivalences. To speak of 
equivalent experiences implies that there is variety. This variety is likely to be 
multiplied on the level of symbolization, as no symbol fully ‘covers’ the 
experience that engendered it. Accordingly, there will be a variety of 
(dis)continuous elements that can be said together to make up the symbol of 
conscience. The ‘flat’ level of the term ‘conscience’ (and its equivalents), 
weaves through the levels of symbolization on the one hand and doctrine on 
the other. It provides a visible trail through history, but at any moment in 
time it remains to be ascertained whether it has attached itself to symbol or 
doctrine. This will concern us later in this chapter. Finally, there is continuity 
in change, as when symbols turn into doctrine. The discontinuation on the 
symbolic level does not preclude continuity between symbol and doctrine. 
There is no abrupt break between the two. 
 The fact that the different levels are often intertwined makes it 
impossible to deal with them separately. In my overview of the historical 
career of the symbol of conscience, and throughout this book generally, I 
will keep pointing out (where necessary) to what level of analysis we are led 
by the data at hand. 
 
                                                 
126 Cf. Dekkers (2003), 198: “Er bestaat een spanningsverhouding, een breuk, tussen 
het gebruik van de term geweten en het fenomeen waarnaar die term verwijst.” 
[“There is a tensional relationship, a rift, between the use of the term conscience and 
the phenomenon which that term refers to.”] I object to the terminology of 
‘referring’ Dekkers uses, but he seems to make a similar point, nevertheless. 
127 Voegelin (1990a), 115. 
128 Whitehead (1956). 
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i.4.3. Much history, little psychology 
Finally, it might be good to say a few words to those readers who might be 
surprised by the amount of attention I pay to history, and to those (possibly 
the same people) who are surprised to find so little psychology in a book on 
this subject. 
 
i.4.3.1. Why history? 
History is relevant to an understanding of any subject, but that does not 
always justify long historical excursions. What is different here, that does 
justify the omnipresence of history in this book? A number of things do. 
First of all, we needed to know why the legitimacy of conscientious objection 
might be in question today. It is my view that we cannot answer this question 
without recourse to the history of expressions of and thought about 
conscience. In particular, we need to see that a symbolic understanding of 
conscience gradually gave way to an indicative one. The claim that such a 
development occurred cannot lightly be made. It needs to be supported by 
an overview of historical developments. Secondly, because we cannot 
understand conscientious objection without understanding conscience; 
because conscience must primarily be understood symbolically; and because 
a symbolic understanding of conscience is best acquired by looking at 
expressions of conscience that preceded processes of differentiation and 
doctrinalization, we need to turn to historical examples. Thirdly, I will argue 
that the difference between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ conscientious objections 
is greatly overstated. My historical approach to conscience allows me to 
show what is constant in all expressions of conscience. Fourthly, the 
problems that theories of conscientious objection (should) attempt to solve 
are most clearly visible in the history of (notions of) freedom of conscience. 
 I could go on like this, but the point is clear. I realize that, however 
many reasons I would adduce, I could never convince everybody. They are 
partly right (but only partly): I cannot mask my own interest in history by all 
such reasons as the above. I hope that others will also appreciate the intrinsic 
interest of particular historical developments. At any rate, once it is decided 
that conscience can only properly be understood when recourse is taken to 
its history, this obliges one to (attempt to) do justice to the people and the 
periods under discussion in their own right. Merely to pluck out expressions 
of and references to conscience produces a travesty of history, and it 
contributes nothing to an understanding of conscience. Such expressions 
must be understood in their context. 
 
i.4.3.2. Why not psychology? 
What about psychology? If we want to know what conscience is, should we 
not just ask a psychologist? As must be clear be now, I think not. The 
suggestion itself betrays a particular view of conscience that I believe is much 
too narrow. As one of the ‘special sciences’, psychology studies phenomena 
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under a specific aspect. That means that the psychology of conscience does 
not exhaust the phenomenon. Philosophy, understood as an attempt to 
provide concepts in terms of which all of our experience can be interpreted, 
transcends such specialization. It can provide us with a non-reductionist 
understanding of conscience. 
 Secondly, my overview of the history of expressions of and thought 
about conscience reveals psychological views to be the result of processes in 
which what is most fundamental about conscience is forgotten. In view of 
this, it would be odd for me to turn to psychology to find out what 
conscience is. Moreover, until quite recently, conscience was more or less 
forgotten by psychologists altogether. Only recently has the concept been 
picked up again, by Kochanska and others. 
The best guide to the psychology of conscience (of the twentieth 
century, before Kochanska took up the concept) is Andreas Zimmer’s Das 
Verständnis des Gewissens in der neueren Psychologie.129 He works with a distinction 
between behaviour-oriented and inner-oriented psychologies. Under the first 
heading are subsumed: classical behaviourism, ethological approaches, 
developmental psychology (in the wake of Piaget), and combinations and 
refinements of those, among which we find Bandura’s social-cognitive 
psychology, which entails a system-theoretical approach. Inner-oriented 
psychologies are Freudian and Jungian psycho-analysis, and humanistic and 
existentialist psychology. In a conference paper, I discussed how these 
approaches would most likely deal with four experiences of conscience: that 
of Wordsworth (see chapter 5), that of the catholic Thomas Fitzherbert and 
the non-conformist Francis Wodehouse, both from the sixteenth century, 
and the experience of Quaker Richard Seller, press-ganged into the British 
Navy in 1665.130 Their experiences of conscience are very different, but all in 
their own way unusual; Fitzherbert and Wodehouse, for instance, became 
physically unwell (and violently so) from attending a church service from 
another religious denomination than their own. All these experiences of 
conscience are highly emotional. Having distilled the main characteristics of 
different psychological approaches from Zimmer’s discussion of them, I 
stipulated the directions in which psychological interpretations of these 
                                                 
129 Zimmer (1999). 
130 Fitzherbert, Wodehouse, and Seller are all repeatedly referred to in part III, ch. 
13, “Aspects of conscientious objection (1)”. I presented the paper “Conscience, 
religious emotions, and psychopathology” at the conference Religious Emotions: 
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Antwerp, 19-21 September 2005. For 
Fitzherbert, see Henry Foley, Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus, 7 vols., 
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Philip Caraman (ed.), The Other Face: Catholic Life under Elizabeth I, Longmans, 
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published as An Account of the Sufferings of Richard Seller, of Keinsey, a Fisherman, 
Philadelphia, 1772, reprinted in Brock (ed.) (1993), 5-29. 
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experiences of conscience might go. From the perspective of inner-oriented 
approaches, all three of the above examples show signs of pathology in some 
way or another. The experiences involved in all examples must be considered 
delusional, even hallucinatory. Fitzherbert’s horror and Wodehouse’s bowel 
problems (see chapter 13) must be seen as the result of unfortunate 
influences exerted by their social environment when they were young. From 
the perspective of behaviour-oriented approaches, it is irrelevant whether 
Wordsworth’s guilt was appropriate; the important thing is that he turned 
back, as society would think desirable. Also, Richard Seller’s case, (which in 
my terms will prove to be the perfect example of an experience of 
conscience in which ultimate concern manifests itself in the form of 
inspiration), does not easily lend itself to a behaviour-oriented interpretation 
of conscience in terms of self-control and self-censorship. More generally, it 
seems that neither approach offers us an understanding of these experiences. 
Instead, they are bent on explaining conscience in any terms, except those 
that would agree with people’s self-understanding. Neither in inner-oriented 
nor in behaviour-oriented approaches is there much, if any, room for the 
intentionality of conscience. If we are to understand experiences of 
conscience, we must be willing to sympathize with them, to dwell in them, 
instead of merely explaining them (away) from a third-person perspective. 
 Much of the above criticism applies also to more recent 
philosophical concepts of conscience, which have been strongly influenced 
by modern psychology. It is mostly through these concepts that psychology 
plays a role in this book. 
 Kochanska’s work focuses on the development of conscience in 
(early) childhood. However interesting her research and her findings may be 
in themselves, her work is characterized by a lack of conceptual reflection. In 
none of the six articles I mentioned before does she (or do the authors) give 
a definition of conscience; in none of them is it explained what they mean by 
the term. Rather, the meaning of ‘conscience’ seems to be taken for granted, 
as if we all know to what it refers. Thus, Kochanska (and her co-authors) 
speak of ‘measures of conscience’, the ‘structure of conscience’, the 
‘organization of conscience’, the ‘development of conscience’ and of 
conscience sec without once stopping to explain the term. The closest we get 
to a concept of conscience is this: “Conscience has a rich conceptual history 
in human thought. For centuries, we have wondered how individuals 
internalize the values of their families and societies and how those values 
become a reliable inner guiding system for conduct and a vehicle for the 
intergenerational transmission.”131 The second sentence presumably contains 
what ‘conscience’ is. My first comment would be that ‘we’ have not 
wondered about all this for centuries at all, because ‘we’ have only started 
wondering what Kochanska wonders about since the arrival of modern 
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developmental psychology. Secondly, I cannot help feeling that the ‘rich 
conceptual history’ undergoes a reductive transformation here; as if 
conscience is merely a matter of the internalized values of parents and 
society. In some articles, Kochanska argues against approaches that identify 
conscience with one of its components (moral emotion, cognition, conduct), 
and for a comprehensive approach that envelops all these components.132 
While this is a very sensible approach, we must not think that if we take all 
these components together, we know what the term ‘conscience’ means. 
Laying out all the component parts of a car does not tell you what a car is, 
but the problem in this case goes beyond this. Conscience, in the end, is not 
something that can be measured with the methods of (empirical) psychology. 
It transcends the level of psychology – the whole book can be considered an 
argument for this view. Psychological categories like those developed by 
Kochanska and her colleagues, valuable as they may be, cannot tell us what is 
so important about conscience and conscientious objections – nor could 
they undermine that importance. What Kochanska’s work does do is provide 
insight in the preconditions for the development of conscience. This, 
however, is not my subject. As I explain in chapter 8, I presuppose a (more 
or less) mature conscience. The first toddler with conscientious objections is 
still to be born. The conscience of one conscientious objector may be more 
mature than the other, but if we want to know if conscientious objections 
deserve a special respect compared to other kinds of objection, we need to 
know what a mature conscience is. Where I discuss that question, I will 
briefly refer to the work of developmental psychologists. 
 Enough about my reasons to ‘leave out’ psychology. Enough, too, 
about my ‘method’. I have good hope that those who have not yet been 
scared away by all the above will find much of interest in the following. 
                                                 
132 Kochanska and Aksan (2004), 300; Aksan and Kochanska (2005), 506; 
Kochanska, Forman, Aksan, and Dunbar (2005), 20. 
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1. The symbol of conscience 
 
“When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to 
be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it 
together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, 
or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to 
speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt, or force another to do so: 
Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto 
very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word 
metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret 
thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a 
thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own 
new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain 
them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, 
as if they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak against them; 
and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that 
they think so.” 
THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 
[1651], chapter 7 (48). 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
There are two modes of speaking about conscience, both of which are 
potentially legitimate. The history of expressions of or concerning 
conscience illustrates this, and it is true now. I will call them, with terms 
derived from Michael Polanyi, the symbolic and the indicative mode.1 These 
modes must not be taken to be mutually exclusive, as if a term or expression 
is either fully symbolic, or fully indicative. They are the extremes of a 
spectrum. Expressions are often partly symbolic, and partly indicative. That 
is, the two modes of speaking intermingle. 
 I take the symbolic mode of speaking to be primary, and the 
indicative mode to be secondary or derived. What this means will become 
clear in the course of this chapter. In short: the symbolic mode of speaking is 
primary, because it is closer to people’s experience. Experiences engender 
symbols, which express those experiences. These symbols then acquire a life 
of their own. Once the original experience is lost, the symbols ‘dry up’. They 
are then on their way to become doctrine, or some other form of the 
indicative mode of speaking. When symbols are reflected upon, this 
reflection, too, is usually in the indicative mode. This means that the terms 
used are not so much understood as expressions of experience, but rather 
intended to point out some existent entity, that is: to refer to something. 
                                                 
1 In the symbolic mode one does not really speak about conscience; one expresses 
oneself by means of the symbol of conscience. 
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 The term ‘conscience’, then, may be an expression of certain 
experiences, or it may (be intended to) refer to some ‘thing’. It may do both 
to a certain extent. If it is clear, in a certain case, that the term is used 
symbolically, its meaning is still not self-evident. If it is clear that the term is 
used indicatively, its referent is not obvious. The most confusing situation is 
that situation in which an author himself or herself does not know in which 
mode he or she is speaking about conscience. Today, we are confronted by 
an almost unsurveyable number of concepts, definitions and descriptions of 
conscience, both within and outside of the field of philosophy. Taken 
together, the whole must still be understood as (unconsciously and 
indirectly) expressive of a certain class of experiences. When we take a closer 
look at them, we see that many of them are the result of a certain 
forgetfulness: what is forgotten is that the primary mode of speaking about 
conscience is symbolic. Symbolic expressions are then taken as indicative 
terms, as descriptions or definitions. Other definitions are conscious 
attempts to achieve greater consistency in and coherence between existing 
definitions. Finally, there are concepts which include an awareness of 
themselves as concepts, so to speak. In their case, their secondary nature as 
derivations from symbolic language is not forgotten, and the danger of 
absolutizing one or a number of aspects of conscience at the cost of others is 
recognized. This is what I take to be the only fully legitimate way of speaking 
indicatively about conscience. Such a concept is what I call, after Bergson, a 
fluid concept. This will be the topic of chapter 8. 
 Before we can arrive at such a concept, we need to gain some clarity 
in the mist surrounding conscience. The present lack of it is no reason to 
abandon the notion altogether; the notions that are of the greatest 
importance to us (friendship, love, God) tend to be shrouded in mist. This 
tends to make them all the more appealing. Much of the mist surrounding 
conscience, however, does not naturally envelop it, but is man-made, 
stemming from the smouldering debris left behind by those who previously 
sought their way through the fog. Some of them camped there for a while, 
made breakfast on a small fire, and left without result. Others have left the 
remains of great bonfires, lit to celebrate their success. To someone who 
puts up his tent there now, it is unclear what made them so happy. 
 What I will do in this chapter, in pursuit of clarity, is to provide an 
analysis of conscience as a symbol. That means that I will not look at 
conscience as (a term referring to) a thing or a disposition that one can have 
or not have; nor is the term taken to signify a source of moral knowledge 
that one can derive moral principles or rules from, as is also quite common. 
‘Conscience’ will be treated as a complex symbol that expresses certain 
experiences. Experiences, via the symbols they engendered, take center stage in 
this chapter. Only after we have gained an understanding of the symbol of 
conscience will philosophical definitions, theories, and doctrines come into 
view. They will feature in a sketch of certain trends in the historical 
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development and transformation of the symbol of conscience. This, 
however, is the subject of chapter 2. 
 The background for the present chapter lies in sections 2, 3 and 4 of 
the general introduction. I will start by formulating a preliminary 
understanding of conscience. In the following section, I discuss the 
emergence of the symbol at the hand of Ancient Egyptian texts and Plato’s 
Apology. Then, I will embark on an analysis of the core elements of the 
symbol of conscience. The chapter ends with a section on some ‘imaginative’ 
symbols, as for example that of the ‘worm of conscience’. 
 
 
1.2. PRELIMINARY UNDERSTANDING OF CONSCIENCE 
At the outset of his analysis of the symbol of immortality, Voegelin identifies 
the class of experiences that engendered the symbol as ‘the varieties of 
religious experience’, (referring to William James), thereby securing the 
proper pre-understanding of the subject in his audience. The need for this is 
obvious. One cannot embark on an analysis of anything, without having a 
certain pre-understanding of it. It is tempting to speak, in the case of 
conscience, of ‘the varieties of moral experience’, but this will not do. 
Besides the fact that this phrase does not have the authority behind it that 
the former has, it is also to narrow. I suggest that ‘conscience’, like the 
related term ‘consciousness’, and the terms ‘experience’ and ‘symbolization’, 
can be seen as denoting ‘the area where the process of reality becomes 
luminous to itself’.2 This may seem to be at variance with my 
characterization of conscience as a symbol conveying truth concerning 
insistent reality (reality within consciousness), but it is not. Consciousness is 
not literally something in which there is experience; rather, it is ‘a mode of 
attention’, as Whitehead calls it, a qualification of experience.3 Similarly, 
conscience can be taken to be such a qualification of experience, but a 
different qualification of a certain class of experiences. In short: conscience is a 
special kind of consciousness.4 
                                                 
2 Voegelin (1990a), 120.  
3 See the general introduction. 
4 It is important to note that we are now speaking of conscience indicatively, as is 
unavoidable in an analysis of experience and symbolism. In chapter 8 I will present a 
diagram, in which I explain the relations between the symbol of conscience and 
indicative use of the term. In the middle are experiences of a certain (moral-
religious) class, that belong to a certain mode of consciousness, to which we may 
(indicatively) refer as ‘conscience’. The symbol of conscience was engendered by 
such experiences, and became the ‘natural’ articulation for them. With their 
indicative use of the term ‘conscience’, people refer (often indirectly and without 
knowing it) to the mode of consciousness we have also called conscience. (I say 
‘indirectly and without knowing it’, because what people tend to refer to directly is a 
reification of this mode of consciousness. The intentional object of indicative use of 
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 The pre-understanding that we have of conscience results from a 
combination of things: with many of us, there will be a reaction 
(unregistered, to be sure), evoked by confrontation with the word, that 
entails at least a tendency to ‘surrender ourselves’ to the symbol, to let 
ourselves be carried away with it. This may sound like an exaggeration to 
some, but then they should realize what is meant by ‘surrender’; I am simply 
referring to the way meaning is constituted symbolically. Secondly, our pre-
understanding is informed by our knowledge of the place(s) occupied by 
conscience in our language, and in particular networks of concepts. In other 
words: we know how and in which contexts to use the word, and in 
combination with which other words (e.g. guilt, remorse, integrity, or certain 
adjectives like ‘troubled’, ‘stained’, or ‘quiet’). Thirdly, we may respond to the 
word by the spontaneous evocation from memory of metaphors commonly 
used as expressions of conscience: ‘the man within’, ‘heart’, ‘the spark of 
conscience’ perhaps. Fourthly and finally, our pre-understanding is shaped 
by our knowledge of theories and concepts of conscience. For instance, on 
hearing the word ‘conscience’, the term ‘super-ego’ may spring to mind. 
Catholics with some knowledge of catholic moral theology may hear 
‘conscience’ and supplement it with ‘synderesis’ – a distinction which goes 
back to medieval scholasticism. 
 To clarify our pre-understanding of conscience, it is useful to look at 
the etymology of the term.5 That ‘conscience’ and ‘consciousness’ are related 
terms is obvious. In English, ‘conscience’ may in certain contexts still be 
used instead of ‘consciousness’. ‘Conscious’, at least up to the nineteenth 
century, was also used to convey the meaning of knowledge of oneself as 
guilty or innocent.6 Samuel Johnson’s dictionary from 1755 gives two 
meanings for ‘consciousness’: “1. The perception of what passes in a man’s 
own mind. (...) 2. Internal sense of guilt, or innocence.”7 The third meaning 
Johnson gives for ‘conscience’ is “[c]onsciousness; knowledge of our own 
thoughts or actions.” Elisha Coles’ 1676 dictionary, not bothered with the 
alphabetical order of the terms, takes up conscience in its description of 
‘conscientious’: “Conscientious, according to Conscience, the witness of one’s 
                                                                                                               
the term conscience is often a ‘faculty’, a ‘thing’ in the mind. What I say here is that 
if we correct for the mistake of reification, we find the proper object of ‘conscience’, 
indicatively used, in this mode of consciousness.) So, in simplified form: the 
experiences engender the symbol and are articulated through the symbol, and the 
mode of consciousness ‘in which’ people have such experiences is what people refer 
to with their indicative use of ‘conscience’. All this will be elaborated upon in 
chapter 8. That I touch upon it in this early stage is unavoidable, for both our pre-
understanding and the fluid concept I develop in chapter 8 belong to the indicative 
mode of thought. 
5 See 3.2.2 for the translation of ‘conscientia’ into German. 
6 The OED (Oxford English Dictionary) gives an example from 1827. 
7 Johnson (1983). 
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own heart.” The next entry is: “Conscious, l. [knowing ones self] guilty.”8 
Another dictionary, twenty years earlier, does not even mention conscience, 
but has only “Conscious (conscius) culpable, that is of Councel, or guilty of a 
thing.”9 While in present-day (non-poetic) English the distinction between 
‘conscience’ and ‘conscious(ness)’ is pretty clear, the French still have only 
one word for both, which is ‘conscience’. In ancient and Hellenistic Greek 
too, the meaning of ‘syneidesis’, which the Romans translated as ‘conscientia’ 
lay close to what we would call ‘consciousness’ (of something).10 C.S. Lewis 
wrote an insightful article about the relations between ‘conscience’ and 
‘consciousness’.11 He starts out with an explanation of the linguistic origins 
of the terms. The Greek ‘oida’ and the Latin ‘scio’ mean ‘I know’. With the 
prefixes ‘sun’ (or ‘syn’) and ‘cum’ (which becomes ‘con’), meaning ‘with’, we 
have ‘sunoida’ and ‘conscio’. The accompanying nouns are ‘syneidesis’ and 
‘conscientia’; the Latin adjective is ‘conscius’. Lewis goes on to distinguish 
two branches of meaning: one with the full ‘together-sense’ of the prefix, 
and a weakened branch, in which the prefix is almost inoperative. The 
French ‘conscience’, Lewis says, descends from the latter. In English, the 
weakened branch is represented by the term ‘consciousness’. Examples from 
both branches can be found in classical literature. 
 Now, when I speak of the symbol of conscience, I see the prefix as 
important; at the same time, it is important to remember that there is a close 
connection to what we now call ‘consciousness’, so as to prevent a narrow, 
exclusively moral reading. Generally, the symbol of conscience expresses a 
special kind of awareness with regard to (usually) one’s own actions. The 
prefix ‘con’ suggests both distance and intimacy. I know something ‘with 
myself’, or ‘with someone else’ – which means that I step back from myself, 
and I am not that someone, though I share certain knowledge with myself or 
the other; my own action is accompanied by a certain detached, yet linked 
awareness. From the beginning, the Greek ‘syneidesis’ was often used to 
express consciousness of one’s own or another’s forbidden or blameworthy 
conduct. So, the possibility of and tendency towards inclusion of a moral 
element was present from the start. In the course of history, it became a 
dominant element. In many languages, ‘conscience’, or a translation of the 
term, became restricted to its moral meaning. Though I wish to avoid a 
narrow reading of ‘conscience’, relating it exclusively to moral experiences, 
my interest in the symbol of conscience lies in what ‘conscience’ adds in 
meaning to Voegelin’s ‘consciousness’. In effect, it is the difference in quality 
between conscience and consciousness that matters. Extending Lewis’ idea 
of the ‘together-sense’, I suggest that the crucial difference between the 
                                                 
8 Coles (1971). 
9 Blount (1969). 
10 See chapter 2.2 for more on syneidesis and related terms. 
11 Lewis (1991), chapter 8, “Conscience and Conscious” (pp. 181-213). 
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symbols of conscience and consciousness lies in the degree and kind of 
involvement they express. The difference in degree may itself be great 
enough to constitute a difference in kind. The symbol of conscience 
expresses not only an awareness accompanying one’s actions, but also the 
depth of one’s involvement – a ‘matter of conscience’ is a matter of ultimate 
concern.12 One cannot remain indifferent to the kind of awareness of (the 
moral/religious quality of) one’s actions that is expressed in the symbol of 
conscience – which sets conscience apart from consciousness. 
Consciousness differs from conscience in that it does not by definition entail 
any strong involvement. Consciousness need not be detached and 
indifferent, though – in fact, it hardly ever is. But the involvement or interest 
of ‘normal’ consciousness is of another kind; it is not moral-religious in 
nature. My analysis of the emerging symbol of conscience in the following 
section will shed more light on what sets conscience apart from ordinary 
consciousness; more precisely, on what allows us to speak (indicatively) of 
conscience as a particular mode of consciousness. 
 
 
1.3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE SYMBOL 
What I have to look for here are clear expressions of that class of moral-
religious experiences that according to our pre-understanding might be 
classified as experiences of conscience. At first, our pre-understanding is all 
we have to guide us. In the hermeneutic process of identifying and analysing 
expressions of conscience by constant reference to our pre-understanding, 
however, more clarity emerges, and we become able to tell why some 
expressions ought to be classed among expressions of conscience and others 
not. So our pre-understanding does not limit the investigation, but it 
functions as an open-ended starting-point. The following does not represent 
the whole process, but rather the last stages of it, where the actual analysis of 
the symbol of conscience begins. 
 The first problem to be solved, then, is the question of where to 
commence the analysis. It is a problem that Voegelin had to tackle as well. 
He describes the problem as follows: “…on the one hand, the case selected 
should be an historically early one, in order to avoid questions which 
otherwise might arise with regard to the traditional character of the symbols 
and a correspondingly suspect authenticity of the experience. But on the 
other hand, it has to be culturally late enough for an exegesis of the 
experience to be so articulate that the connection between the truth 
                                                 
12 ‘Ultimate concern’ is the term Tillich uses to describe faith: “Faith is the state of 
being ultimately concerned: the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man’s ultimate 
concern.” (Tillich [1957], 1.) 
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experienced and the symbols expressing it will be intelligible beyond a 
doubt.”13 
 This problem can be restated in terms of ‘compactness’ and 
‘differentiation’.14 Voegelin speaks of compact and differentiated 
experiences, and corresponding compact and differentiated symbolizations. 
The compact experience of the cosmos, for example, is articulated in the 
form of myths, showing man to be part of a cosmos that is full of gods, 
living alongside (and in many respects behaving like) man. This experience, 
Voegelin says, “has to yield to the experience of eminent divine presence in 
the movement of the soul in the metaxy”.15 Voegelin starts his analysis of the 
symbol of immortality with an Egyptian text of about 2000 B.C. He admits 
that there are more differentiated accounts, rendered by Plato and St. Paul, 
and explains wherein this differentiation consists: they move on the ‘level of 
noetic and revelatory experiences’, they can make use of ‘a more diversified 
arsenal of symbols’, and ‘their expression has become more supple’; 
however, Voegelin asserts that they are fundamentally variations of the 
motifs found in the Egyptian text.16 
 
1.3.1. Ancient Egypt and the dawn of conscience 
That Voegelin starts with an analysis of an ancient Egyptian source does not 
compel us to do so, of course, but as it happens, other authors have started 
looking for conscience in Egypt, and it is worth our while to see why. An 
often cited work in literature on conscience is James Henry Breasted’s The 
Dawn of Conscience.17 He quotes, among others, from a text that was probably 
written just after the end of the New Kingdom, around 1000 B.C., the 
Wisdom of Amenemope. This text was written in a time when a new religious 
movement was taking shape, and it expresses the core of this movement, 
which is ‘personal piety’.18 
 Before we look at some passages from that text (and some other 
texts), we should ask why we should look at an Egyptian text from three 
millennia ago at all. The wikipedia tells us that “Breasted was in the forefront 
of the generation of archaeologist-historians who broadened the idea of 
‘Western Civilization’ to include the entire ‘Near East’ in Europe's cultural 
                                                 
13 Voegelin (1990b), 58. 
14 See chapter 2.2. 
15 Voegelin (1990d), 207. 
16 Voegelin (1990b), 61. The ‘noetic’ denotes a specific aspect of human reason. 
Henkel (1998), 38, defines ‘noetische Vernunft’ [noetic reason] as “die auf die rechte 
Ordnung von menschlicher Psyche und Gesellschaft gerichtete Vernunft” [reason as 
directed towards the right order of the human psyche and of society]. 
17 Breasted (1933). 
18 On this personal piety, in German ‘persönliche Frömmigkeit’, see Brunner (1983), 
33-35, 44-46, and chapter 5 (103-121). 
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roots.”19 Living from 1865 to 1935, so around 1900, Breasted grew up and 
received his education in a time when Egypt was (still) very much in vogue. 
Napoleonic campaigns in Egypt did much to foster interest in its civilisation, 
bringing back to Europe many objects of historical interest. The French 
linguist Jean François Champollion has been called the Father of 
Egyptology, and he is famous for deciphering the ancient Egyptian 
hieroglyphs. This was a long process, culminating in 1824 in his Précis du 
système hiéroglyphique.20 In the remainder of the nineteenth century, with the 
hieroglyphic code just partly cracked, fascination with ancient Egypt only 
grew. This was supported, undoubtedly, by the strong presence of Egypt in 
the Old Testament, but also, more mundanely, by the growth of tourism.21 
 In the intellectual climate of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, a finalistic philosophy of history grew, in which all world history 
worthy of the name culminated in Western Civilization. We, Europeans, 
were seen as the heirs of a line of civilizations and empires: closest to us, 
Rome; before that, Greece; before Greece, Egypt.22 Christian variants 
abound, focusing on the eighteenth dynasty (1562-1308 B.C.). Around 1375 
B.C., Amenhotep IV became pharaoh. He was, one author remarks, ‘a man 
of great individuality’, ‘a lover of piety’, and “resolved to leave a religious 
impress upon his people and his time”.23 Amenhotep was what has been 
called a ‘disk-worshipper’, holding that the God manifests himself in the heat 
(the rays) of the sun. Braudel calls Amenhotep IV ‘the strangest pharaoh in 
history’, and explains that “[t]he sun god had revealed himself to the 
pharaoh, who proceeded to proclaim the omnipotence of this single god, 
represented in simple and symbolic fashion by an image of the sun as a disc 
with rays ending in outstretched hands. This god’s name was Aten and the 
pharaoh took the name of Akhenaten, meaning ‘he who has been approved 
by Aten’.”24 Akhenaten’s (or Akhnaton’s, or Ikhnaton’s) monotheism was of 
particular interest from a certain Christian perspective. Christian-inspired 
progress views of history saw the step from polytheism to monotheism as 
religious progress (and the step from Jewish monotheism to Christian 
monotheism as a further advance). For that reason, Mercer refers to 
Ikhnaton (as he calls him) as a ‘religious genius (...) far in advance of his 
time’.25 He compares Ikhnaton’s ‘radical reforms’ with those of ‘Josiah in 
Israel’, only Ikhnaton’s were even more ‘thoroughgoing and radical’. At the 
                                                 
19 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Henry_Breasted. 
20 “Giants of Egyptology 7: Jean François Champollion”. 
21 Interest in Egypt did not dwindle in the twentieth century. Howard Carter’s 
discovery of Tutankhamen’s grave in 1922 gave a fresh boost to people’s fascination 
with the Orient. 
22 At the same time we are also, of course, the heirs of a Judaic-Christian tradition. 
23 Mercer (1919), 28. 
24 Braudel (2002), 156. 
25 Mercer (1919), 34. 
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end of the day, however, he denies Ikhnaton his monotheism, loath, it 
seems, to accept its ‘discovery’ before Jewish times.26 Mercer concludes: 
“The Egyptian idea of God had gradually developed from a primitive and 
crude anthropomorphism to a spiritual and ethical henotheism, and perhaps 
to a practical monotheism. This took place over six hundred years before the 
Hebrew prophets declared the oneness and uniqueness of Jehovah the God 
of Israel. (...) Egypt (...) was (...) the first and one of the greatest of 
schoolmasters to lead men to Christ.”27 From a similar perspective, E. A. 
Wallis Budge discusses Amen-em-apt’s (Amenemope’s) writings – he, 
however, is not reluctant to say that this man’s monotheism is beyond 
doubt.28 He begins a section on the morality and religion of Amen-em-apt, 
who lived in the first half of the eighteenth dynasty, by saying that “[a] 
perusal of this Teaching will, I believe, convince the reader that it enshrines 
the highest system of morality ever taught or promulgated in Egypt, and that 
from the point of view of morality it deserves to rank with the Book of 
Proverbs and Ecclesiastes”.29 This estimation undoubtedly has to do with 
Amen-em-apt’s supposed monotheism.30 According to Budge, Amen-em-apt 
ascribed to his God (whether this was Ra or not) “the attributes of the 
Hebrew and Christian God”.31 
 Today, most historians would agree that this sketch of a linear 
history leading from empire to empire, from civilization to civilization, 
culminating in Western civilization, is absurd; the attempt to turn the 
Egyptians into proto-Europeans preposterous. Nevertheless, ‘histories of 
ideas’ which simply list the Latin precursors of some of our concepts, its 
Greek predecessors, and its Egyptian ancestors are the descendants of that 
philosophy of history. 
 That history is not a gradual ascent to modern Western liberal 
society (with its science, technology, capitalism, et cetera) does not mean that 
there are no historical connections between Egyptian civilization and ancient 
Greece, via Greece with Rome, and so on. If we keep in mind that there are 
                                                 
26 Ikhnaton’s monotheism is now generally acknowledged. See Braudel (2002); 
Brunner (1983), 35-46; Lichtheim (1976), 89-100. 
27 Mercer (1919), 46. 
28 Amenemope (or, Amen-em-apt) should not otherwise be associated with 
Akhenaten; the latter’s religion constituted a disruption of Egypt’s religious 
development, the movement of personal piety. Amenemope’s writings belong to this 
movement. Hence Budge (1924), 135, also speaks of Amen-em-apt’s ‘personal 
religion’. See Brunner (1983), 35, and 116-117. Brunner would probably not accept 
Budge’s judgement concerning Amenemope’s monotheism. Though the pious 
tended to refer to their gods in a general fashion, this was not, in Brunner’s 
judgement, because they were monotheistic; see Brunner (1983), 112. 
29 Budge (1924), 130. 
30 Ibid., 135. 
31 Ibid., 136. 
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always multiple developments occurring at the same time, that it is only with 
hindsight that certain directions of development seem necessary and 
unavoidable, and that there is continuity as well as discontinuity in history, 
there is nothing wrong with an exploration of some of those connections. 
There is more continuity between Greece and Rome than there is between 
Egypt and Greece. If ideas found in Egypt are also, millennia or centuries 
later, found in Greece, they might very well be linked, but it is not likely that 
the link has the form of direct cultural transmission. It is much more 
complex than that. First of all, we should note that in the millennia B.C. in 
which the Old, the Middle, and the New Kingdom are placed something of a 
Mediterranean culture grew, even though there were separate cores of 
civilization, and even though Egypt was a relatively closed civilization. There 
was trade, and hence there was cultural exchange. Ikhnaton’s montheism is 
often associated with the rise of a form of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and 
universalism.32 Many aspects of Egyptian religion, most notably sun worship, 
were common throughout the Near East and the Mediterranean. In Egypt’s 
late period, after the collapse of the New Kingdom (in the eleventh century 
B.C.), there was with we might call heavy contact with other civilizations, for 
instance through invasions by the Assyrians (in the seventh century B.C.) and 
the annexation of Egypt into the Persian Empire by Cambyses in 525 B.C. 
After a second short period of Persian rule, Egypt was conquered by the 
Macedonian king Alexander the Great in 331 B.C. This is the beginning of 
the Graeco-Roman period, which would last until the seventh century AD. 
In the last four centuries B.C., Egypt was to a certain extent taken up in a 
Hellenistic culture, which means that there was at least some cultural 
exchange. Alexandria was one of the great centres of Hellenistic culture. It 
was also somewhat of a strange body in Egypt, however.33 There was no free 
and easy intermingling of Egyptian and Hellenic ideas. Otto ascribes this 
primarily to the strangeness to the Greeks of the Egyptian way of thinking, 
which persisted due to the mutual difficulties in understanding each other. 
Language and writing, Otto states, constituted a virtually insurmountable 
obstacle to the penetration of the Egyptian way of thinking.34 Nevertheless, 
as I said, there was some cultural exchange, and according to Köster it is first 
and foremost in the field of religion that we can speak of ‘syncretism’, of an 
‘actual intermingling’.35 Moreover, we see this first in the Egyptian empire, 
                                                 
32 Braudel (2002), 156-157; Brunner (1983), 39; Otto (1955), 160-161. 
33 Köster notes that there were only two Greek cities in Egypt, Alexandria and 
Naukratis, and that an opposition between the Greek urban population – the Jews of 
Alexandria are counted among the Hellenes – and an indigenous rural population 
persisted. Among the latter, Egyptian remained the colloquial language. Helmut 
Köster (1980), 41. 
34 Otto (1955), 256. 
35 For ‘syncretism’, see Köster (1980), 169ff. 
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where oriental gods and traditions turn up ‘in Greek clothing’.36 The other 
way around, Köster says, ‘the fascination of the Greeks for everything new 
and strange’ resulted in the adoption of oriental elements, especially in the 
area of religion.37 In general, Hellenistic culture was the result of an 
‘antithesis of East and West’. “Diese Antithese wirkte weder als 
unversöhnlicher Gegensatz, noch als Anreiz zur Verschmelzung, sondern im 
Sinne einer gegenseitigen Faszination, als gegenseitige Anregung auf 
politischem, wirtschaftlichem und kulturellem Gebiet.” Importantly, “[a]uf 
jedem Sektor ist das griechische Element in dieser Antithese maßgebend”.38 
Brunner also remarks on the difficulty of pointing out the precise influence 
of Egyptian culture on other cultures.39 
 I cannot go into this matter in more detail here. It is important to 
note that, although evidence of strong continuity between Egyptian and 
Greek or Roman thought would add some interest to a discussion of the 
emergence of the symbol of conscience, it is by no means crucial to that 
discussion that there would be such continuity. It is of primary importance 
that we find an example of an emergent symbol that is sufficiently articulate 
to be of use to us, without being so articulate that we must suspect it to be 
the result of long and thorough reflection on the subject. The symbol should 
be the fresh result of a ‘breaking forth of language’, or still in that process. I 
believe that, given certain aspects of human nature, the symbol of conscience 
(in whatever precise form) will emerge wherever the social conditions are 
right. This is not to say that I can specify those conditions, but only to say 
that I do not believe the experience of conscience and hence the symbol of 
conscience to be the unique result of one specific cultural-historical 
development. It can emerge in different places, at different times; it can 
disappear, and it can reappear. Hence, the continuity between Ancient Egypt 
and later empires is not of crucial importance here. 
 So let us turn to the aforementioned passages from the Wisdom of 
Amenemope.40 Breasted quotes from this text to substantiate his claim that the 
“impelling voice within, which had originally grown up out of social 
influences and had since been further developed by many centuries of 
contemplative reflection, was now unreservedly recognized by the believer to 
                                                 
36 Köster (1980), 40. 
37 Ibid., 169-170. 
38 Ibid., 40. 
39 Brunner (1983), 149. 
40 Note that my selection of passages is by no means intended to be representative 
for the essence of Egyptian moral-religious thought; I am merely looking for the 
presence of expressions of conscience, and am aware of the fact that Egyptian texts 
are not littered with them, even where they become more frequent, as in the time of 
personal piety. If one should point out the essence of Egyptian religion in that 
period, it would be something like: ‘submit to (the) god(s), accept your fate, and put 
your trust in (the) god(s)’; cf. Brunner (1983), 117. 
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be the mandate of God himself.”41 One of the most convincing passages is 
this one, which I will also give in the translation adopted by Lichtheim – the 
latter is the one on the right: 
 
“God is in his perfection “God is ever in his perfection 
And man is in his insufficiency, Man is ever in his failure. 
The words which men speak diverge, The words men say are one 
 thing, 
And divergent are the acts of God. The deeds of the god are 
 another. 
 
Say not, ‘I have no sin,’ Do not say: “I have done no 
 wrong,” 
And weary not thyself to seek conflict. And then strain to seek a 
 quarrel; 
As for sin, it belongeth to God, The wrong belongs to the god, 
It is sealed with his finger.”42 He seals (the verdict) with his 
 finger.”43 
 
Breasted notes that the third and fourth line of the first stanza quoted here 
are meant to express that the words of men diverge from the acts of God. 
There is an awareness here that human standards fall short of the absolute. 
Miriam Lichtheim remarks that the worth of what she calls The 
Instruction of Amenemope “lies in its quality of inwardness”; “worldly success, 
which had meant so much in the past, has receded into the background”.44 
She speaks of a “shift of emphasis, away from action and success, and 
toward contemplation and endurance” which led to “an overall regrouping 
of values and a redefinition of the ideal man”. Modesty, Lichtheim says, is 
the chief characteristic of the new ideal man. “He is self-controlled, quiet, 
and kind toward people, and he is humble before God. This ideal man is 
indeed not a perfect man, for perfection is now viewed as belonging only to 
God.”45 So Lichtheim points to man’s falling short in view of a superior 
moral-religious standard, as well as to a certain ‘quality of inwardness’ – 
something which we would also associate with conscience, and which we 
                                                 
41 Breasted (1933), 320. 
42 Ibid., 328-329. 
43 Lichtheim (1976), 157-158 (Amenemope, ch. 18). 
44 Ibid., 146. With regard to the issue of the Egyptian influence on other cultures, it 
is interesting that Lichtheim notes that it is quite generally acknowledged that ‘chips’ 
from the Instruction of Amenemope “are embedded in the Book of Proverbs”. This is 
the result of Israelite-Egyptian contact during the Ramesside period, from which the 
Instruction of Amenemope stems; see Lichtheim (1976), 147. 
45 Idem. 
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also found in early modern dictionaries.46 This inwardness is expressed by 
terms referring to internal organs, most often the heart.47 References to the 
heart in Egyptian texts are as old as Egyptian civilization itself. Breasted 
gives some examples from the fifteenth century B.C., a period in which, in 
his view, “the Egyptian had (…) begun to give the word ‘heart’ a meaning 
which made it more fully the equivalent of our word conscience than it had 
been in the Pyramid Age”.48 A court herald stated about his services to the 
king: 
 
“It was my heart which caused that I should do them, by its guidance of my 
affairs. It was…as an excellent witness. I did not disregard its speech, I 
feared to transgress its guidance. (…) ‘Lo,…’ said the people, ‘it is an oracle 
of God in every body. (…)’ (…)”.49 
 
But the guidance by the oracle is here directly related to material success, to a 
prosperous life; the people, for instance, also say: “Prosperous is he whom it 
has guided to the good way of achievement.”50 Relatives of a dead prince 
pray: 
 
“Mayest thou spend eternity in gladness of heart, in the favour of the god 
that is in thee.”51 
 
A dead man declares, in a similar vein: 
 
“The heart of a man is his own god, and my heart was satisfied with my 
deeds.”52 
 
With regard to this idea of the heart as a god within man, Lichtheim refers to 
Bonnet’s Reallexikon der Ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte.53 Bonnet warns that we 
should not too lightly take the ‘god within man’ as synonymous with our 
word ‘conscience’. The religious idea of the god within man has much more 
connotations, is a much wider notion, than that of conscience. It does also 
have ethical connotations, though: “Der Gott, der aus dem Herzen redet, 
stellt auch vor sittliche Entscheidungen, und je und dann mag der Fromme 
                                                 
46 Mercer (1919), 89, does not hesitate to state that “[a]s time went on the 
individual’s relation to the gods became more and more a matter of heart and 
conscience”. 
47 For more on the metaphor of the heart, see (apart from the present section) 
chapter 2.2. 
48 Breasted (1933), 255. 
49 Ibid., 254. 
50 Idem. 
51 Idem. 
52 Ibid., 255. 
53 Lichtheim (1976), 162. 
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das Mahnen jener Stimme in hohem Ernste durchleben. Insofern umgreift 
die Vorstellung von dem G. i. M. [Gott im Menschen] auch den Bereich des 
Gewissens; aber sie fällt keineswegs mit ihm zusammen.”54 Under the lemma 
‘Gewissen’ [conscience], Bonnet issues similar warnings. The Egyptians did 
not have a separate word for ‘conscience’. “Es erscheint daher immer nur als 
eine Teilfunktion von Kräften und Erscheinungen, die ihrem Wesen nach 
viel weiter greifen. Wohl können sie auf den Bezirk des G. [Gewissens] 
zugespitzt werden. Aber diese Zuspitzung ist kaum je so eindeutig und so 
scharf, daß unser Begriff G. [Gewissen] eine adäquate Vorstellung ergäbe.”55 
He discusses the ‘interwovenness’ of ‘conscience’ and ‘heart’, but again 
warns that they are not the same. To say that the word ‘heart’ simply meant 
conscience would be to narrow it down to one aspect of its meaning. 
Bonnet is certainly right to some extent, but his discussion of the 
topic is not entirely satisfactory. For one thing, it betrays that Bonnet 
subscribes to a rather narrowly defined concept of conscience, which 
opposes it to reason: in order to underscore the inadequacy of the translation 
of ‘heart’ with ‘conscience’, Bonnet says that “[i]m ganzen ist es für den Äg. 
[Ägypter] wohl überhaupt mehr der Verstand, der in den Fragen des 
praktischen wie des sittlichen Lebens den rechten Weg weist. ‘Ich bin ein 
Unwissender’, sagt ein Sünder, ‘der kein Herz (d. h. keinen Verstand) hat, der 
nicht weiß, was gut und böse ist’ (Erman, SPAW 1911, 1098).”56 This 
immediately brings me to a second point: oddly enough, Bonnet translates 
‘heart’ as ‘reason’ (‘Verstand’) here, whereas he had just stressed that the 
notion of heart included ‘the whole range of impulses’ that flow through it, 
and that from the heart stem all thoughts and feelings that determine human 
action.57 Similarly, under the lemma ‘Herz’ [heart], Bonnet had stressed the 
affective component: “aus ihm [dem Herzen] quellen die Gefühle und 
Affekte, die den Menschen bewegen”.58 Of reason Bonnet there says that ‘it 
is also the heart’s function’ – so ‘reason’ is certainly not the primary 
translation.59 The many references to the heart in obviously moral contexts 
also seem to preclude the possibility that in those contexts, ‘reason’ would 
always be the proper translation. 
 It seems to me that it is good to be cautious in translating ‘heart’ as 
conscience – but then: that is not what I am trying to do. I am looking for 
the presence of something that we might call the symbol of conscience, and 
this does not rely on the fixed use of a single term. We may speak of the 
symbol of conscience when we find a certain grouping of expressions that 
                                                 
54 Bonnet (1952), 227. 
55 Ibid., 215. 
56 Ibid., 216. 
57 Idem. 
58 Ibid., 296. 
59 Ibid., 297. 
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are (in so far as we can infer from the context) connected to a certain class of 
experiences in a more or less stable manner. This is especially true since we 
are concerned with the emergence of the symbol. 
Let us return to the use of the word ‘heart’, where it does not refer 
to a ‘god within man’. Here is an example from the Instruction of Amenemope: 
 
“Give your ears, hear the sayings, 
Give your heart to understand them; 
it profits to put them in your heart, 
Woe to him who neglects them! 
Let them rest in the casket of your belly, 
May they be bolted in your heart; 
When there rises a whirlwind of words, 
They’ll be a mooring post for your tongue.”60 
 
The importance of the heart, if it were not already clear from the numerous 
references to it, is expressed in these lines: 
 
“The heart of man is a gift of god, 
Beware of neglecting it.”61 
 
 The following lines make us think of the difference between a quiet 
and a troubled conscience: 
 
“Better is poverty in the hand of the god, 
Than wealth in the storehouse; 
Better is bread with a happy heart 
Than wealth with vexation.”62 
 
Further on, this is expressed even more poignantly; guilt is presented as 
leading to physical distress: 
 
“Do not covet a poor man’s goods, 
Nor hunger for his bread; 
A poor man’s goods are a block in the throat, 
It makes the gullet vomit.”63 
 
 The tenth chapter of the Instruction of Amenemope points to the 
importance of integrity, both privately and socially: 
 
                                                 
60 Lichtheim (1976), 149 (Amenemope, ch. 1). She uses various translations of the text. 
61 Ibid., 160 (Amenemope, ch. 24). 
62 Ibid., 152 (Amenemope, ch. 6). These lines are repeated in chapter 13, except for the 
first, which is replaced by “Better is praise with the love of men” (156). 
63 Ibid., 154-155 (Amenemope, ch. 11). 
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“Don’t force yourself to greet the heated man, 
For then you injure your own heart; 
Do not say ‘greetings’ to him falsely, 
While there is terror in your belly. 
Do not speak falsely to a man, 
The god abhors it; 
Do not sever your heart from your tongue, 
That all your strivings may succeed. 
You will be weighty before the others, 
And secure in the hand of the god. 
God hates the falsifier of words, 
He greatly abhors the dissembler.”64 
 
 In chapter sixteen, a comparison is made between the weighing done 
by man, and that done by the gods. People are warned not to cheat in 
weighing (grain, for instance, but perhaps also their own deeds), for another 
kind of weighing is in store for them: 
 
“The Ape sits by the balance, 
His heart is in the plummet; 
Where is a god as great as Thoth, 
Who invented these things and made them?”65 
 
By themselves, these lines may not seem to reveal much, but they are quite 
revealing if one realizes that they refer to the weighing of the hearts of the 
deceased in the Judgement Hall of Osiris. This ritual is elaborately depicted 
in the famous Book of the Dead, a compilation of older texts made at the 
beginning of the eighteenth dynasty (so in the New Kingdom, around 1500 
BC). While Amen (Amen-Rā, or Amon, or Amon-Rā) was the greatest god 
in this world, Osiris was, as Budge writes, “King of the Other World, and 
Judge of the Dead, and the chief Ancestor-god of all Egypt.”66 The Book of 
the Dead was intended “to help the deceased (...) reach the Kingdom of 
Osiris”. “Osiris,” Budge writes, “demanded much of the deceased before he 
admitted him into the abode of the blessed. The deceased had to prove to 
the Divine Magistrates, or Assessors, that he had led a good life upon earth, 
and to submit his actions being weighed in the Great Scales against Maāt, i.e., 
the Truth (or, the Law). This weighing was performed with scrupulous care 
by Thoth and his deputy, in the presence of Osiris and the Great Company 
of the gods, and unless a man’s good deeds exactly counterbalanced Maāt, he 
was doomed to annihilation. (...) A man was responsible to his god, whether 
it was Rā or Osiris, for his deeds and words; on this fundamental fact the 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 154. 
65 Ibid., 156-157. 
66 Budge (1924), 30. 
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Egyptian conception of the Judgement of Souls was based.”67 There are 
many drawings of this ritual, the earlier ones relatively simple, the later ones 
much more elaborate. The early pictures show the goddess Maāt and the 
dog-headed Ape belonging to Thoth (the Ape in the passage from the 
Instruction of Amenemope quoted above) watching the weighing of the deceased 
person’s heart, in the presence of Osiris and, of course, the deceased. The 
heart is in the balance on one side of the Scales; a symbol of Maāt on the 
other.68 The deceased’s testimony of his own deeds (in the form of a 
‘negative confession’: ‘I have not committed sins’, et cetera) was weighed 
against truth, his heart becoming heavier with every lie.69 Descriptions in 
later papyri are also more elaborate; more onlookers and participants in the 
ceremony appear, among which is the soul of the deceased. Budge quotes 
from one text: 
 
“In real truth (...) the heart of the Osiris (Ani) has been weighed. His soul 
stood up bearing witness on his behalf. His character is right according to 
the Great Scales.”70 
 
 Budge shows that this idea of judgement in Egyptian religion was 
much older than the Book of the Dead. He quotes from the Teaching of King 
Khati, which was probably, originally, from around 3000 B.C.: 
 
“Make thyself able to justify thyself, or prove thy integrity, before God...”71 
 
“God knows those who work for him...” 
 
“If thou wilt oppress the widow [etc.] (...), thou wilt be judged and 
punished after death.”72 
 
In a passage on the Judgement, we find the following phrase: 
                                                 
67 Idem. ‘Maāt’ is the divine principle (and the god) of cosmic order and balance, and 
of truth. It is similar to the Stoic idea of natural law. Cf. Brunner (1983), 32; Mercer 
(1919), 90-91. 
68 See the pictures on ibid., 31, 40-44, and plates VI and VII. 
69 Brunner (1983), 132-133. It is not completely clear to me from the literature 
whether it was only the deceased’s statement that was measured against the real 
record of his deeds in his heart, or whether the evil deeds recorded in the heart were 
themselves weighed against Maāt. As the negative confession had a standardized 
form – it was not a personalized confession, but a standardized statement that one 
had not committed a long list of sins – it may come down to the same thing. See 
Budge on the ‘negative confession’ (33-39); he doubts whether it was originally 
intended to be in the Book of the Dead, and whether it was of native origin (37). 
70 Budge (1924), 43-44. The deceased was called ‘the Osiris’. 
71 Ibid., 15. 
72 Ibid., 16. 
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“It is a terrible thing for a man who knows [his sin] to be charged with it.”73 
 
Although the belief in a judgement after death was very old, its only 
expressions are in this form. It never became the subject of analytical 
reflection; hence, to refer both to these texts and to the much later text of 
Amenemope does not vitiate the purpose of this section. Brunner remarks 
that the expressions and images essential to the movement of personal piety 
continued to exist until the end of Egyptian religion (appearing even in 
Greek temples), but that it is dubious whether they still expressed lively 
religious experiences. He does not doubt, however, that they did do so in the 
time of Ramses II and Ramses III, in the nineteenth dynasty (ca. 1307-1196 
B.C.).74 
 It is the two elements of inwardness and judgement that we must 
retain for our analysis of the symbol of conscience. To return once more to 
the issue of the influence of Egypt on later cultures: it is with respect to the 
element of judgement that Brunner states the following: “Die bedeutendste 
religiöse Hinterlassenschaft Ägyptens aber ist ohne Frage der Gedanke des 
Totengerichts, besonders seine Instrumentation mit einer Waage; sowohl 
nach Griechenland wie nach Israel wandert der Gedanke an ein Gericht, das 
über die Lebensführung eines Menschen Rechenschaft fordert und dann 
entsprechend seinen Taten das Jenseitslos bestimmt. Das Christentum mag 
diese Vorstellung über das Judentum oder später (Petrus-Apokalypse) 
erhalten haben – die Herkunft noch der Bilder des Jüngsten Gerichts, oft mit 
der Waage, aus Ägypten ist nicht zweifelhaft.”75 
 Before I start with the analysis of the above passages, I will turn to 
another case (that of Socrates in Plato’s Apology), which may complement the 
Egyptian case in certain respects. 
 
1.3.2. The apology of Socrates 
A popular ‘early example’ of conscience in histories of the concept of 
conscience, is Sophocles’ play Antigone.76 It is, however, also a much debated 
example. Antigone’s ‘appeal to conscience’ seems to be rather egocentric, in 
a way. It is dubious whether she provides a good example of the use of the 
symbol of conscience, rather than an example of strong feelings of 
sympathy, confined to her close relatives. Therefore, I prefer to present the 
(just as often mentioned) example of Socrates (469-399 B.C.), in order to 
point out the basic elements of the symbol of conscience. I will confine 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 18. The words between brackets are in Budge’s text. 
74 Brunner (1983), 117-118. 
75 Ibid., 150-151; he also refers to S.G.F. Brandon, The Judgment of the Dead, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1967. 
76 See, for example: Stelzenberger (1963b); Mock (1983), 1983; Vermeulen (1989). 
 93 
myself here to Plato’s presentation of Socrates’ trial and defence, because of 
the clarity with which certain elements of the symbol of conscience show 
themselves. Xenophon (among others) offers a different version of Socrates’ 
defence, and gives a different interpretation of his famous ‘daimonion’, 
Socrates ‘superhuman thing’, with which we are particularly concerned 
here.77 
 That there are different versions of the apology of Socrates makes us 
realize that we are not dealing with an historically accurate description of 
what happens, but with a piece of literature – a sample, as Gerd van Riel 
says, of “a literary genre that was quite successful in the early fourth century 
BCE”. “This Socratic literature never provides a neutral account of Socrates 
as a historical figure.”78 So any expressions of conscience we might find are 
not spontaneous utterings made by Socrates; instead they are the words 
through which Plato makes Socrates speak. Nevertheless, they can still be 
expressions of conscience, stemming from (or at least mediated by) Plato’s 
experience, and directed at an audience supposed to understand it, or at least 
some of it. While it is important to note that when I speak of ‘Socrates’ 
below, I mean Plato’s Socrates, it is also worth noting that Plato seems to 
have endeavoured to do justice to Socrates’ experience. Van Riel remarks: 
“[T]here is a difference between the way in which the Platonic Socrates is 
allowed to speak about his own daimonion, and the way in which the words 
daimonios and daimōn are used [by Plato] in other contexts.”79 A second point 
to make is that if one wishes to take Plato’s Apology as a starting-point for a 
discussion of conscience, there are two routes one might take. The first 
focuses on Socrates’ disobedience to the polis, on what we might call his 
conscientious objection. The second route takes one via Socrates’ 
‘daimonion’. According to some authors, these routes converge; for others, 
they are one and the same, and yet others hold them to be separate routes 
altogether. Furthermore, many authors would dispute that one or both of 
these routes lead to conscience. Luc Brisson, for instance, categorically 
denies that the ‘daimonion’ has anything in common with what we tend to 
call conscience: “We therefore cannot consider that the signal perceived by 
Socrates might be equivalent to a form of moral conscience.”80 This is his 
answer to Hadot, who wrote with regard to the ‘daimonion’: “Mystic 
experience or mythical image, it is hard to say; but in any case we can see in it 
a kind of figure of what would later be called the moral conscience.”81 I am 
                                                 
77 Michael Stokes translates ‘daimonion’ as ‘superhuman thing’. He explains why in 
Plato (1997), 7-8. 
78 Van Riel (2005), 31. 
79 Ibid., 42. 
80 Brisson (2005), 6. 
81 Idem, note 16, quoted from P. Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, M. Chase 
(transl.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2002. 
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no classicist, which means that I have to make do with translations and other 
people’s comments on them, judging the plausibility of their interpretations 
in light of other interpretations, the strength of their arguments, consistency, 
the number of supporting assumptions required in order to make a point, 
and so on.82 Overall, I can say that there are no conclusive reasons not to 
interpret parts of the Apology in terms of conscience, while there are several 
reasons to do so. So let us just see where both of the aforementioned routes 
take us. 
 
1.3.2.1. Socrates as a conscientious objector 
The Apology is concerned with Socrates’ trial. Everything said, is said at the 
trial, and it is mostly Socrates that does the talking. Socrates is on trial, 
because he is said to be “an offender and a meddler, in studying things below 
the earth and in the sky, and making the weaker argument into the stronger 
and instructing other people in these same things”, as Socrates himself 
repeats the accusation.83 Both Plato’s and Xenophon’s version of the Apology 
make clear that Socrates is charged with corrupting the young of Athens, and 
with not recognising the gods of the city and introducing new superhuman 
beings instead.84 Socrates sets out to defend himself by repudiating the 
various elements of the accusation one by one, while explaining that the 
more problematic accusations for him are not those made by Meletos and 
others during the trial, but older ones: the accusations made by many people 
over many years, the slander and the gossip that have given Socrates a bad 
name, and that have set people up against him.85 He dismisses the various 
elements of the accusations for which he is on trial either by showing them 
to be inconsistent, or by pointing out their evident untruth or obvious 
implausibility. He also tries to explain himself and his behaviour – the 
behaviour that irritated many people so much – by revealing the underlying 
reasons and motivations. Socrates tells the men of Athens about 
Chairephoon, a young friend of his, who once asked the oracle in Delphi 
whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates. The Pythia answered that no 
one was wiser. Socrates could not understand this, and set out to investigate 
the wisdom of notoriously wise people, finding (to his surprise and 
disappointment) that they were invariably not as wise as they thought they 
were. By pointing this out to the people he questioned, Socrates made 
himself hated. He came to see it as his mission, however, to continue this 
                                                 
82 I have used the most recent specialized literature available, collected in Socrates’ 
Divine Sign (see note 131); I found that Michael Stokes’ fairly recent translation of the 
Apology (and of the crucial passages in particular) agrees very well with the literature. 
83 Ap 19b-c (Plato [1997], 45). 
84 Ibid., 10 (introduction), Ap 23d, 24b-c (Plato [1997], 55). 
85 Meletos accuses him on behalf of the poets, Anytos represents the professionals, 
and Lycon the orators. 
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practice. The god (Apollo, most likely, given that the oracle in Delphi was 
devoted mainly to Apollo) used him as an instrument to show people that 
human wisdom amounts to nothing compared to that of the god. The god 
has made Socrates an example to the people, because Socrates at least has 
the wisdom of knowing that he knows nothing. So Socrates’ actions are a 
matter of obedience and servitude to the god.86 His mission is to occupy 
himself with philosophy, with self-examination and the examination of 
others. For Socrates, this is a matter of doing the right thing, of acting justly. 
To do what is right – in Socrates’ case, to fulfil his god-given mission – is 
more important even than to stay alive: 
 
“Someone may perhaps say: ‘Are you not really ashamed, Socrates, of 
having practised the kind of activity that puts your life now in danger?’ I 
should answer him, and justly too, like this: ‘Your suggestion is 
dishonourable, Sir, if you think a man who is the slightest use ought to take 
into account the risk of life or death, rather than to consider one thing 
alone in every action, whether the action is just or unjust, and the behaviour 
that of a good man or a bad. (…)’ ”87 
 
Socrates explains that he owes obedience to the god before the Athenians – 
the kind of expression that would become a recurring motif in (early) 
Christian history: 
 
“[I]f, then, you were to acquit me, as I said, on these conditions [‘that you 
don’t any longer spend your time on this inquiry nor do philosophy’], I 
should tell you: ‘I greet you, Athenians, with affection, but I shall obey the 
god rather than you, and so long as I am alive and capable I will not stop 
doing philosophy and advising you…”88 
 
He even argues that his obedience to the god is the best thing that ever 
happened to the polis. Socrates then answers the question that might arise, 
of why he never gave his service to the polis a more public form. At this 
point, Socrates’ ‘daimonion’ enters the scene. Answering the question why 
                                                 
86 So Socrates is neither an atheist nor an agnostic. Gerd van Riel argues persuasively 
that atheism or agnosticism could not have been the reason behind Socrates’ 
condemnation; nor could it have been his rationalisation of religion, because this was 
in line with a ‘general tendency of religious evolution in the fifth century’, and 
because no accusastion of impiety that we know of from that time concerns 
rationalisation of the divine, unless it leads to atheism or agnosticism. Socrates “does 
not call into question the value of traditional religion as such”. The problem, Van 
Riel argues, was Socrates’ internalisation and privatisation of the divine. (Van Riel 
[2005], 32-33, 35.) 
87 Ap 28b (Plato [1997], 65). 
88 Ap 29d (Plato [1997], 69); see also Ap 28e-29a. 
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he went around advising people all the time, but never went into politics, 
Socrates says: 
 
“The reason for this is the thing you have often heard me talking about in 
various places: a thing divine and superhuman happens to me (…); I have 
had it ever since childhood, a certain voice which happens, and every time 
it happens it always turns me away from whatever I am about to do, but 
never turns me towards anything. This is what opposes my participation in 
politics, and very rightly I think it opposes it. (…) it is essential for a man 
who is in truth going to fight for what is just, if he is going to last for even 
a little time, to act personally rather than publicly.”89 
 
Socrates then points out how dangerous political life is for such a man ‘who 
is in truth going to fight for what is just’. The only public office he ever held, 
was that of counsellor. While he held that office, the Athenians decided to 
sentence ten generals who had failed to pick up drowning men during a sea 
battle all at once, which was against the law, “as you all later thought”.90 
Socrates reminds his audience that he was the only one of the Prytaneis 
(presidents of the Council) who objected to and voted against this course of 
action. He thought he “ought rather to stand by the law and what was just 
than to side with you when you were making a decision that was not just, for 
fear of imprisonment or death”. 91 And this, Socrates says, was when the 
polis was still democratic. Later, when it had become an oligarchy, Socrates 
and four others were given the to his mind unjust order to bring in Leon the 
Salaminian to be killed. He disobeyed: 
 
“…that time I showed again, not in word but in deed, that death concerns 
me (…) not at all, whereas doing nothing unjust or impious, that is my 
whole concern.”92 
 
Had the regime not fallen shortly afterwards, Socrates might very well have 
been killed for his disobedience.93 
 After his speech, the jury pronounces the verdict: ‘guilty’. The 
accusers have demanded the death penalty. Socrates is allowed to speak 
again, and has the opportunity to propose an alternative to the death penalty. 
In the following speech, after he has made it plain that he is innocent and 
does not deserve punishment at all, he considers several options, among 
                                                 
89 Ap 31d (Plato [1997], 73). In Xenophon’s version, Socrates’ daimonion also urges 
him to do certain things, instead of just forbidding certain actions. 
90 Ap 32b (Plato [1997], 73). 
91 Ap 32b-c (Plato [1997], 75). 
92 Ap 32d (Plato [1997], 75). 
93 What Socrates is in fact explaining here, is that the polis was (and is) a 
‘conscientious-objection-unfriendly’ context – see chapter 13. 
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which is that of exile. He states, however, that “to hold his tongue and lead a 
quiet life, in exile” is not an option, as it would be ‘disobedience to the 
god’.94 This attitude Socrates has, of preferring his own idea of what is 
(un)just and of what constitutes obedience to the god to that of the polis or 
the majority, also returns in the Crito: 
 
“Are we to fear and follow the multitude in such matters [‘what is just and 
unjust, honorable and shameful, good and evil’]? Or is it rather the opinion 
of one man, if he but have knowledge, which we must reverence and fear 
beyond all the rest?”95 
 
“SOC. Crito, my dear and faithful friend, (…), [b]e assured that if you speak 
against the things I now think true, you will speak in vain. Still, if you 
suppose you can accomplish anything, please speak. 
CRI. Socrates, I cannot speak. 
SOC. Very well, Crito. Let us so act, since so the God leads.”96 
 
 Unless one were looking for an equivalent of the term ‘conscience’, 
there is little to distinguish Socrates from a modern conscientious objector. 
He wishes to do ‘nothing just or impious’, and to obey the god, rather than 
men. This leads him to make a stand for what he believes in, even if this 
means placing his own life at risk. This seems to me to be enough reason to 
say that conscience is an issue in Plato’s version of the Apology. But what 
about the ‘daimonion’? 
 
1.3.2.2. Socrates’ ‘daimonion’ 
Socrates divine sign, (the one of/from) his ‘daimonion’, is often alluded to as 
a reference to conscience, similar to Christian references to ‘the voice of 
conscience’ (which is then taken to be the voice of God). The Catholic 
Encyclopedia is quite happy to do so: “His frequent references to a ‘divine 
voice’ that inspired him at critical moments in his career are, perhaps, best 
explained by saying that they are simply his peculiar way of speaking about 
the promptings of his own conscience.”97 Stoker writes: “Das ‘warnende 
Gewissen’ sagt immer, was wir nicht tun sollen, nie was wir wohl tun sollen; 
– wer denkt hier nicht unwillkürlich an Sokrates’ Daimonion?”98 Stelzenberger 
also mentions it in an enumeration of Greek and Roman expressions of and 
                                                 
94 Ap 37e-38a (Plato [1997], 85). In the following, Socrates states, famously, that “life 
without examination is not worth a man’s living”. 
95 Crito 47c-d (Plato [1984], 121-122). 
96 Crito 54d-e (Plato [1984], 129). 
97 See http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14119a.htm. The term ‘inspired’ is not 
very appropriate, given the apotreptic (as opposed to protreptic) nature of the sign; 
that is, it always advised against things, but never gave positive advice. 
98 Stoker (1925), 206. 
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references to conscience.99 I have already said that those who made a special 
study of Socrates’ divine sign are divided upon the issue. There is 
disagreement about the origin of the sign, the nature of the sign, and the 
proper translation of the Greek to begin with. Furthermore, specialists argue 
about the consistency between Socrates’ rationality and his obedience to the 
sign, about the (in)consistency between the Apology and other dialogues in 
this regard, about the (non-)exclusiveness of the sign, and so on. Some of 
these discussions are highly relevant for my purpose, so I will very briefly 
address a number of the above questions. 
 As to the translation of ‘daimonion’ and ‘to daimonion’: the 
discussion centres around the question whether we are dealing with an 
adjective or a substantivized adjective. Brisson argues that, even where 
‘daimonion’ is preceded by ‘to’, we should not substantivize it, because ‘to 
daimonion’ should be taken as short for ‘to daimonion sēmeion’, i.e. ‘the 
divine sign’.100 Pierre Destrée holds the same view.101 Many other authors do 
substantivize ‘daimonion’, and often leave it untranslated. However, they 
may still use it as synonymous with ‘the divine sign’, as Mark McPherran 
does.102 Gerd van Riel is less clear about it; he speaks of ‘the daimonion’, but 
refers to it both as a voice, and as an internal force or even a god.103 For my 
purpose, it does not matter too much whether we take the ‘daimonion’ to be 
a god or divine entity itself, or whether we view it as a divine sign. The 
important thing is that the word implies a certain degree of externalisation – 
something is ‘said’ or pointed out to Socrates; it is something that happens to 
him (something divine, supernatural, superhuman, or whatever). 
 Some authors argue that Socrates’ divine sign comes from Apollo, 
the god who (presumably) gave Socrates his mission.104 Others attempt to 
refute this idea. Van Riel, responding to two authors who believe the sign to 
come from Apollo, argues that “it is essential that Socrates himself never 
says that the voice that he hears is the voice of a god that comes from the 
outside. (...) [I]t is not Apollo who is responsible for the daimonion. It is rather 
a matter of the intervention of a private divine force that belongs to 
Socrates.”105 Had it come from Apollo, there would have been little reason 
to accuse Socrates of introducing new gods and of refusing to recognize the 
                                                 
99 Stelzenberger (1963b), 22. 
100 Brisson (2005), 2f. 
101 Destrée (2005), 64. 
102 McPherran (2005), 13-30. 
103 Van Riel (2005), 34-35, 41. 
104 So McPherran (2005), 16, 25 note 32. Brisson (2005), 4, says: “The signal could 
have been sent to Socrates by Apollo or by any other divinity of the traditional 
pantheon. If we limit ourselves to the texts considered here, we cannot say anything 
more.” Brisson is at least convinced, then, that the source must be a traditional god. 
105 Van Riel (2005), 35. 
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gods of the city.106 Mark Joyal remains in doubt: “[I]t is very hard to feel 
completely confident that we should reject the identification of ho theos with 
Apollo in this passage.”107 Overall, it seems much more plausible to me that 
the ‘daimonion’ is in a special category; that it is not in the category of 
prophetic dreams and oracular revelations – things which Socrates believed 
in.108 There is too much vagueness surrounding the ‘daimonion’ for it to be 
likely that the divine sign stems from Apollo; furthermore, there is 
something unsettling about it – hence the accusation of introducing new 
gods – and, finally, it is in practice (virtually) exclusive to Socrates in its 
appearance.109 
 Finally, it is important to look at interpretations of the nature of the 
sign. In this context, the relevant question is whether it is only concerned 
with ‘moral’ matters (in a broad sense of the term), or whether it warns 
Socrates in moral and non-moral matters alike. Brisson is adamant that the 
latter is the case; he enumerates a short list of passages and says: “In all these 
cases, the signal diverts Socrates from occupations to which no moral value 
is attached: instead, the moral value of these occupations depends on the 
interpretation Socrates gives to it after the fact. It is Socrates who, later on, 
will consider that it was better for him not to undertake the prohibited 
action. We therefore cannot consider that the signal perceived by Socrates 
might be equivalent to a form of moral conscience.”110 
 A number of issues have become entangled in this passage. First of 
all, if we want to know whether the ‘daimonion’ has anything to do with 
something we might call conscience, it is quite relevant how Socrates 
interpreted it. Rather than constituting evidence against an interpretation of 
the divine sign as a manifestation of conscience, a consistent interpretation 
of the sign as relating to moral matters on Socrates’ part constitutes evidence 
that the ‘daimonion’ should be taken as a symbolic expression of experiences 
of conscience. (Though, again, we are not dealing with spontaneous 
expressions on the part of the historical Socrates, but with expressions 
placed in the mouth of Plato’s literary Socrates.) 
                                                 
106 Ibid., 31-35. 
107 Joyal (2005), 109. He refers to Ap 40b2: ‘to tou theou sēmeion’ (the sign of/from 
the god). 
108 See McPherran (2005), 14. 
109 See Plato’s Republic, Book VI, 496c, as quoted in Destrée (2005), 65: “What about 
our own case (to hēmeteron), the divine sign is hardly worth mentioning, either because 
it has never happened to anybody else or, perhaps has happened to somebody else in 
the past.” Note that the translation by G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve is 
significantly different; Van Riel (2005), 42 (note 27), quotes from it: “Finally, my 
own case is hardly worth mentioning – my daemonic sign – because it has happened 
to no one before me, or to only a very few.” 
110 Brisson (2005), 6. 
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 Secondly, there is a difference between actions that are good for 
Socrates and actions that are simply good. Otherwise put, actions that are 
beneficial to someone may not be morally good. Socrates would probably 
have argued that things that are morally bad cannot be beneficial, but that 
still leaves room for a difference between the beneficial and the good. What 
is beneficial may at least be morally neutral. I will come back to this later. 
 There is a third problem with the above passage; the claim that “the 
signal diverts Socrates from occupations to which no moral value is 
attached” is partly untrue, and partly disputable. Roslyn Weiss’ interpretation 
of the same passages is very illuminating in this respect. Brisson asks: “From 
what action does the divine signal divert Socrates?” He first mentions a 
passage from the Apology, but I will come to that shortly. Brisson continues: 
“In the Euthydemus (272e) and in the Phaedrus (242d), it stops him from 
getting up and leaving.”111 This makes the sign sound rather ridiculous. Why 
would it simply stop Socrates from getting up and leaving? (It makes sense 
that Socrates would ask the same thing.) Weiss points out, which Brisson 
does not, that the Euthydemus is a comedy. Hence, “[t]he Euthydemus passage 
seems to put a comic spin on the daimonion, a comic turn quite in place in a 
comic dialogue. There is nothing of moral import or even of danger – 
nothing that could even remotely be called ‘bad’ – in Socrates’ leaving the 
dressing room.”112 Given that the Euthydemus is a comedy, we should turn to 
the other passages. 
 For Brisson, the Euthydemus and the Phaedrus provide examples of 
the same thing. But does he do justice to the passage in the Phaedrus by 
describing it the way he does? According to Weiss, the passage has a moral-
religious meaning, and she considers it to offer “still stronger support for my 
thesis that the daimonion does not oppose Socrates’ views but warns him 
when he is about to oppose them.” The reason for this is that the Phaedrus 
tells us what happened before the appearance of the ‘daimonion’, and hence 
                                                 
111 Idem. 
112 Weiss (2005), 89. Note that Weiss does distinguish between two meanings of 
‘bad’ (we might say ‘morally bad’ and ‘harmful’), in the same way I distinguished 
between ‘morally good’ and ‘beneficial’. In a footnote Weiss points out, for those 
who insist on a serious interpretation of the ‘daimonion’ in this passage, that “my 
thesis can still fairly easily accommodate it” – this thesis being that Socrates’ divine 
sign is a ‘warning bell’ that makes itself heard whenever Socrates is about to (or 
intends to) do something which goes against his own better judgement, which 
contradicts Socrates’ own deeply held convictions, or, in yet other words, which 
conflicts with what Socrates’ most deeply cares about. In this case, the sign could be 
said to prevent Socrates from leaving, because that would conflict with Socrates’ 
deep concern with philosophy – for had he left, he would not have had the chance 
to talk with the two ‘eristical clowns’ Dionysodoros and Euthydemus. 
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“affords us a glimpse of where Socrates stands irrespective of the sounding 
of his daimonion.”113 This is how the appearance of the sign is described: 
 
“My friend, just when I was about to cross the river, the familiar divine sign 
came to me which, whenever it occurs, holds me back from something I 
am about to do. I thought I heard a kind of voice at this very moment...”114 
 
The voice forbids Socrates to leave the place where he is standing, and 
thereby to cross the river, as he was about to do, until he had atoned for an 
offence against the gods. Now, Weiss draws attention to what follows, 
regarding what precedes the event of the above passage: 
 
“In fact, the soul too, my friend, is itself a sort of seer; that’s why, almost 
from the beginning of my speech, I was disturbed by a very uneasy feeling, 
as Ibycus puts it, that ‘for offending the gods I am honored by men’. But 
now I understand exactly what my offense has been.”115 
 
Weiss comments: “We see from this passage that well before the sign forbids 
his movement, indeed almost from the beginning of his speech, Socrates 
feels uneasy, sensing that he might be offending the gods. It is Socrates’ soul 
that is the ‘seer’, catching the first glimpse of the wrongness of his action. 
What the daimonion does is make audible to Socrates what his soul intuitively 
grasps, so that his soul’s quiet warning does not go unheeded. (...) [T]he 
daimonion acts upon Socrates’ own feeling that he has done something wrong 
that needs to be rectified; it amplifies, then, his own doubts about what he is 
about to do. Although the sign is experienced by Socrates as adventitious, it 
in fact comes not from without but from within.”116 Most significant for my 
                                                 
113 Weiss (2005), 90. 
114 Phdr 242b8ff, quoted in Joyal (2005), 107; this translation is virtually the same as 
the one by Nehamas and Woodruff (1995) that Weiss uses (see the next note), 
except that they translate ‘a voice’ instead of ‘a kind of voice’ (see Joyal [2005], 103). 
115 Phdr 242c6-d2, quoted in Weiss (2005), 90. 
116 Weiss (2005), 90. It is worth noting that the translation ‘almost from the 
beginning of my speech’ is not unproblematic; the translations of this passage differ 
widely – Weiss’ general point remains valid, however. Her position is close to that of 
Vlastos, who is criticized by Brickhouse and Smith for being a reductionist, that is: 
for seeking “to reduce the daimonion to other, more recognizably rational, 
experiences.” (Brickhouse and Smith [2005], 44.) They quote Vlastos: “Socrates has 
a ‘hunch’ – a strong intuitive impression – that a certain belief or action is correct 
without being able to articulate his grounds for it at the moment.”. (Quoted from G. 
Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
283.) Brickhouse and Smith argue that what the ‘daimonion’ does is “force Socrates 
to attend to his intuitive sense”, and they insist on the separateness of the 
‘daimonion’ and the ‘rational intuition’ – they cannot be identified, “as the 
reductionist account requires” (Brickhouse and Smith [2005], 48). I am not sure 
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purpose here is that we find that the context in which the ‘daimonion’ 
appeared was not at all devoid of moral-religious significance; instead, 
Socrates’ moral-religious convictions were at stake. Brisson’s superficial 
interpretation must be rejected. 
 What does Brisson say about the Theaetetus passage? According to 
Brisson, the ‘daimonion’ “prevents [Socrates] from seeing again some of his 
disciples who left him some time ago”.117 Again, there seems to be little of 
moral import in the event. Weiss says: “In the Theaetetus, it is certainly likely 
that Socrates has his own sense of which of his former pupils are unworthy 
of renewed exposure to his maieutic art, and that his daimonion merely 
concretizes his own reservations about these students, stopping him from 
readmitting them against his better judgment.”118 Again, Weiss is first of all 
eager to defend her thesis, but in doing so she points to what is important 
for us, namely, that something ‘moral’ is at stake right enough. The relevant 
passage in the Theaetetus reads as follows: 
 
(Socrates has just explained his ‘midwifery’, and said that “the many fine 
ideas and offspring that they [his ‘pupils’] produce come from within 
themselves. But the god and I are responsible for the delivery.”) 
 
“There is clear evidence of this. Often in the past people have not been 
aware of the part I play: they have discounted me, and thought that they 
themselves were responsible for the delivery. (...) [T]hey left me sooner 
than they ought to. Then, because they kept bad company, they proceeded 
to have only miscarriages, and they spoiled all the offspring I had delivered 
with wrong upbringing. (...) Eventually, they gained a reputation for 
stupidity, and thought themselves stupid too. (...) If they come back, 
begging and doing goodness knows what for my company, sometimes the 
supernatural sign that I get does not allow me to let them be with me, but 
in some cases it does, and these are the ones who make progress again.”119 
 
For Socrates, the ‘midwifery sessions’ are of the utmost importance; they are 
part and parcel of his philosophical mission, which means that they are part 
of what constitutes ‘doing the right thing’ for Socrates. So Weiss’ 
                                                                                                               
whether Weiss’ account would also be reductionist in their view, but I think her 
position is the most sensible one: the appearance of the ‘daimonion’ is related to 
Socrates’ own convictions, and warns him when he is about to act against him, at 
moments when he is, for some reason or another, momentarily unaware of it, or 
unable to articulate what is wrong. In the latter case, the sign forces him to obtain 
clarity before acting. 
117 Brisson (2005), 6. 
118 Weiss (2005), 90. ‘Maieutic’ refers to the Socratic method of ‘midwifery’; Socrates, 
in conversations, is like a midwife in delivering other person’s ‘babies’, that is: 
insights. 
119 Tht 150d-151a (Plato [1987], 28). 
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interpretation is certainly not implausible, and Brisson’s interpretation at 
least disputable. 
 Yet this passage draws attention to an aspect of Socrates’ ‘morality’ 
that is largely disregarded by all the authors mentioned in this paragraph: it 
comprises much more than what we would call ‘morality’ – in fact, the word 
is too narrow to be really applicable to Socrates’ view of the good. The 
passage from the Apology quoted in 1.8.2.1 might still justify Weiss’ statement 
that “what a daimonion does is prevent the just man from doing unjust things 
by alerting him to their injustice”, but when Socrates, being convicted, 
explains the meaning of what has happened to him, her interpretation is no 
longer adequate: 
 
“…my customary prophecy (the one from my superhuman thing) used 
previously all the time to be very frequent, and oppose me in very slight 
matters, if ever I was about to do anything wrong. But on this occasion 
there have happened to me what you see for yourselves, the very things 
which a person would think, and they are thought, to be the ultimate harm. 
But the god’s sign neither opposed my leaving the house at dawn nor my 
climb up here to the court (…). (…) [A]t no point in this business has it 
opposed any action or word of mine. (…) [P]robably this which has 
happened to me is for the good, and we cannot be right who suppose that 
death is a bad thing. I have had strong evidence of this: it would have been 
impossible for my usual sign not to oppose me if I had not been about to 
do something good for me.”120 
 
It is tempting to focus on Socrates’ (that is, Plato’s) references to justice 
(‘doing nothing unjust or impious’, et cetera) in the Apology, and in this 
passage on the phrase ‘if ever I was about to do something wrong’, and to 
take ‘wrong’ to mean ‘morally wrong’, but that would be a simplification. 
Weiss chooses to interpret the non-manifestation of the sign on the occasion 
of Socrates’ trial exclusively morally: “Just as the daimonion really could only 
have been triggered by the prospect of Socrates’ engaging in the dirty 
business of politics rather than by the badness of the untimely death he 
might incur as a result, so surely was it pacified not by the goodness of 
Socrates’ impending death but by the just way in which Socrates conducted 
himself at his trial.”121 This is a mistake. Socrates’ last reference to the 
‘daimonion’ shows it to have a double or mixed nature: on the one hand it 
prevents Socrates from doing what is unjust, impious, morally wrong; on the 
other it prevents Socrates from incurring harm.122 In this last passage, the 
                                                 
120 Ap 40a2-c2 (Plato [1997], 91). 
121 Weiss (2005), 83. 
122 I will leave undiscussed here the logical problem that not to be about to do 
something harmful is not the same thing as being about to do something beneficial, 
as Socrates seems to hold. Cf. Brisson (2005), 8; Weiss (2005), 83-84. 
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emphasis is clearly on the prevention of harmful consequences. The 
‘something good for me’ in the last sentence precludes any (plausible) moral 
reading. In fact, the passage from the Phaedrus also seems to connect what is 
morally good with what has good (beneficial) consequences: the pupils which 
Socrates’ sign allows him to take back “are the ones who make progress 
again”.123 
 In my view, there is a parallel between the function of Socrates’ 
‘daimonion’ and the ambiguity of goodness in the Apology on the one hand, 
and the meaning of ‘eudaimonia’ as we find it (for instance) in Aristotle. In 
Book I.viii of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “it seems clear that 
happiness needs the addition of external goods”, after which he names a 
number of them, such as wealth, friends, political influence, and personal 
beauty. He concludes the paragraph thus: 
 
“So, as we said, happiness [‘eudaimonia’] seems to require this sort of 
prosperity too; which is why some identify it with good fortune, although 
others identify it with virtue.”124 
 
‘Eudaimonia’, here translated as ‘happiness’, though many prefer other 
translations, like ‘(human) flourishing’, depends on virtue, but also on luck – 
something to which Martha Nussbaum (among others) has drawn 
attention.125 This should not surprise us, really, given that ‘eudaimonia’ is a 
metaphor, depending on the literal meaning of (having) a ‘good (guardian) 
spirit’. So the term may take us two ways: 1) ‘eudaimonia’ may be seen as 
intrinsically connected with virtuousness, as is the case for Aristotle – this 
may perhaps be linked to the literal meaning of ‘eudaimonia’ via an 
association of a guardian spirit with a good moral guide; 2) ‘eudaimonia’ may 
mean that one has a good guardian spirit that takes good care of one, making 
sure that nothing is wanting. So ‘eudaimonia’ refers to virtue as well as to 
luck in external circumstances. Similarly, while I do not wish to imply that 
Socrates’ daimonion should simply be seen as a guardian spirit, we do see 
that the ‘daimonion’ prevents Socrates from doing wrong, as well as 
preventing that something bad happens to him. The moral and the non-
moral are not fully differentiated; hence, Socrates’ ‘daimonion’ cannot be a 
moral conscience in a narrow sense. Nevertheless, it relates to what Socrates 
should do, in a broader sense – to a right order of things. As such, it can 
symbolize conscience. 
 
 
                                                 
123 Of course, we would still say that there is a strong connection between what is 
beneficial and what is morally right, in the sense that some action’s being beneficial 
provides a moral reason for doing it, but that is not the issue here. 
124 Aristotle (1985), 80. 
125 Nussbaum (1995). For the meaning of ‘eudaimonia’, see especially 365. 
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1.3.3. An emerging symbol 
What I have presented in the previous two subsections provides adequate 
and enough material for an analysis of the symbol of conscience in terms of 
its core elements, as I will give in the following section. But it may be useful 
to recapitulate what I have done here, and what I mean by ‘the emergence of 
the symbol’. I have explained (in the introductions to this book and the 
present chapter) why I wish to see conscience as a symbol; it is a means of 
getting at the experiences underlying the enormous variety of expressions 
associated with conscience, and a way to discover an underlying unity. With 
Voegelin, I have explained why an analysis of the symbol must proceed from 
its early (yet not too early) beginnings; this is where the symbol has a level of 
articulation that allows us to distil the various elements of meaning of which 
it is made up, without being ‘spoiled’ by too much reflection, and without 
having lost its close connection to the engendering experiences. I have 
chosen two key texts: the Egyptian Wisdom (or Instruction) of Amenemope and 
Plato’s Apology. Whatever historical connections there may be between 
Egyptian and Greek thought, these texts must not be taken to represent two 
successive phases in the emergence of the symbol of conscience. It is enough 
that they represent two relatively independent moments of emergence, two 
points of ‘break-through’ of the symbol of conscience. Some core elements 
of the symbol of conscience, as we will see, show up more clearly in the one, 
and others more clearly in the other. Another reason why it is valuable to 
have these two texts as ‘raw material’ instead of just one is that it shows that 
the symbol of conscience may turn up in very different places, at very 
different times; hence, that conscience is primarily something human, and 
not something unique to one particular culture and period, as some people 
are wont to think. 
 The emerging symbol of conscience, neither in the Egyptian case 
nor in that of Socrates, consists of a single expression. Only later, as we will 
see in the next chapter, do single terms function as (more or less) the 
complete symbol. ‘Heart’ is a key term in the Egyptian example, of course, 
but whether we are dealing with a symbolization of conscience or not 
depends very much on the context. Context is also important in Socrates’ 
case, but here, too, there are some key symbolic expressions: ‘daimonion’ 
and related terms. The term ‘daimonion’ can be seen as symbolic here, 
because its use is surrounded by too much vagueness to be an indicative 
term. Socrates does not simply refer to something that is well-known and 
recognizable. Hence, he uses expressions like ‘a certain voice which happens 
to me’ (in the Apology), and in the Phaedrus ‘a kind of voice’. Mark Joyal 
comments on both passages, pointing out that the Greek phrase used is 
‘phōnē tis’: “I submit that what the Platonic Socrates lay claim to 
experiencing was not ‘a voice’ in the literal sense that we might think of it, 
but ‘a kind of voice’ or ‘a voice, as it were’, so that tis here, as often, is being 
used to apologize for or to soften a metaphor. (...) Socrates is even more 
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diffident in the Phaedrus than he is in the Apology: edoxa ... akousai, ‘I thought I 
heard a kind of voice’.”126 The suggestion that Socrates is using symbolic 
language gains further strength from the plausibility of the hypothesis that 
when he speaks of ‘the sign of the god’ he is not referring to any particular 
(known) god; the expression is then seen as ‘conveying indeterminacy’, and 
“lack of precision is something that we constantly find in Plato’s 
Socrates”.127 It is also a characteristic of symbolic language. 
 
 
1.4. CORE ELEMENTS OF THE SYMBOL OF CONSCIENCE 
In the two examples presented in the previous section, a number of elements 
can be distinguished, that form the core of the symbol of conscience. They 
are elements on the level of symbolization, but with a connection to the 
experiential level. These elements recur time and again (together or 
separately) in equivalent symbolizations, and also, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, in more doctrinal formulations regarding conscience. I distinguish 
between three core elements of the symbol of conscience: 1) the element of 
ultimate concern; 2) the element of intimacy; 3) the element of the witness. 
Below, I will discuss each of them in turn.128 These elements, of which the 
first is the most important – it can never be absent in symbolic expressions 
of conscience – constitute the more or less stable structure or framework of 
the symbol of conscience wherever and whenever it occurs. Within this 
framework, many things are variable: the exact expressions used, the exact 
quality of underlying experiences, what triggers experiences of conscience 
and what occasions appeal to the symbol. But the semi-formal, semi-
substantial framework constituted by the above elements is what legitimates 
the language of equivalences with regard to experiences and symbolizations 
of conscience. 
 
1.4.1. The element of ultimate concern 
The term ‘ultimate concern’, as I have said, comes from Tillich, who 
described faith as ‘the state of being ultimately concerned’. Ultimate concern 
has two aspects: that of being ultimately concerned, and that of having a 
concern for the ultimate. In a religious person, these ought to be two sides of 
the same coin, and I suppose they inevitably are, as soon as one has an 
ultimate concern. Bu the aspects can be expressed separately and differently. 
The relation to an ultimate, an absolute, is expressed by means of symbols of 
ultimacy. ‘God’ is the most obvious example, and we encounter it both in the 
Egyptian case and with Socrates. The Egyptian texts speak of the god, or of 
the gods in their various manifestations, of the Great Scales, and of the heart 
                                                 
126 Joyal (2005), 107. 
127 Ibid., 109. 
128 On these elements, see also chapters 13, 14 and 15. 
 107 
of a man as his own god. Socrates speaks of his ‘daimonion’, his divine or 
superhuman thing, as well as of the god. Such expressions convey an 
awareness of a moral-religious standard, other than and superior to one’s 
own or that of the community.129 More precisely, they convey an awareness 
of two possibilities: that one’s own moral standard needs to be corrected, and 
that one may participate in knowledge of a higher order – that is, that one can 
indeed correct one’s standard. We might call the superior standard a 
transcendent standard, but it need not be transcendent in the sense of 
referring to something outside of this world. Later expressions of conscience 
are often immanentized, in the sense that the superior standard is not felt to 
be outerworldly, but comes, for example, from within oneself. It is then still 
transcendent, but only in the sense that it still relates to an ultimate. In fact, 
the Egyptian idea of the ‘oracle of god in every body’, of the ‘god in the 
heart’, is also at least a semi-immanentized symbolization of conscience. 
 An awareness of a superior standard entails a corresponding 
awareness that one’s own (human) standards fall short of perfection. The 
Egyptian texts cited are replete with expressions of such an awareness; it is 
most explicit in the ‘insufficiency’ or ‘failure’ of man referred to in the 
Wisdom of Amenemope. Humility was the characteristic attitude of the pious in 
the movement of personal piety.130 Brunner emphasizes that it was in this 
period, too, that the awareness of sin became a ‘tangible’ element in Egyptian 
faith, even if confessions of concrete sins remained scarce.131 Socrates, for all 
his self-confidence, expresses his awareness of his ‘falling short’ throughout 
the Apology, counting his own wisdom (and human wisdom in general) for 
nothing, compared to that of the god. In fact, his self-confidence (bordering 
on arrogance) is based on his awareness of his own insufficiency, on his 
knowing that he knows nothing – this awareness is the only thing that makes 
him superior to the men of Athens.132 
                                                 
129 Both ‘moral’ and ‘religious’ should be taken in a broad sense. As a rough 
approximation, we might say that the first concerns the right order of things, right 
behaviour, explicitly moral virtues, but also a virtue like openness, and so on, while 
the second concerns the practice of faith, acting in accordance with one’s faith, 
varying from adopting a certain attitude (towards others) to observing religious 
rituals and prescripts (praying so many times a day, et cetera). 
130 Brunner (1983), chapter 5: ‘Persönliche Frömmigkeit’, in particular 104 and 108-
111. 
131 Ibid., 46, 108, and chapter 5 in general. 
132 In this regard it is interesting to note the meaning of the Greek term ‘hamartia’, 
usually translated as ‘error (of judgement)’ or (in a moral-religious context) as ‘sin’. 
Originally, this term, stemming from ‘hamartanein’ (‘to miss the mark’), was applied 
to archers who missed the mark – their arrow flying wide or falling short. Later, the 
term begot the general connotations of error and sin, especially related to one’s own 
qualities. Hence, there is a connection between ‘hamartia’ and ‘hubris’. 
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 Something that is quite prominent in Egyptian texts, but less so in 
the Apology, is the aspect of judgement. In the Wisdom of Amenemope, as in 
many other Egyptian texts, the judgement of the dead, where it is not 
explicitly referred to, is a constant presence in the background. It is the 
strongest way in which the Egyptians expressed their awareness of ‘falling 
short’, of ‘sin’ – an awareness that led them to use magic formulas in order 
to leave Osiris’ Judgement Hall unscathed. We will see in later chapters that 
the idea of judgement is a recurring theme in expressions of and reflections 
on conscience. 
 The second aspect of ultimate concern draws attention to the 
concern itself, rather than the object of concern. Socrates does this 
repeatedly, as when he says that “death concerns me (…) not at all, whereas 
doing nothing unjust or impious, that is my whole concern”. Socrates points 
out that his concern with justice and piety is so great, that he has risked his 
life for it. He also relates it to a god-given mission – there can be no doubt 
that it is a matter of ultimate concern to Socrates. In the Egyptian texts, this 
aspect of ultimate concern shows up in the form of fear (“I feared to 
transgress its guidance”) and that of happiness (the ‘happy heart’; “Mayest 
thou spend eternity in gladness of heart”), but it is less prominent than the 
first aspect. The texts do intend to stimulate the emotional strength of the 
concern, especially in the form of fear, by drawing attention to the 
impending Judgement. 
 
1.4.1.1. Authority and inspiration: two guises of the element of ultimate concern 
Apart from having the two aspects explained above, the element of ultimate 
concern tends to come in one of two guises, though they are not mutually 
exclusive, and hence may occur at the same time. These are the elements of 
authority and inspiration. The terms are intended to draw attention to the 
way in which ultimate concern is experienced. ‘Authority’ draws attention to 
the object-side of the experience, while ‘inspiration’ places the subject in 
focus. In the latter case, the concern proceeds outward from the subject 
towards the world; in the former, the experience is one of an imperative 
coming towards you, a command being addressed to you. The terms 
‘authority’ and ‘inspiration’, then, represent two experienced directions, or 
two loci of initiative – yet they are different ways of experiencing essentially 
the same thing.133 
                                                 
133 In his Freudian/Frommian interpretation of morality, Richard Wollheim speaks 
of the growth of the moral sense as a transition ‘from voices to values’ that is 
somewhat analogous to my distinction between the elements of authority and 
inspiration. He also speaks of a shift from super-ego to ego-ideal; the former is 
concerned with obligation, the second with value. He attaches guilt to the neglect of 
obligation, and shame to the failure to live up to the ego-ideal. Wollheim takes 
obligation and value to have fundamentally different sources, the one deriving from 
introjection, the other from projection. As a psychological-genetic explanation of 
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 Someone might object that the term ‘inspiration’ also implies a 
reference to something external, in a sense, something that does not coincide 
with the subject – a source of inspiration. That is true, even if that source is 
someone’s ‘true self’, as certain modern expressions would have it. So we 
should say that, phenomenologically speaking, there is always a double 
movement: first the movement from a source of authority or inspiration to a 
‘listening’ subject, and then the movement from that subject to the world, in 
which the authoritative command or the inspiration received is translated 
into action. In the case of authority the centre of gravity lies in the first 
movement; in the case of inspiration the first movement is, in a manner of 
speaking, merely a spark (‘the spark of conscience’, or scintilla conscientiae), 
while the energy is released in the world.134 
 
1.4.2. The element of intimacy 
There is a close connection between the element of intimacy and that of 
ultimate concern. Central to the symbol of conscience is that a very strong 
personal involvement is expressed. This corresponds with the insistent 
quality of the experience of conscience. What Tillich calls an ‘ultimate 
concern’ is almost literally expressed by Socrates: “doing nothing unjust or 
impious, that is my whole concern”. The element of intimacy is close to the 
second aspect of ultimate concern, but there is more to it. It draws attention 
not just to the strength of the concern, but rather to the intimate connection 
of an experience of conscience with the individual concerned (or the 
concerned individual). When this intimate connection is missing, it may also 
be doubted whether the element of ultimate concern is really there, and 
hence whether we are really dealing with an expression of conscience. An 
example of this is given in chapter 13. The element of intimacy pertains to 
the way a person is related to the reasons he puts forward, the convictions he 
expresses, and so on; they must be expressions of his person, not merely 
expressions used by him. 
 I have said that conscience (indicatively speaking) is one of the terms 
“denoting the area where the process of reality becomes luminous to itself”. 
In view of the element of intimacy, this statement ought to be qualified such 
as to say that it is that part of the process of reality that concerns myself, or 
involves me, or for which I am to a certain degree responsible that comes to light, 
that enters into my awareness. It does not necessarily have to be a 
responsibility for something I have already done; it might also be that I feel a 
responsibility to do something. For instance, when I see a beggar on the 
                                                                                                               
morality, this is quite interesting. It does not, however, diminish the unity of both in 
being guises of the element of ultimate concern. See Wollheim (1986), chapter 7, 
especially 216-220. 
134 More about the elements of authority and inspiration will follow in 1.5, where the 
‘subsymbol’ of the voice of conscience is discussed. 
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street, ‘my conscience’ may persuade me to give the poor man or woman 
something, because what happens is that certain facts are highlighted in my 
consciousness: the fact that there is a beggar, in need of money to buy food, 
and the fact that I have money and can afford to give something away, to 
name the two most important facts. The symbol of conscience is engendered 
by such an experience of reality, in which one’s own past or possible 
contribution to reality is highlighted, in view of a (moral/religious) standard 
that is experienced as absolute – evoking ultimate concern. 
 So the element of intimacy draws attention to the necessary 
connection to experiences of conscience and the experiencing subject, as 
well as to the intimate nature of that connection; they are that person’s 
experiences in a much stronger way than ordinary experiences. With recent 
authors on conscience one can say that a person’s identity is at stake. 
 
1.4.2.1. Secrecy and privacy: two guises of the element of intimacy 
Like the element of ultimate concern, the element of intimacy often comes in 
one of two guises: that of secrecy or that of privacy. The latter, often 
entailing the experience of conscience as being of a very personal, often 
emotional nature, is more regularly and more clearly present in modern 
symbolizations and other expressions of conscience than in premodern ones. 
It would be a mistake to read in ancient uses of the term ‘heart’ simply the 
same connotations of intimacy we now attach to the word – these were 
present, but certainly did not exhaust the meaning of the word. In ancient 
Egypt, the word had both cognitive and noncognitive connotations. In the 
Old Testament, the word often expressed a more emotional aspect of 
conscience. This does not diminish the fact that references to the heart (or 
other internal organs) do suggest intimacy, a link with the core of the 
personality – but that intimacy need not have the association with private 
feelings, as the term does now. ‘Privacy’, in a less loaded sense, however, 
may simply mean that something does not concern anyone beside oneself. In 
that form, we see expressions of it in the Egyptian texts, as well as with 
Socrates. An impression of it is conveyed in the Wisdom of Amenemope by the 
use of the term ‘heart’ and by speaking of the ‘god within’ (which as an 
expression is quite similar to Adam Smith’s more secular ‘man within’). We 
will see that this inwardness, or interiority, is stressed by St. Augustine, and 
much later by the Protestants that fall back on certain aspects of his thought. 
Socrates’ ‘daimonion’ is certainly private, in the sense that no one else hears 
it, and because it concerns Socrates’ actions, and no one else’s. 
 Privacy and secrecy are not opposites, of course, and they may lie 
close together. What is private is what you do not want any Tom, Dick and 
Harry to know – hence, it is to a certain extent secret, it is a closed area to all 
but a privileged few, if anyone. Note that ‘secretus’ also meant ‘secluded’ or 
‘separated or closed off from…’, which brings it very close to ‘private’. But 
the term ‘privacy’ does not have the strong associations with feelings of guilt 
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and fear that ‘secrecy’ has; moreover, while privacy is usually evaluated as 
something positive, secrecy is something that tends to be frowned upon. 
 In premodern times, the element of intimacy turns up quite regularly 
in the form of secrecy. C.S. Lewis’ remarked that ‘consciring’ was often close 
to ‘conspiring’: “Since secrets often are, and are always suspected of being, 
guilty secrets, the normal implications of conscius and conscientia are bad.”135 In 
the motto to this chapter, we see Hobbes remarking on a metaphoric use of 
the term ‘conscience’ “for the knowledge of [one’s] own secret facts, and 
secret thoughts”. More recently, the element of secrecy has receded into the 
background. Neither in the Wisdom of Amenemope nor in the Apology does the 
element of secrecy occur clearly; for this form of the element of intimacy 
they were not the best sources. It is not strange that we do not see it in the 
Apology, for it belongs primarily to the guilty conscience, which Socrates 
obviously does not have. As to the Wisdom of Amenemope (and other Egyptian 
texts), one reason why we do not find expressions of secrecy is that what 
could give rise to such experiences was so secret that it could not be 
expressed. In a sense, the secrecy is complete, because there is no expression 
and therefore no confession of secrecy. The Egyptian ‘magical’ strategy was 
to plead innocence in the knowledge of guilt, and to do so in such a 
ritualized way that the will of the gods would be swayed in one’s favour. A 
central characteristic of the movement of personal piety (when magic was 
less in vogue) was trust in the mercy of the god(s). This trust did not usually 
lead to confession of one’s sins; these remained secret (though not in a 
heavy-hearted way – the Egyptians, for all their preoccupation with the 
afterlife, are never said to have been a downcast and downhearted people). 
Another possible explanation lies in the strong awareness of what gave rise 
to a third element of the symbol of conscience: the experience that there is a 
witness for all one’s thoughts and deeds. It made no sense for the Egyptians 
to speak of secrecy, when all would be revealed anyway in the weighing of 
the heart. This seems rather inconsistent with the first explanation, but on 
the other hand, it might be that here, too, the Egyptian trusted in the power 
of magical persuasion to make his heart or any other possible witness speak 
nothing against him. Budge quotes from the Book of the Dead: 
 
“Let no one stand up to testify against me, let none of the Tchatchaut (...) 
thrust me back, and do not thou (i.e., his heart) turn aside from me in the 
presence of the Guardian of the Scales.”136 
 
Also from the Book of the Dead is the following line: 
 
“God has hidden Himself; [He] knows the dispositions [of men].”137 
                                                 
135 Lewis (1991), 185. 
136 Budge (1924), 19. 
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But here it is God that is ‘secret’, and it is clearly pointless to try to keep 
anything secret from him. 
 
1.4.3. The element of the witness 
In Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, conscience is closely allied to 
self-command, and with respect to this he states that “this control of our 
passive feelings must be acquired (...) from that great discipline which Nature 
has established for the acquisition of this and every other virtue; a regard to 
the sentiments of the real or supposed spectator of our conduct.”138 He then 
sets out to sketch the development of conscience – ‘the impartial spectator’ 
is one of the names Smith uses for it – from early childhood to adulthood in 
a way that anticipates twentieth-century developmental psychology. It is 
suggested by both that the development of conscience entails a transition 
from Smith’s ‘real spectator’ to the ‘supposed spectator’ – but supposed or 
not, a spectator remains. The experience that there is a spectator who 
witnesses all one’s actions – and, even worse, thoughts – is an important part 
of the phenomenology of conscience. Hence, it need not surprise us that we 
find expressions of such an experience in the Egyptian texts of the previous 
section. 
 In one place, a man compared his heart to ‘an excellent witness’. In 
many passages from different texts, the presence of a witness is suggested, 
whether it be god, the heart, or a god in the heart. The heart records a man’s 
deeds; that is why it is weighed against Maāt in the Judgement Hall. In that 
context it was said in one text that “[h]is soul stood up bearing witness on 
his behalf”. In Socrates’ case, we find no explicit mention (in the passages 
quoted) of a witness of his actions or thoughts. Yet it is clear that there was 
such a witness. Socrates’ ‘daimonion’ ‘opposes him whenever he his about to 
do something wrong’. It always knows what is going to happen, and what 
Socrates’ intends to do. We get the image of a permanent onlooker that 
remains in the background as long as things go right, but who steps in as 
soon as things are about to take a turn for the worse (both morally and in 
terms of possible harm for Socrates). 
 More interestingly, we find in Socrates’ case something we did not 
really see in the Egyptian texts, namely that Socrates is his own witness. 
Reflexivity and reflectivity are defining characteristics of Socrates. He 
functions as a witness both to himself and to others; a witness of their lack 
of wisdom. Even though Socrates claims to know nothing but that he knows 
nothing himself, it is clear that he has strong ideas about what is just, as well 
as, emphatically, about what is unjust, and unacceptable. Hence, he is in the 
habit of examining himself and his behaviour in light of those ideas. The 
                                                                                                               
137 Ibid., 20. 
138 Smith (1982b), 145 (III.3.21). 
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‘daimonion’ can be seen as an experientially externalized manifestation of 
this habit, at times when Socrates, for one reason or another, does not 
succeed in being his own witness, in connecting what he is about to do with 
his more deeply held convictions. 
 The symbol of conscience, then, is also engendered by the 
experience that someone (either God oneself, or another person) bears 
witness to one’s actions, so that they cannot simply be forgotten, but have to 
be accounted for.139 We will see that it is a persistent element both in 
symbolizations and in doctrines of conscience. It often acquires the status of 
an independent subsymbol. C.S. Lewis, in his analysis of the meaning of 
‘syneidesis’ and ‘conscientia’, distinguishes between an ‘external witness’ and 
an ‘internal witness’. The former refers to the situation in which one shares 
(secret) knowledge with another person – the ‘consciring’, which was close 
to ‘conspiring’. Where ‘syneidesis’ or ‘conscientia’ express the experience of 
an internal witness, one conscires with oneself. Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’, 
or ‘great inmate of the breast’ takes an intermediary position between the 
two. In general, we can say that the external witness gradually gave way to its 
internal counterpart, even if Hobbes still insisted on the correctness of the 
first interpretation of ‘conscious’ and ‘conscience’. His ‘later’ metaphorical 
use of the term in the ‘rhetorical’ phrase: ‘conscience is a thousand witnesses’ 
is actually not so late at all – Lewis traces it back to Quintilian: ‘conscientia 
mille testes’.140 
 
 
1.5 SOME IMAGINATIVE SYMBOLS 
The symbol of conscience is not one symbol, in the sense that one single 
symbolic expression exhausts it, though some symbolic expressions unite all 
or most of the core elements that I identified in themselves. Rather, there is 
a certain class of experiences with a corresponding class of symbolizations, 
and we can speak of ‘the symbol of conscience’ whenever there is a 
conjunction between a member of the first class and one of the second. This 
section is concerned with two imaginative symbols, two members of the 
class of symbolizations that gained a strong measure of independence (not 
unlike the independence in use that the element of the witness often 
acquires), and which for that reason we might call subsymbols of conscience. 
The symbols of the ‘worm of conscience’ and the (divine) ‘voice of 
                                                 
139 See Lehmann (1963), 329. 
140 Lewis (1991), 190; Quintilian (2006), Book V, xi, 41 (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, 
ca. AD 35-95); it is perhaps possible that Hobbes is referring to the Quinti Horatii 
Flacci Emblemata, published in Antwerp, 1612, where a number of passages from 
various authors are collected under the heading ‘conscientia mille testes’ – not, I 
should add, the passage by Quintilian. For these Emblemata, see 
http://emblems.let.uu.nl/emblems/html/va1612026.html. On the saying 
‘conscientia mille testes’ see Otto (1971), N421. 
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conscience’ persisted alongside theories and doctrines of conscience. 
Sometimes, they became elements of doctrine themselves. It is worth while 
looking at these imaginative symbols, because they illustrate something of 
the wealth of symbolic expressions of conscience. There are other examples 
then the two I have chosen to discuss; Heinz Kittsteiner draws attention to 
the connection between ‘Gewitter’ (thunder and lightning) and ‘Gewissen’ 
(conscience). Thunder could be seen as a sign of (some)one’s sinfulness, and, 
theologians desired, should be followed by penance.141 Kittsteiner points out 
that Hell has also been made to symbolize conscience, and vice versa – and 
we will see a bit of hell below.142 Many other symbols relate to the 
court(room); so we find the judge, the accuser, the prosecutor, the lawgiver, 
and, of course, the witness. Another important reason to look at such 
symbols is that they also appealed to ‘common’ people, to the illiterate. That 
does not mean that thunder and the worm of conscience are simply folk 
symbolizations of conscience; they were actively used by theologians, by 
members of the intellectual elite, to discipline people. 
 
1.5.1. The worm of conscience 
The ‘worm of conscience’ is the kind of symbol we call a ‘metaphor’, which 
means that the bearer of the symbol is not just interesting because of what it 
conveys, but is intrinsically interesting. The term ‘worm (of conscience)’ 
immediately calls forth a large number of images and associations, which 
have been judged fit by many philosophers and theologians to be connected 
with the notion of conscience. It may be said that we are dealing here, not 
just with a metaphor, but with an allegory, as conscience seems to be 
personified in a worm. Sometimes, the term ‘worm of conscience’ indeed 
seems to have been used allegorically. There have even been plays in which a 
Worm of Conscience appeared.143 For my purpose, it is not relevant whether 
or when we are dealing with an allegory, especially since allegory is of a 
‘thoroughgoing metaphorical nature’.144 What is important, is that the 
metaphor has been in use since Origen, who was born around 185 AD, up to 
the twentieth century. Nietzsche, for example, speaks of the worm of 
                                                 
141 Kittsteiner (1995), 151-156. 
142 Ibid., 116-156. 
143 In the Corpus Christi plays of Coventry, in particular the Doomsday play of the 
Drapers’ Guild in 1561, two characters called the ‘Worms of Conscience’ occurred. 
They may have been the inspiration for Shakespeare’s use of the metaphor in Richard 
III, where Margaret of Anjou expresses the wish that “The worm of conscience still 
begnaw thy [Richard’s] soul” (William Shakespeare, King Richard III, 1.3.222, Arden 
edition, ed. Antony Hammond, Methuen, London, 1981). This suggestion is made 
by Irvin Leigh Matus in Matus (1989), 196-197. The Shakespeare quotation also 
stems from this article. There is also a play called “Worm of Conscience”, by Ludwig 
Anzengruber (1839-1889). 
144 Tuve (1966), 220. 
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conscience in The Antichrist.145 In between, the metaphor is used by people 
like Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Geoffrey Chaucer (in the Canterbury Tales) 
and John Calvin, and in the twentieth century it occurs in James Joyce’s 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916).146 
 The metaphor was introduced into philosophical thought by Origen 
(ca. 185 AD-between 250 and 255 AD), who relates the story of manna from 
Exodus to a remark from Isaiah. It says in Exodus that the unfaithful saved 
manna for later, “and worms came forth in abundance from it and it 
rotted”.147 Origen asks: 
 
“How ‘do worms come forth in abundance’? Hear what the judgment of 
the prophet is about sinners and these who love the present world: ‘Their 
worm,’ he says, ‘will not die and their fire will not be extinguished.’ (…) But 
someone says, ‘If you say that the word of God is manna, how does it 
produce worms?’ The worms in us come from no other source than from 
the word of God. For he himself says, ‘If I had not come and spoken to 
them they would not have sin.’ If anyone, therefore, sins after the word of 
God has been received, the word itself becomes a worm in him which 
always pricks his conscience and gnaws at the hidden things of his 
heart.”148 
 
It is interesting to see that the worm stands both for the torment of sinners 
who have disobeyed God’s law, and for God’s law itself. The phrase ‘their 
fire will not be extinguished’ is very similar to the formula of ‘synderesis’, 
‘the spark of conscience which was not even extinguished in the breast of 
Cain’, and these two kinds of fire are indeed intermingled in patristic (and 
later) literature.149 In Calvin’s work too, it is emphasized that conscience 
                                                 
145 Nietzsche (1969), 192 (§ 25) asks: “Was ist jüdische, was ist christliche Moral? Der 
Zufall um seine Unschuld gebracht; das Unglück mit dem Begriff ‘Sünde’ 
beschmutzt; das Wohlbefinden als Gefahr, als ‘Versuchung’; das physiologische 
Übelbefinden mit dem Gewissens-Wurm vergiftet…” 
146 See Thrane (1960). Joyce’s ‘source’ must have been Hell Opened to Christians, the 
English translation of a seventeenth century tract by the Jesuit Pinamonti. 
147 Exodus 16:20, quoted in: Origen (1981), 310. R. A. Greene mistakenly supposes 
that Augustine “was responsible for the tradition of interpreting Isaiah’s worm to be 
the worm of conscience” (Greene [1991], 202). 
148 Idem. The ‘worm that shall not die’ is that of the sinner (in hell: Mark 9: 47-49). 
Isaiah 66:24 says, in full: “And they will go out and look upon the dead bodies of 
those who rebelled against me. Their worm will not die, nor will their fire be 
quenched, and they will be loathsome to all mankind.” (Unless otherwise stated, 
Bible references are to the Bible, New International Version, International Bible Society, 
1984). 
149 See Stelzenberger (1959), 52, especially note 25, and Stelzenberger (1963b), 82-83. 
Greene reports the same phenomenon. He mentions, for example, John Minsheu, 
author of a linguistic guide, who described ‘synteresis’ as both ‘the remorse or prick 
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cannot be completely extinguished, which can be taken in two ways: there 
remains an element of purity in man, or man can never hide from 
conscience, nor destroy it. The same double meaning is illustrated by 
Calvin’s speaking of conscience as harassing the sinner and being harassed by 
the sinner. 
 That the worm of conscience represents both the divine law and the 
consequence of transgressing it, is not as strange as it may seem. We have 
seen that the symbol of conscience conveys an awareness of a superior 
moral-religious standard. What the symbol of the worm of conscience 
emphasises, is that this awareness is often a painful awareness, as the 
experience usually occurs after a transgression of this standard – after a sin 
has been committed. The worm of conscience, ‘sharper than any cauterizing 
iron, gnaws away within’.150 This is a way of describing the feelings of guilt 
by which we recognize the functioning of conscience. The symbol of the 
worm of conscience emphasizes the affective side of the experiences that 
engendered the symbol of conscience, a side that is implicated by the core 
elements of the symbol, more specifically by the fact that the experiences 
must be described in terms of a concerned awareness – and I might add that 
concern turns to worry here.151 
 The worm is not the favourite animal of many people. It is a ‘low’ 
creature, literally. It crawls and wriggles through the earth and, more 
importantly, through corpses. The worm is associated with decay. It is also 
associated with sickness – people in medieval times will have had experience 
with worms living in their bodies; probably more than we have. In 
Guillaume Deguileville’s Pélerinage de l’Âme (1355-1358), ‘synderesis’ was 
personified “as a fantastic, human-headed bodiless creature with a worm’s 
tail”.152 So, when the image of this creature is invoked to symbolize (an 
element of) conscience, it cannot be the nicest part of conscience to which it 
pertains. Guilt, remorse, ‘pangs’ of conscience, etcetera, are the experiences 
that engendered the symbol of the worm of conscience. The worm of 
conscience was seen as a torment, and came to be mentioned among other 
                                                                                                               
of conscience, that parte of the soule which opposeth it selfe against sin’ and ‘the 
pure part of conscience’ (Greene [1991], 206; see also 201-202). In scholastic 
thought, ‘synderesis’ was the counterpart of ‘conscientia’; see chapter 3. 
150 Bosco (1986), 345 (the quotation is from Calvin’s Institutes). 
151 In some places, it is not so much the torment on which the focus lies, but the 
element of bearing witness and testifying, as in Elizabeth Grymeston’s Miscellanea: 
Prayers, Meditations, Memoratives (1604): “What harm the head doth think and the hand 
effect, that will the worm of conscience betray” (Michael Roberts [ed.], Elizabethan 
Prose, Jonathan Cape, London, 1933, 87, quoted in Nist [1984]). 
152 Greene (1991), 202. 
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‘bitter things, such as tears’ and ‘sadness’.153 Alfred L. Kellogg mentions a 
theological compendium by Albert the Great that would have been known 
to Chaucer, in which it is said that the effect of sin “creates of man Hell, for 
within the sinner is the flame of avarice, the stench of lechery, the shadows 
of ignorance, the worm of conscience, the thirst of concupiscence” – the 
worm of conscience finds himself not in the best company, to be sure.154 
 But symbols may also be used. It seems likely that the Catholic 
Church, as well as people like Calvin, could make use of a frightening symbol 
like that of the worm, in ‘restraining’ people. Lewis notes: “Even in ancient 
times (…) a ‘bad conscience’ (…) was associated with fear; fear of possible 
detection and punishment by men, or of punishment by the gods whose 
detection was certain.” He goes on to say that the “Christian doctrine of 
certain judgement and (highly probable) damnation naturally linked conscience 
and fear even more tightly together. (…) When this process is complete, the 
word conscience itself may come to mean simply ‘fear of hell’.”155 Through 
literary examples, Lewis shows how conscience develops from a ‘driver into 
an abyss of fears’, via something which has punishment, rather than sin, as 
its content, to a synonym of fear for future (afterlife) suffering – hence 
Shakespeare’s “conscience (…) makes a man a coward” (from Richard III).156 
But conscience as fear appears in Isaiah too: “O Lord, why hast thou made 
us to err from thy ways and hardened our heart from thy fear.”157 Therefore, 
I suggest that the perseverance of the symbol through the ages has a basis 
both in ordinary experience and in its utility. 
 
1.5.2. The voice of conscience 
We have seen that Origen identifies word and worm. He also quotes John 
15:22: “If I had not come and spoken to them they would not have sin.”158 
In Origen’s work, therefore, we find a connection between the symbol of the 
worm and that of the voice. The symbol of the voice of conscience is older 
than that of the worm; we have seen it occur in the Wisdom of Amenemope and 
in Plato’s Apology. In the Wisdom of Amenemope, we find: “I did not disregard 
its speech…”, and Socrates repeatedly speaks of a (kind of) voice ‘happening 
to him’, in connection with a superhuman thing that also ‘happens to him’. 
So the experience is one of being spoken to, or called upon, though it is not 
                                                 
153 St. Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius of Loyola, W.H. 
Longridge (transl.), London, 1919, 67, cited in Lawrence (1965). (Ignatius of Loyola 
lived from A.D. 1491-1556.) 
154 Compendium Theologicae Veritatis, translated from Beati Alberti Magni Opera, XIII, 56 
(Lyons, 1651) in Kellogg (1951), 469. 
155 Lewis (1991), 205. 
156 Ibid., 205-208. 
157 Isaiah 63:17; quoted from the King James Version by Reinhold Niebuhr in 
Niebuhr (1946), 141. 
158 Origen (1982), 310. 
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a normal voice; it cannot be heard by others. That was probably why Plato’s 
Socrates used this phrase ‘happening to him’ (but we might also say 
‘occurring’), instead of merely saying that he heard a voice – it is not literally a 
voice, but ‘voice’ is an adequate symbol; there simply are no words to describe 
the phenomenon, so one has to try to evoke the appropriate effect 
symbolically. Because the experience is somehow like that of hearing a voice, 
this is the word that is used. It is a way of expressing the insistent quality of 
the experiences conveyed by the symbol of conscience: the ‘voice’ is within 
Socrates, and it is a compelling voice. 
 The Bible also affords ample inspiration for the symbolization of 
conscience as a (divine) voice.159 I mentioned Isaiah just now, but the 
‘hardened hearts’ appear in Psalms as well, in connection with God’s voice: 
“Today, if you hear his voice, do not harden your hearts as you did at 
Meribah…”.160 Another passage that may have suggested the symbolism of 
the voice to refer to conscience to theologians and philosophers is 
Deuteronomy 4:36: “From heaven he made you hear his voice to discipline 
you”. Augustine spoke of the voice of conscience in his City of God.161 In 
scholastic discussions of conscience and synderesis, the latter was said to 
‘murmur at evil’ or ‘murmur back at sin’.162 An interesting eighteenth century 
example of the use of the metaphor is afforded by Henry Home, Lord 
Kames, who writes: 
 
“[C]onscience, or the moral sense, is none of our principles of action, but 
their guide and director. It is still of greater importance to observe, that the 
authority of conscience does not consist merely in an act of reflection. It 
arises from a direct perception, which we have upon presenting the object, 
without the intervention of any sort of reflection. And the authority lies in 
this circumstance, that we perceive the action to be our duty, and what we 
are indispensably bound to perform. It is in this manner that the moral 
sense, with regard to some actions, plainly bears upon it the marks of 
                                                 
159 There are several passages in the Bible in which God’s voice is said to be like 
thunder, or to be accompanied by it, so that the symbols of the voice and thunder 
are combined. There is also a passage that may have given rise to both the 
symbolism of the voice and that of the worm: “…the people of Tyre and Sidon (…) 
sought an audience with him. (…) [T]hey asked for peace (…). On the appointed 
day Herod, wearing his royal robes, sat on his throne and delivered a public address 
to the people. They shouted, ‘This is the voice of god, not of a man.’ Immediately, 
because Herod did not give praise to God, an angel of the Lord struck him down, 
and he was eaten by worms and died” (Acts 12:20-23). 
160 Psalms 95:7-8. 
161 Augustine (1890), book 12, chapter 8. 
162 See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 79, Article 
12, and Potts (1980), 101 (where the phrase ‘murmurs back in answer to sin’ can be 
found in a translation of Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de Bono [Treatise on Conscience] 
from about 1230 A.D.). 
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authority over all our appetites and passions. It is the voice of God within 
us which commands our strictest obedience, just as much as when his will 
is declared by express revelation.” 163 
 
This is an interesting passage, because it draws attention to some of the main 
characteristics of the experience that engendered the symbol of the voice of 
conscience (or of conscience as the voice of God – or nature, for that 
matter, as in Rousseau’s case). The symbol of the voice draws attention to 
the authority of conscience, and to the immediateness of the experience – it is 
not after ample deliberation that conscience arrives at a conclusion and 
dictates what to do; in almost any situation, we will immediately perceive 
‘what conscience commands’. 
 David Velleman, in his article “The Voice of Conscience”, wonders 
how one recognizes the voice of one’s conscience. He says that it cannot be 
by what it talks about, for if that were the case, we would not have to think 
of it as a distinctive voice. He goes on to say that ‘conscience does not 
literally speak’; “The idea of its addressing you in a voice is thus an image 
(…).”164 The image “must represent something significant” about the 
dictates of conscience, “or it wouldn’t be used to identify them as a 
distinctive mode of thought”. His suggestion is that dictates of conscience 
carry a special authority, and that hence “the voice of conscience is, 
metaphorically speaking, the voice of this authority”.165 According to 
Velleman, the metaphor of the voice of conscience “symbolizes a 
fundamental feature of morality”.166 Velleman goes on to connect the voice 
of conscience to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, but for my purpose it is not 
necessary to fill it in so precisely. What is most interesting is Velleman’s 
remark that the metaphor of the voice symbolizes a fundamental feature of 
morality. This is in line with what we have said before, when discussing the 
core elements of the symbol of conscience. One of them was that the 
symbol is an expression of ultimate concern. This, we have seen, often 
manifests itself in one of two guises: that of authority or that of inspiration. 
It is because morality is a matter of ultimate concern, because one is 
ultimately concerned about it, that the voice of conscience can ‘speak’ with 
such authority – but the authority is experienced as something external, in a 
way; it comes towards one. 
 Velleman connects the metaphor of the voice exclusively to the 
authority of conscience. I would agree that the metaphor of the voice is 
peculiarly suited to express this element, but it can also be an inspirational 
voice. To speak of inspiration, or of ultimate concern in general, sounds 
                                                 
163 Home (1976), Essay II, Chapter III, 45. 
164 Recall that the voice (or kind of voice) of Socrates’ ‘daimonion’ did not really 
speak either; it was decribed as ‘phōnē (tis)’, not ‘logos’. 
165 Velleman (1999), 57-76. 
166 Idem. 
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more positive than the terminology of authority, but this experience of 
authority is not something other than ultimate concern: in reality we often 
need to be rebuked by conscience to remind us of our ultimate concern – 
and this is only possible because we have this ultimate concern. Sometimes – 
quite often actually – we simply have to be reminded of this special quality, 
this fundamental feature of morality expressed in the metaphor of the voice 
of conscience, that we might also call its overridingness, to borrow a term from 
Hare (and use it in a way that he would not approve of). But the voice of 
conscience need not be experienced as a rebuke or a warning reminder; it 
may be an empowering and supporting voice, a voice of purity – the voice of 
one’s authentic self, or the voice of Nature in Romantic thought. 
 The voice of conscience is an element both on the level of 
symbolization, and on the experiential level. I have touched on this point at 
the beginning of this section, with regard to Socrates. The symbol of the 
voice expresses the insistent quality of the experience of conscience. It also 
expresses the transcendent quality of that experience, in the sense that the 
voice comes from beyond oneself; there is an experienced externality. At the 
same time, it draws attention to the element of intimacy, to one’s personal 
involvement: you are called upon. The simultaneous distance and intimacy 
that are typical for the experience of conscience come together in the symbol 
of the voice. 
 In the aspect of being addressed, a voice being directed at you, the 
metaphorical character of the symbol of the voice becomes most 
pronounced, as this aspect leans on the intrinsic meaning and interest of the 
(carrier of the) symbol. The aspect of being personally addressed is  very 
clearly illustrated by the use Martin Heidegger makes of the symbol of the 
voice. Without going into the details of his conception of conscience, or 
addressing the obvious question whether ‘conscience’ is a moral concept or 
symbol in Heidegger’s philosophy, we can say something about the role of 
the voice of conscience in Sein und Zeit. For Heidegger, conscience is what 
constitutes the subject as an individual. It has the character of a ‘call’.167 It 
individuates, in that it calls upon you to step out of your situation of 
‘lostness’ or ‘fallenness’ (Verfallenheit) in ‘the They’ (das Man). It is a call 
towards authenticity, a ‘true’ (eigentlich) existence; a call towards one’s 
authentic self, which people find hard to answer, because it is also a call 
towards the unknown, the strange, das Unheimische. This makes it a very 
personal, individual thing; the individual sets himself off against the others, 
das Man. However, to be able to respond to the call of conscience, of 
authenticity, one must first be able to hear it – one has to be a responsible 
person beforehand. This might be interpreted as Heidegger’s variant of the 
                                                 
167 As John C. Staten puts it: “The voice of conscience (…) is a call to Care” (Care = 
Sorge, in Heidegger’s terms); see Staten (1988), 67. About Heidegger’s description of 
conscience, see Staten, chapter 3, and Kukla (2002), 1-34. 
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‘synderesis’, or ‘that spark of conscience which was not even extinguished in 
the breast of Cain’. 
 With this example we have leaped into the twentieth century, to one 
of that century’s most important thinkers, for whom conscience was 
obviously still a significant reality. We have also jumped over centuries of 
thought, often critical thought, on conscience. These will be the subject of 
the following chapter. 
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2. Between symbol and doctrine (1): the conceptualization 
 of conscience until the early Middle Ages 
 
“Nihil prodest inclusam esse conscientiam; patemus Deo” 
 LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA, Fragments, 24. 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
While the purpose of the previous chapter, for all its references to history, 
was basically metahistorical, the present chapter and the following four are 
concerned with historical developments. The first chapter was 
metahistorical, because it concerned the symbol of conscience as a 
framework with a strong stability over time, within which variable but 
equivalent symbolizations as expressions of variable but equivalent 
experiences can be placed. This symbol of conscience is historical, in the 
sense that it appears at certain times and places in history, in societies at a 
certain stage of development; but it is metahistorical in the sense that it is 
elicited by experiences that are not historically and culturally unique (within 
historical time), but human.1 These experiences occur whenever certain 
characteristics of the human animal interact with certain social 
circumstances. Darwin was certainly on the right track in this regard.2 The 
symbol of conscience is metahistorical in the same sense (even if to a lesser 
degree) as the symbol of God. 
 In this and the four ensuing chapters, which all belong together (as 
the titles show), I will be concerned with historical development within (the 
framework of) the symbol of conscience; that is, with changing experiences 
and symbolizations. My ‘focus’ is on (approximately) the last two millennia 
of European history. Secondly, but for a large part, I will be concerned with 
theories, doctrines, and concepts of conscience; with their genesis and 
historical development. The main purpose of these chapters is to show that 
there is a direct relation between the transition from the level of 
symbolization to that of doctrine and concepts on the one hand, and a 
                                                 
1 Cf. Seel (1953), 297-298: “Mir scheint, hier wird ein humanes Kontinuum, etwas 
strukturell nicht Hinwegdenkbares, gefaßt; die Leistung der griechischen 
Geistesgeschichte von Homer bis Platon besteht nicht darin, all dies aus dem Nichts 
entdeckt und geschaffen, sondern es nach und nach, und zumeist viel früher als man 
wahrhaben will, durch gestaltende Aussage ins Bewußtsein gerückt zu haben.” 
2 According to Darwin, “any animal (…) endowed with well-marked social instincts 
(…) would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual 
powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man”; “Ultimately our 
moral sense or conscience becomes a highly complex sentiment – originating in the 
social instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by 
reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, and confirmed by 
instruction and habit.” (Darwin [1922], 150 and 203.) 
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subsequent criticism and rejection of conscience on the other. The 
discussion of this matter builds on the section on loss of meaning in the 
previous chapter. Symbolizations do not all make way for theories, doctrines 
and concepts; some remain, while others make way for new symbolizations. 
I will attend to these (remaining) old and (appearing) new symbolizations as 
well. 
 One of the underlying purposes of the whole of part I of this book 
is to provide a means of interpreting both the phenomenon of conscience, 
its various expressions, and the multifarious theoretical reflections on 
conscience that have accumulated over the centuries. Chapters 2 to 6 are 
crucial for an understanding of the present situation, by which I mean the 
simultaneous rejection of conscience by many philosophers, psychologists, and 
other scientists, and recognition of conscience by others, who each seem to 
recognize a different conscience. The ‘history’ of symbolizations and 
conceptualizations of conscience presented in this and the following chapters 
has been written with a view both to the modern – not necessarily recent – 
dismissal of conscience as a meaningful notion, and to the modern spread of 
diverse concepts of conscience. The interpretation of the ‘history of 
conscience’ given here is written for the purpose of rendering 
understandable the modern rejection of conscience and its multifarious 
recognition; this purpose largely determined what I chose to draw attention 
to and what I decided to leave out. The chapters ‘between symbol and 
doctrine’ taken as a whole, then, while dealing in large part with the 
development and expansion of symbolizations and conceptualizations of 
conscience, build up (twice – once for the seventeenth and once for the 
nineteenth century) towards the critique of conscience and the reactions to 
that. 
 The present chapter deals with the phenomena of and the 
development from compactness to differentiation – the terms were briefly 
mentioned in the previous chapter – until the early Middle Ages. Chapter 
three takes up the thread of this development with the distinction between 
‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’. It also introduces the idea of the development 
from symbol to doctrine, a development which (from the standpoint of the 
late Middle Ages) is traced in retrospect, and also prospectively, until the 
seventeenth century.3 Chapter 4 presents the first wave of criticism, in the 
figures of Hobbes and Locke. The next chapter deals with the re-emergence 
of conscience in Enlightenment and Romantic thought, and chapter 6 with 
the second wave of criticism, that of the nineteenth century. Bentham, 
Darwin, and Freud are among the people discussed here. Of course, this is 
                                                 
3 Hence, ‘conceptualization’ in the title of the present chapter has a double meaning; 
it refers not only to the way in which concepts of conscience were formed, but also 
to an increasingly conceptual (as opposed to symbolic) understanding of conscience 
– so to an historical development. 
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not by far a complete ‘history of conscience’; there can be no such thing. 
That it is also not a straightforward ‘history of ideas’ should be clear by now, 
but insofar as it resembles such a thing, it has no ambitions of 
comprehensiveness. What I wish to do is to draw attention to certain trends 
in history, viewed from a certain perspective, focusing on some key points in 
the European history of expressions of and reflection on conscience. For the 
most part, this does not entail new interpretations of well-known thinkers, 
but rather a somewhat different pattern in which they are placed – assuming 
that these things are not completely synonymous. I have tried not merely to 
extract some lines about conscience from the work of each thinker, but to do 
justice to the thought of each one (within limits, of course), and to place it in 
its historical context (where possible both intellectual and non-intellectual). 
At the same time I have tried to point out the many continuing threads, the 
lines of influence, the recurring themes, so that there should indeed be 
enough unity to the following chapters. 
 
 
2.2. FROM COMPACTNESS TO DIFFERENTIATION (1) 
I have touched upon the topic of compactness and differentiation in 1.8. 
Before I can speak of a development in experiences and symbolizations from 
compactness to differentiation, I will have to say more about the meaning of 
these terms. 
 
2.2.1. ‘Compactness’ and ‘differentiation’ 
Voegelin connects ‘compactness’ with myth, and ‘differentiation’ with 
history and philosophy. The compact experience of the cosmos finds 
expression in myth. In this experience, nor in its expression, do we find 
distinctions that we take for granted, like that between the natural and the 
supernatural, the immanent and the transcendent; these terms simply do not 
apply.4 Such distinctions arise in the process of differentiation. Historical 
linguistics suggests that there is a relation between the compactness of 
language and the compactness of experience and symbolization that 
Voegelin is concerned with. For a better understanding of compactness and 
differentiation, then, I will turn to the historical study of language. 
 In Poetic Diction, Owen Barfield discusses the idea that language starts 
“with simple, purely perceptual meanings”, and develops by metaphor to 
include supposedly abstract (‘complex psychic’) meanings.5 Proponents of 
this idea, the further they go back in the history of language, see it 
“becoming more and more figurative with every step”, and yet they have “no 
hesitation in assuming a period – still further back – when it was not 
                                                 
4 Cf. Voegelin (2004d), 188-189. 
5 Barfield (1962), 65 and 69. This idea was once widely shared; Barfield mentions 
Anatole France, Hugh Blair, and Max Müller, but also John Locke. 
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figurative at all”.6 They combine two hypotheses. One is the ‘root’ 
hypothesis, which states that “every language started with a group of 
monosyllabic sounds, each of which expressed a simple, general notion. 
These general notions (...) were then applied to particular phenomena, 
among which they were subdivided by the addition of other words; and these 
latter words finally became the prefixes, suffixes, inflexions, etc. (...)”.7 This 
hypothesis is combined with the hypothesis, or theory, of metaphor: the idea 
that language grows more and more poetic as it is traced back into the past.8 
With regard to the ‘root’ hypothesis, Barfield cites Otto Jespersen, who 
argued that languages develop from being inflexional to being isolating, 
instead of the other way around: “The evolution of language shows a 
progressive tendency from inseparable irregular conglomerations to freely 
and regularly combinable short elements.”9 Language did not start with 
monosyllables with general meanings; nor did it start out with only words 
with ‘physical meanings’, which were then, in a ‘metaphorical period’ applied 
to psychic phenomena. Hence, the ‘metaphor’ hypothesis is wrong as well. 
 Barfield’s solution to the problem is that languages start out with 
meanings of a concrete type; but the meaning of ‘concrete’ is not that a word 
referred to something ‘material’: “It is just those meanings which attempt to 
be most exclusively material (‘sensuel’), which are also the most generalized 
and abstract – i.e. remote from reality.”10 He takes the English word ‘cut’ as 
an example: “Its reference is perfectly material; yet its meaning is at the same 
time more general and less particular, more abstract and less concrete, than 
some single word which should comprise in itself – let us say – all that we 
have to express to-day by the sentence: ‘I cut this flesh with joy in order to 
sacrifice’. If it is impossible to cut a pound of flesh without spilling blood, it 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 73. 
7 Ibid., 77 and 81. This is part of the Romantic theory of language propounded by 
August von Schlegel, Wilhelm von Humboldt and August Schleicher, the latter of 
whom elaborated Schlegel’s distinction between isolating, agglutinating and 
inflexional languages. (Humboldt included a fourth type: incorporating languages.) 
According to Schleicher, languages developed from isolating, through agglutinating, 
to inflexional. Inflexional languages, like Latin and the modern European languages, 
were held to be ‘organic’, and superior to the other kinds, which because of their 
simple structure were unable to convey complex thought. English is inflexional, but 
has been moving towards being isolating. In isolating languages, each morpheme 
(basic unit of meaning) is usually one word; to go from singular to plural requires 
another morpheme, and thereby another word. Agglutinating languages attach 
morphemes to form one word, and inflexional (fusional) languages fuse their 
morphemes, as in Latin, where a noun’s ending tells us the case (nominative, 
genitive, et cetera), the gender, and whether it is singular or plural. 
8 Ibid., 81 and 83. 
9 Ibid., 78; Barfield quotes from Otto Jespersen, Progress in Language, but does not 
mention page numbers. 
10 Ibid., 79. 
 127 
is even more impossible ‘to cut’.”11 Barfield also refers to an anthropologist 
who found that there are languages in which “although you can express 
twenty different kinds of cutting, you cannot say ‘cut’.”12 According to 
Barfield, “the further we look back into the history of the meanings of 
common words, the more closely we find them approximating to this (...) 
concrete type.”13 An example is the Greek ‘pneuma’ as used in the New 
Testament, in which “we can hear (...) an echo of just such an old, concrete, 
undivided meaning”. What is undivided here is the physical and the psychic, 
which in our translation become separated: ‘pneuma’ must be translated as 
‘spirit’ and/or ‘wind’. Such ‘purely abstract’ and ‘purely material’ contents 
“are both late arrivals in human consciousness”.14 “So far from the psychic 
meaning of ‘spiritus’ [the Latin equivalent of ‘pneuma’] having arisen because 
someone had the abstract idea, ‘principle of life...’ and wanted a word for it, 
the abstract idea ‘principle of life’ is itself a product of the old concrete meaning 
‘spiritus’, which contained within itself the germs of both later significations. 
We must, therefore, imagine a time when ‘spiritus’ or πνευμα, or older words 
from which these had descended, meant neither breath, nor wind, nor spirit, 
nor yet all of these three things, but when they simply had their own peculiar 
meaning, which has since, in the course of the evolution of consciousness, 
crystallized into the three meanings specified (...).”15 
 Thus, analogous to Voegelin’s speaking of a development from 
compactness to differentiation, Barfield speaks of a movement ‘from 
homogeneity towards dissociation and multiplicity’.16 Voegelin’s 
‘compactness’ corresponds with Barfield’s ‘concreteness’; his ‘differentiation’ 
with Barfield’s ‘abstraction’. Barfield also points to the work of psychologist 
J. M. Baldwin, who “shows how a child’s apparent ‘generalizations’ are in 
reality single meanings, which it has not yet learnt to split up into two or 
more. ‘All psychic dualisms and distinctions’, he points out, ‘are meanings in 
the sense that they are differentiations from earlier and more simple [sic] 
apprehensions.’”17 The linguistic development of the child, then, seems to 
resemble the evolution of languages in this respect. Barfield adduces 
examples of ‘primitive’ languages which, for instance, have words for all 
sorts of trees, but none for ‘tree’ in general – supposedly, such languages are 
‘concrete’ (in Voegelin’s terms: compact), which means that the meanings of 
words are connected with concrete experiences, not with elements of those 
experiences laid bare by analysis – as would be ‘tree-ness’ as an element that 
                                                 
11 Idem. 
12 Ibid., 83. The reference is to R.R. Marett, Anthropology. 
13 Ibid., 79. 
14 Ibid., 80. 
15 Ibid., 81. 
16 Idem. 
17 Ibid., 82-83. The italics are probably Barfield’s. 
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all trees have in common.18 So originally, words referred to ‘sensible objects’, 
but these we must ‘suppose to be something more’. We “must suppose that 
they were not, as they appear to be at present, isolated, or detached, from 
thinking and feeling. Afterwards, in the development of language and 
thought, these single meanings split up into contrasting pairs – the abstract 
and the concrete, particular and general, objective and subjective. And the 
poesy felt by us to reside in ancient language consists just in this, that, out of 
our later, analytic, ‘subjective’ consciousness, a consciousness which has 
been brought about along with, and partly because of, this splitting up of 
meaning, we are led back to experience the original unity.”19 
 The idea that languages start out conveying concrete, undivided 
meanings, and develop through differentiation, the ‘splitting up’ of meaning, 
analysis, or whatever one wishes to call it, is highly interesting for my 
purpose. It corresponds very well with Voegelin’s use of the terminology of 
‘compactness’ and ‘differentiation’, and the idea can be valid regardless of 
morphological matters; that is, regardless of whether languages start out 
being inflexional, isolating, or something else. I am concerned with semantic, 
not morphological differentiation. Barfield also relates his thoughts to myth, 
which he sees as conveying concrete meaning, the same way Voegelin sees it 
as a form of compact symbolization of man’s experience of the cosmos. “In 
the Classical Dictionary,” Barfield writes, “the student of poetic diction finds 
delicately mummified for his inspection any number of just those old single 
meanings, which the differentiating, analytic process already referred to has 
desiccated and dissected.”20 Where Voegelin applauds the differentiation 
occurring in Greek philosophy, Barfield seems less happy with it. 
Nevertheless, he agrees with the idea that this differentiation occurs: “[T]he 
old, instinctive consciousness of single meanings, which comes down to us 
as the Greek myths, is already fighting for its life by Plato’s time (...).”21 
                                                 
18 Cf. Buber (2004), 22: “Consider the speech of ‘primitive’ peoples, that is, of those 
that have a meagre stock of objects, and whose life is built up within a narrow circle 
of acts highly charged with presentness. The nuclei of this speech, words in the form 
of sentences and original pre-grammatical structures (which later, splitting asunder, 
give rise to the many various kinds of words), mostly indicate the wholeness of a 
relation. We say ‘far away’; the Zulu has for that a word which means, in our 
sentence form, ‘There where someone cries out: “O mother, I am lost.”’ The 
Fuegian soars above our analytic wisdom with a seven-syllabled word whose precise 
meaning is, ‘They stare at one another, each waiting for the other to volunteer to do 
what both wish, but are not able to do.’ In this total situation the persons, as 
expressed both in nouns and pronouns, are embedded, still only in relief and without 
finished independence. The chief concern is not with these products of analysis and 
reflection but with the true original unity, the lived relation.” 
19 Ibid., 85-86. 
20 Ibid., 91. 
21 Ibid., 95. 
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 Now that we have gained a clearer understanding of ‘compactness’ 
and ‘differentiation’ in language and experience, one question is worth 
considering: that of the relation between compact and symbolic language. 
We have seen that it is a mistake to see the earliest language either as 
completely symbolic (‘metaphorical’, Barfield would say), or as pre-symbolic, 
in the sense that it contained only material meanings, which then had to be 
metaphorically transferred to the realm of the psyche and the immaterial. 
Compact language had its ‘own peculiar meaning’. But its association with 
symbolic language is not strange, according to Barfield: “It is really not at all 
surprising that philologists should have had such a vivid hallucination of 
metaphor bending over the cradle of meaning. For the distinction is a 
distinction of agent rather than of function, and the principle is indeed one. 
(...) Figure and figurative (...) may justly be applied, owing to the perceptual or 
aesthetic, the pictorial, form in which these unitary meanings first manifest in 
consciousness.”22 
 Where does this leave me, with the theory of symbols I have 
adopted? The distinction between symbolization and indication is the result 
of a differentiation that has not occurred in a compact language. That means 
that insofar as the language of the Egyptian texts I used was still compact, it 
was not simply symbolic – but neither was it indicative. Insofar as the 
language of the Egyptian texts was compact, these categories do not apply 
without qualification. If Barfield is right in associating compact experience 
with the experience of ‘living unity’, we are in a sense already where 
symbolism would bring us: we already have an integrated experience. The 
language used would reflect this; but it seems to me that it is still likely that 
there would be a difference among utterances in the manner and degree of 
personal involvement – so that even in a compact language, there would be 
some analogue for the distinction between symbolic and indicative language. 
As to the level of differentiation in the Egyptian language, I can only make 
some cautious remarks. Akhenaten’s employment of another symbol of Ra 
than was commonly used – he depicted the God as a disk with rays with 
hands at the end protruding from it – may indicate an awareness of the 
symbolic nature of those symbols, which would already be more than 
required for us to be able to speak of symbols in the full sense of the word. 
The user of symbols need not be cognitively aware of the symbolic nature of 
symbols he employs, let alone be able to manipulate them, as we can perhaps 
say that Akhenaten did. That a user of symbols need not be aware of his 
using symbols also means that the lack of a distinction between symbolic and 
indicative language need not prevent us, from a third-person perspective, to 
point out instances where language leans more to what we would call the 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 88. 
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indicative side, or to the symbolic side.23 Another point is that the Egyptian 
hieroglyphs have been said to be metaphorical, in the sense that metaphor 
was the cognitive tool required for the invention of this kind of script.24 
Finally, it is clear that the Egyptians differentiated between the physical and 
the psychic or spiritual, though not always. They held that every person had a 
Ba and a Ka, the first of which is usually translated as ‘personality’, while the 
second is ‘spirit’, in the sense of life-giving principle. While ‘Ka’ originally 
stood for ‘food’ as well as this spiritual ‘being’, it is clear that it came to 
signify the latter, as distinguished from anything physical. Yet, in the word 
‘heart’ we see the connection between the physical and the psychic 
preserved. 
 In the previous chapter, we saw that in the case of the emerging 
symbol of conscience, the process of ‘symballein’ had not yet concentrated 
itself into a single symbolic term. In the Egyptian texts especially, we saw 
that different expressions in various contexts conveyed experiences of 
conscience. This is not a sign of differentiation, but of compactness: the 
word ‘heart’, for instance, could be used to express experiences of 
conscience, but it always expressed something more and other as well. 
Conscience was an element in various compact expressions. The same goes 
for Socrates’ ‘daimonion’, though that may constitute a more conscious use 
of symbolism. 
 
2.2.2. ‘Syneidesis’; compactness and differentiation 
The word ‘heart’ occurs quite frequently in the Wisdom of Amenemope. Anyone 
familiar with the Old Testament will know that it occurs there as well, and 
sometimes with similar connotations. In several places, the Greek translation 
gives ‘syneidesis’ in connection with ‘kardia’ (heart). The Hebrew ‘leb’, which 
we also translate ‘heart’, denotes the “Sitz, Zentrale und Träger aller geistigen 
Tätigkeiten, so auch der Bezogenheit zu Gott und der sittlichen Funktion. Es 
ist die gottgebildete Basis allen persönlichen Erlebens, Boden der Sünde und 
Liebe, der Reue und des Hasses [etc.]”.25 An analysis of the contexts in 
which the word ‘heart’ occurs, reveals important similarities with the use of 
‘syneidesis’ for the moral conscience. We now speak of a ‘good conscience’ 
or a ‘bad conscience’. Jewish texts speak of  a ‘good or bad heart’.26 Both in 
the Egyptian text and in Hebrew texts is the heart associated with the 
consciousness of sin, either as a witness or as a judge, or both.27 In both, the 
awareness of sin is also an awareness coram deo, before God. Despite 
                                                 
23 Recall Tillich’s remark that the ultimate can only be expressed symbolically – a 
remark that is intended to apply to any human society. 
24 Goldwasser (1995). 
25 Stelzenberger (1961), 37. 
26 Idem. 
27 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 909. 
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differences in quality between the Egyptian and the Old Testament use of 
‘heart’, and between ‘heart’ and ‘syneidesis’, we can say that they are 
equivalent symbolizations, engendered by equivalent experiences. 
 Both the Greek ‘syneidesis’ and the Latin ‘conscientia’ are more 
differentiated symbolizations then the Egyptian or Old Testament ‘heart’; a 
number of elements of meaning are suggested by the terms themselves. This 
is mainly due to the combination of ‘oida’ and ‘scio’ with the prefixes ‘sun’ 
and ‘con’, respectively, that opened up a spectrum of possible meanings. It is 
relatively easy to trace the core elements of the symbol of conscience in the 
use of ‘syneidesis’ and ‘conscientia’. That we are dealing with a special kind 
of awareness concerning one’s own actions is far more explicitly expressed in 
these terms than in a term like ‘heart’, even though it took quite some time 
before ‘syneidesis’ took a reflexive turn, and even more time before its 
reflexive meaning became standard.28 
 
2.2.2.1. ‘Syneidesis’ 
‘Syneidesis’, the first known use of which is from the fifth century B.C., 
means, first of all, ‘shared knowledge’ – one knows something with another 
person.29 When the knowledge is shared with none other than oneself, this is 
expressed by the phrase ‘synoida emautoi’. Its primary meaning is non-moral 
(or not exclusively moral) – the moral use of ‘syneidesis’ is a special case, 
which will only become prominent in Hellenistic times. Where older uses of 
‘syneidesis’ can be translated as ‘conscience’, it is virtually always a guilty 
conscience that finds expression.30 It is not useful to look into the 
development of the uses of words from the ‘synoida’ group in much detail 
here; a general statement will suffice. The history of that word group is 
multifarious. In the first century B.C., the substantives ‘syneidos’ and 
‘syneidesis’ are more widely used, and the word group becomes more closely 
associated with the moral conscience. 
                                                 
28 This reflexive turn is a central theme in Seel (1953). 
29 I will speak mainly of ‘syneidesis’, but it should be noted that this is part of a 
group of words: the verb ‘synoida’ and the nouns ‘syneidos’, ‘synesis’, and 
‘syneidesis’ are the most important members of this group. See Theologisches 
Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 900. The general treatment of ‘syneidesis’ in this 
section is based on Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 897-918, 
Stelzenberger (1963b), 23-66, and Marietta (1970). 
30 V.A. Rodgers argues that the translation of ‘synesis’ and related expressions, as 
they occur in Greek tragedy, by the term ‘conscience’ is never justified; he does 
admit that they “indicate a growing awareness of the inner self, and an increasingly 
subtle psychological analysis” (Rodgers [1969], 254). Against this, I would like to cite 
what immediately follows the quotation from Otto Seel in note 1: “Und wer in 
diesem Betracht, um einer morphologischen Spezifikation willen allzu schroff 
schneidet, schneidet ins lebendige Leben (...).” 
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 With respect to ‘syneidesis’, C.S. Lewis notes that an important shift 
of meaning occurred “whereby conscience, so to speak, passed from the 
witness-box to the bench and even to the legislator’s throne”.31 Roughly until 
early Christian times, ‘syneidesis’ primarily conveyed a knowledge of one’s 
own (or sometimes another’s) actions that other people did not have – 
knowledge as a special witness. Though this was usually knowledge of the 
evil quality of an action, the fact that the action was evil was already known 
in some other way, according to Lewis. ‘Syneidesis’ was the witness, not the 
prosecutor or judge, and not the lawgiver. According to Lewis, the New 
Testament use of ‘syneidesis’ played an important part in the shift of 
meaning whereby ‘syneidesis’ ‘passed from the witness-box to the bench and 
even to the legislator’s throne’. The shift was ‘foreshadowed’, Lewis says, by 
Menander, who wrote that “to all mortals suneidesis is theos [a god/divine]”.32 I 
might add that we find all three shades of meaning (conscience as witness, 
prosecutor or judge, and legislator) in the work of Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 
B.C. – c. A.D. 50), although ‘legislator’ must not be taken narrowly here.33 
What is also important about Philo, is that he clearly differentiates between 
these ‘functions’ of conscience, as well as between conscience and the God 
behind it and working through it, a differentiation that will become even 
more pronounced later, as we will see.34 
 Lewis’ claims are supported by the evidence provided by historical 
dictionaries. Before the time of Philo, as far as we know, ‘syneidesis’ was not 
(clearly) used in any other meaning than that of the (internal) witness. This is 
a broad meaning in the sense that it does not differentiate between the moral 
and the non-moral; and at the same time, where it is used in a moral sense, it 
is rather narrow, for the symbol of conscience is not exhausted by 
‘syneidesis’ in the sense of an internal witness. Socrates, in the passages 
referred to in the previous chapter, did not use the word ‘syneidesis’, but in 
                                                 
31 Lewis (1991), 191. 
32 Lewis (1991), 192. He quotes from Pierce (1955). 
33 See Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 910-912. One finds rather widely 
differing dates for Philo; the presented dates come from Honderich (ed.) (1995). 
Copleston (1962), 202, gives c. 25 B.C. – ‘some time after A.D. 40’. Samuel Sandmel 
says that he was presumably born ‘about 25 or 20 B.C.’, and that “the date of his 
death can be guessed at as around A.D. 50” (Sandmel [1979], 3). 
34 The Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 900, notes that originally, words 
of the ‘synoida’ group generally had little to do with anything divine: “Weder das im 
philosophischen noch das im moralischen Sinne verstandene Gewissen hat viel mit 
der Gottheit zu tun.” With respect to the Menander passage, it says that it is hardly 
the common interpretation to say that conscience is there held to originate from 
God or to be divine in nature; the dictionary suggests that it was meant mockingly, 
to say that for an incorrigible know-it-all, his own conscience is his god. Serious or 
not, the passage is probably best read as comparing conscience to a god, rather than 
saying that conscience is divine (in nature or origin). 
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his own terms he constructed a much richer symbolism, as we have seen. 
This is a clear illustration of the fact that the symbol is not tied to one term.35 
The symbolism used by Socrates indicates that experience was not limited to 
the ‘witness element’ of conscience. The levels of experience and 
symbolization are, in this period, not always closely linked to the term 
‘syneidesis’. Pierce gives an example from Xenophon’s version of the Apology 
of Socrates, however, in which “Socrates is content to let their own 
συνειδησις punish those who induced the witnesses at the trial to give 
perjured evidence against him, for he is satisfied that in the nature of things 
they will suffer greatly from such knowledge within themselves of sacrilege 
and injustice, which will have followed automatically upon the act’s 
commission”.36 
 Generally speaking, it is in the first century A.D. that the moral 
sense of ‘syneidesis’ becomes dominant, and that in that moral sense the 
term starts to acquire more elements of meaning, and to become more 
widespread. Even more importantly, it is at this time that the substantives 
‘syneidesis’ and ‘syneidos’ start to be used frequently; the former in the New 
Testament (and by Paul in particular), the latter by Philo.37 In the paulinian 
texts in the New Testament, ‘syneidesis’ has become a rich symbol, 
conveying the three core experiential elements identified in the previous 
chapter, but with strong religious overtones. The Theologisches Wörterbuch zum 
Neuen Testament states that with St. Paul, ‘syneidesis’ stands (roughly 
translated) for “the γνοσις [gnosis], in which the knowledge and 
understanding perception of facts at hand, the affirmative choice of 
commitments desired by God and the valuating self-judgement are 
concentrated [zusammengefaßt] in a whole”.38 It is also described as a kind 
of self-consciousness “that is threatened in its existence” – but here I would 
say: ‘that is insistent’ – when “acknowledging and knowing [Anerkennen und 
Erkennen], desire and knowledge [Wollen und Wissen], judgement and 
action diverge”.39 It is emphasized, furthermore, that ‘syneidesis’ should not 
                                                 
35 Cf. Kittsteiner (1995), 18: “Das Phänomen kann beschrieben werden, ohne daß 
das Wort dabei gebraucht werden muß.” As will be clear by now, I would prefer to 
speak of expression, rather than of description – but otherwise I agree with 
Kittsteiner. Cf. Seel (1953), 298: “Daß die Untersuchung des antiken Verhältnisses 
zu dem seelischen Sachverhalt, den wir ‘Gewissen’ nennen, von dem Wort συνείδησις 
(...) ausgegangen ist, versteht sich von selbst. Daß sie sich nicht darauf beschränken 
darf, ist auch bereits gesagt (...).” 
36 Pierce (1955), 40. 
37 Bosman (2003), 276: “Two ancient authors, Philo and Paul, represent a decisive 
moment in the history of the word group in that substantive forms for the first time 
feature with relative frequency in their writings. Philo’s use is dominated by the 
substantive participle συνειδος, while Paul prefers the verbal substantive συνειδησις.” 
38 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 913. 
39 Idem. 
 134 
be taken to be a faculty of judgement; the term also designates the person 
itself, as aware of himself in certain respects. The element of intimacy is quite 
pronounced in Paul’s use of ‘syneidesis’. 
 
2.2.2.2 Consequences of differentiation 
It is very important to note that ‘syneidesis’ (whether as ‘conscience’ or in a 
more general sense) was never a technical term. It came from the vocabulary 
of common people. Marietta elaborates this point. She notes that “[a]fter (...) 
non-moral uses of syneidēsis in the fifth and fourth centuries, the term 
dropped from sight until near the beginning of the Christian era.” The term 
“reappeared in literature of the Hellenistic period, and now with an ethical 
connotation. (...) The Hellenistic concern for ethics and the individual’s inner 
attitudes fostered the development of the concept of conscience.” She does 
note that “[t]he ethical and non-ethical aspects (...) were conveyed by the 
same word, and only the context indicated the moral quality of the object of 
the consciousness.”40 A bit further on, she discusses the question as to the 
Stoic influence in shaping the use of ‘syneidesis’ – a question that naturally 
arises given the term’s sudden prominence in the Hellenistic era. In the 
course of her discussion, she says that there “seems to have been a popular 
Hellenistic moral philosophy which would have influenced Greek and 
Roman moralists alike. (...) It seems likely that Latin Stoic use of conscientia 
reflects the popular use of syneidēsis.”41 She argues against Friedrich Zucker, 
who “argues that the lack of a definition of conscience in Stoic literature 
shows that the concept had little significance in Stoicism”: “the lack of a 
definition probably indicates that none was thought necessary. The Stoics 
would have needed a definition if their readers were not familiar with the 
term, or if they were using the term in an unusual or technical way. (...) 
Syneidēsis seems to have been part of the syncretistic religious and ethical 
thought which permeated the Graeco-Roman world. Rather than originating 
as a technical philosophical term, syneidēsis as a term for moral consciousness 
developed in the common speech of the people.” The term grew “out of the 
experience of the people”; it “appears to have been a common and popular 
word, never carefully defined, never made a philosophical technicality, but 
simply taken for granted and used to express an important but little analyzed 
experience of the ordinary man.”42 
                                                 
40 Marietta (1970), 178. 
41 Ibid., 184. 
42 Ibid., 186. Cf. Seel (1953), 302, who, with regard to fifth century B.C. uses of 
words from the ‘synoida’ group says: “Zusammenfassend sei festgestellt, daß die – 
bis jetzt – frühesten und deutlichsten Belege für die Formulierung jenes ‘krummen’ 
Gefühls, das man Gewissen nennt, sich in der Komödie finden, also in einer dem 
vulgären Umgangston nahestehenden, dem γένος ισχνόν angehörigen Stillage.” Cf. 
also Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 900, on the same point, and 912, 
with regard to St. Paul’s use of ‘syneidesis’: his frequent use of the term in the 
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 So ‘syneidesis’ may in itself be a more differentiated notion than, for 
instance, ‘heart’, but this differentiation was not produced by analysis, and 
was not the result of reflection on the awareness of sin. That suggests that 
the symbolic aspect of ‘syneidesis’ was probably still strong – it was an 
expression of quite common experiences, rather than an analytically 
distinguished element in people’s experience. For the importance of 
differentiation is twofold: 1) inherent in differentiation, especially when 
related to (philosophical or theological) analysis, is a tendency towards 
doctrinalization; 2) differentiation enables the meanings of terms to change, 
and stimulates this. This is paradoxical, for doctrinalization implies the 
fixation of meaning. The solution of the paradox lies in the relation between 
differentiation and abstraction. Increasing linguistic differentiation implies 
greater abstraction of the resulting notions – we have seen that in 2.2.1. The 
more we differentiate between diverse elements of experience, and the more 
we give these elements their own separate names, the more we abstract from 
the concrete, undivided experience. The names we have devised are 
abstractions from an always more compact reality. The attempt to define all 
the various elements of experience we are able to discern, and the attempt – 
the other way around – to pin-point the exact meanings of the terms we 
have coined for the purpose, constitute thrusts in the direction of doctrine. 
Yet simultaneously, because our notions (concepts) are abstract and 
therefore only loosely connected to concrete experience, the meanings of 
those notions are apt to undergo change. Shifts in meaning may occur 
undetected and unchecked for a long time, simply because the connection 
with experience – the only thing that might check such shifts – is lacking. 
Moreover, the lack of a (strong) connection between concrete experiences 
and abstract notions necessitates a continuous redefinition of those notions, in 
order to prevent them from drifting further and further away from the 
experiences to which they are supposed to apply. Also, where thinkers are 
not concerned with the connection with concrete experience, the 
abstractness of these notions allows them to manipulate these notions so as 
to fit more general theological or philosophical systems. 
 The ‘differentiation paradox’ can also be stated in terms of 
vagueness and precision: differentiation leads to more precision, in the sense 
that the precise location of a concept in a conceptual network becomes more 
and more clearly delineated; its relation to ‘neighbouring’ concepts is 
                                                                                                               
context of discussions concerning sacrificial meat “läßt vermuten, daß hier ein in der 
Gemeinde umlaufendes Stichwort aufgenommen und umgeprägt wird”; Köster 
(1980), 110, points out that the language of the New Testament is the colloquial 
language, not that of literature. See also Kittsteiner (1995), 20: “Zur Grundlage einer 
individuellen Sittlichkeit wird das Gewissen aber erst in den Jahrhunderten vor und 
nach der Zeitenwende. Nicht von der philosophischen Schulsprache herkommend, 
sondern aus der Umgangssprache und der hellenistischen Popularphilosophie dringt 
es in das Vokabular der mittleren und jüngeren Stoa ein.”  
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explicated, or becomes explicit (if the differentiation is a natural process, 
rather than the result of a conscious effort). Differentiation also leads to 
increasing vagueness, in the sense that the relation between concepts and 
concrete experiences becomes vaguer. Precision can be gained through 
external or internal differentiation. External differentiation is what I described 
just now: it concerns the clarification of the relation between one concept 
and surrounding concepts and the precise delineation of its width of 
application. Internal differentiation is a similar process, but within a concept; 
increasing internal differentiation means that an increasing number of 
aspects of a concept are distinguished and named. This brings with it the 
possibility of emphasizing one aspect at the cost of another, and in its wake, 
in the case of conscience, the possibility of a plurality of concepts of 
conscience. The origination of a plurality of concepts of conscience itself is 
not what I mean by differentiation, though it is related to internal 
differentiation. So when Stelzenberger speaks of the ‘Differenziertheit’ of the 
modern concept of conscience, he is using the term in another, less technical 
sense; he refers merely to the plurality of concepts, to the manifold meanings 
of the word ‘Gewissen’. While this situation, that the word has so many 
meanings, and that it is often unclear which is meant, is a result of (among 
other things) internal differentiation in the (earlier) concept of conscience, I 
would not call the resulting plurality of meanings itself an example of 
differentiation. Rather, it might constitute a new compactness, in so far as 
the use of the word draws in fact not on just one of the available meanings, 
but on several at the same time. 
 Compact experiences persist and arise next to more differentiated 
experiences, and compact language remains and appears side by side with 
more differentiated language; and even highly differentiated experiences are 
always more compact than the most differentiated language. This is due to 
the fundamental difference between experience and analysis of experience. 
Symbols can be more or less compact, but they always retain an element of 
compactness – this they have in common with experiences. Symbols always 
integrate a plurality of experiences and elements of experience. Compact 
symbols of conscience persist throughout European history, alongside 
philosophical theories of conscience. The (sub)symbols of the worm and the 
voice of conscience are good examples of this. In the Middle Ages, we see 
that besides the highly differentiated and doctrinal theories of conscience of 
the scholastics, an anti-doctrinal mystic movement exists, with its own 
symbolization of conscience.43 Because of their compactness, symbols 
constitute a perpetual challenge to the differentiating consciousness, and a 
continuous threat to differentiated thought. The differentiating 
consciousness (of theologians, philosophers, psychologists) has always tried 
either to suppress symbolic language, or to discipline it and harness it for its 
                                                 
43 Cf. Stelzenberger (1961), 12-13. See 2.5. 
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purposes.44 It is no wonder, then, that the symbolic aspect of expressions of 
conscience tends to go unnoticed and/or undiscussed. 
 
2.2.3. ‘Syneidesis’ in Philo and the New Testament 
In the introduction to this chapter, I pointed out that I would provide 
nothing more than a sketch of some important trends in the development of 
expressions of and reflection on conscience. In this section, which is 
concerned with a development from compactness to differentiation, Philo of 
Alexandria and the New Testament use of ‘syneidesis’ will be discussed, 
because they constitute key points in that development. That means that 
many authors (philosophers and others) will be mentioned only in passing or 
not at all. However, to mention every author that used the term ‘syneidesis’, 
a related term, or some other expression of conscience – not that ‘syneidesis’ 
is always an expression of conscience, of course – would only distract from 
our purpose. As a final justifying remark I might add that Philo and the New 
Testament are not only important in the development from compactness to 
differentiation, but also for their semantic contribution to the symbolization 
of conscience. Later expressions of conscience often (consciously or 
unconsciously) hark back to these sources. 
 When Philo and New Testament writers employed the words 
‘syneidos’ and ‘syneidesis’, they were adopting a notion from Hellenistic folk 
psychology. They did not just adapt themselves to common linguistic 
practice, however. Philo was the first to come up with what we (with some 
imagination) might call a ‘theory’ of conscience, while with the apostle Paul 
and in the New Testament in general the term received a new shade of 
meaning – according to some authors even a profoundly different meaning. 
Philo contributed much to (later) differentiation and doctrinalization; later 
reflection (by church fathers) on the meaning of ‘syneidesis’ in the New 
Testament had the same effect. 
 
2.2.3.1. ‘Syneidos’ and ‘syneidesis’ in Philo 
Philo of Alexandria, or Philo Judaeus (‘the Jew’), a contemporary of Jesus 
and Paul, among others, can be called a Greek Jew – or a Jewish Greek.45 
Sandmel does not choose between the two, but explains Philo’s position as 
follows: “Philo’s basic religious ideas are Jewish, his intuitions Jewish, and his 
loyalties Jewish, but his explanations of ideas, intuitions, and devotions are 
invariably Greek. Scripture has its array of prophets, and Philo ‘believes’ in 
prophecy; when Philo explains what prophecy is and how it works, his 
exposition comes from Plato.”46 Copleston says that eastern thinkers of the 
second period in the development of Hellenistic-Roman philosophy, 
                                                 
44 This is a recurring theme in Kittsteiner’s book. 
45 Sandmel (1979), 15-16. 
46 Ibid., 15. 
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thinkers like Philo, “tried to systematise their religious conceptions in a 
philosophic framework”.47 
 Very little is known about him as a person, though much of his 
writing has been preserved – by Christians, significantly; this is where his 
main influence lay.48 What we do know is that he came from a social and 
intellectual elite.49 Stelzenberger remarks that Paul and the other New 
Testament writers adopt the term ‘syneidesis’ from the popular philosophy 
of their Hellenistic environment, and adds: “Verwendet ist nur das ionische 
Wort syneidesis. Das attische syneidós uns synesis fehlen.”50 The relevance 
of this remark only becomes clear in combination with what Sandmel says 
about Philo’s language: “His Greek is the koine, but it is in the pretentious 
imitation of Athens that is customarily called Atticistic.” Philo, who does 
indeed normally use ‘syneidos’, and only thrice ‘syneidesis’, writes an elitist 
form of the koine Greek, whereas Paul’s language is that of the common 
people.51 Philo certainly did not address a similar public to that addressed by 
Paul, though we do not really know what his readership consisted of.52 
 In his work, Philo was mainly concerned with demonstrating that 
“the same truth is to be found in both the Greek philosophy and Jewish 
                                                 
47 Copleston (1962), 127. He also notes that “[t]hinkers like Philo were, of course, 
also influenced by the desire to win over the Greeks for their un-Greek doctrines by 
presenting the latter in philosophic guise”. 
48 Sandmel (1979), 171 (note 3 to ch. 1), notes that “Philo’s writings became useful 
to Christians in Alexandria. A result was the rewriting of at least one passage, the 
first part of Prov [De Providentia]. The view arose that Philo had converted to 
Christianity; baseless as this is, it nevertheless points to the congruencies between 
Philo’s theological position and that of Christians such as Clement and Origen.” 
49 His brother, Alexander Lysimachus, held the position of ‘alabarch’ for some time 
– apparently an ‘alabarch’ was an important political leader or authority. 
“Alexander”, Sandmel notes, “was eminent enough to have been the ‘guardian’ of 
the mother of the Emperor Tiberius and wealthy enough to have made a substantial 
loan to Agrippa I”, who was a grandson of Herod the Great (Sandmel [1979], 10-
11). Presumably, Philo shared in this wealth and prestige; at any rate, he could afford 
to spend a lot of his time writing, and we know nothing that suggests that Philo 
earned money in some function or other. 
50 Stelzenberger (1963b), 35. 
51 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 910: ‘syneidesis’ is used in particular 
combinations, always meaning ‘Das Wissen um eigene unrechte Taten’; “Das 
Gewissen heißt συνειδος.” Cf. Marietta (1970), 178: “My study indicates that syneidēsis 
and syneidos had the same meaning, but more style conscious writers such as 
Josephus, Philo, Simplicius, and Plutarch prefer syneidos, while Wisdom of Solomon, 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Diodorus Siculus use syneidēsis.” Bosman (2003), 
106, maintains that it is difficult to establish why Philo prefers ‘syneidos’: it “might 
simply be Philo’s choice of Greek for the Latin conscientia or it might be linked to the 
fact that Attic forms were generally regarded as more elegant”. 
52 Sandmel (1979), 14. 
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Scriptures and tradition”.53 He believed that the philosophers had made use 
of the Scriptures, and, more importantly, he interpreted the Scriptures 
allegorically, so as to render their meaning compatible with Greek 
philosophy.54 He invented a complete system, we might say, of allegorical 
interpretations of the Scriptures. Indeed, he held that the ‘literal’ reading of 
them was inferior to the non-literal, allegorical interpretation. The former 
was necessary for the common people, however, because to them the latter 
was unattainable. By means of allegory, Philo transformed “biblical 
characters, or biblical place-names, into universal types of people, or 
universal characteristics of mankind”.55 He took the method of allegory from 
the Stoics, who interpreted Homer and Homeric legends allegorically. What 
he also took from them and/or from Plato is the distinction between a 
sensible world (‘kosmos aesthetikos’) and an intelligible world (‘kosmos 
noëtos’). He interpreted the Scriptures as providing a map for the journey to 
spiritual perfection that everyone can make, a journey which entails a 
‘departure’ from the sensible world, to enter the intelligible world, the world 
of ideas, of immortality.56 
 For Philo’s ethics, this distinction between the worldly and the 
spiritual is also important, in the form of a dualism between body and soul. 
Sandmel notes that in the Scriptures, the Deity tends to judge and reward or 
punish people collectively, as a community of the (un)faithful. Some texts, 
however, individualize good and evil, righteousness and unrighteousness. 
According to Sandmel, Scripture “simply assumes that man is free to choose 
evil or good. That such choice can involve a complexity of moral dilemmas 
seems not to be raised in Scripture. Rather, it is held that man has in him 
both an impulse to good and one to evil. (...) [I]n Scripture there is no 
extended development of the theme of two impulses. Later Rabbinic 
thought (...) does not probe in any depth into the inner psyche of man.”57 
Philo’s thought is significantly different – and this is especially significant in 
the present context: “Not only does Philo present such a probing with what 
is to be described as some complexity, but his dualism of body and soul is an 
important element in his probing.”58 Philo probes into the inner psyche of 
man; hence, it is not surprising that we find the earliest thorough reflection 
on ‘conscience’ (‘syneidos’) in his work. Sandmel goes on to discuss the 
relation between Philo’s body-soul dualism and his ethics; he does not, in 
this short chapter, speak of conscience. “In a general way,” Sandmel says, “it 
is his view that those deeds which are associated with the body, especially 
                                                 
53 Copleston (1962), 202. 
54 Idem. 
55 Sandmel (1979), 18. 
56 Ibid., 19; 24-25. 
57 Ibid., 112. 
58 Idem. 
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with the gratification of the senses, are evil; those which stem from the soul 
are good and related to the virtues. The worthy man seeks for the virtues, 
meaning in effect that man should live by the soul, this through rising above 
the body.”59 For Philo, the virtues are closely bound up with piety. “The goal 
of righteous living is achieved when man, observing the Laws of Moses, 
thereby progresses from this sensible world into the intelligible world where 
virtue, piety, and wisdom abide.”60 The result of reaching this goal, Sandmel 
says, is spiritual joy. Against Wolfson, Sandmel maintains that Philo agreed 
with the Stoics in seeing virtue as its own reward. Importantly, he did not 
foresee a reward for virtue and a punishment for vice in the afterlife. Here, 
Philo departs from traditional Jewish thought, in which there is an afterlife 
where one receives one’s due reward or punishment. “In Philo, there is no 
hint of these matters, and no real concept of a future heaven or hell.”61 For 
him, “immortality is the ordinary sequel to a man’s rising above his body; at 
death, his soul simply becomes separated from it. Immortality in Philo seems 
never to be conceived of as a reward, but only as a natural destiny.”62 
 Against this background, it is quite understandable that Philo would 
be the first to come to something of a ‘theory’ of conscience.63 He is a Jew, 
and has the Jewish concern with ethics; he combines this with a Greek focus 
on psychology. Human life, for him, is (or should be) a spiritual journey; that 
is, a journey towards the spiritual. The goal of this journey is reached 
through a life of virtue and piety, which are two sides of the same coin. This 
journey is not easy. Given man’s (bodily) tendencies towards evil, man needs 
to be warned, rebuked, punished, guided. For this purpose, God has placed 
the conscience in our soul. This is usually a bad conscience, but it has a 
positive function; it is through conscience that God tries to keep people on 
the right path in their journey.64 “[D]as fehlen dieses Strafens käme der 
völligen Preisgabe des Menschen durch Gott gleich.”65 
 The Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament reserves ample space 
for Philo’s ‘theory’ of conscience. It notes that “[d]ie Aufgabe des Gewissens 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 112-113. Hence Philo’s admiration for the Essenes and the Therapeutae, 
groups that, both in their own way, emphasized the spiritual over the wordly in the 
way they lived. 
60 Ibid., 114. 
61 Ibid., 116. 
62 Ibid., 117. 
63 The word ‘theory’ is not so strange or out of place if we take it quite literally; the 
Greek ‘theorein’ meaning ‘to see’, a theory would simply be a way of seeing 
something. 
64 Because ‘conscience’ is normally a bad conscience, we do not find expressions like 
‘bad conscience’ in Philo’s work – they would be pleonastic. Instead of using ‘kardia’ 
for ‘heart’ in the Old Testament sense, Philo sometimes speaks of a ‘good 
conscience’, as in ‘ek katharou suneidotos’ (‘from [a] good conscience’). 
65 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 911. 
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ist das ελεγχειν.”66 In the term ‘elenchein’ the whole juridical process from 
the issued complaint to the rebuke and the judgement by the judge is 
metaphorically concentrated.67 This process of ‘elenchein’ takes place before 
the inner forum, or in the inner court. As accuser, the conscience cannot be 
bribed; it is incorruptible. As judge, conscience is infallible. Its workings are 
described in terms like ‘anstacheln, schlagen, martern’ (‘to urge/spur on’, ‘to 
hit’, ‘to torture’).68 Marietta, having surveyed the range of metaphors Philo 
employs (the judge [‘dikastes’], the accuser [‘kategoros’], the witness 
[‘martys’], and most commonly the scrutinizer, reprover or convicter), 
concludes: “Clearly, Philo saw the syneidos as that within man which convicts 
him of his evil.”69 Outward consequences and signs of the bad conscience 
are a lack of ‘thrasos’ (courage), ‘parresia’ (freedom of speech), or other 
inhibitions; inner turmoil (‘tarache’), fear (‘phobos’), and pain (‘lupe’) go 
together with outward confusion, inhibited speech, as well as insincerity, 
deceitfulness, and a lack of integrity.70 If conscience succeeds in ‘turning’ or 
converting a man, however, it is joyful and reconciled.71 
 The way conscience manifests itself according to Philo must be 
understood in its theological context: conscience has an important place in 
the battle against sin. It is sent by God to effect man’s conversion, to make 
man repent and confess his sins. Hence, conscience is given man in order 
that his soul may be saved – not in the afterlife, but in this life. “Wenn er 
[Gott] uns aber straft, so wird er uns, da er ja gütig ist, nachsichtig u[nd] 
milde die Sünden wieder gutmachen, indem er den zurechtweisenden 
Elenchus, seinen eigenen Logos, in unsere Seele sendet, durch welchen er 
sie, nachdem er sie wegen ihrer Sünden geschmäht u[nd] getadelt hat, retten 
wird.”72 To this purpose of saving man’s soul, or helping man keep to the 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 910. Marietta notes that ‘syneidos’ is related to ‘elegchos’ or ‘elegchō’ (her 
spelling) in almost half of its occurrences. For the relation between ‘elenchos’ or 
‘elenchein’ and ‘syneidos’ see Bosman (2003), 109-111; he says that ‘elenchos’ and 
‘syneidos’ function as synonyms in Philo, while retaining their own intrinsic 
meaning. 
67 Conscience does not punish (Marietta [1970], 178). 
68 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 910. 
69 Marietta (1970), 179. 
70 Bosman (2003), 90-95, 178. Bosman notes that “[t]he inhibiting effect is 
particularly unacceptable as such inhibitions are associated with a lack of freedom 
traditionally belonging to the lower social strata such as slaves, women and children” 
(178); and explains that in the literature “descriptions of interactive inhibitions are 
collectively referred to as the παρρησια topos”, while ‘lack of παρρησια’ topos would 
have been more appropriate (90). 
71 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 910; see the quotation from Die Werke 
Philos von Alexandria in deutscher Übersetzung I, Leopold Cohn (ed.), Marcus, Breslau, 
1909, 390. 
72 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum neuen Testament, 911; the passage is from Quod Deterius 
Potiori Insidiari Soleat 145f. 
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right path in his spiritual journey, conscience could also play the role of a 
guide. In Philo’s writings, there are two places where he seems to suggest 
this. Both concern an allegorical interpretation of Genesis 37:15, where a 
man who points out the way to Joseph is taken to be the true ‘Anthropos’, 
who inhabits the soul, functioning both as Lord and King and as Judge.73 
The Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament comments on the vagueness 
of both passages, saying that not only the conscience, but also the ‘nous’ and 
the ‘theios logos’ are identified with the ‘elenchos’. It would go too far, the 
Wörterbuch says, to ascribe the guiding function simply to the conscience.74 
 The Theologisches Wörterbuch ends its section on Philo with a 
subsection on his historical situation. It points out the connections with the 
Stoics, from whom he takes (among other things) the idea of a divine ‘logos’ 
or ‘nous’, implanted in the soul, an idea which he transposes to the 
conscience. New is that he sees conscience as independent from reason and 
as manifesting itself spontaneously. The Theologisches Wörterbuch sees his 
‘decisive contribution’ to the development of a doctrine or theory of 
conscience as deriving from the Old Testament. His indebtedness to the 
Scriptures is said to be threefold: it resides in his use of ‘elenchos’, in the 
juridical function of conscience – for the Roman Stoics, the witness (‘testis’) 
is much more an onlooker than a witness in a trial – and in the religious 
point of departure of the theory of conscience. The person of God stands 
behind the conscience as accuser and judge.75 His thought is more strongly 
ethical than that of the Stoics; it is more focused on the interior and on 
individual psychology than Jewish thought; in this combination, I would say, 
lies Philo’s greatest contribution to later (Christian) thought.76 I say later 
thought, because most likely he did not influence Paul.77 It was the Church 
Fathers who took up his work, without, however, taking over the term 
‘syneidos’.78 
 As a final remark, I should say something about Philo’s ‘theory’ of 
conscience. We must not misunderstand the nature of his reflection on the 
subject. What Philo did, was to give conscience a place in a broader, 
systematic, theological framework. He also made an effort in describing and 
to a certain extent analyzing the phenomenology of conscience, in a manner 
                                                 
73 Cf. Marietta (1970), 180. Compare also Adam Smith’s ‘man within’. 
74 Theologisches Wörterbuch zum neuen Testament, 911. 
75 Ibid., 912. 
76 Cf. Raju (1966), 52-53; he, however, speaks of Philo’s main contribution to Jewish 
thought – this is an odd remark, given that Philo’s main influence lay in the Christian 
world. 
77 See, for instance, Stelzenberger (1989), 205. Bosman (2003), 9, argues that this 
option should be kept open, however; pointing out a possible connection between 
Philo and a Corinthian ‘Apollos’ group, which may have been the group within the 
Christian community Paul argued against. 
78 Bosman (2003), 17. 
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directly related to his ideas concerning the function(s) of conscience. 
Conscience can be experienced as judging one’s actions or thoughts; hence, 
conscience can be said to function as a judge. It can be experienced as 
accusing one’s own person; hence, conscience functions as an accuser. There 
is a beginning of a conceptual network in which conscience (‘syneidos’) has a 
place; the most important neighbouring concept is that of ‘elenchos’. But 
with all this said, we must remain aware of what Philo did not do: he did not 
formulate anything like a medieval scholastic doctrine of conscience; he did 
not elaborate on the place of conscience among (other) human faculties; he 
did not problematize conscience in any way (what about misplaced guilt?); he 
did not move far beyond phenomenology.79 In a way, this is also what is 
good about his thought on the subject. ‘Syneidos’ is still very much a 
symbolic term, even if it has a place in ‘theory’, and we see that it is 
embedded in a range of metaphors, mostly pertaining to the juridical sphere 
or process. He takes this symbolic expression of primarily painful or 
troubling experiences of conscience from the popular philosophy of his time 
and situates it within his own peculiar mixture of Stoic (Hellenistic) 
philosophy and Jewish theology. 
 
2.2.3.2. ‘Syneidesis’ in the New Testament 
Much has been written about the meaning of ‘syneidesis’ in the New 
Testament, not least because of its sudden abundant appearance there – the 
term occurs only three times in the Greek translation of the Old Testament 
and its originally Greek books.80 Authors tend to focus on Paul’s 
contribution to the (supposedly) new meaning of ‘syneidesis’, not least 
because he is responsible for half of the occurrences of the term in the New 
Testament.81 But here the problems have already started, for when I say half, 
I mean fifteen, whereas Stelzenberger ascribes twenty occurrences to Paul. 
The reason for that is quite simple: Stelzenberger considers the so-called 
Pastoral Epistles (I and II Timothy, and Titus) to be written by Paul, whereas 
                                                 
79 Marietta (1970) notes that it “should be understood (...) that conscience is not 
described as a repository of ethical norms or as an infallible inner oracle”. I am not 
in a position to judge whether Philo took ‘syneidos’ to be infallible or not; according 
to the Theologisches Wörterbuch, Philo took it to be an infallible judge. It is possible that 
Marietta meant primarily to counter the idea that conscience was understood as an 
inner oracle that one could consult to get infallible advice; this could be consistent 
with the idea of conscience as infallibly judging past actions, in the sense that the 
shameful or guilty awareness of sin invariably arises when it is appropriate, and never 
when it is not. 
80 The sites are: Ecclesiastes 10:20; Wisdom 17:10; Sirach 42:18. See Schnackenburg 
(1988), 49. According to Stelzenberger (1989), 37, the Sirach passage is a gloss. 
81 Well, he and those responsible for the canonization of the New Testament, of 
course; that is, St. Athanasius (with a letter to the churches in A.D. 367) and the 
participants in the Third Council of Carthage in 397. 
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many (if not most) specialists today would dispute this. This has important 
consequences for the interpretation of Paul’s use of ‘syneidesis’, as we shall 
see. 
 Kittsteiner adopts Eckstein’s and Kähler’s interpretation of 
‘syneidesis’ in the paulinian writings. For Jews and Gentiles alike, ‘syneidesis’ 
is a witness to their actions. “Diese Zeugenschaft ist aber in ihrer 
anklagenden und den Menschen schmerzhaft aufspaltenden Funktion 
zugleich überwunden durch das Christusgeschehen: in der Annahme durch 
einen gnädigen Gott zeigt sich das eigentlich Neue im paulinischen 
Gewissensbegriff.”82 The novelty of the paulinian use of ‘syneidesis’ is also 
emphasized in the Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament and by 
Stelzenberger. In the former we find the following question and answer: 
“Warum hat das Gewissen bei Paulus die Rolle des anklagenden und 
überführenden Elenchus gegenüber dem Spätjudentum so stark eingebüßt? 
Der Grund dafür liegt nicht in der stärkeren hellenistischen oder 
rabbinischen Herkunft des Apostels. Er hängt mit dem Neuen zusammen, 
das Paulus mit seinem Evangelium von Jesus Christus zu sagen hat. Die 
anklagende Stimme des Gewissens ist deshalb überwunden, weil der noch 
ungleich schärfere Ankläger, das von Gott geoffenbarte Gesetz, das nicht 
nur anklagt, sondern tötet (R 7, 7 ff), abgetan und durch die freisprechende 
Stimme des in Christus neuschaffenden Gottes abgelöst ist.” As in the 
interpretation presented by Kittsteiner, an opposition is constructed between 
a tormented conscience on the one hand, and a freed, absolved Christian 
conscience on the other. Stelzenberger does not emphasize this aspect of the 
‘justification by faith’ so much, but he does repeatedly insist on the novelty 
of the New Testament, especially the paulinian, use of ‘syneidesis.83 This 
claim is nowhere substantiated by any supporting remarks, except in one 
place, and even there rather briefly.84 Below, I will first look into the 
interpretation of the paulinian ‘syneidesis’ as a precursor of Luther’s 
Christian conscience, which is what the Eckstein/Kähler interpretation, as 
well as that of the Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament amount to.85 
Then, I will consider the more general matter of the novelty of the paulinian 
use of ‘syneidesis’. We will then be in a position to gain a better 
understanding of what he means by the term, to compare it with other New 
Testament occurrences of ‘syneidesis’, and to assess the influence of New 
Testament use of the term on later writers. 
                                                 
82 Kittsteiner (1995), 169. 
83 Stelzenberger (1961), 18, 34, 35, 49, 84, 94. He also quotes authors who emphasize 
the same thing; Kuß and Spicq for instance. See also Stelzenberger (1963b), 36: 
“Aber charakteristisch ist für das Neue Testament besonders Paulus eine 
vollständige und unabhängige Eigenprägung.” 
84 This is in Stelzenberger (1961), 84-85. 
85 Stelzenberger (1989), 213, also suggests this traditional interpretation, speaking of 
the Jew “der streng und gesetzetreu dem Buchstaben dient”. 
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 Kittsteiner presents Eckstein’s interpretation of the paulinian 
‘concept of conscience’ (an interpretation that draws on Kähler’s work) in 
the context of a section on Luther’s interpretation of the conceptual history 
of the term ‘conscience’. This is quite appropriate, in a way, for it is 
especially Martin Luther himself who interpreted Paul’s writings in such a 
way that Paul became, in Krister Stendahl’s words, ‘a hero of the 
introspective conscience’. In an article which, as Bill DeJong remarks, “has 
taken its place in Pauline scholarship as one of the pivotal essays in the 
formation of what James D. G. Dunn has dubbed ‘the new perspective on 
Paul’”, Stendahl points out how “[e]specially in Protestant Christianity (...) 
the Pauline awareness of sin has been interpreted in the light of Luther’s 
struggle with his conscience”.86 “Luther’s inner struggles,” Stendahl writes, 
“presuppose the developed system of Penance and Indulgence, and it is 
significant that his famous 95 theses take their point of departure from the 
problem of forgiveness of sins within the framework of Penance (...).”87 In 
the course of the Middle Ages, “[p]enetrating self-examination reached a 
hitherto unknown intensity. For those who took this practice seriously (...) 
the pressure was great. It is as one of those – and for them – that Luther 
carries out his mission as a great pioneer. It is in response to their question, 
‘How can I find a gracious God?’ that Paul’s words about a justification in 
Christ by faith, and without the works of the Law, appears as the liberating 
and saving answer.”88 To someone preoccupied with the demands of the 
Law and burdened by a guilty conscience, Paul’s words seemed to offer a 
deeply needed and ‘graceful’ solution: not legalism, not the works of the 
Law, but faith constitutes the road to salvation. 
 Stendahl offers two important objections to this interpretation: 1) It 
is not how Paul’s writings were interpreted in the beginning. In fact, Stendahl 
remarks, “[i]t has always been a puzzling fact that Paul meant so relatively 
little for the thinking of the Church during the first 350 years of its history” 
– that is, until Augustine, “it seems that Paul’s great insight into justification 
by faith was forgotten”.89 Only when the concrete problems Paul was 
addressing – problems pertaining to the relation between Jews and Gentiles, 
and to the status of the Torah once the Messiah had come – had lost their 
relevance, a new interpretation could arise. This Augustinian and Lutheran 
interpretation became the common (but especially the Protestant) 
interpretation of Paul; it held that Paul was the first to offer the solution of 
Christian freedom to the painfully troubled conscience. Stendahl 
summarizes: “Paul’s argument that the Gentiles must not, and should not 
come to Christ via the [Mosaic] Law, i.e. via circumcision etc., has turned into 
                                                 
86 Stendahl (1963), 200. 
87 Ibid., 202-203. 
88 Ibid., 203. 
89 Ibid., 203-204. 
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a statement according to which all men must come to Christ with 
consciences properly convicted by the Law [understood as the moral 
imperative as such] and its insatiable requirements for righteousness.”90 2) 
Not only does the traditional interpretation of Paul fail to do justice to the 
historical context, it also ignores the fact that Paul himself did not suffer 
from a troubled conscience at all. Stendahl points to Philippians 3 and Acts 9 
to substantiate this claim. In both texts, there is no sign of a conscience 
troubled by disobedience to the law; on the contrary, Paul says he was 
“blameless as to righteousness – of the Law, that is”.91 Stendahl also notes 
that “Paul never urges Jews to find in Christ the answer to the anguish of a 
plagued conscience”; similarly, ‘forgiveness’ “is the term for salvation which 
is used least of all in the Pauline writings”.92 There are no signs of a troubled 
conscience after Paul’s (or Saul’s) conversion either. Stendahl points to 
Romans 9:1, 2 Corinthians 1:12 and 2 Corinthians 5:10 as passages that 
testify to Paul’s confidence. And in 1 Corinthians 4:4 Paul says: “ouden 
emauto synoida” – “I know nothing with me” (“I am conscious of no 
sin”).93 He adds that God is the final judge, but this is not so much a sign of 
humility or less confidence, but rather a way of pointing out to the 
Corinthians that it is not their place to judge him. Then, finally, there is the 
much quoted passage from Romans 7:19: “I do not do the good I want, but 
the evil I do not want to do is what I do.” This has traditionally been 
interpreted as a classic expression of a troubled introspective conscience. But 
what is overlooked here, is that Paul is convinced of the rightness of his will, 
his intention. Moreover, Paul says: “Now if I do what I do not want, then it is 
not I who do it, but the sin which dwells in me.”94 Stendahl concludes that 
“[t]he argument is one of acquittal of the ego, not one of utter contrition”.95 
Hence, when we look at the paulinian use of ‘syneidesis’, it is unlikely that we 
should interpret it in terms of either an oppressed or a freed conscience. 
 But what about the novelty of Paul’s use of ‘syneidesis’? 
Stelzenberger is adamant that the New Testament, and especially the 
paulinian, use of ‘syneidesis’ is completely novel.96 His most poignant 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 207. 
91 Phil. 3:6, quoted in Stendahl (1963), 201; the New International Version of the Bible 
speaks of ‘legalistic righteousness’, thereby exemplifying the traditional reading of 
Paul, where the Mosaic law is turned into a universal principle of legalism. 
92 Stendahl (1963), 202. 
93 Ibid., 210; Cf. Stelzenberger (1961), 82-85. 
94 Quoted in Stendahl (1963), 212; the italics are his. Paul actually says this twice, in 
more or less the same words; in other verses, too, he distances himself from his 
sinful body. 
95 Idem. 
96 Pierce holds a different position, and Stelzenberger criticizes him for that; Pierce is 
said not to do justice to the ‘Sonderstellung und Eigenart des Terminus in der 
neutestamentlichen Theologie’ (Stelzenberger [1961], 25). 
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statement of this view, in which he does not limit himself to Paul, is the 
following: “Die Hülse ist antik, der Inhalt aber neu. Er hat eine völlig neue 
theologische Note. Syneidesis im Neuen Testament ist ein Novum. Es kann 
aus der Umwelt nicht adäquat erklärt werden. Es zählt zu den Begriffen, die 
vom Neuen Testament sehr eigenmächtig und frei von historischen 
Bindungen geprägt werden. Auch das Alte Testament scheidet als Quelle 
aus.”97 From a historical point of view, it is obviously nonsense to say that 
anything could be created ‘free from historical connections’. Nevertheless, 
there is still a question as to the relative novelty of the New Testament use of 
‘syneidesis’. In the above passage and elsewhere, Stelzenberger speaks of the 
New Testament ‘concept’ of ‘syneidesis’, as if there is one concept with a 
clearly new, Christian meaning. At the same time, however, he goes to great 
lengths to point out the diversity in meaning the notion has: “Der Inhalt des 
Wortes hat eine beachtliche Breite. Nichts wäre unsachlicher als eine einzige 
Richtung annehmen zu wollen.”98 These two seemingly contradictory 
statements can go together, if in its various uses, ‘syneidesis’ always has this 
characteristically new element of meaning.99 For Stelzenberger, the novelty 
of ‘syneidesis’ in the New Testament lies in its relation to God: “[B]ei Paulus 
ist syneidenai und syneidesis notwendig mit dem stehen vor Gott oder Gott-
gegenüber-sich-Befinden verbunden. Wie bei Augustinus ist es keine 
Bezeichnung für rein weltlichen, irdischen Inhalt. Deshalb sind Parallelen aus 
dem antiken Sprachgebrauch (...) für das Verständnis des Neuen 
Testamentes sehr aufschlußreich, aber keine bindende Erklärung. Paulus und 
die anderen neutestamentlichen Schriftsteller übernehmen das Wort nicht in 
seiner bisherigen Ur-Bedeutung, sondern verstehen es völlig anders.”100 The 
difference between the Stoic connection between ‘conscientia’ and the divine 
is said to lie in the fact that in the New Testament, the connection is with a 
personal ‘Abba-Gott’, the father of ‘our Lord, Jesus Christ’.101 
 It seems to me that in this manner, virtually any word used in the 
New Testament can be said to have acquired a completely new meaning, 
                                                 
97 Stelzenberger (1961), 94. In ibid., 34, 35, 84 and 85, and Stelzenberger (1963b), 36, 
the emphasis is on Paul. 
98 Idem. 
99 This is what the Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament suggests: “Paulus 
nimmt wie keiner vor ihm den Begriff der συνειδησις in umfassender Weite und 
Vielschichtigkeit auf. (...) Doch hat Paulus keine einheitliche Lehre von der 
συνειδησις vorgelegt. Nicht nur ist der Gewissensbegriff lediglich einer unter anderen 
Versuchen, den ganzen Menschen zu erfassen (...), sondern es laufen in ihm 
verschiedene Traditionmsströme unausgeglichen nebeneinander her. Dies alles aber 
ist umschlossen und zusammengehalten durch das Neue, das Paulus mit dem 
Gewissensbegriff verbindet...” (916-917). 
100 Stelzenberger (1961), 85. 
101 Ibid., 84. I would rather say that the main difference is that for Paul, ‘syneidesis’ 
itself is not divine. 
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totally unconnected to historical antecedents or context. But let us first look 
at the different meanings of ‘syneidesis’ Stelzenberger discerns. In 1 Peter 
2:19, ‘syneidesis’ is said to stand for ‘consciousness/awareness of the God-
relatedness of man’.102 The passage speaks of a ‘conscience toward God’.103 
In Acts 23:1, ‘syneidesis’, according to Stelzenberger, should be translated as 
‘awareness’ [Bewußtheit]. The German reads: “Ich bin mit völlig guter 
syneidesis bis zu diesem Tag vor Gott gewandelt.”104 For Romans 9:1 and 2 
Corinthians 1:12, Stelzenberger suggests ‘awareness as a witness’. Romans 
9:1 reads: “Die Wahrheit sage ich in Christus, ich lüge nicht. Meine 
syneidesis bezeugt mir im pneuma hagion, daß ich große Trauer habe und 
mein Herz unablässigen Schmerz.”105 And so Stelzenberger goes on to 
distinguish six other meanings: ‘inner obligation’, ‘the inner (core)’, ‘moral-
religious faculty/power of judgement’, ‘conscience’, ‘the good conscience’, 
and ‘the bad or evil conscience’.106 Given what other authors have written on 
the subject, and seeing Stelzenberger’s ‘evidence’ underlying all these 
distinctions, it seems to me that he is attempting to do what New Testament 
authors did not do: differentiate between all these different meanings. To be 
sure, there was some differentiation, and ‘syneidesis’ is sometimes qualified 
by ‘agathos’ (good), ‘kathara’ (clear), ‘aproskopos’ (stained), or otherwise. It 
is also true that meaning depends on context, and that one can often discern 
different elements of meaning in the use of a term. But Stelzenberger, trying 
to pin-point the meaning of ‘syneidesis’ in all these passages, goes too far.107 
Schnackenburg presents a nuanced interpretation of the notion, that makes 
                                                 
102 Ibid., 45. The German ‘Gottbezogenheit’ says a bit more than God-relatedness – 
it is also ‘man’s bearing on God’. Stelzenberger writes ‘Bewußtheit’, not 
‘Bewußtsein’, probably to draw attention to the activity of being aware. 
103 That, at least, is the translation in the King James Version that is connected with 
an online New Testament Greek Lexicon, based on Thayer’s and Smith’s Bible 
Dictionary, the large Kittel, and the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 
which can be found on http://www.translatum.gr/dics/gr1.htm. 
104 Stelzenberger (1961), 49; the KJV reads ‘in all good conscience’. 
105 Ibid., 51. The KJV: “I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing 
me witness in the Holy Ghost...” 
106 Ibid., 55-56, 56-68, 68-78, 78-82, 82-90, 90-94. With respect to ‘conscience’ I 
should note that Stelzenberger here means ‘conscience in the authentic and strict 
sense of the word’ (note the cobination ‘authentic and strict’). He spends a lot of 
time emphasizing that ‘syneidesis’ is so often incorrectly translated as ‘Gewissen’, 
saying things like “Syneidesis ist hier bestimmt nicht ‘Gewissen’” (57) and “Von 
‘Gewissen’ ist gar keine Rede” (73); see also 26, 42, 50, 62, 72. This is quite tiresome, 
and actually, given his narrow definition of ‘Gewissen’, it is rather unsurprising that 
it is hardly ever what New Testament authors meant. 
107 Cf. Jewett’s criticism of Stelzenberger, as referred to by Bosman (2003), 192. I 
subscribe to Bosman’s remark that “[m]any difficulties of Paul’s use of the word 
συνειδησις are solved by allowing for sufficient semantic flexibility while not 
abandoning the quest for a single meaning” (193). 
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clear that it is not so much the notion itself that is so very novel in meaning, 
but rather the context that changes the status of ‘syneidesis’.108 Paul is said to 
have built a bridge from Judaic to Hellenistic thought.109 In Schnackenburg’s 
view, Paul’s notion of ‘syneidesis’ is, firstly, the result of his combination of 
Jewish and popular Hellenistic thought; secondly, for Paul, ‘syneidesis’ is 
informed and guided by the Christian value of ‘Love’; thirdly, it is limited by 
God’s Judgement.110 ‘Syneidesis’ is an “innermenschliche Instanz, die das 
Verhalten des Menschen mit positivem oder negativem Urteil ins 
Bewußtsein hebt. Das Wissen um Gut und Böse ist dabei vorausgesetzt.”111 
It is “eine innere spontane Reaktion, eine innermenschliche Instanz (...) die 
dem Menschen als Richtungweiser zu Bewußtsein kommt”.112 Such 
‘definitions’ do not sound very different from pre-Christian or non-Christian 
meanings of ‘syneidesis’.113 
 It is mainly in the non-paulinian books of the New Testament that 
‘syneidesis’ is accompanied by attributes (‘good’, ‘stained’, et cetera).114 In so 
far as this is new for the New Testament, it is not primarily paulinian. We 
also find a ‘clear’ ‘syneidos’ in Philo’s work, and Flavius Josephus (Jewish 
historian, ca. A.D. 37 – ca. 100) speaks of both a good and a bad 
‘syneidos’.115 Bosman points out that ‘syneidesis’ in Paul’s writings does have 
a twofold (or neutral) nature; it may condemn, but it may also applaud.116 
 Reviewing the above, I would say that New Testament authors, Paul 
included, adopted a popular Hellenistic notion, the meaning of which was 
influenced by their Jewish background. They did not obviously change the 
meaning of ‘syneidesis’, nor did they use the word in a very different way. 
When Paul speaks of the weak ‘syneidesis’ of those newly converted 
Christians who dare not eat sacrificial meat, even though, for Christians, that 
                                                 
108 Bosman rightly distinguishes between ‘intrinsic lexical meaning’ and ‘contextual 
meaning’; I would say that the latter makes the greatest difference here. 
109 Schnackenburg (1988), 56-57. 
110 Ibid., 58. 
111 Ibid., 54. 
112 Ibid., 56. 
113 See Stelzenberger (1961), 27-36. Pierce (1955), 54 and 111, who is (not unjustly) 
accused by Stelzenberger of turning ‘syneidesis’ too much into a moral notion, 
defines ‘syneidesis’ as “the pain suffered by man, as man, and therefore as a creature 
involved in the order of things, when, by his acts completed or initiated, he 
transgresses the moral limits of his nature”; it is “the internal counterpart and 
complement of the wrath. It is the painful consciousness that a man has of his own 
sins, past or, if present, begun in the past. It is of God in that it is the reaction of 
man’s nature, as created, and so delimited, by God, against moral transgressions of 
its bounds.” 
114 Cf. Schnackenburg (1988), 57; M. Dibelius and H. Conzelmann, Die Pastoralbriefe, 
Tübingen, 1955, referred to in Stelzenberger (1961), 40-41. 
115 Schnackenburg (1988), 50; Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 909-910. 
116 Bosman (2003), 271. 
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should be unproblematic, ‘syneidesis’ conveys the experience of a concerned 
awareness of one’s own actions as being sinful.117 Part of one’s 
consciousness splits itself from the rest of one’s person, bearing witness and 
causing unease. ‘Syneidesis’ needs to be informed by the right ‘gnosis’ 
(knowledge), but even if (in another person) it is not, it should still be 
respected.118 Those with a strong ‘syneidesis’ should take care not to offend 
the weaker ‘syneidesis’ of others, for that would destroy it, and with it the 
piety of the weaker brothers. Stelzenberger emphasizes the connection 
between ‘syneidesis’ and ‘pistis’ (faith and piety), which in my view however 
does not uniquely change the meaning of ‘syneidesis’, but is rather in line 
with it. ‘Syneidesis’ is an awareness of who one is, what one does, how one 
lives, and (even more importantly) of who one strives to be, what one 
intends to do, and how one tries to live, that arises from a contrast or a 
deeply felt convergence with one’s idea of who one should be, what one should 
do, and how one should live. Piety is very much a part of that; ‘syneidesis’ 
relates to a moral-religious (mode of) consciousness. The famous passage 
from Romans 2:14-15 does not give us a totally different use of ‘syneidesis’, 
even if Stelzenberger would say that in this case it is the ‘real’ conscience that 
is referred to, whereas in the Corinthians passages it is the moral-religious 
power or faculty of judgement. The passage reads: 
 
“14 (Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things 
required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not 
have the law, 15 since they show that the requirements of the law are 
written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their 
thoughts now accusing, now even defending them.)”119 
 
In this passage, too, ‘syneidesis’ (here translated as ‘conscience’) conveys the 
experience of a concerned reflective consciousness, an awareness that does 
not coincide with themselves, even if it is their own, and even if the standard 
by which their thoughts judge them is written on their own hearts. The 
author of Hebrews (9:9, 9:14, 10:2, 10:22) speaks mostly of the cleansing of 
the conscience; ‘syneidesis’ is primarily associated with sin, but also with 
(in)sincerity 
                                                 
117 1 Corinthians 8:7, 8:10, 8:12, 10:25, 10:27-29. 
118 I do not mean to say that Paul thought that the objectively erroneous conscience 
is subjectively binding. Bosman points out that Paul did not express himself “on the 
validity or invalidity of the weak or erring συνειδησις”. He did believe that 
‘syneidesis’ has no direct access to ‘aletheia’; hence, its judgement is provisional. 
119 This translation is from the New International Version of the Bible. 
Schnackenburg (1988), 53, points out that ‘by nature’ should not be taken as a 
reference to a ‘lex naturalis’ in Stoic fashion. Paul does not speak of all pagans, but 
of some; he uses the Greek ‘phusei’ in the sense of ‘in line with their nature’ or ‘from 
themselves’ (the way we would say ‘naturally’). Cf. Potts (1980), 64-65. 
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“[L]et us draw near to God with a sincere heart in full assurance of faith, 
having our hearts sprinkled to cleanse us from a guilty conscience and 
having our bodies washed with pure water.”120 
 
Again, this is not radically different from other uses of ‘syneidesis’. 2 
Corinthians 1:12 reads: 
 
“Now this is our boast: Our conscience testifies that we have conducted 
ourselves in the world, and especially in our relations with you, in the 
holiness and sincerity that are from God.” 
 
And 2 Timothy 1:3: 
 
“I thank God, whom I serve, as my forefathers did, with a clear conscience, 
as night and day I constantly remember you in my prayers.” 
 
‘Syneidesis’ (conscience) in all these passages expresses a similar awareness as 
in the other Corinthians passages, and in Romans 2:15, but with greater 
emphasis on sincerity, on the purity of one’s own intentions. This fits in very 
well with the connection between ‘syneidesis’ and ‘pistis’.121 
 Finally, some remarks concerning compactness and differentiation: 
‘syneidesis’ is a more differentiated notion than heart; it has fewer 
connotations, even if it still has many, but what is lost in meaning is gained in 
precision. ‘Syneidesis’ is still a more compact notion than the English 
‘conscience’ or the German ‘Gewissen’.122 It is less compact than heart, and 
in the New Testament it is used alongside, sometimes in connection with, 
‘kardia’. Stelzenberger quotes Paul Feine: “Der Tätigkeit des Herzens 
verwandt ist die des Gewissens (syneidesis). Denn dasselbe begleitet die 
Stimme des Herzens (...), es kann befleckt werden (...) oder lauter und rein 
                                                 
120 Hebrews 10:22. 
121 Cf. Stelzenberger (1961), 65 and 93, especially his reference (on page 65) to Ed. 
Güder, who “deutet (...) ‘gutes Gewissen’ nicht bloß als Sündenlosigkeit, sondern als 
das ernste Streben Christus nachzufolgen.” (Ed. Güder, “Erörterungen über die 
Lehre vom Gewissen nach der Schrift”, in Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Vol. 30, 
1857, 245-296, i.c. 288-191.) 
122 Cf. Stelzenberger (1963b), 34: “Wertgefühl und Gewissen sind mit einbegriffen.” 
He also makes the slightly ridiculous remark here, that in cultures where a word for 
‘conscience’ fails, the word ‘heart’ is often used ‘as a replacement’ – as if the people 
in question scratched the back of their heads, saying to each other: “We obviously 
lack the word ‘conscience’; what shall we use to replace it?” More sensible is that he 
speaks of the word ‘heart’ as the ‘Sammelpunkt ihrer Empfindungen’; this goes some 
way towards the idea of ‘symballein’, and the symbolic expression of experiences. 
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sein.”123 He also refers to Langenberg, who discusses ‘conscience’ under the 
lemma ‘heart’: “Syneidesis ist ‘das Bewußtsein, das als Mitwisser oder Zeuge 
auftritt’. ‘Es ist das geistige Vermögen des Herzens, sich selbst zu 
objektivieren’ (277), auch sittliche Urteilsfähigkeit, gefühlsmäßige Reaktion 
des Herzens gegen das Normwidrige und Wissen oder Erkennen des 
sogennanten besseren Ich.”124 Spicq sees ‘syneidesis’ as a function of ‘nous’ 
(mind).125 All these interpretations suggest that ‘syneidesis’ pertains to a more 
limited part of our anthropology than the term ‘heart’ – hence that it is a 
more precise notion. Both ‘heart’ (whether in the Old or in the New 
Testament, or elsewhere) and ‘syneidesis’ are sometimes accompanied by 
adjectives like ‘good’, ‘bad’, or ‘clean’. These are differentiations within the 
notions of ‘heart’ and ‘syneidesis’; for the latter, such attributes occur in the 
first century B.C., and more often in the first century A.D. So this is a time 
of differentiation. But importantly, it is not a time of philosophical or 
theological reflection on conscience; the differentiation comes about more 
spontaneously.126 A related point to take note of is that ‘syneidesis’ is not by 
far a purely indicative notion, as Stelzenberger seems to think.127 The term is 
still primarily a symbolic expression of a certain class of experiences. At the 
same time, it seems to have been a more limited symbol than both the older 
‘heart’ and (for instance) the seventeenth- or eighteenth-century ‘conscience’, 
with its connotation of a divine faculty.128 Arguably the most important 
differentiation that occurs in the New Testament, especially in the pauline 
writings, is that between ‘syneidesis’ and God. Like Philo, though even more 
clearly, and unlike Cicero or Seneca (who will be discussed in the following 
section), Paul does not consider conscience to be divine; rather, its 
temporary judgement will be superseded by God’s judgement.129 
                                                 
123 Stelzenberger (1961), 38; the quotation is from Paul Feine, Theologie des Neuen 
Testaments, Berlin, 1953, 258. 
124 Ibid., 24; he (disapprovingly) quotes from and refers to Heinrich Langenberg, 
Biblische Begriffskonkordanz, Metzingen, 1954, 273-281. 
125 Ibid.,  25; the reference is to C. Spicq, Les épitres pastorales, (Études biblique, Vol. 32), 
Paris, 1947, 29-38, i.c. 29. 
126 Stelzenberger (1989), 193: “Er [Paulus] bringt eine ausführliche Gewissenslehre” 
is nonsense. 
127 He also tends to use reifying expressions like ‘die Sache’, and even ‘das Ding’, 
when speaking of conscience; see for instance: Stelzenberger (1963b), 19; 
Stelzenberger (1989), 206. 
128 Stelzenberger (1963b), 22-23, rightly points out that the Greeks and Romans used 
other words besides ‘syneidesis’ and ‘conscientia’ to express what we would express 
with ‘conscience’ (‘Gewissen’, ‘geweten’); for instance ‘nous’ (Latin ‘mens’), and even 
‘eunous’ (‘eu’ = good). 
129 Cf. Schockenhoff (2003), chapter 2.4: “Das Vermächtnis des Paulus”. 
Schockenhoff writes that for Paulus, conscience is “die prüfende Instanz im Menschen, 
die ihm die Übereinstimmung seines Handelns mit dem Gesetz anzeigt oder die ihn 
des Widerspruchs überführt, in den er durch sein praktisches Tun zu ihm gerät” 
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2.2.3.4. Evaluation 
Philo and Paul (and other New Testament authors) have much in common. 
Bosman provides a helpful overview of the main linguistic and conceptual 
developments, which brings together the main points of the foregoing 
subsections, and points out some interesting connections between them. 
 First of all, Philo and Paul both use substantive forms (‘syneidos’ 
and ‘syneidesis’, respectively) with relative frequency. Bosman points out that 
‘syneidesis’ “originally served as a substitute for the form συνοιδα εμαυτω 
[synoida emautoi – there should be an ι under the ω]. For this reason, it was 
initially required to qualify the substantive by means of objective genitives or 
adjectives in order to convey the same semantic load (...). (...) However, 
when the substantives are used without any qualification (...) a novel 
possibility of usage presents itself. The substantive gets divorced from the 
subject of the verb and becomes a second ‘knowing’ subject alongside that of 
the subject of the verb. (...) [I]t becomes something within the individual that 
‘knows with him’ that he has done something wrong.” At this point, 
Bosman, says, one might speak of the ‘birth of conscience’.130 So the use of 
the substantive goes together with a ‘solidification’ of conscience into an 
inner entity. It becomes “a permanent component of the soul”. As a result, 
“its basically negative character becomes something of a problem as it 
cannot be both permanent and restricted to a negative role at the same 
time”. Hence, it “must eventually become neutral”.131 We have seen this 
happen in the New Testament; Bosman sees a beginning of it in Philo.132 
 ‘Syneidesis’ being a neutral term, it is not surprising that the 
‘parresia’ topos shows itself differently in Paul’s writings than in Philo’s. I 
have mentioned the inhibiting effect of the activity of ‘syneidos’ in Philo’s 
work; with Paul, we have seen that ‘syneidesis’ led to ‘boasting’, to the 
opposite of inhibited speech: he ‘knew nothing with himself’. 
 “To ‘know with’”, Bosman says, “must be a rational ability. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the συνοιδα word group from the start belongs to the 
sphere of reason.” Against the background of the Hellenistic concern for 
inner harmony (which will also figure in the next section), the presence of 
‘syneidos’ or ‘syneidesis’ as a permanent component of the soul is a 
potentially disturbing (and therefore already a disturbing) presence; inner 
turmoil can only be avoided by living a pious and virtuous life.133 In Philo’s 
                                                                                                               
(81). But conscience is not the final test: “Statt im Gewissen die Präsenz der 
Gottheit im menschlichen Geist zu rühmen, so dass dessen Selbstbeurteilung mit 
dem göttlichen Richterspruch faktisch in eins fällt, unterstellt Paulus sein eigenes 
Gewissen nochmals der Überprüfung durch eine andere Instanz, deren Urteil im 
eschatologischen Endgericht Gottes ergeht.” (86) 
130 Bosman (2003), 277. 
131 Ibid., 278. Cf. Schockenhoff (2003), 82. 
132 Ibid., 183-184. 
133 Ibid., 279. 
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case, this was part of an ascent towards the spiritual; with Paul, the emphasis 
lies on the right conduct in the eyes of God, with the prospect of salvation. 
 ‘Syneidos’ and ‘syneidesis’, functioning as inner entities, are 
particularly concerned with “behaviour of which no one other than the 
transgressor is aware”. This coincides with the Hellenistic turn of attention 
away from the evaluation of external actions, towards internal dispositions 
and intentions. The ‘syneidos’ and ‘syneidesis’ are for a large part concerned 
with the convergence or divergence between knowledge of what one should 
do, and one’s inner motivations.134 
 ‘Syneidos’ and ‘syneidesis’ are not themselves divine. “Philo’s 
συνειδος is indeed closely related to the λογος as a divine aspect, but nowhere 
does it become the voice of God. To Paul, the συνειδησις is never more than 
a purely anthropological term.”135 This means that neither ‘syneidos’ nor 
‘syneidesis’ is infallible. Both have to work with the available knowledge, and 
human knowledge or wisdom is not equal to divine knowledge or wisdom. 
That does not mean that ‘syneidos’ and ‘syneidesis’ are not that important, 
after all. Their importance is preserved through its primary concern with 
piety, intentions, and the individual’s inner disposition.136 “Inner harmony,” 
Bosman writes about Philo, “is not in itself the ethical τελος”; “impiety and 
ungodliness are the most objectionable of all transgressions”.137 The same is 
true for Paul, as is evident from his concern for the ‘syneidesis’ of the weaker 
brothers. Whether the knowledge available to the ‘syneidos’ or ‘syneidesis’ is 
indeed true knowledge or not, they are manifestations of ultimate concern. 
 I have already emphasized the symbolic aspect of both the Philonic 
and the New Testament use of ‘syneidos’ and ‘syneidesis’, respectively. The 
‘solidification’ resulting from the use of these substantives does not 
contradict this. In fact, the opposite is true: it allows conscience to become a 
more powerful symbol, while at the same time the danger of reification and of 
mistaking the term for an indicative notion increases. It is also important to 
emphasize that neither Philo nor Paul or any other New Testament writer 
expounded a doctrine of conscience. Bosman speaks of the ‘fluidity of the 
concept’, by which he means that its meaning is not yet fixed, as it is a 
concept in evolution.138 Let us see how the ‘concept’ – but at this stage I 
would still prefer: the symbol – evolved with the Roman Stoics. 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 280. We have seen that this is not always the case, however. In the case of 
those with a weak ‘syneidesis’, for instance, ‘syneidesis’ was concerned with the 
supposed badness of their actions. 
135 Ibid., 283. 
136 Philo connects the ‘syneidos’ with intentions, words, and deeds, by teaching that 
the ‘syneidos’ becomes operative “in the case of disharmony between the respective 
functions of ‘heart, mouth, and hands’” (Bosman [2003], 173). 
137 Bosman (2003), 189. 
138 Ibid., 176, 183. Bosman means something else, to be sure, than I do with my 
‘fluid concept’ (see chapter 8). 
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2.2.4. ‘Conscientia’ 
The Latin ‘conscientia’ is a translation, even (more or less) a transliteration of 
the Greek ‘syneidesis’. There are two main sources for the term: the Roman 
Stoics and the Latin Bible. The Church Fathers drew on both these sources 
for their use of the term. This section will deal first with the Roman Stoics, 
and subsequently with the Church Fathers. The biblical use of ‘syneidesis’ 
has already been discussed, so I will not treat the biblical use of ‘conscientia’ 
separately. References to any relevant differences will be incorporated in the 
aforementioned two subsections. 
 
2.2.4.1. The Roman Stoics 
Stoic philosophy is often divided into three periods: the early Stoics, the 
middle, and the later Stoics. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 – 43 B.C.) and 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (ca. 2 B.C. – A.D. 65) belong to the late middle 
period and the later period, respectively – Cicero being not so much a ‘pure’ 
Stoic, but rather an Eclectic, taking up elements from various strands of 
thought, in good Hellenistic fashion. I will confine myself to these authors, 
on the one hand because it is simply impossible to discuss everyone, and on 
the other hand because the term ‘conscientia’ occurs quite frequently in their 
writings, and because they exerted a considerable influence on medieval 
thought.139 Stoics generally held that the cosmos is divinely and rationally 
ordered, and that virtue and happiness are attainable by participating in the 
ordering principle, the ‘logos’, and by conforming internally to this principle. 
This entailed a thorough-going independence with regard to what happened 
to one, and the emotions which external happenings tend to trigger or evoke. 
This ‘apatheia’ of the Stoics lingers on in our time in the form of expressions 
like ‘remaining Stoic’ to something, or under certain circumstances.140 This 
attitude was connected with a strong belief in and acceptance of divine 
providence – as is popularly well-known from the Meditations of Marcus 
Aurelius (121-180). Stoic philosophy in general, and Roman Stoicism in 
particular, is characterized by a strong emphasis on practical philosophy and 
ethics (as a part of practical philosophy). Copleston begins his section on ‘the 
Stoic ethic’ by quoting a description of philosophy given by Seneca, which 
exemplifies “the importance of the ethical part of philosophy for the Stoics”: 
 
“Philosophia nihil aliud est quam recta vivendi ratio vel honeste vivendi 
scientia vel ars rectae vitae agendae. non errabimus, si dixerimus 
                                                 
139 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 8; Marietta (1970), 184 (with regard to the frequent use of 
‘conscientia’ by Cicero and Seneca). 
140 Besides ‘apatheia’, the Stoics also spoke of ‘euthymia’ (spiritual peace and well-
being) and ‘eudaimonia’; Cf. Hallie (1967). 
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philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque vivendi, et qui dixerit illam 
regulam vitae, suum illi nomen reddidit.”141 
 
A famous Stoic maxim was ‘Live according to nature’.142 To live in 
accordance with natural law, with the ordering principle called the ‘logos’, 
with the divine will, and with man’s essential nature, was one and the same 
thing. To live like that was man’s ethical end. It is also the definition of 
virtue, which for the Stoics was the only thing that was truly good; what was 
neither virtue nor vice was indifferent (‘adiaphoron’).143 The cardinal virtues 
were held to be: moral insight or practical wisdom (‘phronesis’), courage, 
self-control or temperance, and justice. They are connected; to have one of 
them meant to have them all. The wise, virtuous man, is someone who has 
reached a high level of autonomy – but this is not so much external but 
internal autonomy, by which I mean that he had very strong self-control, in 
particular control over his passions and emotions, and a high level of 
independence from external influences. He was not autonomous in the sense 
that he could simply decide what was ‘law’ for himself and by himself and act 
accordingly. An important Stoic term in this respect is ‘autarkeia’, meaning 
‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘contentment with one’s lot’.144 To conclude this very 
brief summary of what Stoic ethics was about, I should mention the concept 
of ‘oikeosis’, described by Copleston as ‘the fundamental instinct or 
tendency of self-preservation or self-love’.145 This principle is initially 
                                                 
141 Copleston (1962), 138; he quotes from Seneca, Fragment 17. [“Philosophy is 
nothing else than the ‘recta ratio’ (right reason, right rule) of living, or the knowledge 
of living honourably, or the art of conducting one’s life in the right manner. We will 
not err, if we were to say that philosophy is the law of living good and honourably, 
and he who would state that law to be the rule of (his) life, has borne its name.” (My 
translation.)] ‘Recta ratio’ is a translation of the Greek ‘orthos logos’, which is 
defined by Eisler’s Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe as ‘rechte, das Richtige 
treffende, sittliche Vernunft’; Eisler’s dictionary further says: “Die Stoiker verstehen 
darunter den »eingeborenen, sittlichen Tact« (L. STEIN, Psychol. d. Stoa II, 264). 
Dieser orthos Logos ist zugleich Kriterium der Wahrheit (s. d.) und Weltgesetz. 
CICERO erklärt: »Recta ratio - quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines 
cum diis putandi sumus« (De leg. I, 7, I, 2).” Cf. Seneca (1918), the following passage 
from letter 16: “Philosophy (...) is a matter, not of words, but of facts. (...) It molds 
and constructs the soul; it orders our life, guides our conduct, shows us what we 
should do and what we should leave undone; it sits at the helm and directs our 
course as we waver amid uncertainties. Without it, no one can live fearlessly or in 
peace of mind. Countless things that happen every hour call for advice; and such 
advice is to be sought in philosophy.” 
142 Copleston (1962), 139. 
143 Ibid., 141. ‘Adiaphora’ (indifferent things) will figure in part II of this book, in 
relation to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion. 
144 Hallie (1967). 
145 Copleston (1962), 143-144. 
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confined to oneself, or primarily concerned with the self, but it extends (or 
can extend) first to those closest to one, and secondly to strangers, and 
finally to all mankind. To reach this extension requires an effort, but it is part 
of the ethical ideal – as it still is in the works of Adam Smith, the semi-Stoic 
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher. In Seneca’s thought, man’s self-
sufficiency was qualified by the obligation to help our fellow-men.146 
 It is against this background that we must situate Cicero’s and 
Seneca’s use of the term ‘conscientia’. The basic meaning of the term is that 
of an awareness that accompanies one’s own actions or those of others; 
Marietta speaks of ‘shared knowledge’ and ‘consciousness’.147 We find it with 
such a meaning in the work of Cicero and Seneca. Their emphasis on the 
practical life, however, manifests itself in a more ethical use of ‘conscientia’, 
to mean an evaluative awareness of (particularly) one’s own actions. 
“Gewissen ist also zunehmend nur noch das Bewußtsein vom eigenen Tun 
in moralischer Hinsicht, kaum noch das vom Tun der anderen.”148 Given the 
fact that ‘syneidesis’ is virtually absent from the work of Stoic philosophers, 
it is most likely that the Roman Stoics derived their use of ‘conscientia’ from 
the same source from which Greek Hellenism took ‘syneidesis’: the 
colloquial language, and popular psychology.149 Marietta concludes: “It seems 
likely that Latin use of conscientia reflects the popular use of syneidēsis. It is not 
established that there is anything distinctively Stoic about this use.” The 
Roman Stoic use of ‘conscientia’ is, at any rate, different from the New 
Testament use of ‘syneidesis’ in at least one important respect: while for 
New Testament authors, ‘syneidesis’ was not divine, but constituted the 
provisional judgement that awaited the final Judgement by God, the Stoic 
‘conscientia’ was held to be a divine element implanted in the soul, the ‘voice 
of God’ in man.150 The meaning of ‘conscientia’ was also influenced by the 
Stoic philosophy in which it was embedded. Kittsteiner writes: “Bei Cicero 
and Seneca wird das Gewissen zur Grundlage einer individuellen Sittlichkeit, 
die gegen Lob und Tadel der Gesellschaft weitgehend immun ist.”151 
Conscience plays a role in enabling people to gain the required independence 
from the external world, from external goods like the praise of others. Virtue 
                                                 
146 Ibid., 175. 
147 Marietta (1970), 184. 
148 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 9; she includes a reference to Reiner, (1974), 577. 
149 Some authors hold that ‘conscientia’ was a much broader term than ‘syneidesis’, 
with far more emphasis on the aspect of knowing, whereas the Greek word mostly 
conveyed the meaning of judging oneself, and expressed feelings of guilt; Baylor 
(1977), 24; Pierce strongly advocates this view in his Conscience in the New Testament. 
Stelzenberger (1961), 25, however, criticizes him for reading too much morality into 
‘syneidesis’. 
150 The great importance of this difference will become clear in 2.2.5. 
151 Kittsteiner (1995), 168. 
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(as we see with Philo) is its own reward; it is so through the good conscience. 
Cicero writes: 
 
“...sed tamen nullum theatrum virtuti conscientia maius est.”152 
 
 Cicero, then, places ‘conscientia’ in the context of Stoic natural law 
theory and ethics. Conscience, like a moral guardian, approves of our actions 
insofar as they correspond to natural law, the divine order of things; it 
disapproves when they do not. But whether our actions are good or evil 
depends on our intentions. The Stoics turn their attention toward the 
individual and his motives. Hence, they stress the value of self-observation 
and self-judging.153 “[W]ie die Pythagoreer und Epikuräer,” Kittsteiner 
writes, “so empfiehlt auch der Stoiker die allabendliche 
Gewissensprüfung.”154 ‘Conscientia’ is not the only relevant expression in 
this context: “Was wir heute (...) mit Gewissen bezeichnen, ist in der Antike 
auch eingekleidet in Wendungen wie Inneres des Menschen, Innenwelt, 
Gesinnung, innere Einstellung, persönliche geheime Angelegenheit, reine 
Hände, reiner Sinn usw. Bei den Griechen wird nous und bei den Römern 
mens in diesem Sinne verwendet. (...) Cicero (...) bezeichnet die menschliche 
mens als göttlichen Zeugen und Göttlichstes in uns.”155 It is also used in 
more general senses than that of ‘conscience’.156 
 Cicero speaks of conscience as a witness.157 ‘Conscientia’ is an 
infallible witness and guide; it has precedence over the often erring opinions 
of others.158 For Cicero, ‘conscientia’ (in its broadly moral sense) is both the 
standard which each individual is measured against, the witness to the 
approximation to or the divergence from this standard, and the peaceful or 
painful judging consciousness of one’s righteousness or depravity. That it is 
also the standard is clear from Cicero’s statement that every man has an 
                                                 
152 Cicero (2005), II, chapter 26, paragraph 64. [“...yet there is no greater theater for 
virtue than the conscience.”] 
153 Knight (1969), 3. 
154 Kittsteiner (1995), 168. 
155 Stelzenberger (1963b), 22-23. He refers to Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis, III, 
10, 44: “mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit Deus ipse divinius”. 
156 Ibid., 25, 27. 
157 Ibid., 28: “Die conscientia,” Stelzenberger writes, “ist uns von den unsterblichen 
Göttern als unentreißbarer Zeuge guter Ratschläge und unserer Taten gegeben. 
Unter ihrer Führung leben wir ohne Furcht und höchst ehrenhaft.” The reference is 
to Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Cluentio, 25. 
158 Idem; Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Finibus, II, 71: “...ut nostram stabilem 
conscientiam contemnamus, aliorum errantem opinionem aucupemur” [“...so that 
we depreciate our secure conscience, if we (would) pursue the erring opinions of 
others”]. 
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‘unwritten, inborn law’ in himself.159 Through conscience (though not 
exclusively through conscience) man participates in the ‘logos’. This is 
expressed by the term ‘logos spermatikos’ (the seed of the logos), which is 
implanted in every animated being.160 Cicero was also aware of the 
physiognomy of conscience, stating that “morderi est melius conscientia” 
[“to be bitten is better than (the sting of/a bad) conscience”].161 
Stelzenberger notes that both Cicero and Seneca mention phenomena like 
blushing, turning pale, confusion, and shame as signs of ‘conscientia’.162 That 
Cicero also recognized the phenomenon of the good conscience was already 
mentioned. ‘Conscientia’ is said to comfort – a remark that we must 
understand in the context of the wise man’s attempt to become independent 
from external goods, including the comforting words of other people.163 
 “Neben dem römischen Rhetor”, Stelzenberger says, “hat der 
Stoiker Seneca die ausgebildetste Lehre vom Gewissen.” He calls his letters a 
true ‘Fundgrube’ (a rich source or mine) for the term ‘conscientia’, though he 
warns that it does not always refer to the moral conscience – in other words: 
‘conscientia’ does not always serve as an expression of moral-religious 
experiences.164 With respect to the symbol of conscience, one of the most 
important sites in Seneca’s work is in number 41 of the Moral Epistles: 
 
“[1] Facis rem optimam et tibi salutarem si, ut scribis, perseveras ire ad 
bonam mentem, quam stultum est optare cum possis a te impetrare. Non 
sunt ad caelum elevandae manus nec exorandus aedituus ut nos ad aurem 
simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus, admittat: prope est a te deus, 
tecum est, intus est. [2] Ita dico, Lucili: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, 
malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos; hic prout a nobis 
tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Bonus vero vir sine deo nemo est: an 
potest aliquis supra fortunam nisi ab illo adiutus exsurgere? Ille dat consilia 
magnifica et erecta. In unoquoque virorum bonorum [quis deus incertum 
est] habitat deus.”165 
                                                 
159 Ibid., 29; the Latin phrase is ‘non scripta, sed nata lex’. 
160 The German Wikipedia entry for ‘logos’ translates ‘logos spermatikos’ as 
‘Seelenfünklein’, thereby illustrating how this Stoic idea was taken up in later 
Christian thought, that is, as more or less identical with the ‘scintilla conscientiae’ 
(spark of conscience), which was one way in which ‘synderesis’ was understood. 
161 Stelzenberger (1963b), 32; Cicero (2005), IV, chapter 20, 45. Stelzenberger 
mentions several other passages relating to feelings of guilt. 
162 Ibid., 56. 
163 Ibid., 33-34; Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistularum ad Familiares, VI, 10b: 
“...consolatione non utebar, quod ex multis audiebam, quam fortiter sapienterque 
ferres iniuriam temporum quamque te vehementer consolaretur conscientia 
factorum et consiliorum tuorum.” 
164 Ibid., 211. 
165 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Epistularum Moralium ad Lucilium Liber, IV, 41 
(http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/sen.html). 
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“You are doing an excellent thing, one which will be wholesome for you, if, 
as you write me, you are persisting in your effort to attain sound 
understanding; it is foolish to pray for this when you can acquire it from 
yourself.  We do not need to uplift our hands towards heaven, or to beg the 
keeper of a temple to let us approach his idol’s ear, as if in this way our 
prayers were more likely to be heard.  God is near you, he is with you, he is 
within you.  This is what I mean, Lucilius:  a holy spirit indwells within us, 
one who marks our good and bad deeds, and is our guardian.  As we treat 
this spirit, so are we treated by it.  Indeed, no man can be good without the 
help of God.  Can one rise superior to fortune unless God helps him to 
rise?  He it is that gives noble and  upright counsel.  In each good man ‘a 
god doth dwell, but what god know we not’.”166 
 
There is one word in the above passage that I would translate differently: 
‘mens’. Gummere translates ‘bonam mentem’ by ‘sound understanding’. In 
view of Stelzenberger’s remark concerning the Stoic use of ‘nous’ and 
‘mens’, the German ‘Gesinnung’ (inner disposition) would be a better 
translation. Like the New Testament ‘syneidesis’, it seems to pertain to the 
right disposition, to sincerity also, in doing the right thing. 
 Again, this passage illustrates the Stoic concern with independence 
from external goods, and from fortune generally. God does not count as an 
external good; hence there is no contradiction in saying that man is 
dependent on God for his goodness. God is an internal good; he guides us 
from within. If we do good, the holy spirit within us will treat us well; that is, 
we will experience a peaceful conscience, which is all the reward we need for 
our virtue. If we treat this spirit badly by our evil actions, so it will treat us 
badly; it will pain us with guilt and remorse.167 While the word ‘conscience’ 
(‘conscientia’) is absent from this passage from Seneca’s letters to his friend 
Lucilius, the three core elements of the symbol of conscience as outlined in 
the previous chapter are all overtly present.168 
 In this phrase: 
 
“Nihil prodest inclusam esse conscientiam; patemus Deo”, 
 
Seneca opposes the elements of intimacy and the witness: intimacy, in the 
form of secrecy, is no use, for God sees everything.169 He uses various 
                                                 
166 This translation is taken from Seneca (1918). 
167 Recall from 1.5.1 how Calvin said that conscience is harassed by the sinner and 
harasses the sinner. 
168 Whether they correspond with equally strong experiences is another matter; the 
letter reflects upon the subject, it does not immediately express his own feelings. 
169 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Fragment 24; quoted in Stelzenberger (1963b), 22, 28. [“It 
is of no avail that the conscience is enclosed; we lie open before God.”] 
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expressions for the bad and the good conscience.170 We also find them in the 
Proverbs ascribed to Seneca (but not written by him).171 Stelzenberger notes 
that ‘conscientia optimae mentis’ in Cicero, like ‘bona conscientia’ in Seneca, 
means ‘reines inneres Bewußtsein, ehrliche Gesinnung, reines Inneres’ and 
so on, rather than ‘unser moralisch gutes Gewissen’. This is in line with what 
I said above concerning the larger passage from Seneca’s Moral Epistles. 
Unlike Stelzenberger, however, I would not consider it to mean something 
other than conscience; rather, I would refuse to narrow conscience down to 
one particular meaning, to one aspect of the symbol of conscience. 
 Stoic thought was an importance influence on the works of later 
Christian authors. Stelzenberger points out the direct link between Seneca 
and Lactantius (ca. 250 – ca. 325).172 Other church fathers were also 
influenced by Cicero and Seneca.173 The importance of Stoic thought for 
scholastic discussions of conscience will be discussed in 2.2.5. An important 
contribution of Stoic – or should we say ‘Hellenistic’? – moral thought to 
later thought on the subject lies in its egalitarianism.174 Everyone can be 
good, no matter what people think of him or her; goodness does not depend 
on the judgement of others. Your conscience will tell you whether you are 
virtuous or not; its peace and its silence will speak volumes. Stelzenberger 
                                                 
170 Stelzenberger (1963b), 32, note 89; for Cicero, note 88. In De Tranquillitate Animi, 
Seneca once speaks of ‘bona conscientia’, but he does not devote as much attention 
to it, we may note, as the Greek philosopher Plutarch in his treatise of the same 
name. Plutarch (ca. 46 – ca. 120) explains that the consciousness of our own evil-
doings oppresses as and leaves behind in the soul what in the body would be a 
wound: remorse that always bleeds and causes pain; thinking can take away other 
troubles, but only enhances this one. Nothing contributes so much to tranquillity 
and peace in life as a soul that is clean of evil deeds and thoughts. From such a soul 
flow good deeds, joyfully done.  
171 For instance: proverb 65: “Mala conscientia saepe tuta est, secura numquam.” 
[“The bad conscience is often safe, but never secure.”]; and 133: “Bonus fruitur 
bona conscientia.” [“The good (man) enjoys a good conscience.”]. 
172 Stelzenberger (1989), 213. 
173 Stelzenberger (1959), 17. Kittsteiner (1995), 169, points out the similarities 
between Origen on the one hand and Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Seneca on the 
other hand. Voegelin (1997), 131, says that Cicero “has been quoted extensively by 
the Latin church fathers, and the quotations have been requoted to a degree that the 
Ciceronian formulas (it would in most cases be too much to call them theories) have 
become a permanent fixture in Western political theory”. 
174 I include this suggestion that we should perhaps say ‘Hellenistic thought’ because 
of the Eclecticism of both Cicero and Seneca, though of the former in particular. 
Cicero gathered up elements of thought from wherever he could find them. He is 
chastised by Voegelin for his lack of originality, and Copleston remarks on his 
unoriginality as well (Voegelin [1997], 131; Copleston [1962], 163: “The writings of 
Cicero are scarcely to be called original in content, as Cicero himself openly admits – 
“απογραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt, verba tantum affero, quibus abundo.”) 
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quotes Cicero: “Mein inneres Bewußtsein [conscientia] gilt mir mehr als das 
Gerede der Menschen.” He says that “Seneca nennt den tugendhaft, der sich 
um das Urteil der Menge nicht kümmert und die conscientia höher stellt als 
die fama.”175 In his review of Reydam-Schils’ The Roman Stoics, Siep Stuurman 
writes: “Reydams-Schils highlights the egalitarian thrust of Stoicism: putting 
the nobility of the soul above nobility of birth, and positing an equal capacity 
for reason in both men and women, the Roman Stoics transcended the 
conventional morality of their society.”176 This must not too easily be taken 
as an inspiration for conscientious objection. Though both radical puritans 
and radical Enlightenment thinkers based their revolutionary conscience on 
similar egalitarian ideas and ideals, Roman Stoic thought could never 
sanction such revolutionary action. They emphasized internal freedom, not 
external freedom; whether you were guilty or not may have been for your 
conscience to say, whether you could and would be punished or not lay in 
the hands of others. ‘Autarkeia’ did not entail the freedom to act publicly 
according to your conscience, even if it meant transgressing the law; rather, it 
entailed the freedom not to care about what other people thought of you.177 
Nevertheless, with their emphasis on interiority, Roman Stoic writers exerted 
a great influence on Augustine and other Christian authors. 
 The Roman Stoics did not develop a ‘theory’ of conscience; rather, 
they took up a popular notion, and helped spread the use of the term 
‘conscientia’. The meaning of the term became more clearly ethical (in a 
broad sense of the term), even though it was often used otherwise. The 
‘good conscience’ occurs more often in their writings than in earlier periods, 
which reflects both their optimistic disposition and their ethical ideal. No 
further differentiation is evident. The symbol of conscience gains in moral-
religious power through its incorporation in the Stoic philosophy of the 
divine ‘logos’; its symbolic power is far greater than that of ‘syneidesis’ in the 
New Testament, which is at the end of the day a subsidiary symbol – 
subservient to God, rather than godly. 
 
 
                                                 
175 Stelzenberger (1963b), 46; he quotes from Marcus Tullis Cicero, Ad Atticum, XII, 
28, 2: “mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam omnium sermo”, from Seneca, Epistulae 
Morales, 81, 20: “Nemo mihi videtur pluris aestimare virtutem, nemo illi magis esse 
devotus quam qui boni viri famam perdidit ne conscientiam perderet.”, from Seneca, 
De Beneficiis, IV, 21, 5, and from Seneca, De vita beata, XX, 4: “Nihil opinionis causa, 
omnia conscientiae faciam.” [“I do nothing because of (the) opinions (of others), 
everything for conscience sake.”] 
176 Stuurman (2005). 
177 Copleston (1962), 134: “...cosmological determinism is modified by their 
insistence on interior freedom, in the sense that a man can alter his judgment on 
events and his attitude towards events, seeing them and welcoming them as the 
expression of ‘God’s Will.’ In this sense man is free.” 
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2.2.4.2. The Church Fathers 
Early Christian writers drew their inspiration from two sources: classical 
antiquity and the Bible. Stoic and biblical elements were blended together in 
the elaboration of the meaning of ‘syneidesis’ and ‘conscientia’. Eastern 
Church Fathers concerned themselves with the notion of ‘syneidesis’, and 
tended towards a more speculative, religious interpretation of this New 
Testament notion. In the West, the emphasis lay on the practical side, and 
‘syneidesis’ and ‘conscientia’ are much more often understood in a moral-
religious sense. Stelzenberger speaks of a ‘jüdisch-liturgische’ and a 
‘disciplinary-moral’ interpretation of Acts 15:20-29 (a text which concerns 
regulations for converted pagans, the former being the eastern, the latter the 
western interpretation.178 
 The frequency with which the term ‘conscientia’ occurs in the 
writings of the (western) Church Fathers is striking. It testifies to the 
importance of the term, but it is also the result of its great width of 
application.179 Stelzenberger distinguishes between a large number of senses 
of the term, under five headings: ‘knowledge’, 
‘consciousness/reflection/power of judgement’, ‘inner/inner disposition’, 
‘Wertgefühl’ (moral sense, a sense of value), and ‘conscience’. In the latter 
meaning, we find it especially with Origen (185-254) in the East, and with 
Augustine (354-430) in the West, so Stelzenberger states.180 Though I will 
not adopt Stelzenberger’s categorization, it is true that there is a plethora of 
different senses and different shades of meaning behind the single term 
‘conscientia’. Nevertheless, the western Church Fathers draw ‘conscientia’ in 
the moral-religious sphere, and expressions in this sphere abound. The 
‘neutral’ meaning of ‘conscientia’ as ‘knowledge’, which stands out most 
clearly as an independent use of the term, is abandoned by Augustine, with 
whom ‘conscientia’ loses any ‘profane’ meaning.181 The other senses 
Stelzenberger distinguishes are in fact often difficult to separate from each 
other. The abundance with which the word ‘conscientia’ occurs in the 
writings of Church Fathers, it should be noted, is related to the fact that the 
Latin translation of the Bible often gives ‘conscientia’ where there was no 
‘syneidesis’ – both in moral and non-moral senses.182 It was also with 
Jerome’s Latin translation of the Bible (the Vulgate) that “conscientia became 
the entrenched Latin equivalent for συνειδησις”.183 
                                                 
178 Stelzenberger (1963b), 65. 
179 Ibid., 64. 
180 Ibid., 53. 
181 Stelzenberger (1959), 27: “Für Augustinus scheidet conscientia in der Bedeutung 
von Kenntnis oder Wissen um rein weltliche Dinge (gleich cognitio) überhaupt aus. 
(...) Der Begriff verliert seine profane Verwendung.” 
182 Stelzenberger (1963b), Syneidesis, Conscientia, Gewissen, 45. 
183 Bosman (2003), 17. 
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 Conscience becomes incorporated and encapsulated in Christian 
doctrine (which is not yet dogma). Kittsteiner notes that the interpretation of 
Ezekiel’s vision by Origen and Jerome (ca. 340/342-420) completes the 
incorporation of the doctrine of the Fall in a Stoic conception of conscience. 
Timothy Potts summarizes the vision and Jerome’s interpretation: “In his 
vision, Ezekiel saw four living creatures coming out of a fiery cloud. Each of 
them had the form of a man, but with four faces; the front face was human, 
the right face that of a lion, the left that of an ox, and the back face that of 
an eagle. Jerome interprets the four faces as representing the structure of the 
human soul, correlating the first three faces with Plato’s tripartite division in 
the Republic (4, 436B-441B). (...) Jerome’s suggestion is that the soul has a 
quadripartite structure, with conscience as a fourth potentiality irreducible to 
any of the other three.”184 This fourth potentiality is represented by the 
eagle’s face. “Der Adler aber, der alle überflügelt, deutet auf eine von diesen 
Seelenteilen [the rational, the appetitive, and the emotional] unabhängige 
Kraft, auf eine oberste Gewissensfunktion, die auch in dem Sünder Kain 
nicht hat ausgelöscht werden können. Damit ist die Lehre vom Sündenfall in 
die stoische Gewissenskonzeption eingebaut; aus dem ‘Gott in uns’ ist ein 
geschwächtes Vermögen geworden, das der Gnade bedarf, zugleich aber sich 
als rudimentäre ursprüngliche Anlage erhalten hat.” 185 Another good 
example is afforded by whom we might call Augustine’s teacher, Ambrosius 
(339-397).186 In his Exposition of the Christian Faith, even though he does not 
use the word, he gives conscience a place in the Christian doctrine of 
salvation: 
 
“As for me, Lord Jesu, though I am conscious within myself of great sin, 
yet will I say: "I have not denied Thee; Thou mayest pardon the infirmity of 
my flesh. My transgression I confess; my sin I deny not. If Thou wilt Thou 
canst make me clean. For this saying, the leper obtained his request. Enter 
not, I pray, into judgment with Thy servant. I ask, not that Thou mayest 
judge, but that Thou mayest forgive.”187 
 
Henry Chadwick also mentions this as one of the themes discussed by the 
Church Fathers; he enumerates: “[d]ie Heilung des siechen oder tribulierten 
Gewissens, die Notwendigkeit der Selbstprüfung vor dem Tribunal der Seele 
(das Thema, über das Augustin immer wieder predigte); die gewissenhaften 
beteuerungen des Märtyrers, der seine Integrität gegen die Anfechtungen des 
Kompromittierens verteidigt; die sittliche Verantwortung vor Gott”. But he 
continues: “Aber – selbst bei Augustin wird man keine Theorie sittlicher 
                                                 
184 Potts (1980), 6-8. 
185 Kittsteiner (1995), 169-170. 
186 The Wikipedia states that Augustine “owes more to him than to any other writer 
except Paul” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambrose). 
187 Ambrose (2004), Book II, chapter 13, 122. 
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Entscheidung finden, keine Analyse des Phänomens Gewissen, keine 
Diskussion seiner metaphysicher Natur. Nur in einer Hinsicht ist Augustin 
von Bedeutung für unser Thema und seine Geschichte. Er legte viel größeres 
Gewicht auf die subjektive Absicht als auf den Faktor, der den sittlichen 
Wert einer Handlung bestimmt. Das heißt, er verstärkte den Nachdruck auf 
die innere Gesinnung im Gegensatz zur äußeren Handlung.”188 
 The influence of Augustine, bishop of Hippo in North-Africa, can 
hardly be underestimated. With regard to conscience, it lay not just in his use 
of the term and his interpretation of previous uses, but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, in his practice of self-observation. His Confessiones were the 
beginning of a new literary genre. The Stoics, as we have seen, emphasized 
the importance of daily self-scrutinization, but Augustine took this practice 
to a new level in writing his confessions. He set an example by this elaborate 
exposition and expression of a troubled moral-religious consciousness. 
Rather than on the level of symbolization and doctrine, Augustine’s main 
contribution to the European mentality lay in his promotion of the value and 
importance of the experience of conscience. Stelzenberger draws attention to 
Augustine’s often troubled conscience, and his expressions of guilt. He also 
emphasizes the great importance of Augustine’s ‘conscientia-Lehre’ for later 
times, saying that it becomes the dominant interpretation of conscience.189 
Kittsteiner, however, rightly points out the importance of Jerome’s 
Commentary on Ezekiel for scholastic discussions of conscience.190 Central to 
Augustine’s introspective conscience was that it was a conscience ‘coram 
Deo’, ‘before God’. This has a ring to it that is quite similar to Seneca’s 
‘patemus Deo’, though Stelzenberger hastens to stress that ‘coram Deo’ “ist 
nicht wie bei den Stoikern Formel der vagen Annahme eines höheren 
Wesens oder Ausdruck einer monistischen oder pantheistischen Schau. Sie 
bedingt den Glauben an den persönlichen Vater-Gott und seinen Sohn Jesus 
Christus.”191 The ‘God-relatedness’ of the Augustinian conscience is 
expressed in various ways; God is said to be present in conscience as an 
‘inspector’, and Augustine says that ‘conscientia’ is ‘in spiritu sancto’.192 But 
most important for Augustine’s conception of conscience is the idea that 
man can find God by introspection: ‘in te ipsum redi’ (‘turn [back] into 
yourself’), for God is ‘interior intimo meo’ – the element of intimacy could 
hardly be more pronounced. Schockenhoff sees as characteristic for the 
Augustinian conception of conscience the polarity between the Biblical 
‘Höre Israel’ and the idea of the proximity of God’s word to the heart of the 
righteous on the one hand, and the Greek ‘gnothi seauton’ (‘know yourself’): 
                                                 
188 Chadwick (1974), 17. 
189 Stelzenberger (1963b), 55. 
190 Kittsteiner (1995), 170. 
191 Stelzenberger (1959), 36-37. 
192 Ibid., 29-30, 41. 
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“Weil ich Gott in Innersten meiner selbst entdecke, bin ich mir dort am 
nächsten, wo ich Gott nahe bin; weil er interior intimo meo zugegen ist, sehe ich 
mich selbst am klarsten, wo ich mich seinem Blick geöffnet habe.”193 
 In Augustine’s work, as in that of other Church Fathers, the idea of 
a ‘lex nata’ or ‘lex naturalis’, an innate and inner law, figures prominently.194 
Some take it most directly from the Stoics; others from the New Testament, 
especially Romans 2:14.195 In Origen’s case, it goes back to Paul.196 
Importantly, Origen tried to differentiate ‘conscientia’ from ‘cor’ (heart) and 
‘anima’ (soul), and concluded that ‘conscientia’ is more than either of them, 
namely divine ‘pneuma’.197 Every author had his own way of expressing the 
idea of an innate law; John Chrysostom (347-407), for instance, explained the 
Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil (Genesis 3:3) as the ‘syneidos’ that is 
implanted in us. It is both natural law, incorruptible criterion, and court of 
law. He also speaks of it as the voice of God.198 Stelzenberger notes the 
importance of John of Damascus (676-749) for later (scholastic) theology. 
He said that “our ‘syneidesis’ is the law of our ‘nous’”. It knows and ‘wills’ 
the Law (or Command) of God. “Diese Prägung”, Stelzenberger says, “ist 
bedeutungsvoll für die intellektualistische Auffassung des Wertbewußtseins. 
Die lateinische Übersetzung (conscientia est lex intellectus nostri) bahnt das 
an. In dieser Form geht die Glosse in die Theologie der Folgezeit besonders 
die Früh- und Hochscholastik ein.”199 ‘Conscientia’ is understood as an 
internal voice that imposes an obligation on people in accordance with 
external laws. What is importance about this doctrine, Stelzenberger says, is 
that the internally acknowledged obligation is identified with objective 
norms, with divine and human law. “Für die Theologie des Mittelalters wird 
damit der Intellekt als Träger des Wertbewußtseins festgelegt. Auch bahnt 
sich eine Entwicklung an, die subjektive Werte mehr und mehr durch 
objektive Gesetze ersetzt.”200 
 This development must be understood against the background of 
the western emphasis on what Stelzenberger called the moral-disciplinary 
                                                 
193 Schockenhoff (2003), 96-97; more generally 3.1. 
194 For Augustine, see ibid., 109-123. 
195 Recall Schnackenburg’s remark that this is not a correct interpretation of the 
passage; it is in fact a ‘Stoic’ interpretation. 
196 Stelzenberger (1963b), 51; Stelzenberger (1963a), 42-45. 
197 Ibid., 61. The differentiation here takes the form of an attempt to define the place 
of ‘conscientia’ in a conceptual network in which ‘cor’ and ‘anima’ are the most 
important neighbouring concepts. 
198 Ibid., 52. Stelzenberger notes that “[d]ie alt- und neu-testamentlichen Berichte 
von der Stimme Gottes aus der Wolke (...), die Worte Jesu bei der Erscheinung vor 
Damaskus (...) und auch Rom 2, 14f werden als innere Stimme Gottes ausgelegt”. So 
an immanentization of the voice of God occurs in such interpretations. 
199 Ibid., 62. 
200 Idem. 
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aspect of conscience. In my terminology, one could say that the emphasis lay 
on the element of authority. This was supported by the use that was made of 
the element of the witness: it was mainly used to instil caution, if not fear. 
Both eastern and western Church Fathers knew the joy and the ‘high’ of a 
good conscience, but the latter were indisputably the champions of the bad 
conscience. Expressions for the torments of conscience abound. Ambrosius, 
who studied Philo and Origen, knew the ‘conscientiae verbera’ (beatings of 
the conscience), and said that “non est tranquillitas mentis ubi animus 
exagitatur obnoxiae stimulis conscientiae” [“there is no peace of mind where 
the soul is tormented by the stings of a guilty conscience”].201 Augustine’s 
preoccupation with his own guilty conscience is well-known. In book X of 
his Confessiones, he speaks to God about the carnal desires that sometimes get 
hold of him while he sleeps, and in desperation pleads to know whether he 
should say it is really himself that does or allows these things or not; 
sometimes, while he sleeps, he knows that it is wrong, but on other 
occasions he cannot stop it. When he awakes, he does return to a peaceful 
conscience, Augustine writes, for he knows that the distance between his 
waking and his sleeping self is so great as to allow the conclusion that he did 
not do it, but that it was somehow done in him. Other authors, too, like 
Cicero and Seneca, wrote about the physical ‘symptoms’ of both the good 
and the bad conscience; in the latter case a reddening face, bad dreams, and 
so on.202 The most important symbolism taken from the Old Testament is 
that of the gnawing worm and the tormenting fire.203 
 While the Church Fathers did not turn what they inherited from 
classical authors and the Bible into solid doctrine, but rather contributed to a 
much more widespread use of the term ‘conscientia’ in a great variety of 
senses, some more solid tendencies stand out. In the West, ‘conscientia’ 
became a morally charged term, with an important place in Christian 
theology; its use tended towards the disciplinary, which is clear from the 
emphasis on the bad conscience and its torments, as well as from the 
increasing stress on the objective laws which it ought to convey. The 
emphasis on the ‘inner’, effected most clearly by Augustine, brought both a 
certain freedom and its opposite. Insofar as man’s inner eludes external 
control, the necessity of discipline increases – that is, from the perspective of 
an organization that has established itself and aims at consolidating and 
extending its power and influence. The abundance of expressions relating to 
the torments of conscience constitutes the first attempts at the control of 
conscience. 
                                                 
201 Ibid., 54; quoted by Stelzenberger from the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum 
Latinorum, 64, p. 353, 13, and 62, p. 384, 16. 
202 Recall also the ‘parresia’ topos in Philo and Paul. 
203 Ibid., 58. 
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 No systematic examination of conscience is extant from the patristic 
period, but in the East the eighth-century monk John Saba the Elder devoted 
one chapter of his Doctrina to the topic of ‘syneidesis’, and in the West, 
according to Stelzenberger, Isidore of Seville (560-636) gave the first impulse 
towards systematization. It is appropriate to end this section with a passage 
from his work, as it comprises in itself the most characteristic elements of 
the patristic use of ‘conscientia’.204 The ‘impulse towards systematization’ 
Stelzenberger alludes to is found in Book II of the Sententiae: 
 
“XXVI. De conscientia. 
26.1. Humana conditio dum diversis vitiositatibus mentem conturbat, etiam 
ante poenas gehennae per inconditum animae appetitum iam poenas 
conscientiae patitur. 
26.2. Omnia fugire poterit homo praeter cor suum.205 Non enim potest a se 
quisque recedere. Ubicumque enim abierit reatus sui conscientia illum non 
derelinquit. 
26.3-4. Quamvis humana iudicia subterfugiat omnis qui male agit, iudicium 
tamen conscientiae suae effugire non potest. Nam etsi aliis celat quod egit, 
sibi tamen celare non potest, qui plene novit malum esse quod gessit. 
Duplex fit ergo in eo iudicium, quia et hic suae conscientiae reatu punitur, 
et illuc perpetuali poena damnatur. Hoc enim significat: Abyssus abyssum 
invocat in voce cataractarum. Abyssus enim abyssum invocare est de 
iudicio suae conscientiae ire ad iudicium damnationis perpetuae. In voce 
cataractarum, id est in praedicatione sanctorum.”206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
204 An interesting passage, besides the one below, can also be found in book 30 of 
Isidorus’ De Mendacio [‘Concerning the lie/illusion’]: “30.9-10. Sicut bene sibi 
conscius non metuit alienae linguae convicium, ita et qui laudatur ab alio non debet 
errorem alienae laudis adtendere; sed magis unusquisque testimonium conscientiae 
suae quaerat, cui plus ipse praesens est quam ille qui eum laudat.  Opus enim suum 
unusquisque probet, ut ait apostolus, et tunc in seipso quisque gloriam habebit, id est 
occulte in sua conscientia, non palam in aliena lingua.” This passage reminds us of 
the Stoic attitude towards the praise of others in comparison to the praise of our 
own ‘conscientia’. In the same work, 31.8, Isidore speaks of “Deus tamen, qui 
conscientiae testis est” [“God (...), who is the witness of conscience”]. 
205 I have taken ‘fugire’ to mean ‘fugere’ (as in the next paragraph ‘effugire’); either it 
is an early medieval variation, or it is a confusion resulting from the fact that ‘fugio’ 
is the normal first-personal form of ‘fugere’ in the indicative praesens. 
206 Isidore of Seville (1998), Book II, chapter 26. For easier reading, I have changed 
every ‘u’ that should be read as ‘v’ into the latter, and the other way around. 
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“XXVI. On conscience. 
26.1. While the human condition confuses the mind with diverse 
depravities, it [the mind] suffers the punishments of conscience even before 
the punishments of hell through the confused striving of the soul.207 
26.2. A man will be able to flee from anything except his own heart. For 
one cannot depart from oneself. Because wherever he may have gone the 
conscience of his sin does not leave him. 
26.3-4. Even if everyone who did wrong were to escape human 
judgements, they would not be able to escape the judgement of their 
conscience.208 For although he could hide from others what he had done, 
he cannot hide it from himself, who has fully recognized that what he did 
was wrong. So a double judgement is passed on him, because he is 
punished for his sin here and now by his conscience, and in the beyond he 
is sentenced to eternal punishment. For is it not said: Hell invokes hell with 
the voice of waterfalls. Because for hell to invoke hell is to go from the 
judgement of one’s conscience to the judgement of eternal damnation. 
With the voice of waterfalls means: in the proclamations of the saints.”209 
 
Stelzenberger’s commentary on the above passage from Isidore’s Sententiae is 
as follows: “Schon diese schmale Skizze deutet an, daß conscientia nicht bloß 
moralischer Ausdruck ist. Am Anfang und Ende stehen dogmatische 
Aussagen.”210 While Origen, Augustine, and Jerome exert the greatest 
influence on medieval thought, Isidore’s brief excursion concerning 
conscience forms an appropriate ending for this section. It shows what 
patristic thought had led to by the time the Middle Ages had begun: 
conscience had become quite a solid moral-religious entity, something that 
made itself felt in horrible ways. The symbolic aspect of the language of 
conscience is surely not gone, but it is doubtful to what extent it was seen as 
symbolic. The passage from Isidore’s Sententiae seems to suggest the 
gruesome reality of hell and conscience, rather than their symbolic nature as 
expressions of experiences that defy description. 
 
 
2.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
What we have seen in this chapter, if it allows itself to be summarized in a 
few sentences, is that the symbol of conscience stabilized itself over time in 
its conjunction with particular vehicles of expression: ‘syneidesis’ and other 
                                                 
207 ‘Humana conditio’ is in fact ‘the human creature’, but I take ‘conditio’ to mean 
‘condicio’, as the confusion of the two is quite common, and it seems to be what was 
intended here. 
208 Literally, it says “he would not be able to escape the judgement of his 
conscience”. 
209 ‘In voce’ can also mean: ‘in the words (of)’. 
210 Stelzenberger (1963b), 64. 
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members of the ‘synoida’ group, and ‘conscientia’. This development 
probably coincided with an increasing familiarity of ordinary people with 
experiences of conscience; at any rate, people became increasingly familiar 
with the forerunners of our term ‘conscience’. Such familiarity is likely to 
result in pressure on the symbolic nature of the terms, but it is hard to 
determine to what extent this was so. Conscience became part of theological 
and philosophical treatises when the terms ‘syneidesis’ and ‘conscientia’ were 
taken from folk psychology by Roman Stoics and Church Fathers. It was 
then also underway to become an object of reflection. In the first half of the 
Middle Ages, conscience was taken up into Christian dogma. The process of 
differentiation and doctrinalization sped up; we can see the beginning of a 
process that would lead to a plethora of concepts and definitions of 
conscience. But the major differentiating step occurred in the twelfth 
century, when conscience was split up into ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’; this 
is where the following chapter begins. 
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3. Between symbol and doctrine (2): differentiation and 
 doctrinalization – the religious conscience before and 
 after the Reformation 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the second half of the Middle Ages, a differentiation occurred in the 
‘concept’ of conscience that was to an enormous influence in its own time, 
as well as on later reflection on the subject. Two words, ‘synderesis’ and 
‘conscientia’, were now used, where at first only the latter was available. This 
determined the character of scholastic discussions of conscience, but its 
influence extends far beyond these. Luther developed his own ‘concept’ of 
conscience in reaction to scholasticism. The medieval distinction between 
‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ lurks in the background of Protestant casuistry. 
Most importantly, this differentiation may be taken as the starting-point of 
the increase in and diversification of concepts of conscience. Afterwards, 
lines that were until then held together begin to diverge, hooking up to 
different elements of scholastic thought. 
 Other important developments occurred in the same period: we can 
witness the solidification of conscience into something one ‘has’, or 
‘possesses’. Also, we see that the Latin terms are translated into English, 
German, and other languages. In combination with the mysticism and 
spirituality that blossomed alongside scholasticism, and found its way into 
the Reformation, this development sparked a revival of symbolism of 
conscience. At the same time, however, we see that in English and German 
what I have called ‘external differentiation’ occurred: the moral phenomenon 
of conscience was separated from the morally neutral phenomenon of 
consciousness. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows: 3.2 continues the 
discussion of the development from compactness to differentiation begun in 
chapter 2; I attend to the origins of the distinction between ‘synderesis’ and 
‘conscientia’ (3.2.1), and to the meanings of these terms in scholastic 
philosophy (3.2.2). Because the scholastic conceptualization of conscience 
constitutes such an important turning-point, I start with a review of 
doctrinalization until scholastic times (3.2.3) The first half of the title of 3.3 
is ‘From symbol to doctrine – and back?’, because of the revival of symbolic 
language of conscience inspired by humanism and mysticism. In European 
history until then, scholastic thought represents the peak, even a break-
through, of doctrinal thought. Did the simultaneous revival of symbolism 
mean that it was also the end of the process of doctrinalization? Obviously 
not. A century or two later, the popular metaphors of (inner) light were used 
to back up unshakable convictions of righteousness. In 3.3 I deal with the 
following subjects: the translation of ‘conscientia’ (3.3.1), mysticism and 
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spirituality (3.3.2), the influence of Stoicism (3.3.3), and, finally, conscience in 
Protestant casuistry (3.3.4). 3.4 contains some concluding remarks and looks 
ahead to chapter 4. 
 
 
3.2. FROM COMPACTNESS TO DIFFERENTIATION (2) 
 
3.2.1. Origins of the distinction between ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’ 
Medieval (scholastic) discussions of conscience revolved around the terms 
‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’.1 At least on the ‘flat’ level of terminology, then, 
an innovation occurred. It is my contention that the differentiation of 
conscience into ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ constituted a critical step in the 
transition from the symbolic to the doctrinal level. In this form, the step was 
probably taken by accident – it was a misstep. It occurred for the first time 
probably around the middle of the twelfth century, when a novice or monk 
made a mistake in copying Jerome’s Ezekiel commentary, writing ‘synteresin’ 
or ‘synteresis’ instead of ‘syneidesis’.2 This word may hark back to the late 
Greek ‘synterein’ (‘to keep [safe]’, ‘to watch over [oneself]’), which makes 
some sense in connection with the function of the eagle in Ezekiel’s vision, 
as interpreted by Jerome.3 Potts remarks that ‘synteresis’ “most commonly 
means ‘preservation’ or ‘maintenance’, as e.g. in God’s conservation of his 
creation. But the ‘syn-’ prefix can also have a reflexive force, which gives it 
the sense of observing or watching over oneself, and, perhaps, thereby 
preserving oneself from wrongdoing. Jerome’s quotation from I Corinthians 
suggests that this is how he understood it, for the verb which St Paul used in 
that passage was ‘tereo’ (‘keep sound’ in the translation).”4 
 Stoker writes: “Wissen wir nicht genau, wie das Wort συντηρησις 
entstanden ist, wo Hieronymus es her hat, wie es seine moralische Prägung 
gewann, so ist und bleibt es ein künstlich geformtes Wort, welches den 
Scolasticis sehr brauchbare Dienste geliefert hat.”5 Störmer-Caysa notes that 
                                                 
1 Originally ‘synteresin’ or ‘synteresis’, but ‘synderesis’ became the more common 
variant. Cf. Störmer-Caysa (1995), 13; Potts (1980), 10-11, who points out that 
Greek ‘ντ’ is pronounced ‘nd’. 
2 The most detailed explanation of what happened is in Störmer-Caysa (1995), 11-13. 
It was originally written in Greek (συντηρησις), and later transliterated into Latin. 
3 In the literature, the ‘scribal slip’ and the ‘syntereo’-hypothesis are often presented 
as competing explanations, whereas they combine very well. The ‘syntereo’-
hypothesis supports the likelihood of this scribal error; had the term been virtually 
unknown, it is most unlikely that it would have been written instead of ‘syneidesis’. 
As to the other (background-)explanations put forward in what follows: it may very 
well have been that the eager acceptance of ‘synderesis’ was overdetermined. 
4 Potts (1980), 10. Kittsteiner (1995), 170, also connects it with “die Vorstellung des 
‘Bewahrens’ bei Paulus, I. Thess. 5 v. 23”. 
5 Stoker (1925), 27. 
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“die synderesis als bloßes synonym zur conscientia zu verstehen wäre bei weitem 
das Einfachste gewesen; das Einfachste trat aber nicht ein, denn die 
begriffliche Verdopplung war hochwillkommen. So ist die synderesis zwar 
spontan entstanden, aber wäre sie es nicht, so hätte man einen eigenen 
Begriff prägen, sie erfinden müssen.”6 Bosman speaks of the ‘fortuitous 
distinction between conscientia and sunderesis’ and says that it “should be 
regarded as an essential part of the historical process of refinement”.7 
Whether ‘synderesis’ came into scholastic thought as the result of a mistake 
or not, its ready adoption was no mistake. Hence, reasons for the grateful 
acceptance of the term should be considered. 
 Potts places the acceptance of the term in the context of an apparent 
inconsistency in Jerome, that medieval scholars wished to resolve. While 
Jerome, on the one hand, speaks of the ‘scintilla conscientiae’ (‘spark of 
conscience’) “which was not even extinguished in the breast of Cain”, he 
also says, in Potts’ words, “that very wicked people do cease to have any 
conscience”.8 With the new distinction available, it would be possible to say 
that one part, the ‘synderesis’, can never be extinguished, while the other 
part, ‘conscientia’, can perish. The distinction also fitted the distinction 
between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ reason, which went back to Augustine’s 
distinction between wisdom and knowledge, the first of which pertains to 
‘eternal things’ and is hence “to be preferred to the latter”.9 Bosman confines 
himself to the remark that “[a]ccidental or not, the synteresis filled an 
epistemological void that is already apparent in Philo’s conception of the 
συνειδος and its relationship to the moral code and human rationality”, which 
‘to a lesser extent’ is also true for Paul.10 Kittsteiner places the distinction 
between ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ in the wake of the incorporation of the 
Christian doctrine of the Fall in the stoic conception of conscience. It seems 
to me that it makes sense to pursue this line of thought, in the sense that we 
seek an underlying reason for the ready acceptance of the term ‘synderesis’ in 
a sought ‘rapprochement’ between Christian and classical (including Stoic) 
thought. Stelzenberger points out that the notion of the ‘terein’ (‘conservare’) 
of the ‘logos’ occurs in Stoic philosophy, and that the notion of the 
‘pneumatic fire’ as well as the idea of the divine, ruling part of reason, both 
of which would be taken up in speculation concerning ‘synderesis’, are Stoic 
in origin. Origen adopted the idea of the divine pneumatic fire, which he 
                                                 
6 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 14. 
7 Bosman (2003), 283. See also McGrade, Kilcullen, and Kempshall (2001), 169-170: 
“The misunderstanding was a fruitful one, however, for it stimulated finely 
discriminating discussions of moral knowledge and motivation.” 
8 Potts (1980), 10. 
9 Ibid., 89; translation of excerpts from Book 12 of On the Trinity. Cf. ibid., 83: 
Augustine, On the Trinity, Book 12.12: “For man is made in the image of God not in 
the form of his body but in his rational mind...” 
10 Bosman (2003), 18, note 10. 
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called ‘scintilla in anima’, and he connects fire (‘ignis’) with conscience. And 
so Stelzenberger adduces many more examples of pre-scholastic thought that 
might have ‘prepared’ the scholastics for the differentiation of conscience 
into ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’.11 
 In my view, it would make sense to broaden the perspective a bit 
more than Stelzenberger does, and look at the double inheritance medieval 
authors begot from classical and Stoic thought on the one hand, and 
Philonic and New Testament writing on the other. One of the greatest 
differences between them was that for Philo and New Testament authors, 
‘syneidos’ and ‘syneidesis’ were not divine, while for the Stoics ‘conscientia’ 
was ‘vox Dei’ and ‘God within you’. The tension which was the result is 
evident in Augustine, who on the one hand places ‘conscientia’ ‘coram Deo’ 
(which means that he distinguishes conscience and God), whereas on the 
other hand he also accepts the idea of conscience as the voice of God.12 The 
differentiation between ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’ allowed for the 
reconciliation of the Stoic and the Pauline inheritance, for the resolution of 
the tension between the divine and the human conscience, by assigning each 
of them their own place. This suggestion aligns the acceptance of ‘synderesis’ 
next to ‘conscientia’ with the general purpose of scholastic philosophy: to 
render compatible and to integrate Christian and classical thought. It was 
now possible to say that ‘synderesis’ was divine, inextinguishable, and 
infallible, while ‘conscientia’ was human, extinguishable, and fallible. Thus, 
the Pauline conscience that awaits the final Judgement is wedded to the Stoic 
‘vox Dei’, and the tension in patristic thought is resolved. 
 There is also a more historical explanation for the readiness with 
which the distinction between ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’ was accepted. 
While Schockenhoff merely says that the refined Thomistic concept of 
conscience ‘presupposed a sharper conceptual distinction’, Störmer-Caysa 
explains the need for this sharper distinction. She relates it to the fourth 
Lateran council of 1215, which imposed the duty of at least one-yearly 
auricular confession on all Christians. “Um zu beichten, mußte man aber 
wissen, was Sünde sei; und nicht alle Fälle waren so eindeutig wie Mord oder 
Ehebruch.”13 Priests in particular needed to be instructed, so as to be able to 
aid their confessants in probing their conscience. Catalogues of sins were 
used, but they were not sufficient. “Sie blieben vor der Vielfalt möglicher 
Handlungskonstellationen immer zurück.”14 What was needed was new 
theory, that would answer a host of questions, like: what is conscience? how 
sure is its decision? can it be sinful to obey your conscience? Störmer-Caysa 
notes that Abelard (1079-1142) held that there is no sin except against the 
                                                 
11 Stelzenberger (1963b), 81ff. 
12 Stelzenberger (1959), 116ff; Schockenhoff (2003), 100. 
13 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 14. 
14 Idem. 
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conscience.15 What if an action was said to be sinful, while the actor was not 
aware of its sinful nature? Would he not doubt the power of his conscience, 
cease to educate it, and stop confiding in it? “So paradoxal es auch klingt: 
Die Entwicklung einer personalen Gewissenskonzeption, die in die 
neuzeitliche Subjektivität und Individualität mündet, hatte ihre Wurzeln im 
Versuch der Kirche, sich der Köpfe und Herzen gründlicher zu 
bemächtigen. Das Gewissen,” Störmer-Caysa states in Foucauldian manner, 
“ist in einer Kultur mit Beichtpflicht die Instanz der totalen Kontrolle; es 
macht den gläsernen Menschen aus.”16 The internal differentiation of 
conscience into ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ was, besides other things, an 
instrument in the attempt to gain control over the minds of the people: “Die 
ausgearbeitete Lehre vom Gewissen sollte in erster Linie die mentale 
Bindung des einzelnen klarstellen, nicht seine Freiheit.”17 
 With respect to the idea that the word ‘synderesis’ was simply needed 
at that time, I would finally like to suggest that this makes sense in view of 
the fact that language lags behind experience. The word ‘conscientia’ alone 
could no longer bear the strain caused by an experiential differentiation of 
the divine and the human in conscience. ‘Synderesis’ was perhaps so 
welcome, simply because it provided the means verbally to express a 
differentiation that had already taken place on the level of experience. 
 
3.2.2. ‘Synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ in scholasticism 
It is impossible, nor would it be fruitful, to look into scholastic discussions 
of ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’ in any detail here. For my purpose, it is more 
important to get an idea of the nature of these discussions than of their 
precise contents.18 We have already noted – but it is an important point – 
that the differentiation between ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’ was an internal 
differentiation within what by this time we may call the concept of 
conscience. ‘Synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ belonged together; they were parts 
of the same ‘thing’, which we would call conscience. Hence, Kittsteiner 
                                                 
15 For Abelard on conscience see Hennig (2003). 
16 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 15. 
17 Idem. 
18 Potts (1980) provides a thorough discussion of the first scholastic treatise on 
conscience, written by Philip the Chancellor about 1235, and of the primary 
exponents of the two major schools of thought on the subject: Bonaventure (1221-
1274) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274); he also provides translations of their 
treatises on conscience, and a list of medieval writings on conscience; Langston 
(2001) discusses extensively the background to scholastic discussions of conscience, 
and devotes chapters to Bonaventure’s view, the view of Thomas Aquinas, and that 
of Scotus and Ockham. It is from Langston’s book that I derive my brief discussion 
of the contents of the main scholastic positions. See also Stelzenberger (1963b), part 
II (67-106), and Schockenhoff (2003), 102-122; Störmer-Caysa (1995), 19-21 sums 
up some of the specialist discussions of Thomas Aquinas’ and Bonaventure’s views. 
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rightly speaks of an ‘in sich differenzierter Gewissensbegriff’’, and 
Schockenhoff of a ‘Differenzierung im Gewissensphänomen’ that underlay 
the terminological distinction.19 The scholastics were concerned with 
determining the proper place of both terms in a conceptual network that 
included the concepts of the will, reason, emotion, virtue, and many other 
besides.20 The concepts of ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ were used in 
discussions of problems deriving from Platonic and Aristotelian ethics. Two 
major schools arose, because, as Störmer-Caysa aptly remarks: “Wie beinahe 
alle bedeutenden Lehren der mittelalterlichen Philosophie ist auch die über 
das Gewissen erst im Widerstreit zweier rivalisierender Bettelmönchsorden 
voll ausgearbeitet worden.”21 For the Dominicans, Thomas Aquinas entered 
the ring; his opponent, for the Franciscans, was Bonaventure. ‘The ring’ was 
the University of Paris, founded around 1200. Both developed their views of 
‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ on the basis of the first treatise on the subject, 
that of Philip the Chancellor (somewhere in the 1160’s - 1236). He seemed 
to suggest, on the one hand, that ‘synderesis’ is an unerring intellectual 
(dispositional) potentiality, while on the other hand he held that ‘synderesis’ 
“moves us to the general good which is found in this or that good deed”.22 
So in Philip the Chancellor’s work could be found the beginnings of both an 
intellectualistic and a voluntaristic view of conscience. 
 Bonaventure links up with the latter aspect of Philip’s work. For 
him, ‘conscientia’ is a part of practical reason, while ‘synderesis’ belongs to 
the affective part of human beings. His leading question was: how can it be 
that people do evil, while they have an orientation on and drive towards the 
good, namely the ‘synderesis’? He distinguished within ‘conscientia’ between 
an unerring and innate ‘potential conscience’, and an equally innate but 
fallible ‘applied conscience’.23 Evil arises through ignorance or faulty 
reasoning. With respect to the problems of ‘contra conscientiam agere’ and 
the ‘objectively erring, yet subjectively binding’ conscience, Bonaventure 
holds that it is wrong to act against our conscience, while also maintaining 
that it is wrong to against God’s law, which is what an erroneous conscience 
may tell us to do. Langston notes that Bonaventure could have solved this 
dilemma by pointing out that to act against conscience would mean to act 
with the wrong intention, and to violate the internal representative of God, 
while to follow an erroneous conscience would merely be the result of 
ignorance. Bonaventure did not pursue this line of reasoning, however, 
because he focused on cases in which one had reason to suspect one’s 
conscience was in error. He recommended self-education for those with an 
                                                 
19 Kittsteiner (1995), 170; Schockenhoff (2003), 104. 
20 See Langston (2001), chapter 1. 
21 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 16. 
22 Langston (2001), 24; Potts (1980), 101-102. 
23 Langston (2001), 26; the terms are Langston’s. 
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erroneous applied conscience.24 Bonaventure held that ‘conscientia’ “cannot 
move or vex or stimulate without the mediation of synderesis (...). [J]ust us 
reason cannot move without the mediation of the will, so conscience [cannot 
move] without the mediation of synderesis.”25 ‘Synderesis’ is the ‘spark of 
conscience’. This ‘spark’ should not be understood as a part of conscience, 
but as the spark necessary to operate; it constitutes the general drive to do 
good, the drive to formulate true principles leading to good, the desire to 
follow those principles, and the vexation at having failed to follow them. 
‘Synderesis’ aims at the good in objects, rather than good objects; it aims at 
the general good. Hence, it is not very practical, which is why ‘conscientia’ is 
needed. ‘Synderesis’ can never be destroyed, and is found in all human 
beings. Its exercise can be prevented by ‘darkness of blindness’ (which harks 
back to Plato), ‘wantonness of pleasure’ (which can be associated with 
Aristotle’s view on ‘akrasia’), or ‘hardness of obstinacy’. The third 
impediment, Langston notes, is not classical, but important in the voluntarist 
tradition.26 When ‘hardness of obstinacy’ impedes the exercise of 
‘synderesis’, there is no pursuit of the good. ‘Synderesis’ “can be said to be 
extinguished in respect of its exercise, but not extinguished without 
qualification, because it has another use, namely, to murmur in reply [to evil]. 
In this use (...) it flourishes most in the damned. I say this, in the sense in 
which murmuring in reply to evil is a punishment, not in the sense in which 
it is a matter of justice...”27 
 Langston points out the sophistication of Bonaventure’s concept of 
conscience: ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ are part of different faculties (the 
affective and the rational); yet they interpenetrate. We have a desire for the 
good (‘synderesis’), which makes us desire the means to that good; the 
principles of ‘conscientia’ are such means. If we disregard what ‘conscientia’ 
tells us is good in a particular situation, ‘synderesis’ will give us guilt or 
remorse. Bonaventure is able to answer the question ‘why should conscience 
be followed?’, “without moving outside a discussion of synderesis and 
conscience. Because synderesis is the desire for the good and conscience is 
an expression of synderesis, following one’s conscience is the means for 
pursuing the good.”28 A final ‘bonus’ of the interconnectedness of 
‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’ is that “it escapes the tendency to identify 
particular human functions with particular parts of the human being”.29 So 
whatever we find in Bonaventure’s discussion of conscience, it is not a 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 27-28. 
25 Ibid., 29-30; quoted from Bonaventure, Commentary on the Sentences, in Opera 
Theologica Selecta, Ad Claras Aquas, Florence, 1934, 945b. 
26 Ibid., 32. 
27 Ibid., 33; quoted from Bonaventure, Commentary, 947a. 
28 Ibid., 35. 
29 Ibid., 36. 
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faculty or a pair of faculties. His view is more dynamic than that, which, 
finally, is also evident from Bonaventure’s view that ‘conscientia’ “grows and 
changes with experience”.30 
 The intellectualistic position was held by Thomas Aquinas, who 
placed both ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ in man’s rational part, the former 
being a ‘habit’ (‘habitus’), as opposed to a ‘power’ (‘potentia’), while the latter 
was also not a power, but an ‘act’ (‘actus’). ‘Synderesis’, in Langston’s words, 
is a “natural disposition of the human mind by which we apprehend without 
inquiry the basic principles of behavior”.31 ‘Conscientia’ applies the ‘first 
principles’ apprehended by ‘synderesis’ to particular situations.32 With this 
application the possibility of error, and thus of evil, arises. ‘Synderesis’ 
cannot be wrong; it is the voice of God. But its principles can be misapplied 
through false reasoning or the use of false premises.33 Aquinas distinguishes 
between culpable and inculpable ignorance; ignorance is culpable when it 
concerns a law the agent should know.34 Aquinas, like Bonaventure, held that 
conscience is binding. According to Langston, the “ultimate justification of 
his view that conscience is binding centers on the precept that not to follow 
conscience violates a first principle of synderesis”. This principle would be 
“something like the claim that God ought to be obeyed. Because conscience 
is the voice of God, it follows that conscience ought to be obeyed.”35 Yet the 
question remains: why follow the first principles of ‘synderesis’? The 
problem arises because Aquinas places both ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’ in 
the rational faculty. Motivation needs to come from elsewhere.36 Langston 
believes we can only make sense of Aquinas’ view of conscience if we see it 
in the broader context of his ethics, which are to a great extent Aristotelian. 
Where they are not, Aquinas’ views develop in discussion with Aristotle. 
                                                 
30 Idem. 
31 Ibid., 39. 
32 Aquinas resolves conscience (‘conscientia’) into “cum alio scientia, i.e., knowledge 
applied to an individual case” (Aquinas [1981], Vol. I, 408; Pt. 1, Q. 79, Art. 13). 
33 Ibid., 40. 
34 Aquinas (1981), Vol. II, 675-676 (First part of the second part, Q. 19, Art. 6). 
35 Idem. 
36 In De Veritate, however, Aquinas also speaks of an ‘act’ of ‘synderesis’, which 
consists of a ‘remurmurare malo et inclinare ad bonum’ [‘murmuring againt evil and 
inclining towards good’]; see Reiner (1974). Moreover, in the Summa Theologica itself, 
he writes: “Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not 
belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call synderesis. 
Whence synderesis is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as 
through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have 
discovered.” (Aquinas [1981], Vol. I, 407; Pt. 1, Q. 79, Art. 12.) This last 
qualification (‘inasmuch…’), however, does seem to reintroduce the problem of 
motivation. It is not clear how ‘discovery’ (of what is good?) is linked to an 
inclination towards the good. 
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Most important in the present context is that “the richer activities of 
conscience found in Bonaventure’s discussion of conscience are placed by 
[Aquinas] into issues surrounding prudence”.37 For Aquinas, there could be 
no prudence without moral virtue.38 The rather empty and formal principles 
of ‘synderesis’ had to be supplemented and informed by experience and 
tuition; thus, prudence, ‘conscientia’, and ‘synderesis’ are connected. 
Moreover, the exercise of ‘conscientia’ is part of a larger framework: that of 
the gradual acquisition (through practice) and the exercise of the virtues. All 
these themes come together in Aquinas’ discussion of incontinence 
(‘incontinentia’), or weakness of will (‘akrasia’). The incontinent man, in the 
final analysis, lacks prudence; he suffers from weakness of will, because he 
has failed “to train himself adequately to see opportunities in the proper 
way”.39 This amounts to culpable ignorance. Since prudence and ‘conscientia’ 
are related, “weakness of will also involves a failure of conscience”.40 
 In his evaluation of Aquinas’ views, Langston stresses that they 
depart from earlier discussions of conscience, where “the focus was on 
conscience and synderesis in isolation from other issues”. Aquinas places his 
discussion of conscience firmly within a broader (Aristotelian) ethical 
framework. Duns Scotus (1265-1308) and William of Ockham (1280-1349) 
follow Aquinas in this respect, but incorporate elements of both 
Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’ views in their own, while also taking the 
discussion in new directions. Much of what Bonaventure discussed under the 
heading of ‘conscientia’ is phrased in terms of the ‘will’ in the work of Duns 
Scotus. Ockham also takes a voluntaristic view of conscience. An important 
claim of his is that “only internal acts of the will are morally meritorious”.41 
Both Duns Scotus and Ockham see conscience as providing knowledge and 
guidance necessary to develop prudence and the virtues. Yet a radical turn 
occurs in Ockham’s writings. His voluntaristic conception of God led him to 
present God as absolutely free, and man as under the obligation to conform 
his will to that of God. “Evil is nothing else than to do something when one 
is under an obligation to do the opposite. Obligation does not fall on God, 
since He is not under any obligation to do anything.”42 Hence, “the whole 
created order, including the moral law, is viewed by Ockham as wholly 
contingent”; “the divine will is the ultimate law of morality: the moral law is 
founded on the free divine choice rather than ultimately on the divine 
essence”.43 The other side of this voluntaristic and authoritarian view of 
                                                 
37 Langston (2001), 43. 
38 Ibid., 42. 
39 Ibid., 50. 
40 Ibid., 51. 
41 Ibid., 62. 
42 William of Ockham, Sentences, Book 3, 5, H, quoted in Copleston (1983), 103. 
43 Copleston (1983), 104. 
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morality is that man has a duty to follow his conscience, even when it is 
‘invincibly erroneous’; that is, when one is not responsible for the error. To 
follow an invincibly erroneous conscience is not sin, but duty.44 These 
elements are united by the idea that an act chosen against the dictate of 
conscience “would be elicited contrary to the divine precept and the divine 
will which wills that an act should be elicited in conformity with right 
reason”.45 Joseph Dolan argues fiercely against Ockham’s views, for 
replacing prudence with obedience as ‘chief cardinal virtue’, and for 
transforming the idea of law into that of an ‘arbitrary check’ upon the will: 
“Law and liberty no longer complement but confront each other. And 
conscience is on hand, not to work in harness with prudence in preparing its 
decision, but to mediate the rival claims of law and liberty and determine 
which of the two is ‘in possession’ (another legal formula).”46 
 “In many ways,” Langston says (but Dolan would not agree), “the 
view of conscience offered by Scotus and Ockham presents a culmination of 
medieval views about conscience. Yet, despite its power, this sophisticated 
view was abandoned for a number of reasons.”47 The Roman Catholic 
tradition would revert to Thomistic views, and hold on to them until the 
previous century – some of its adherents until the present day. Luther was 
influenced by Ockham’s thought, via the work of Gabriel Biel. While first 
accepting the distinction between ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’, he would 
later abandon it, however. But that is a matter for section 2.3. 
 
3.2.3. Doctrinalization until scholastic times 
There is a difference between expressing oneself by means of the term 
‘conscience’, simply using the term ‘conscience’, and speaking about 
conscience. The first is a result of consciousness as luminosity; the second, 
and even more the third, are the products of consciousness in its intentional 
mode. The first is an example of symbolic language; the second and third are 
examples of indicative language. Yet, this picture is too clean. Once the term 
‘conscience’ has become familiar, and its use has become the standard way of 
expressing certain experiences, its symbolic aspect will inevitably decline in 
favour of its indicative aspect. So there are many in-between cases; as a 
matter of fact, most cases are in-between cases on the scale from ‘purely’ 
symbolic to ‘purely’ indicative. 
 We see this illustrated in the history of the terms ‘syneidesis’ and 
‘conscientia’. The substantivization that occurs in the time of Philo and Paul 
is a coagulation of what used to be more fluid. It is an important step 
towards conceiving of conscience as an inner entity, and with that towards 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 106-107. 
45 Ibid., 109; quoted by Copleston from Ockham, Sentences, Book 3, 13, C. 
46 Dolan (1971), 14-15. 
47 Langston (2001), 69. 
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an indicative use of the term ‘conscience’ (and its equivalents). Whereas in 
Romans 2:15 Paul ‘merely’ uses the term ‘syneidesis’, in 2 Corinthians 1:12 it 
functions more as a symbolic expression of his own experiences. The Stoics 
contributed to the power of the symbol of conscience, among other things 
by means of the ‘vox Dei’-symbolization. At the same time they furthered 
the spread and thereby the familiarity of the term, which constitutes an anti-
symbolic tendency. Ritual and symbolism depend upon repetition for their 
power, but this power depends equally on the infrequency of repetition. 
Rituals that are too often repeated, and symbols that are too readily used, 
lose their meaning. The Latin Church Fathers, like the Roman Stoics, speak 
about conscience from time to time, but still there is no systematic reflection 
on the subject. Only at the end of patristic times do we find a cluster of 
statements under the heading ‘On Conscience’. In patristic and scholastic 
times, we see that the use of phrases like ‘my conscience’ and ‘his conscience’ 
becomes somewhat more frequent. Very gradually, conscience begets a 
thing-like character. 
The differentiation within the concept of conscience between 
‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’ was the most important differentiation in the 
history of conscience (either as symbol or concept) so far; it contributed to, 
and was a symptom of, doctrinalization. The distinction was elaborated in 
systematic and thorough reflection on the subject – a kind of reflection that 
had never occurred before with respect to conscience. The nature of this 
reflection can be illustrated by a brief reference to Bonaventure. He 
proceeded as follows: first, (after explaining what he was about to do), he 
asked: “Does conscience reside in understanding or in affect?”; five 
preliminary arguments for the former are presented, then five against the 
former; the conclusion is then reached that “conscience is a habit of a 
cognitive power insofar as the latter is practical, not insofar as it is 
speculative”; replies to the preliminary arguments are then given, after which 
Bonaventure moves on to the second question: “Is conscience an innate or 
an acquired habit?”48 The picture is clear enough, I presume: the scholastics 
attempted to define the exact place of the concept under discussion in a 
specified conceptual network. They emphasized particular aspects of the 
experiential phenomenon of conscience at the cost of others, though, on the 
other hand, their conceptualization (especially in Bonaventure’s case) was so 
refined as to allow one concept to make up for the loss incurred by another. 
The distinction between ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’ allowed Bonaventure 
to assign a function both to the intellectual and to the affective part of the 
human make-up. Thomas Aquinas, however, overstressed the intellect at the 
cost of the affective element. The scholastics differentiated between the 
‘conscientia antecedens’ (the guiding conscience that operates before the act) 
and the ‘conscientia consequens’ (the retrospective conscience), but they did 
                                                 
48 Bonaventure (2001). 
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not yet introduce these terms. The terminological differentiation occurred in 
seventeenth-century Spain.49 
 The story of differentiation does not end there either; it is only after 
the translation of ‘conscientia’ into English, German, French, and other 
languages that the important terminological differentiation between 
conscience and consciousness is made – though in France only by 
distinguishing ‘conscience’ (consciousness) from ‘conscience morale’ 
(conscience). Nevertheless, the late Middle Ages are a crucial period in the 
differentiation of symbolizations and conceptualizations of conscience. The 
major thrust away from the symbolic understanding of conscience and 
towards the supposedly exact formulation of the nature and function of (the 
two parts of) conscience occurred in this period. Different schools of 
thought held different views as to the proper definition of conscience, but 
the dominant schools were alike in that respect, that they felt they could ‘pin 
conscience down’, so to speak. The strict definition of conscience led to 
insoluble problems, like that of the objectively erring but subjectively binding 
conscience.50 Conscience, if not fully seen as an existent entity, was taken to 
be a definable part of a specified faculty.51 As such, it became an additional 
factor to be reckoned with in moral reasoning. In combination with an 
insistence on objectively knowable and known truth – known through the 
Bible, and by the Church – this led to a duplification of the goal of morality: 
to do the right thing, and to obey the dictates of one’s conscience. Ideally, 
these were coincident, but in practice they often were not. This meant that 
people could, and had to, follow their conscience, while doing the wrong 
thing. The next question was that of the guilt of people following their 
erroneous conscience. We have seen that Abelard defined sin, subjectively, as 
acting against what one holds to be right; that is, against conscience. Thomas 
Aquinas held that the objectively erroneous conscience was subjectively 
binding, but he also thought that people who followed their erroneous 
conscience could be punished for committing an objectively evil act.52 I 
guess there is no solution to such problems. The best thing to do would be 
to avoid such discussions altogether, by avoiding the duplification of the goal 
of morality through a misunderstanding of conscience. Augustine had still 
declared that the erroneous conscience was not to be followed, because God 
was a higher authority than conscience, and it was God’s command that was 
to be obeyed; thus, he may have realized at least to some extent that 
                                                 
49 Bosman (2003), 19. 
50 See part II, chapter 10.3.1. 
51 Reification is not a necessary element of indicative language; concepts can also be 
understood in a relational manner, that is, as occupying a certain place in a 
conceptual network, with specified relations to other concepts, and possibly even 
without any reference to an external reality. 
52 Baylor (1977), 53-58. 
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‘conscience’ is no more than a human articulation of human experience.53 To 
treat it as such would also mean to avoid scholastic discussions, in which 
conscience becomes an extra factor in reality to be considered. 
 On the other hand, Augustine believed he knew what God’s 
command was, and so did the scholastics. If scholastic concepts of 
conscience left space for moral reasoning, this space was readily filled with 
Biblical truth and Church Doctrine. Aquinas had no doubts whatsoever 
concerning the contents of synderesis; nor was he in doubt concerning their 
correct application. Viewed from this perspective, the very discussion of the 
‘objectively erring, yet subjectively binding’ conscience constitutes, not so 
much a recognition of the subjectivity of conscience, but rather an emphasis 
on objective truth. One has to be quite self-confident to feel free to judge 
which conscience is in error and which is not. Thomas Aquinas did not lack 
self-confidence, backed up as he was by Church doctrine. Sin was easily 
distinguished from its opposite; heresy stood out from the proper faith like 
daylight from the night, and its consequences were clear: 
 
“Heresy is a sin which merits not only excommunication but also death, for 
it is worse to corrupt the Faith which is the life of the soul than to issue 
counterfeit coins which minister to the secular life. Since counterfeiters are 
justly killed by princes as enemies to the common good, so heretics also 
deserve the same punishment.”54 
 
Doctrine, so it seems, is the currency of faith, sustaining the soul. Yet from 
another perspective it might be said that subjectivity did matter more. The 
erring conscience was binding for the subject because the subject believed it 
to represent God’s will, and it was clearly evil to go against what one thought 
was God’s will. This means that apart from objective truth, intentions and 
character mattered to the scholastics as well – which, given the influence of 
Aristotle, is hardly surprising. For Aquinas, however, subjectively good 
intentions did not exempt a person from punishment when the deed was 
objectively evil. 
 Scholastic discussions of conscience must be seen in their context. 
Bonaventure and Aquinas represent the culmination, and also the end, of 
medieval system building.55 From their time onwards, the Church – in 
particular the papacy – changed its attitude: “For two centuries [the twelfth 
and thirteenth] the papacy had on the whole encouraged new ideas and new 
organizations. Innovators had instinctively sought papal protection and 
approval. Now the balance suddenly changed.”56 A series of condemnations 
                                                 
53 Baylor (1977), 27 and footnote on page 29. 
54 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2, 2, qu. xi, art. 3, quoted in Southern (1990), 
17. 
55 Southern (1990), 42. 
56 Ibid., 44. 
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followed, which “signalized the growing papal fear of extremism”.57 A 
similar attitude had characterized the papal policy towards the Eastern 
Church since the middle of the eleventh century; from then on, “unity was 
seen (at least in the West) in terms of discipline, obedience, and 
uniformity”.58 With regard to conscience, the emphasis on the element of 
authority had been increasing since patristic times. For the scholastics, 
conscience is primarily something that dictates, needs to be obeyed, and 
binds. With Ockham, this emphasis becomes even stronger, and it would 
become the most distinguishing element of Kant’s concept of conscience – 
hence Velleman’s remark that “the voice of conscience is (...) the voice of 
this authority” (the authority carried by dictates of conscience).59 
 With the scholastics, then, the doctrinalization of conscience had 
progressed very far: conscience was defined in terms of ‘synderesis’ and 
‘conscientia’. The refined concepts of conscience that were developed 
allowed a more precise study of the human psyche, but (for that reason) they 
were instruments of control. The contents of conscience were also more 
explicitly fixed then before.60 
 Someone may object that it is no wonder that I see an increasingly 
indicative understanding of conscience in the course of history, given that I 
started out with (Egyptian and Greek) expressions of conscience, and went on 
to look at the writings of (mainly) philosophers and theologians, which, 
naturally, are more reflective in nature. Should I not have stuck with 
expressions of conscience, and would I then not have seen a continued 
symbolic understanding, which runs parallel to reflection on conscience, 
which entails an indicative understanding? To some extent this is true. I have 
moved from the level of expression to that of reflection. But the Socratic 
expression of conscience came from Plato’s work, and it is within 
philosophical and theological writings that we see an increasingly indicative 
understanding of conscience become dominant. Conscience started out as a 
symbol; the symbol became attached to certain terms, which became its 
prime carriers; these terms became more and more familiar, finally to 
become the object of systematic reflection. Importantly, this reflection 
shows no sign of an inherent recognition of the symbolic nature, or at least 
of the symbolic aspect, of expressions of conscience. It is likely that a parallel 
symbolic expression of experiences of conscience occurred throughout the 
period I have discussed so far, though it is impossible to say to what extent 
this involved the same terminology. It is likely that there was a connection 
                                                 
57 Idem. 
58 Ibid., 72. 
59 See 1.5.2. 
60 Cf. Stoker (1925), 30, who says that “with a host of sharp-witted notions” the 
scholastics “gave us a construction, that is determined too much by concepts and 
conceptual premises and too little by the objective reality of the phenomenon”. 
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between the ‘everyday’ expression of conscience and philosophical and 
theological reflection on conscience – the connection is certainly there, as we 
will see, after the Middle Ages. Reflection on conscience, and the indicative 
use of the term ‘conscience’ that went with it, came to influence the symbolic 
expression of experiences of conscience. For medieval times, I simply do not 
have the sources at my disposal to point out the same. What is clear from 
scholastic discussions of conscience, as well as from patristic literature, is 
that attempts were made to influence people’s experience of conscience. The 
extent to which these were successful is open to doubt, however, as 
Kittsteiner points out for even later periods.61 
 
 
3.3. FROM SYMBOL TO DOCTRINE – AND BACK? CONSCIENCE IN 
RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION 
After the Middle Ages (but of course this starts in the Middle Ages) the 
conceptualization of conscience becomes very diverse; many different views 
spring up, and several traditions develop. With the Reformation, conscience 
becomes a hugely important concept, especially in the context of Luther’s 
Christian freedom (of conscience), which I discuss in part II. Meanwhile, its 
importance for the Catholic tradition does not diminish. This section will 
take up some important developments, especially those pertaining to the 
later critique and dismissal of conscience. Much that is relevant for an 
understanding of the symbol and concept of conscience in Protestantism, as 
well is in the thought of diverse (early) modern philosophers, will be 
discussed in part II. In chapter 9, I will also give an interpretation of the 
development of the concept of conscience in terms of a double inversion of 
meaning. This interpretation rests on what has been and will be said in the 
present chapter; as its direct relevance lies in the context of the relation 
between (concepts of) conscience and freedom of conscience, I will not 
present it here. The late Middle Ages and the early modern era are a time of 
intellectual upheaval and ferment. Though there is no period in history when 
there is no alternative to orthodoxy, this period abounds with alternatives – 
hence the rigidity of its orthodoxy. With respect to conscience, this means a 
rediscovery of symbolism as part of a growth of mysticism and spirituality. 
The rediscovery of Stoicism will also receive attention in this section, 
because it would prove to be an enduring element of modern thought. I 
conclude with a subsection on (Protestant) casuistry, which was a practical 
elaboration (and transformation) of Reformation thought, and would be an 
important point of departure for Enlightenment philosophy – even if they 
tended to aim their criticism at Roman Catholic, rather than Protestant, 
                                                 
61 See 10.3.2, where Kittsteiner’s (1995) opening lines are quoted, in which a priest 
(as opposed to laymen) is called a ‘man of conscience’. 
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casuistry. But I will start with an important feature of the late Middle Ages: 
the gradual appearance of non-Latin texts for lay-readers. 
 
3.3.1. The translation of ‘conscientia’ and the solidification of 
 conscience 
The appearance of translations of Latin texts had important consequences 
for the concept of conscience, which had to be translated into many 
different languages, using either existing words, or derivatives of the Latin. 
Latin nouns have no article. ‘Conscientia’, therefore, inadvertently retained a 
certain fluidity, an elusiveness, that the article would destroy. Sometimes, the 
noun went accompanied by a possessive pronoun. We have seen Isidorus of 
Sevilla speak of ‘conscientiae suae’ (‘their consciences’); Bonaventure and 
Aquinas also used possessive pronouns occasionally.62 This has the same 
effect as the use of an article – it vitiates the fluidity of the concept. With the 
translation of ‘conscientia’ into French, German, English, and other 
languages, articles and possessive pronouns became (gradually, in the case of 
English) more common or even grammatically necessary. The first known 
occurrence of the German ‘Gewissen’ illustrates this beautifully. Around the 
year 1000, an anonymous monk, adding translations to a commentary on the 
Psalms by Notker Teutonicus, wrote ‘gewizzeni’ where Notker had written 
‘conscientia’.63 Above Notker’s ‘quae mordet conscientiam’ was written ‘diu 
mih pîzzet in mînero gewizzeni’ [‘die mich beißt in meinem Gewissen’] – 
(my) ‘conscience’ has become ‘my conscience’.64 The Latin Bible used the 
possessive pronoun quite often already; translated into German, every 
occurrence of ‘Gewissen’ had to be accompanied by an article. So 
‘conscientia’ becomes ‘das Gewissen’, ‘the conscience’, ‘la conscience 
morale’. 
 The difference between the French on the one hand and the 
German and English on the other, is that in the latter a further 
differentiation occurred between conscience and consciousness, ‘Gewissen’ 
and ‘Bewußtsein’. Where the German ‘Gewissen’, after a period of 
‘bedeutungsverengerung’ as the Grimm brothers say, came to signify only 
(the moral) conscience, and where the English ‘conscience’ after some time 
could only mean ‘consciousness’ in poetic usage, the French ‘conscience’ 
retained the general meaning of consciousness, and needed to be qualified in 
order to signify conscience.65 
                                                 
62 See, for instance, the translations in Potts (1980), 111, 114, and 129. 
63 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 7; Kittsteiner (1995), 18, gives ‘giwizzani’; Grimm and 
Grimm (1911), 6219, gives ‘gawizani’. 
64 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 7. 
65 Grimm and Grimm (1911), 6219. 
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 In English, from the thirteenth century onwards, ‘conscience’ 
replaced the earlier ‘inwit’ ‘in all its senses’, as the Oxford English Dictionary 
says.66 It tells us that conscience 
 
“is etymologically, as its form shows, a noun of condition or function, like 
science, prescience, intelligence, prudence, etc., and as such originally had 
no plural: a man or a people had more or less conscience. But in sense 4 
[the moral sense] it came gradually to be thought of as an individual entity, 
a member or organ of the mental system, of which each man possessed 
one, and thus it took a and plural. So my conscience, your conscience, was 
understood to mean no longer our respective shares or amounts of the 
common quality conscience, but to be two distinct individual consciences, 
mine and yours. Where the word has continued to be used without the 
article, as in ‘the dictates of conscience’, orig. parallel to ‘the dictates of 
prudence’ or ‘of common sense’, the prevalent tendency is to personify 
Conscience as ‘this Deity in my bosom’.”67 
 
So the story is that of the gradual solidification and reification of conscience. 
It shows the gradual coming into prominence of a faculty view of 
conscience, which will be discussed in chapter 4. 
 
3.3.2. Mysticism and spirituality 
There was also another side to translation. Section 3.3 is headed ‘From 
symbol to doctrine – and back?’ for a reason. Störmer-Caysa remarks that the 
example of Meister Eckhart shows the difficulty of translating the technical 
language of Latin theology into the German vernacular. But “[e]s zeigt auch 
die Chance, die mit diesem Medienwechsel verbunden ist. Das deutsche 
Wort ist begrifflich nicht festgelegt, folglich ungenauer. Es hat andererseits 
eine Aura, die der lateinische Begriff verloren hat. Eine längst konventionelle 
Lehre in lateinisch abgeschliffenen Worten wirkt dadurch deutsch neu und 
besonders...”68 In other words: the change of language allowed the return 
from the conceptual and doctrinal level to the symbolic level. It revived the 
possibility for consciousness to relate to reality in its structure of luminosity, 
rather than intentionality. New language, not yet fixated but fluid, lends itself 
to become the symbolic vehicle of the expression of experience. Translation 
may thus become a variant of the ‘breaking forth of language’. 
 Störmer-Caysa uses the example of Eckhart’s ‘Funkenmetaphorik’ 
(‘spark metaphor’). The spark (‘scintilla’ in Latin) is usually a metaphor for 
the uncreated pneumatic ground (‘Seelengrund’). In the German sermon on 
Luke 14:16, however, it is related to ‘synderesis’. Störmer-Caysa rightly 
points out that this is in itself unremarkable, for ‘synderesis’ had since long 
                                                 
66 The Oxford English Dictionary (1978), lemma ‘Conscience’, 845. 
67 Idem. 
68 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 23. 
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been the ‘scintilla conscientiae’ – but Eckhart speaks of ‘daz vünkelin der 
sêle’ (‘the spark of the soul’). With his view of ‘synderesis’, understood as 
‘ungeschaffener, göttlicher Seelengrund’, rather than ‘geschaffene, 
gottebenbildliche Naturausstattung’, Eckhart distances himself from the idea 
of ‘synderesis’ as ‘ein kraft der sêle’, Bonaventure’s ‘potentia animae’.69 The 
view of ‘synderesis’ as the created image of God in man, which, as Störmer-
Caysa points out, is still quite similar to Eckhart’s view, resembles that of 
‘monastic and mystical theologians’ referred to by Mary C. Schroeder in her 
article on the fourteenth-century allegorical play Piers Plowman – a play in 
which Conscience is one of the principal characters.70 Personification is itself 
a way in which a concept becomes much more than that: a character, a multi-
faceted and developing personality. The basic elements of the scholastic 
concept of conscience make up part of Conscience in this play, but another 
part is of a more mystical nature, resembling what the author of the 
contemporaneous allegory The Abbey of the Holy Ghost said about conscience 
when he described his work as “a buke of the religion of the herte, that es, of 
the abbaye of the Holy Goste”, built “in a place that es called ‘consyence’.”71 
Schroeder adds that “[t]his mystical tradition is also reflected in a Bernardine 
treatise, Tractatus de interiori domo seu de conscientia aedificanda: 
 
The creator-image created in its likeness is nothing but wisdom in the soul, glory in 
the conscience, sanctity in the body.... Therefore the conscience should be pure so 
that it may lead God into our dwelling-place. 
 
The author goes on to call a pure conscience: 
 
the honor of religion, the temple of Solomon, the field of blessing, the garden of 
delights...the treasure of the King, the court of God, the habitation of the Holy 
Spirit. 
 
It is conscience which essentially makes it possible for man to know God.”72 
 Mysticism of this kind was obviously not a new phenomenon, but it 
acquired a new impulse through those social changes of which the 
appearance of theological texts in the vernacular was one part and one 
symptom. At the same time that German religious-theological tracts appear, 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 24-25. 
70 Schroeder (1970). 
71 Ibid., 16-17. 
72 Ibid., 17. The passages quoted by Schroeder are translated from Latin. On the 
transformation of the ‘synderesis’ metaphor in the English Renaissance, see Greene 
(1991a). He shows (among other things) how mystical metaphors eventually became 
commonplaces, quoting even Margaret Thatcher, who expressed the view that 
“[e]ven the Soviets realize there is a divine spark (...) in every one of them which 
they must not ignore if they are to reach the right answer” (219). 
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around the middle of the fourteenth century, Latin treatises on conscience 
stop appearing. “Es ist, als hielte die scholastische Ethik sich selbst im 
Zaum, als wolle sie sich kaum noch bewegen und keine beunruhigenden 
Theorien hervorbringen, seit beinahe jede Theorie in den Volkssprachen 
wiederzugeben versucht wurde.”73 But for practical reasons, Störmer-Caysa 
writes, the subject had to be discussed: “So wechselt die 
Gewissensdiskussion das Medium und die Sprache. In Predigten und 
Erbauungsschriften ist ständig von dem Phänomen Gewissen die Rede. Auf 
deutsch, französisch, englisch, italienisch, mit den Mitteln dieser Sprachen, 
also ohne das ausgebildete begriffliche Inventar des Lateinischen.”74 It stands 
to reason that these first attempts did not have the refinement of a 
Thomistic treatise – but I would say they served another audience and 
another purpose. At any rate they contributed to the solution to an 
important problem: that of the language in which conscience speaks. What is 
the ‘Muttersprache’ of conscience? Is it the spiritual language of ‘synderesis’, 
or the natural, external language of conscience? The latter must necessarily 
fall short of the former, of which it is only an imperfect image. It was not an 
option to drop the spiritual language, so the natural language was ennobled: 
“Das Gewissen spricht in der Muttersprache. Es ist eine Seitenlinie derselben 
Entwicklung, die in ganz Europa auch zur Durchsetzung volkssprachlicher 
Bibeltexte führt.”75 
 Popular mysticism was particularly an urban form of religion. 
Urbanization was an important feature of the late Middle Ages, and city life 
stimulated a different sense of spirituality. Hence, Southern can say that 
“Eckhart was the first impressive spokesman for the religion of articulate 
townspeople”.76 The rise in the number and size of cities had some 
significant consequences. “Articulate lay opinion about religion, often crude 
and generally subversive, began in the towns.”77 ‘New types of religious 
organization and a new intensity of personal religion’ sprang up.78 “Emotion 
is the leading characteristic of urban religion. It transports men out of the 
pressures of business (...) and it transports them into a world of the spirit 
where (as Eckhart taught them) ‘God begets his Son in the soul’ and ‘in this 
way (...) the soul is made equal to God’.”79 Urban life bred dissent, and the 
new religious movement posed a threat to social stability, especially when 
their momentum was greatly strengthened by the invention of the printing 
press. We will see in the next chapter that seventeenth-century criticism was 
                                                 
73 Störmer-Caysa (1995), 25. 
74 Idem. 
75 Ibid., 27. 
76 Southern (1990), 45. 
77 Ibid., 46. 
78 Ibid., 47. 
79 Ibid., 48. 
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largely aimed at the doctrines spread in pamphlets, rather than at 
philosophical or (academic) theological positions.80 The rise of towns and 
universities had formed the seedbed for new monastic movements, those of 
the Dominicans and the Franciscans, both of which advocated a return to a 
purer and simpler way of life.81 The latter movement belongs “to the 
succession of ephemeral urban movements, like the ‘Apostles’ (...), which 
appeared spasmodically throughout Europe from the mid eleventh century 
onwards”.82 They had in common with people like John Wycliffe (ca. 1320-
1384), Eckhart, Thomas à Kempis (ca. 1380-1471), Erasmus, and Luther, an 
aversion to established organized religion, wonderfully expressed by Eckhart 
in this passage: 
 
“If anyone imagines he will get more by inner thoughts and sweet yearnings 
and a special grace of God than he could get beside the fire or with his 
flocks or in the stable, he is doing no more than trying to take God and 
wrap His head in a cloak and shove Him under the bench. For whoever 
seeks God in some special Way, will gain the Way and lose God who is 
hidden in the Way. But whoever seeks God without any special Way, finds 
Him as He really is; and such a man lives with the Son, and He is life 
itself.”83 
 
 A more intense and spiritual religiosity entailed a different 
experience of conscience. Walter Hilton’s (1340-1396) The Ladder of Perfection 
(first printed in 1494) provides a good example of this.84 Written for a nun as 
a guide to contemplation and an aid to spiritual growth, The Ladder of 
Perfection places great emphasis on the need to overcome one’s sinfulness, to 
clean one’s conscience, in order to reach the third and highest stage of 
contemplation, in which one reaches a union with God. The higher part of 
the second stage of contemplation – the second stage consisting principally 
in loving God – 
 
“can only be reached and retained by those who live in great peace of body 
and soul, and who by the grace of Jesus Christ and through prolonged 
bodily and spiritual discipline have found peace of heart and purity of 
                                                 
80 The breaking-up of the medieval ‘unity’ of faith is also discussed in part II.  
81 Southern (1990), 72ff. 
82 Ibid., 283; on the ‘Apostles’, see 276. 
83 Meister Eckhart, Die Deutschen Werke, J. Quint (ed.), 1938-? (work still in progress 
when quoted by Southern [1990], 301), i (Predigt 5b), 450. About Thomas à Kempis, 
see Hale (1985), 236. On Erasmus’ ‘Law of Degeneracy’, regarding the corruption of 
organization (including the church) see Salomon (1963), 22, 27, and 34. 
84 Hilton (1988). The work was originally in Latin. 
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conscience, so that they desire nothing more than to live quietly in constant 
prayer to God, and in meditation on our Lord.”85 
 
The third stage consists “in knowing God and loving him perfectly. This is 
achieved when the soul is restored to the likeness of Jesus and filled with all 
virtues.”86 Conversion often begins with contemplation of one’s sins. The 
intensity of this experience is expressed in terms of ‘great compunction and 
heartfelt sorrow’, ‘grief and tears’, a ‘pricking and tormenting conscience’, 
‘agony of mind’. Someone who experiences this will ‘urgently ask God’s 
mercy and forgiveness’. “And God’s great mercy consists in this; that He will 
not only forgive the guilt of sin, but will remit its punishment in purgatory 
for a little pain and remorse of conscience here.”87 When we have ‘cast out 
our sins from our hearts’ and ‘swept our souls clean with the broom of the 
fear of God’, and washed it with our tears, we will have a clean conscience, 
and be able “to feel the close and peaceful presence of our blessed Lord 
Jesus Christ, given as a foreshadowing and glimpse of Him as He is”.88 The 
element of intimacy is present in this expression of the felt presence of Jesus, 
but is also more generally an aspect of the experience of conscience, for the 
examination of conscience is an examination of one’s inner dispositions and 
of one’s will. If the will is “turned away from every kind of mortal sin”, and 
if one has confessed one’s previous offences “with a firm resolve to abandon 
these sins”, one’s “soul is restored by faith to the likeness of God”. 89 
 
“[T]he true Sun does not display Himself to bestow mental light and 
perfect charity upon the soul unless the sky is first bright and free from 
clouds; that is, unless the conscience is first cleansed in this darkness by the 
fire of a burning desire for Jesus, which cauterizes and destroys all evil 
impulses of pride, vainglory, anger, envy, and other sins in the soul.”90 
 
When the conscience is ‘cleansed by grace’, one’s ‘spiritual eyes’ are opened; 
this happening is called a ‘glowing darkness’ and a ‘rich nothingness’; 
moreover: 
 
“Purity of soul and spiritual rest, inward stillness and peace of conscience, 
refinement of thought and integrity of soul, a lively consciousness of grace 
and solitude of heart, the wakeful sleep of the spouse and the tasting of 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 6-7. 
86 Ibid., 7. 
87 Ibid., 38. For Luther, hell is (and will be) nothing but the tormenting conscience 
itself; see Kittsteiner (1995), 117ff. 
88 Ibid., 60. 
89 Ibid., 128. 
90 Ibid., 173. 
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heavenly joys, the ardour of love and the brightness of light, the entry into 
contemplation and reformation in feeling.”91 
 
Grace “banishes the pain and remorse (...) and brings peace and 
reconciliation, uniting God and the soul in a single will. There is no harsh 
reproof of the soul for its sins (...). All its misdoings have been forgiven.”92 
 In many ways The Ladder of Perfection seems to anticipate the Lutheran 
Reformation. Grace (or salvation) is to be reached by going through the hell 
of one’s own conscience first. The sincerity and intensity of this experience is 
crucial. The element of ultimate concern is to be present in the experience, 
and if it is, it will make the transition from its one form to the other – from 
authority to inspiration. The soul is cast down in the first stage, and is 
covered in darkness (though not the good, glowing darkness Hilton also 
speaks of); but then, with God’s grace, one enters the light, and this is joy 
and ecstasy. In Luther’s terms, one would be free. The danger inherent in 
this process from the beginning is that it becomes an instrument of discipline 
– and indeed, this did happen. I have discussed the symbolism of the worm 
of conscience in chapter 1; in one case, ‘synderesis’ was described as the 
worm. The symbolism of light is inevitably accompanied by the symbolism 
of darkness and despair. The Candle of the Lord may light up one’s soul, but 
also set fire to it; the spark of conscience may ignite the fires of hell. J.R. 
Hale points out that “[t]he church was careful to leave escape routes for the 
sinful (...). Unless there was suspicion of downright heresy, its yoke was laid 
fairly lightly on the conscience of the individual.”93 New religious 
movements could distance themselves from the church in two ways: either 
by denying the need for (or pointing out the dangers of) institutionalized 
religion, thus unburdening the individual believer to some extent, or by 
stimulating a more intense religious experience, which was in practice more 
likely to burden the (sinful) believer than to unburden him. Quite often, 
these things went together. Both were attempts to return to a purer faith. 
 A more intense religious experience may, for a while, entail a revival 
of symbolism, but it is likely to travel the way from the intense experience, 
via subjective certainty, to a belief in the truth of one’s symbols, no longer 
understood as such. Unless it is a purely mystical experience – and even in 
that case it is debatable – any religious experience will be coloured by the 
symbols in which it is expressed, and by pre-existing conceptual 
frameworks.94 It is therefore hard for any believer to separate the certainty 
inherent in the experience from the symbols in which they express them. 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 223; see also 229 and 233. 
92 Ibid., 225. 
93 Hale (1985), 237. 
94 See Proudfoot (1985). 
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Religious symbols, then, are always likely to turn into doctrine, and most of 
them are somewhere in between. 
 Late medieval religious movements, the Lutheran Reformation, and 
humanist thought shared many characteristics.95 Luther’s own religious 
experience was much like that aimed at in The Ladder of Perfection. He 
renounced the authority of the church, and rejected much of its institutional 
framework, which he saw as corrupt. His aim was a purer and simpler faith, 
an intensely subjectively experienced faith, with the Bible as its only authority 
– the Revelation to which everyone had equal access, without mediation by 
the clergy. That the practice was different hardly needs saying. Even if more 
people could own a Bible and read it, this did not ensure the right 
interpretation. Also, one can speculate whether the invention of the printing 
press did not stimulate the quest for certainty that was already taking place. 
Of a handwritten book there were never that many copies, copies differed 
among each other due to accidental or deliberate changes made by copyists, 
and much scholarly referring was done from memory. This was a fluidity that 
the printed word lacked. The printing press stimulated the transition from a 
memory-based to a paper-based society, giving rise in early modernity to 
expressions like ‘having it black on white’ – which is an expression of 
absolute certainty. Thus, the printed word, while it offered the opportunity 
to challenge dogma, was at the same time ideal for the spread of dogmatic 
truth. 
 “Humanism,” Hale writes, “had a mystical core.”96 He points to 
Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) as its most mystical expression. In his 
famous On Human Dignity, Pico posits man as a creature unlimited by nature, 
able to be what he wants to be, to form himself as he pleases. Man is godlike 
in creativity, and he alone is able to contemplate the beauty of Creation. If he 
desires, man can rival even the Seraphines. Hence, “humanism as a 
movement had a clear plan for educational reform. At its core was a belief in 
self-improvement by taking thought and exercising the will. (...) Without this 
mystical element, which was essentially private and contemplative, humanism 
would have lacked much of its intensity. Yet paradoxically this new concern 
with self-perfection enabled it to be seen for the first time as a reformist 
movement.”97 Humanists “postulated a return to the spiritual and moral 
resources of the church”.98 They wished to ‘re-unite heart and mind’, which 
entailed an attack on the scholasticism in which they themselves had been 
educated.99 A concern for man’s moral development was an important aspect 
                                                 
95 Of course there were also great differences; take only the debate on free will 
between Luther and Erasmus. 
96 Hale (1985), 289. 
97 Ibid., 288. 
98 Salomon (1963), 21. 
99 Hale (1985), 288. 
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of humanist thought. Erasmus and More represent this aspect.100 More 
ended his life as a conscientious objector avant la lettre. He will receive ample 
attention in part III. As an important part of the influence of humanism lay 
in their use of “the wisdom of the old world to redress the values of the 
new”, I will now turn to the influence of Stoicism.101 
 
3.3.3. The influence of Stoicism 
Stoic thought had had its influence on the early Church Fathers; in the 
Renaissance it got a second chance to impress itself upon the European 
mentality.102 Salomon writes about the influence of Stoicism as a 
‘Weltanschauung’ which “assures an understanding of the world and the 
liberation of the philosopher from it by the sovereignty of the mind”.103 He 
pays particular attention to the importance of Epictetus’ Enchiridion, a manual 
for those who wish to become ‘true philosophers’, and also ‘a manual for the 
combat officer’ – for the Stoics used many military metaphors.104 An 
‘advancing’ student “understands the basic Stoic truth of subjective 
consciousness, which is to distinguish what is in our power from what is not 
in our power”.105 All external goods belong to the latter category. What we 
can control is our thoughts, intentions, desires, decisions. Self-knowledge and 
self-control can make a man free. 
 Erasmus wrote his Enchiridion Militis Christiani for a similar purpose: 
to make man free, to show him the way to salvation. Indeed, Salomon points 
out that the term ‘Christian liberty’ was coined by Erasmus, not Luther.106 
The first rule for someone desiring a Christian way of life was to have a 
strong and sincere belief in God and ‘the promises of God’. 
 
“If (...) thou often stir up the flame of faith, and then fervently desire of 
God to increase thy faith I shall marvel if thou canst be any long time an 
evil man. For who is all together so unhappy and full of mischief that 
would not depart from vices, if so be he utterly believed, that with these 
momentary pleasures, beside the unhappy vexation of conscience and 
mind, is purchased also eternal punishments: on the other side, if he surely 
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believed for this temporal and little worldly vexation to be rewarded or 
recompensed to good men an hundred fold joy of pure conscience 
presently: and at the last life immortal.”107 
 
The second rule is 
 
“that thou go unto the way of life, not slothfully, not fearfully: but with 
sure purpose, with all thy heart, with a confident mind, and (if I may so say) 
with such mind as he hath that would rather fight than drink: so that thou 
be ready at all hours for Christ’s sake to lose both life and goods.”108 
 
In this chapter Erasmus states in stern Stoic fashion that “there be but two 
ways only, the one which by obedience of the affections leadeth to perdition: 
the other which through mortifying of the flesh, leadeth to life.” Further on, 
he states that there is a divine element in human nature: 
 
“What this visible sun is in the visible world that is the divine mind, that is 
to say God, in the intelligible world, and in that part of thee which is of that 
same nature, that is to say in the spirit.”109 
 
Here we see how the Stoic ‘seed’ metaphor (the ‘logos spermatikos’) is 
couched in metaphors of light; in this period and the following centuries, the 
‘seed’ metaphor and expressions related to ‘synderesis’ would often 
combine.110 In Erasmus’ work, Stoicism acquires a social dimension. Though 
the imitation of Christ meant a turn away from everything worldly, ‘inward 
living’ as Salomon calls it, the realization that every man has a divine spirit 
urged towards charity. Erasmus’ “social spiritualism closes the dualism of the 
medieval world between the spiritual and the secular areas”.111 
 
“Paul calleth charity to edify thy neighbour What is true charity., to count 
that we all be members of one body, to think that we all are but one in 
Christ (...). If any brother err or go out of the right way, to warn him, to 
admonish him, to tell him his fault meekly, soberly and courteously: to 
teach the ignorant: to lift up him that is fallen: to comfort and courage him 
that is in heaviness: to help him that laboureth: to succour the needy. In 
conclusion to refer all riches and substance, all thy study, all thy cares to 
this point, that thou in Christ shouldest help as much as thy power 
extendeth to.”112 
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For Luther, salvation was a matter of faith, and it was something that happens 
to one, a gift from God. In Erasmus’ view, it was much more a matter of 
control; he was more positive about man’s natural capacity to reach God. 
For Luther, man’s conscience had to be liberated from outside – by God; 
Erasmus thought man capable of attaining a clear conscience himself.113 
“Moral learning and spiritual learning as a way of life lead to Christian liberty, 
tranquillity of mind, and peace of conscience – ideals of human perfection 
on which pagans and Christians, Epicurus and Christ, agree.”114 If one could 
help oneself to attain these goals, it was also one’s duty to help another. This, 
in Erasmus, is the result of the combination of Stoicism and Christianity. 
The Christian conscience was self-sufficient; it needed praise nor reward, and 
it was happy with a simple life, an independence of worldly goods.115 “True 
and only pleasure is the inward joy of a pure conscience.”116 For all its stress 
on inwardness and detachment from the world, this would become the basis 
for Enlightenment views on the perfection of society. 
 But the influence of Stoicism went beyond this. Salomon identifies 
three functions it had in the modern world: “first, it reconciled Christian 
traditions to modern rationalistic philosophies; secondly, it established an 
ideal pattern of natural religion; and, thirdly, it opened the way for the 
autonomy of morals.”117 With Erasmus, we have only seen the beginning of 
the renewed Stoic influence. The more practical its application became, the 
more rigid also the conscience which was to be instilled in man. Late 
medieval spirituality constituted a temporary, rather than a lasting return to a 
more symbolic expression and understanding of conscience. 
 
3.3.4. Conscience and casuistry 
Martin Luther (1483-1546) initially accepted the scholastic distinction 
between ‘conscientia’ and ‘synderesis’. By 1519, however, ‘synderesis’ had 
disappeared from his writings. Baylor holds the view that this was the result 
of the fact that Luther had “established a new object for the working of the 
conscience: its judgments are not just about actions (...) – it also judges about 
the agent who performs these actions, the individual or person as a 
whole.”118 In the scholastic view, ‘synderesis’ offered the principles which 
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 197 
‘conscientia’ applied to concrete cases. “In order to develop a view of the 
conscience which depicted the conscience as concerning itself, on the 
highest level, with the person as a whole rather than just his particular 
actions, Luther was forced to discard the synteresis as the ontological base 
and, in this sense, determinant of the conscience.”119 Conscience is 
transformed from a guide in action to a mirror of the soul, reflecting the 
moral state of the whole person. According to Langston, this “‘Protestant 
turn’ in relation to views about conscience, that is, the focus on the state of 
the person, was prepared for by the ‘turn to the virtues’ in Scotus’s and 
Ockham’s views about conscience”.120 What Langston considers to be ‘one 
of Luther’s most lasting contributions to the history of views about 
conscience’, however, results from his downplaying (which Scotus and 
Ockham did not do) of the connection with practical reason: “Once 
conscience is no longer thought of as part of a process (of practical reason) 
and is viewed as something like a judge of the whole person, the way is 
prepared for conceiving of conscience as an independent entity, a most 
unfortunate turn in the history of the concept of conscience.”121 
 Langston moves a bit too fast here. We have seen that the paulinian 
‘syneidesis’ also testified to the piety of the individual – not so much 
particular deeds, but the whole of one’s conduct in life and the state of one’s 
person were the object of ‘syneidesis’. Yet no faculty view of conscience 
developed in the wake of paulinian writing. Insofar as Luther had an 
influence of the kind Langston ascribes to him, it must have been in 
combination with fifteen hundred years of gradual development in the 
direction of the idea of conscience as an independent entity, more 
specifically: a faculty. 
 Protestant casuistry prepared the way for the faculty view of 
conscience, but “perhaps the person most responsible for the modern view 
that conscience is a faculty”, bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) rejected 
casuistry.122 Kittsteiner explains the rise of Protestant casuistry as the result 
of a difference between theory and practice. Luther despised casuistry (which 
was at that point still an exclusively Roman Catholic thing); so how could 
Protestants develop a casuistry of their own? Luther’s concept of conscience 
is an integral part of the core of his theology. Kittsteiner explains it as 
follows: “Ein ursprüngliches Wissen von Gott und seinen Geboten bleibt im 
Gewissen immer erhalten.”123 This is identified with the Decalogue; even 
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when people were never given the Decalogue, they know by nature that God 
should be worshipped and one’s fellow man loved. This knowledge, 
however, is clouded; that is why we need the law of the Old Testament. It 
teaches us that we are all sinners, whatever we attempt. Fear and desperation 
are the result. “Aber in diese affektuale Gewissenserfahrung stößt das 
‘andere Wort’ hinein”, saying that if only people believe in Christ, they will 
be freed by God’s grace.124 In this new state of justification, of Christian 
freedom, good works will be done, but not to achieve salvation, not as 
something people can or need to rely on to be saved, but they will flow from 
faith, in the Christian’s knowledge that he is justified. Conscience finds peace 
through God’s grace; “Das gute Gewissen ist das beruhigte Gewissen.”125 
Now, the problem with this conception of conscience, Kittsteiner says, is 
that it is doubtful that many people will achieve this kind of experience, this 
type of faith. “Luthers Gewissensbegriff ist der eines ‘homo religiosus’; er 
setzt ein Maß an innerer Erfahrung voraus, das nicht verallgemeinert werden 
darf. Wollte man sich nur an die Aussagen der symbolischen Schriften des 
Protestantismus halten, käme man zwangsläufig zu dem Resultat, daß eine 
universale Gewissensangst im frühen 16. Jahrhundert Trost im Glauben 
gesucht habe. (...) Doch neben der ‘Mönchsfront’ kämpft der missionierende 
Protestantismus an der ‘Bauernfront’, und hier gelten andere Spielregeln.”126 
This other ‘front’ required another treatment. Casuistry was an instrument in 
that treatment. 
 The oldest German example of Protestant casuistry is a tractate by 
Friedrich Balduin from 1628.127 In England, William Perkins (1558-1602), 
sometimes called the ‘father of Puritanism’, wrote A Discourse on Conscience 
and Cases of Conscience. William Ames (1576-1633) published his De Conscientia, 
eius Iure et Casibus in 1630; it was translated into English and Dutch, and later 
(1654) into German. Perkins and Ames combined the new Protestant faith 
with a desire to live correctly in all detail; Perkins had a ‘zeal for precise 
Christian living’, and this required ‘precise moral reflection’ – hence his 
interest in casuistry.128 While Perkins was still quite close to Luther in his 
views on man’s road to salvation, although he placed more emphasis on 
‘performing obedience’ as a way to salvation, Balduin departed significantly 
from Lutheran views.129 Balduin begins by contrasting his casuistry with 
                                                 
124 Ibid., 173. 
125 Ibid., 172. 
126 Ibid., 173-174. 
127 Ibid., 177. 
128 “William Perkins (1558-1602)”. 
129 In chapter 5 of Cases of Conscience, Perkins deals with the question “What must a 
man do, that he may come into God’s favor, and be saved?” He summarizes hiw 
own (detailed) answer as follows: “[T]he man that would stand in the favor of God 
and be saved must do four things: first, humble himself before God; secondly, 
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papish casuistry. Difficult cases of conscience were to be dealt with on the 
basis of Scripture, as opposed to the tradition of the Church or papal 
decrees.130 Yet he saw another guide, besides the Bible: “hat denn nicht jeder 
Mensch ein eigenes Gewissen?”131 This conscience binds, not by itself, but 
insofar as it has the divine law behind it.132 Its binding power depends on the 
lurking presence of God’s wrath behind the conscience, but in practice this 
power is often too weak. Hence, Balduin comes up with an elaborate 
classification of consciences. There is the ‘right conscience’ (‘recta 
conscientia’), the ‘hesitant conscience’ (‘conscientia dubia’), the ‘conscientia 
opiniabilis’ that depends on uncertain ideas, the ‘scrupulous conscience’, and 
(worse) the ‘perverse/wrong conscience’ (‘conscientia perversa’), the 
‘conscientia perplexa’, the too lenient conscience, the dangerous conscience, 
and the ‘cauterized/stigmatized conscience’ (‘conscientia cauteriata’). In fact, 
many of the last types of conscience are names for a non-existent 
conscience: “der Begriff des Gewissens wird auch dann benutzt, wenn das 
faktische Nicht-Vorhandensein eines Gewissens ausgedrückt werden soll. 
Jeder Mensch hat ein Gewissen; der qualifizierende Zusatz aber macht 
darauf aufmerksam, daß bei einem Großteil der Menschen nicht mit einem 
funktionierenden Gewissen zu rechnen ist, zumindest nicht mit einem 
Gewissen im Sinne der Moraltheologie.”133 To say that everyone has a 
conscience, then, is a normative statement, to be understood in the context 
of a disciplinatory mission. 
 “Luther hätte wohl seinen Augen nicht getraut bei diesen Aussagen 
eines Lutheraners,” Kittsteiner remarks after an exposition of Balduin’s 
presentation of the role of conscience in man’s salvation.134 Balduin revived 
the notion of ‘synderesis’, holding this retained conscience to be a condition 
necessary for any Christian to come to faith, whereas with Luther ‘das 
                                                                                                               
believe in Christ; thirdly, repent of his sins; fourthly, perform new obedience to 
God.” 
130 Luther and Protestants generally – but the Jansenist (and thus Catholic) Blaise 
Pascal is particularly known for it – despised especially the Catholic probabilism, 
which is defined as follows by the Wikipedia: “In moral theology, especially Catholic, 
it refers especially to the view in casuistry that in difficult matters of conscience one 
may safely follow a doctrine that is probable, for example is approved by a 
recognized Doctor of the Church, even if the opposite opinion is more probable.” 
In Protestant views, this came down to moral laxity. The online Catholic 
Encyclopedia defines it as “the moral system which holds that, when there is 
question solely of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action, it is permissible to 
follow a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty even though the opposing view 
is more probable.” 
131 Kittsteiner (1995), 178. 
132 Ibid., 181. 
133 Ibid., 184-185. 
134 Ibid., 186. 
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geängstete Gewissen’ found ‘Kraft und Erlösung’ in faith. With Luther, the 
awareness of one’s sinfulness led to the acceptance of faith; Balduin (and 
others) made an ethical turn, positing the retention, revival, and healing of 
conscience as the goal of casuistry. For them, this was what ‘reborn’ 
Christians really needed.135 They may have been ‘reborn’, but that did not 
mean that it was no easy for them to remain on the right track. Therefore, 
people were urged to probe their consciences, to meditate, to remember the 
coming of the final Judgement.136 It is not surprising, then, that puritans 
were among the most ardent writers of (religious) diaries. The English 
dissenting minister John Reynolds (1667-1727) is a good example. He 
enrolled in Pembroke College, Oxford, in 1684. Seventeen years old, he drew 
up a covenant with God, to help him withstand earthly temptations. Eleven 
years later, he reviewed and renewed his covenant:  
 
“Blessed Lord! though now ‘tis ten or eleven Years since in Oxford a Place 
of Temptation, the foregoing Covenant was solemnly entered into, in thy 
Presence, under thy view, thy self being Witness; and though in all these ten 
Years, what through Sin and Miserable and inexcusable forgetfulness (Oh 
how is my Love, and Faith, and Joy, decay’d since the Day of mine 
espousals unto thee!) and what thro’ frequent and long Absence, from this 
subscribed Covenant, I don’t remember that in all these Years this 
Covenant has been review’d or read over, yet still, Dearest Lord, my Heart, 
as far as I can know it, stands to it, loves it, and loves thee for bringing me 
into it...”137 
 
Casuists wrote in detail about the manner in which one’s conscience was to 
be probed. Kittsteiner enumerates the list of questions drawn up by Georg 
Philipp Hardsdörffer (1607-1658), who translated William Ames’ casuistic 
works. A central element in these questions is the almost threatening 
presence of God that is behind the judgement of one’s own conscience. But 
the reborn Christian can be recognized from the outside: “sie sind sanft, 
demütig, lassen sich zum Guten belehren”.138 
 Casuistic works were often (to a large extent) aimed at parsons and 
ministers, rather than the members of their congregations. They instructed in 
what conscience is, in its relation to religion, in the recognition of make-
belief and how to deal with it, and in many moral matters. For many 
everyday moral problems, they provided syllogisms for their resolution. But 
                                                 
135 Ibid., 186-187. 
136 Ibid., 188. 
137 The Pleasure and Benefit of being Religious, exemplified in the Life of the late Revd. Learned 
and Pious Mr. John Reynolds (1740), 19. The author and compiler of this work is 
anonymous, but the passage quoted comes from Reynolds’ own manuscripts. 
138 Kittsteiner (1995), 190. He notes: “Erkennungskataloge dieser Art hat vor allem 
der Pietismus ausgebildet.” 
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these applied differently to ‘unreborn’ and reborn Christians. “Auch im 17. 
Jahrhundert spricht der lutherische Protestantismus noch mit zwei 
Sprachen,” Kittsteiner writes.139 It could be lenient towards the former, 
taking the contingencies of life into account. To the reborn, however, a 
different regime applied. Discipline and obedience were stressed. “Mit den 
empfohlenen Techniken der Gewissenskontrolle dringen neostoische 
Grundsätze in den theologischen Diskurs ein; die Gnade ist und bleibt die 
Grundlage einer Verstärkung des Gewissens, aber der selbst-errungenen 
Gewissensruhe gelten alle Bemühungen.” The tendency, towards the 
eighteenth century, was “zu einer generellen Verschärfung der 
Anforderungen an das Gewissen”.140 
 It is worth noting, in conclusion of this subsection, that there are 
great similarities between the ‘mission’ of the Reformation and that of the 
(Spanish) Counter-Reformation – a movement that was not originally a 
movement against Protestantism, but a Catholic Reformation. Its main goals 
lay in “the quest for a more adequate clergy – better-trained and better-
instructed priests, priests resident in their parishes, (...), pastors fervent and 
self-sacrificing and missionary-minded, (...); a priesthood uncorrupted and 
incorruptable, educated and other-worldly”.141 It sounds almost like a puritan 
mission statement. Owen Chadwick points out the likeness between the 
religious experiences of Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), founder of the Jesuit 
order (perhaps the driving force of the Counter-Reformation), and those of 
Martin Luther.142 Like Luther, Ignatius found that flagellation and austerity 
“failed to bring peace of mind”. “His conscience began to torture itself, he 
felt bound in his confession to go over and over the same sins (...). Luther 
discovered the way of escape by reading the epistle to the Romans. Ignatius 
discerned his way of escape through a concentration of his iron will upon 
obedience to the suffering Christ, an obedience formed by obedience to the 
precepts of his Church. (...) If faith was the ground of all Luther’s work, 
obedience was the key to Loyola’s.”143 But we have seen that the practice of 
Lutheranism was different – in fact, much closer to Loyola’s stress on 
obedience. And yet, at the same time it is true that, while Jesuit casuistry was 
often condemned for its laxity, Protestant casuistry could be sensitive to the 
circumstances of the ‘unreborn’ as well. 
 
                                                 
139 Ibid., 203. 
140 Idem. 
141 Chadwick (1981), 255. 
142 On Loyola, see also Salomon (1963), 254-257, where he discusses the 
revolutionary character of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises, which differed from older 
spiritual techniques in focusing on the psychology of social relationships, rather than 
individual psychology, and on action, rather than contemplation. Loyola also 
employed the disciplining power of symbols in an unprecedented way. 
143 Ibid., 256-257. 
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3.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Protestant thought retained the notion of an innate conscience. It made no 
less of objective truth than the scholastics, but combined this with a 
subjective certainty of their own justification – a certainty of which 
conscience was the source. Protestant casuists, however, emphasized that 
people could never be (too) certain, and aimed at disciplining people’s 
consciences. They also contributed to the rise of the faculty view of 
conscience. Religious groups of all denominations made use of the new 
medium of the printing press, spreading their widely divergent but all equally 
certain truths in pamphlets. All this, and the religious wars in the context of 
which it was set, combined to form the background to the seventeenth 
century critique of conscience to which I turn in the next chapter. This 
represents both a critique of doctrine and a further step in the process of 
doctrinalization. Importantly, it is the first time in which the nature of the 
language of conscience (the importance of which I have stressed from the 
beginning) becomes the focus of philosophical attention. 
 203 
4. Between symbol and doctrine (3): the first wave of 
 criticism - the seventeenth century 
 
“Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that whatsoever a man does 
against his Conscience, is Sinne; and it dependeth on the presumption of 
making himselfe judge of Good and Evill. For a mans Conscience, and his 
Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience 
may be erroneous. (...) [P]rivate Consciences (...) are but private opinions.” 
THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan, chapter 29 (223). 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Particular concepts of conscience had been criticized before, by Montaigne 
for instance, but it was in the seventeenth century that the notion as such 
was directly attacked for the first time. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was its 
most severe critic, and Locke (1632-1704) followed in his wake. Hobbes was 
annoyed, to say the least, by the liberty with which men from different 
religious persuasions used the term for their own purposes. Both Roman 
Catholics and Protestants (of various sorts) claimed to have a conscience; 
what is more: they claimed to have the only true conscience. The ‘conscience’ 
of the others was said to be false. This popular use of the term was the basis 
for Hobbes’ skeptical attitude towards conscience. As both Hobbes and 
Locke will figure prominently in part II of this book, I will avoid a discussion 
of their views on liberty of conscience here. 
 The attack on conscience mounted by Hobbes and Locke was 
related to circumstances of upheaval, and it was part of a critique on the 
improper use of language. It is remarkable that the same holds true for 
Bentham’s critique of the notion of conscience, at the close of the eighteenth 
century. With Hobbes, conscience is for the first time regarded as, first of all, 
a word. This is a significant breakthrough, but it leads him to conclusions I 
can understand, given the historical context, but do not share. Hobbes 
provides a perfect illustration of the distrust of symbolic language that I 
discussed in chapter 2. It is interesting to see that both Hobbes and Locke, 
for all their criticism of the notion, greatly influenced (and also positively) 
eighteenth-century authors that restored conscience to its elevated position. 
 
 
4.2. THOMAS HOBBES ON CONSCIENCE, METAPHOR, AND THE ABUSE OF 
 LANGUAGE 
As a motto for the first chapter I took the following quotation from Hobbes’ 
Leviathan, in part because it is one of the few explicit references to 
‘conscience’ as a metaphorical term: 
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“When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to 
be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it 
together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, 
or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to 
speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt, or force another to do so: 
Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto 
very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word 
metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret 
thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a 
thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own 
new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain 
them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, 
as if they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak against them; 
and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that 
they think so.”1 
 
Hobbes claims that the term ‘conscience’ is still used in the sense of ‘shared 
knowledge’; that is, knowledge shared with another person. Conscience, 
understood in this way, conveys relatively objective knowledge – that, at 
least, is the implication. Secondly, Hobbes says that ‘afterwards’ people 
started to use the term metaphorically. The example he gives, however, is 
quite old, as I have pointed out in the first chapter. And then Hobbes 
distinguishes a third use of conscience, which is the use of the term for 
people’s own opinions. This use is not said to be metaphorical, but it must 
be metaphorical at least in the sense that a word with a certain meaning is 
used to denote something else. 
 The importance of Hobbes’ criticism of those who used the 
‘reverenced name of Conscience’ for something else, namely their own 
opinions, cannot be underestimated. Hobbes lists the use of metaphors as 
one of four possible abuses of language (or ‘speech’); when people use words 
metaphorically they use them “in other sense than that they are ordained for; 
and thereby deceive others”.2 Metaphors are not as dangerous as ‘inconstant 
names’, the names for things that please or displease us, which is different 
for different persons. The reason for that is that metaphors, unlike 
inconstant names, ‘profess their inconstancy’.3 In the case of ‘conscience’, 
however, it is not at all clear to other people besides Hobbes that they use 
the term metaphorically. Therefore, we may assume that it actually belongs 
to the class of ‘inconstant names’, just like ‘wisdom’, ‘justice’, and ‘cruelty’, to 
name a few. To use the term ‘conscience’ in any but the proper way, then, is 
a serious matter. Social chaos, in Hobbes’ view, is to a great extent a result of 
linguistic chaos. He sees his own career as a battle against the incorrect use 
                                                 
1 Hobbes (2000), 48 (chapter 7). 
2 Ibid., 26 (ch. 4). 
3 Ibid., 31. 
 205 
of words, and, Robert Stillman writes, “blames the ‘evil fortune’ of England’s 
civil wars upon distortions of language and logic”.4 He points out that 
“Hobbes repeatedly connects the mid-century’s cultural discord with 
linguistic discord”, and quotes from De Cive: “The tongue of man is a 
trumpet of war and sedition.”5 
 To understand Hobbes’ reaction to metaphor, we need to take into 
account a number of things. First of all, we must understand that Hobbes’ 
philosophy, and especially his moral philosophy, “has the character of 
mature reflection on an entire culture”, this culture being, with regard to his 
moral philosophy, “the rich and complex ethical culture of Renaissance 
humanism”; furthermore: “many of [Hobbes’ moral philosophy’s] central 
concerns derive from that fact. In particular, its stress on the malleability of 
beliefs corresponds to the great weight put on the alteration of belief by the 
moral writers by whom he was most influenced.”6 Secondly, these ‘moral 
writers’ “were above all the writers working within or close to the tradition 
of classical rhetoric”, among whom Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the most 
important.7 Bacon influenced Hobbes most notably through his skepticism, 
and through his advocacy of the new (empirical) sciences. Both authors, 
Tuck explained, stressed “that the orator secured a change in belief on the 
part of his audience by manipulating their existing opinions” by means of 
certain rhetorical devices, and by doing so Bacon and Hobbes “signaled their 
conviction that there was nothing objective to which the orator could draw 
attention in order to persuade”.8 Thirdly, we must realize that ethics, in 
Hobbes’ view, was “the science or knowledge of ‘Consequences from the 
Passions of Men’”, and also that ‘passions’ are in part a matter of cognition, 
“involving beliefs about what sort of power we possess and what we can do 
with it”.9 Hobbes, then, was naturally concerned with issues relating to 
language. Influenced as he was by skeptical thought, and in particular by 
Bacon, and given the context of the civil wars and religious strife of his time, 
Hobbes’ concern for social order and stability was inextricably bound up 
with a concern for the proper use of language. He is an outspoken 
representative of the anti-symbolic consciousness of which I spoke in 
2.2.2.2. It is worth noting that the same urbanization that led to the 
development and spread of popular mysticism and a more symbolic language 
                                                 
4 Stillman (1995), 791-792. 
5 Ibid., 798. See Thomas Hobbes (1991a), 168-169. 
6 Tuck (1996), 175 and 195. 
7 For the influence of Bacon on Hobbes see Stillman (1995), 791, and Tuck (1996), 
177, 197-199, and 201. 
8 Tuck (1996), 198. 
9 Ibid., 178, (183 and) 184. Cf. also 179, where it is pointed out that Hobbes (in De 
Corpore)held that in moral philosophy “we are to consider the motions of the mind, 
namely, appetite, aversion, love, benevolence, hope, fear, anger, emulation, envy, &c.; what 
causes they have, and of what they be causes”. 
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of conscience, was also an important factor in the increasing power of 
‘opinion’, and in the spreading of dissent.10 At any rate, when Stillman speaks 
of a ‘hostility to metaphor’, and of an ‘urgency to erase metaphors’, he is not 
exaggerating.11 
 The proper use of the term ‘conscience’, in Hobbes’ view, made it 
refer to shared, or public, knowledge – as opposed to the ‘knowledge of 
secret facts and thought’.12 This shows Hobbes’ fear of sedition. Now, in his 
time, no one would have used the term in the way he suggests.13 This use 
was long outdated. That makes it all the more surprising that he presents this 
as the true meaning of the term, and what was in fact much closer to the 
ordinary understanding as a metaphorical use of the same.14 “Who, before 
Hobbes,” Stillman asks, “had ever considered conscience a metaphor?”15 The 
question is to the point in that sense, that the ordinary understanding of 
conscience was that it was a divine faculty, enabling each man to distinguish 
between good and evil, right and wrong. Hobbes’ reacted, to a great extent, 
to the way ordinary people used the term ‘conscience’.16 I would agree with 
Hobbes, if he merely said that people were using a symbolic term; I would 
not agree that it was a metaphor in the sense in which Hobbes conceived of 
it, namely as a misapplication of an indicative term. What people did was use 
a symbolic term, (or use a term symbolically), while forgetting its symbolic 
nature. Hobbes saw correctly how people often misunderstand the status of 
the words they use. While words like ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’, in Hobbes’ view, are 
actually expressions of subjective evaluations (something with which I do 
not fully agree), people take them to be things in reality, just as in seeing they 
mistake the image for the thing seen. “[T]hroughout his discussion of moral 
                                                 
10 Cf. Southern (1990), 46: “There is something about urban life which provokes 
dissent.” To this should be added the invention of the printing press, and the 
thereby enabled use of pamphlets, which increased rapidly in early modern Europe. 
11 Stillman (1995), 791; 799. 
12 Inadvertently, however, he also uses the term differently himself. Discussing the 
question ‘Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men suffer’, he says that 
“whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments from his Affliction to his Sinne, 
(...) he defended himselfe by the conscience of his Innocence” (Hobbes [2000], 247 
[ch. 31]). ‘Conscience’ is here neither used in Hobbes’ ‘proper’ sense, nor in the 
‘metaphorical’ sense he rejects; but it does mean something more and other than 
‘consciousness’, and it is private ‘knowledge’. 
13 Kittsteiner (1995), 235, says Hobbes refers to Thomas Aquinas (“conscientia 
dicitur ‘cum alio scientia’”); this may be, but Thomas did not think of ‘conscientia’ as 
knowledge shared between human beings. 
14 The association of conscience with secrecy, we have seen, is actually from all 
times. 
15 Stillman (1995), 800. 
16 But various theologians and philosophers would support this use. As we will see, 
however, even Joseph Butler, who did conceive of conscience as a faculty, had quite 
a nuanced view. 
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matters Hobbes assumes that the actual moral language that human beings 
employ presupposes (wrongly) the real existence of the entities with which it 
is concerned – and therefore presupposes the possibility of conflict over the 
correct description of the entities.”17 
 ‘Conscience’ provides an example of this popular false realism. The 
quotation at the beginning of this section is preceded by a discussion and 
definition of ‘science’ and ‘opinion’, the former being “a knowledge of all the 
Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand” or “knowledge 
of the consequence of words”, the latter “of the truth of somewhat said, 
though sometimes in absurd and senselesse words, without possibility of 
being understood”.18 Now, ‘conscience’, as used by ordinary people, is such a 
‘senseless’ word – ‘senseless’ also in the sense that it does not ‘adequately 
cohere with a thing’, as Stillman puts it, pointing out the ‘materialist’s pun’.19 
Hobbes, then, precisely illustrates that kind of loss of meaning that occurs 
when a symbolic relation is mistaken for one of indication – but it is the 
‘common people’ who thought of ‘conscience’ as an indicative term, 
referring to an existent entity, and it is Hobbes who rejected such a use of 
the term. In effect, the loss of meaning was virtually complete, however, for 
the use of ‘conscience’ Hobbes himself advocated had virtually no 
connection with any normal understanding of the term of the preceding 
thousand years or more. 
 Hobbes’ ideas of the false realism of language, which also applies to 
‘conscience’, and of the metaphorical use of ‘conscience’, may seem at odds 
with each other. In fact, they are not. People use the term metaphorically, 
and (then) they believe it indicates something real, something more exalted 
than their own opinions, to which the term was metaphorically applied.20 By 
speaking of conscience instead of their opinions, they transfer the aura of 
objectivity of conscience, ‘properly understood’, to this new private 
conscience, behind or within which their private opinions hide.21 Referring 
to the old, ‘proper’ understanding of ‘conscience’, Hobbes speaks of ‘that 
reverenced name’. It might be that Hobbes covertly uses something of the 
divine aura of the term ‘conscience’ for his own purposes here, but it may 
very well be that he used the word ‘reverenced’ simply because he strongly 
disapproved of private or secret knowledge, and by contrast highly approved 
of public knowledge, which is what he took ‘conscience’ to be. His fear of 
                                                 
17 Tuck (1996), 181. 
18 Hobbes (2000), 35, 47-48. Cf. Stillman (1995), 799. 
19 Stillman (1995), 796. 
20 In the rejection of false realism lies an important point of agreement between my 
own view of conscience and that of Hobbes; but whereas he sees an indicative use as 
proper, I take the symbolic expression of experiences of conscience to be primary. It 
is not in a metaphorical (or, generally, a symbolic) use of the term that loss of 
meaning lies, but in forgetfulness of the symbolic nature of the term. 
21 Feldman (2001), 27. 
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metaphor and his fear of the private conscience, then, derive from one and 
the same source. Metaphor is, in a sense, an idiosyncratic (and therefore 
initially private) use of words; it conceals true meaning. The private 
conscience is also an instrument to conceal ‘knowledge’ from view. And 
private conscience and metaphor are deeply connected: in a sense, as 
Feldman points out, the inner space of the private conscience, or the sphere 
of private opinion, came into existence through the metaphorical use of the 
term ‘conscience’.22 Hobbes speaks of ‘their own new opinions’ – in a very 
literal sense they may not be new, but in another they are, for they are now 
the object of the false realism instantiated in the understanding of 
‘conscience’. Private opinions are now ‘conscience’; they have acquired a new 
status. Conscience lends them its power, and from that moment on, 
‘opinion’ is a force to be reckoned with. 
 Hobbes’ reaction to the contemporary use of the term ‘conscience’ 
was a consequence of processes of doctrinalization: conscience was generally 
seen as a ‘solid’ entity, but Hobbes could find no entity to which the term 
referred. When people spoke of ‘my conscience’, they could in fact mean 
nothing more than ‘my opinions’. People of various religious denominations 
also thought they knew what the contents of a real conscience were – 
doctrine was dominant there, too. But Hobbes countered with an indicative 
understanding of conscience; and he shared with his opponents the quest for 
and the belief in the attainability of certainty. His work was intended to move 
from the improper use towards the proper use of language. Stillman writes: 
“Hobbes seeks to purify language of equivocation, and thereby to cleanse the 
body politic of a primary source of contamination.”23 Metaphor, according 
to Hobbes, was a cause of ‘absurd assertions’, not to be ‘admitted’ in 
‘reckoning, and seeking of truth’; for that purpose, one needed ‘words 
proper’.24 In his own way, then, Hobbes strove for the fixation of meaning. 
But in his case, there could be no other basis for such fixation than general 
agreement. Hence, Hobbes writes: “they are said to be conscious of it...”, and 
“it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act...”.25 
 The same goes for moral principles. Hobbes was not a moral 
relativist like Montaigne, but countered such relativism by pointing out the 
actual agreement between people on certain matters. “But the ethical 
principles evident even to the meanest capacity are likely to be of an 
extremely exiguous kind,” Tuck notes, and this remained a problem for 
                                                 
22 Idem. 
23 Stillman (1995), 797. 
24 Hobbes (2000), 34-35 (ch. 5). 
25 Tuck (1996), 200: “[F]or Hobbes and his circle, moral matters were inextricably 
bound up with what ‘the world’ says. What ‘the world’ called valor, or vanity, 
mattered most to Hobbes (...). A perceived agreement on moral matters was the 
foundation of morality.” 
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Hobbes.26 These principles (for instance: ‘everyone has a right to preserve 
himself’) resembled those of synderesis in their generality.27 Their application 
would generate evident problems. 
 The solution lies in an agreement on macro-level: the social contract. 
When people, seeking peace and protection, pass from the state of nature to 
the civil state, they transfer some of their natural rights to the sovereign – all 
natural rights except those one can never renounce, like the right to life (and 
self-defence).28 In the societal state, there is no place for the exercise of one’s 
own judgement in moral matters, if this entails illegal action. There is now 
only one conscience left that counts, and that is that of the sovereign. Hence: 
 
“Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that whatsoever a man does 
against his Conscience, is Sinne; and it dependeth on the presumption of 
making himselfe judge of Good and Evill.”29 
 
A man’s conscience is nothing but his judgement, his private opinion, 
Hobbes says here, adopting the new, ‘metaphorical’ use of the term as the 
meaning of ‘conscience’. And as this judgement is fallible, conscience may 
err too. Hence, there is no reason to accept Abelard’s idea that there is no sin 
but against one’s conscience, of which dictum Hobbes gives us a variant, 
with a somewhat different emphasis.30 Kittsteiner points out that Hobbes’ 
attack on conscience does not just pertain to the ‘conclusio’, that is, to the 
application (‘conscientia’) of in themselves infallible principles (‘synderesis’). 
“Der Angriff von Hobbes gilt der Wahrheit der Synteresis; in diesem Licht 
muß der Satz ‘Auctoritas, non veritas facit legem’ betrachtet werden.”31 
Private judgement, by agreement (the social contract), has made way for the 
public conscience, which is the law laid down by the sovereign.32 All citizens 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 188. 
27 There is also a statement reminiscent of the principle of ‘synderesis’ in On Man (De 
Homine): “God himself, because He hath made men rational, hath enjoined the 
following law on them, and hath inscribed it in all hearts: that no one should do unto 
another that which he would consider inequitable for the other to do unto him.” 
(Hobbes [1991b], 73 [XIV.5].) 
28 Hobbes (2000), 93 (ch. 14). 
29 Ibid., 223 (ch. 29). 
30 Cf. Kittsteiner (1995), 236. 
31 Ibid., 237. 
32 Hobbes (2000), 223 (ch. 29): “[T]hough he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth 
in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his 
own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-Wealth; because the 
Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. 
Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private 
opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey 
the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.” 
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are obligated to obey the sovereign, even if in their own conscience they 
disagree. Besides, human laws do not touch a person’s conscience at all.33 
 According to Kittsteiner, this does not lead to the existence of a 
“großartiger privater Binnenraum, der sogar zum ‘Todeskeim’ für den 
Leviathan werden könnte”, for Hobbes, who ‘distrusted the conscience too 
much to attempt to reform it’, filled its place with “den Glauben, daß Jesus 
der Erlöser ist”.34 This belief, ‘that Jesus is the Christ’, is Hobbes’ solution to 
the problem of whether obedience to God and obedience to the sovereign 
can ever clash. “Die Wiederzurechtbringung Aller entzieht dem Gewissen 
seinen richtenden Maßstab, der über die Aufgabe der Friedenssicherung 
hinausginge (...).”35 This may be true theoretically, but it seems to me that 
Hobbes’ separation of conscience and law, of private and public morality, 
would be of greater consequence – as would his distrust of human nature, 
that lay at the basis of it all. 
 
 
4.3. JOHN LOCKE 
 
4.3.1. Introduction 
Both in his thought on conscience and in his use of the term, Locke was 
highly ambiguous. It is not just that over time he changed his views 
concerning liberty of conscience – what he says about conscience belongs 
even more clearly to this context than in Hobbes’ case – but he transmits 
different messages in works of the same period, and sometimes in one and 
                                                 
33 So Hobbes explains in The Elements of Law; see Martinich (1995), lemma 
‘conscience’. There is also a more positive side to this, to which Edward G. Andrew 
draws attention: Hobbes condemned the practice of inquisition; “The inner realm of 
conscience is sacrosanct, in that individuals can be tried and punished only for their 
deeds, not for their thoughts, on the basis of public evidence, not on private 
intentions.” In the same article, Andrew explains how Hobbes created a space for 
conscience within the law, while Locke found one without the law. This space within 
the law lay in the jury system, where juries were to be allowed to judge according to 
their consciences, which means they could not be punished for giving a verdict 
contrary to what the judge had in mind. They played a role in determining law, not 
just fact, in Hobbes’ view. Andrew explains how this is consistent with Hobbes’ 
command theory of law. Basically, with his egalitarian view of the jury system, 
Hobbes sought to counter the danger of bribed or pressured juries, and biased 
judges. His distrust of people with certain interests led him to opt for a ‘democratic’ 
solution, which also shows in his view that people had the right to reject jurors, if 
they thought them biased. People could choose their own jury. See: Andrew (1999); 
the quotation is from 217. For a defence of Hobbes’ position, see also Ewin (1991), 
especially 47-49, where he nuances the opposition between ‘public procedure’ and 
‘private conscience’. 
34 Kittsteiner (1995), 240. 
35 Ibid., 239-240. 
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the same work (as did Hobbes, occasionally). I will leave his thoughts on 
freedom of conscience for part II, and confine myself here to his thought 
pertaining to conscience and his use of the term in separation from his 
thought on toleration. 
 ‘His use of the term’ could also read ‘his (lack of) use of the term’, 
for, as the Locke Dictionary states, ‘conscience’ “is not a term used very often 
by Locke”, and “[a]fter 1690, it fades out of his use”.36 It should be noted, 
though, that most of his major works (both published and unpublished) were 
written before that year, and that the term is still abundantly present in the 
second (1690) and third (1692) letter concerning toleration, and that it also 
occurs a number of times in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). It seems 
that Locke adapted his terminology very much to the purpose of the text, as 
well as to the audience for which he wrote. Where he confronts the same 
people Hobbes reacted against, who used the term ‘conscience’ much too 
liberally (in Hobbes’ and Locke’s view, at any rate), he is clear about what 
conscience is, namely “nothing but an opinion of the truth of any practical 
position, which may concern any actions as well moral as religious, civil as 
ecclesiastical”.37 Similarly, in his less popular, more strictly philosophical 
work An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), he defines conscience 
as “nothing else, but our own Opinion or Judgment of the Moral Rectitude 
or Pravity of our own Actions”.38 In his works concerning toleration, he 
seems to be less concerned with the meaning of the term, and to feel quite 
free to use it, simply because his purpose is not to set people straight 
regarding the correct use of the term, but to make a case for toleration. 
 
4.3.2. Locke on the abuse of language; the attack on the notion of 
 innate ideas 
A strong concern for the proper use of terms, similar to that which we found 
in Hobbes, does inform his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Children 
are taught the ‘names’ of ‘simple ideas or substances’ by people pointing to 
the things and then naming them, so Locke explains. But this procedure 
does not work for ‘mixed modes’, concepts constructed artificially by 
combination of (words for) simple ideas. With them, and “especially the 
most material of them, moral words, the sounds are usually learned first”. It is 
mainly by ‘their own observation and industry’ that children are to find out 
the meaning of these words, 
 
“which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of 
Names, these moral Words are, in most Men’s mouths, little more than 
                                                 
36 Yolton (1993), lemma ‘conscience’. 
37 Idem; quoted from the first Tract on Government in John Locke, Two Tracts on 
Government, Philip Abrams (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967, 138. 
38 Locke (1979), 70 (Book I, ch. III, § 8). 
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bare Sounds; or when they have any, ’tis for the most part but a very loose 
and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused signification.”39 
 
Book 10, chapter 10 of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding is concerned 
with the abuse of words, of which there are many varieties. The first of these 
is to use ‘words without any, or without clear ideas’; there are ‘two sorts’ of 
this abuse. In the first case, we are dealing with words that on examination 
are found ‘not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas’. “These, for the most 
part, the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced.” Such 
words may be called ‘insignificant terms’. 
 
“II. Others there be, who extend this abuse yet farther, who take so little 
care to lay by Words, which in their primary notation have scarce any clear 
and distinct Ideas which they are annexed to, that by an unpardonable 
negligence, they familiarly use Words, which the Propriety of Language has 
affixed to very important Ideas, without any distinct meaning at all. Wisdom, 
Glory, Grace, etc. are Words frequent enough in every Man’s Mouth; but if a 
great many of those who use them, should be asked, what they mean by 
them? they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: A plain 
proof, that though they have learned those Sounds, and have them ready at 
their Tongues end, yet there are no determined Ideas laid up in their Minds, 
which are to be expressed to others by them.”40 
 
(Skipping the third,) a fourth possible abuse is to take words for things, to 
which especially those who firmly believe in the ‘perfection of any received 
hypothesis’ are most liable.41 Without going into all kinds of other possible 
abuses, it may be noted that ‘conscience’ may often be abused in some of 
those ways, in particular those mentioned above. This is clearly suggested by 
the following remark: 
 
“Some confused or obscure Notions have served their turns; and many 
who talk very much of Religion and Conscience, of Church and Faith, of Power 
and Right, of Obstructions and Humours, Melancholy and Choler, would, perhaps, 
have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one should desire them 
to think only of the Things themselves, and lay by those Words, with which 
they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.”42 
 
Note that Locke says that these terms were useful before, but then they 
became the buzzwords of the period, which entailed an inflation of meaning 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 480 (Book III, ch. IX, § 9). 
40 Ibid., ch. X, § 2-3. 
41 This is more or less what Whitehead has called the ‘fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness’. 
42 Locke (1979), 575 (Book IV, ch. V, § 4). 
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– which is often the fate of words that come into fashion and are then used 
much more often than before. Secondly, we should note that Locke adheres 
to an indicative understanding of the term ‘conscience’; the word should 
correspond with an idea, or even a ‘thing’. Locke does not share the 
symbolism of the people he criticizes. Perhaps he would not have shared it, 
even if it had been employed with moderation; but as it is, it seems that his 
reaction was primarily the consequence of the inflation of meaning that had 
turned ‘conscience’ – for Locke, but according to Locke also for those who 
loved the term so much – into an empty shell. 
 Locke’s criticism is mainly directed against the authors of various 
pamphlets, a type of literature that boomed in those days. It is at them, too, 
that his famous attack on innate ideas was aimed, rather than at René 
Descartes, as students are often taught. He writes: “It is an established 
Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain 
innate Principles; some primary Notions, Κοιναι εννοιαι, Characters, as it were 
stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first 
Being; and brings into the World with it.”43 He also calls them ‘principles’ or 
‘truths’ ‘written on their Hearts’, ‘Propositions stamped on their Minds’, and 
‘Characters, and Marks of Himself [God], engraven in their minds by his 
own finger’.44 Yolton writes: “Locke was referring to a view that can be 
found in many tracts and pamphlets earlier in this century. The language he 
used to describe that view is borrowed from those pamphlets. The metaphor 
of the ‘finger of God’ can be found in Richard Carpenter’s The Conscionable 
Christian (1623): conscience is spoken of as a book ‘euen in thine owne 
bosome, written by the finger of God, in such plaine Characters, and so 
legible, that though thou knowest not a letter in any other booke, yet thou 
maist reade this’ (43-44).”45 Locke was not the only one with scruples 
concerning the use of words. The cautious Cambridge Platonist Henry More, 
in his An Antidote against Atheisme (1653), opts for the term ‘implicit 
knowledge’, denying “the more vivid language of ‘Ideas flaring and shining to 
the Animadersive faculty like so many Torches or Starres in the Firmament to our 
outward sight’ and ‘Red Letters or Astronomical Characters in an Almanack’ (p. 
13)”. Samuel Parker not only distanced himself from this kind of language, 
but rejected the notion of innate ideas altogether. In his A Demonstration of the 
Divine Authority of the Law of Nature he complained “that ‘the plain Account of 
it [the Divine Authority etc.] has been obscured by nothing more, then that it 
has alwaies been described and discoursed of in metaphorical and allusive 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 48 (Book I, ch. II, § 1). 
44 And he uses similar expressions in his early work; see Yolton (1993), lemma 
‘innate ideas’ (110-111). 
45 Idem. 
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Expressions, such as Engravings, and Inscriptions, and the Tables of the Heart’ 
(p.5)”.46 
 In his attack on the idea of innate practical principles, Locke 
discards the notion of an innate conscience.47 “The great Principle of 
Morality, To do as one would be done to, is more commended, than practised,” 
Locke notes. What may prevent us from breaking this rule, for surely it is a 
moral rule? Conscience, perhaps? 
 
“§ 8. To which, I answer, That I doubt not, but without being written on 
their Hearts, many Men, may, by the same way that they come to the 
Knowledge of other things, come to assent to several Moral Rules, and be 
convinced of their Obligation. Others also may come to be of the same 
Mind, from their Education, Company, and Customs of their Country; 
which, Perswasion however got, will serve to set Conscience on work, which is 
nothing else, but our own Opinion or Judgment of the Moral Rectitude or 
Pravity of our own Actions. And if Conscience be a Proof of innate 
Principles, contraries may be innate Principles: Since some Men with the 
same bent of Conscience, prosecute what others avoid.”48 
 
Locke, then, thinks that there are other ways by which men can come to 
hold moral principles, than through the operation of an innate conscience. 
And as we see that the dictates of conscience differ among people, it is not 
likely to be an innate principle, or there must be opposing innate principles. 
Another argument against the innateness of conscience is that if it were 
innate, and ‘stamped upon [people’s] minds’, it ought to be very hard to 
transgress its dictates. Practice, however, teaches us otherwise. 
 
“View but an Army at the sacking of a Town, and see what Observation, or 
Sense of Moral Principles, or what touch of Conscience, for all the 
Outrages they do.”49 
 
Yet it does not surprise Locke “that Doctrines, that have been derived from 
no better original, than the Superstition of a Nurse, or the Authority of an 
old Woman; may, by length of time, and consent of Neighbours, grow up to 
the dignity of Principles in Religion or Morality”.50 For children are taught such 
doctrines when they are still very young, they are confirmed time and again, 
and form the ‘basis and foundation’ for their ‘religion and manners’. As 
                                                 
46 Idem. 
47 In doing so, he went against the traditional interpretation of Romans 2:14-15, 
which made his theory hard to swallow for many who took that passage as evidence 
for the existence of an innate conscience. See Schneewind (1995), 201. 
48 Locke (1979), 70 (Book I, ch. III, § 8). 
49 Idem (Book I, ch. III, § 9). 
50 Ibid., 81 (Book I, ch. III, § 22). 
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people grow up and ‘reflect on their own minds’, they cannot find anything 
older in it than 
 
“those Opinions, which were taught them, before their Memory began to 
keep a Register of their Actions, or date or time, when any new thing 
appeared to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude, That those 
Propositions, of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certainly 
the impress of God and Nature upon their Minds; and not taught them by 
anyone else.”51 
 
In this way a man may come to “stamp the Characters of Divinity, upon Absurdities 
and Errors”, and “to take Monsters lodged in his own brain, for the Images of 
the Deity”.52 
 
4.3.3. Moral philosophy 
Locke’s alternative to an innate conscience as the source of moral knowledge 
is a combination of three things: experience (empiricism), Reason 
(rationalism), and Revelation (the Bible).53 As the latter can tell us nothing 
that is contrary to Reason, however, experience and Reason are most 
important. Experience is of two kinds: firstly there is sensation, which is the 
perception of external objects, and secondly there is reflection, which is the 
perception of the mind’s own operations. Both result in ideas. Ideas can be 
either simple or complex. In the first case, the mind is passive in perceiving 
them; in the latter, the mind actively constructs complex ideas out of the 
variation or combination (in one way or another) of simple ones. This 
activity results in modes, substances, or relations. Modes can be either simple 
or mixed; the latter being the case when the mode ‘contains a combination 
of several ideas of several kinds’.54 Moral words, as I have said before, belong 
to this category. It is worth noting that for Locke, “the most usual way” of 
coming by these complex ideas is “by explaining the names of Actions we never 
saw, or Notions we cannot see”, which comes down to an enumeration of all 
its constituent ideas.55 Now, moral ideas, Schneewind notes, “are harder to 
clarify, and ‘commonly more complex,’ than those involved in 
mathematics”.56 Nevertheless, they are capable of demonstration. In fact, 
“Morality is the proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general”.57 To this 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 82 (Book I, ch. III, § 23). 
52 Ibid., 83-84 (Book I, ch. III, § 26). 
53 It is important to attend to this, if only briefly, because later authors adopted 
much of Locke’s views on morality, while reintroducing conscience (sometimes 
under the guise of the ‘moral sense’). 
54 Locke (1979), 165 (Book II, ch. XII, § 5). 
55 Ibid., 292 (Book II, ch. XXII, § 9). 
56 Schneewind (1995), 205-206; Locke (1979), 489 (Book III, ch. IX, § 22). 
57 Locke (1979), 646 (Book IV, ch. XII, § 11). 
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purpose, we have to employ ‘Definitions’, “setting down that Collection of 
simple Ideas, which every Term shall stand for; and then using the Terms 
steadily and constantly for that precise Collection”.58 That does not mean 
that morality is based on convention. The ‘only true touchstone of moral 
Rectitude’ is the Divine Law.59 God is the foundation of morality, and reason 
tells us so: 
 
“The Idea of a supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom, 
whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the Idea of our 
selves, as understanding, rational Beings, being such as are clear in us, 
would, I suppose, if duly considered, and pursued, afford such Foundations 
of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place Morality amongst the Sciences 
capable of Demonstration: wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident 
Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as incontestable as those in 
Mathematicks, the measures of right and wrong be made out, to any one 
that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the one, 
as he does to the other of these Sciences.”60 
 
This could have been Kant’s mission statement. Locke himself did not 
pursue the demonstration very far. His moral philosophy can be summarized 
quite briefly: 
 
“Good and Evil (...) are nothing but Pleasure and Pain, or that which 
occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. Morally Good and Evil then, is 
only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary Actions to some 
Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, from the Will and Power of 
the Law-maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure or Pain, attending our 
observance, or breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that 
we call Reward and Punishment.”61 
 
Moral rules (or: laws) are of three sorts: divine law, civil law, and the law of 
opinion or reputation. On the first depend duty and sin, on the second 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 552 (Book IV, ch. III, § 20). 
59 Ibid., 352 (Book II, ch. XXVIII, § 8). 
60 Ibid., 549 (Book IV, ch. III, § 18). Cf. Schneewind (1995), 205. Locke’s 
mentioning of ‘self-evident propositions’ is significant, for these are propositions 
that are intuitively known. Locke may not have believed in innate knowledge, but he 
did believe in intuitive knowledge, which is “the perception of the certain 
Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately compared together” (Ibid., 
685 [Book IV, ch. XVII, § 17]). Such knowledge is quite important, for “no 
Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation, or obtain the Assent due to all such, if it be 
contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge” (Ibid., 692 [Book IV, ch. XVIII, § 5]). 
61 Ibid., 351 (Book II, ch. XXVIII, § 5). 
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criminality, on the third virtue and vice.62 But, as I quoted before, the divine 
law is ‘the only true touchstone of moral rectitude’; the meaning of moral 
good and evil depend on the Divine Will.63 Moral knowledge is derived from 
a combination of perception, reason, and revelation. Once the moral words 
are defined (in agreement with Divine Law), conceptual analysis will tell us 
what is wrong and what is right. 
 If moral knowledge, then, was not a problem, moral motivation was. 
It seems that Reason, by itself, is not able to instill a clear sense of right and 
wrong in people’s minds, and to make them act according to the moral 
rules.64 People are only motivated by what affects their happiness. For this 
reason, religion is necessary – in particular the idea of God and the belief in 
an afterlife, in which people will be either rewarded or punished, depending 
on their behaviour on earth.65 Locke’s views concerning moral motivation 
also modify his ideas about the discovering powers of reason. As 
Schneewind points out, Locke’s doubts in this area “require us to interpret 
with caution those passages in which Locke says that the law of nature is 
‘plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures’ (T [Two Treatises of Government] 
II.ix.124: 369). This is no slip into a rationalist claim that the laws are self-
evident. But neither is it the claim that knowledge of the laws of nature is 
equally available to everyone alike. The laws are plain enough so that the day-
laborer and the spinster can obey, once they have been instructed. But they 
will not necessarily be able to see for themselves why the laws are binding on 
them. They will be obeying God by obeying other men.”66 
                                                 
62 In the realm of virtue and vice lie the seeds of the moral realm that would come to 
criticize the political; here lies the beginning of the utopian force of society (the 
social conscience) against government (Koselleck [1973], 42-43). 
63 This at once explains and obscures the meaning of the following passage (from 
the Essay, 344 [Book II, ch. XXVII, § 22]): “For, though punishment be annexed to 
personality, and personality to consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps be not 
conscious of what he did, yet human judicatures justly punish him; because the fact 
is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in 
the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be 
reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of, 
but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.” It explains the 
difference between the judgement according to Divine Law and that according to 
human law, but it obscures why the former judgement would depend on one’s 
subjective awareness of sin, rather than objective sinfulness. Locke seems to disagree 
with Hobbes’ rejection of Abelard’s idea that there is no sin but against the 
conscience – but maybe he cannot be bothered about it, as long as sinfulness is 
understood as irrelevant for human law. Concerning Locke’s voluntarism, see 
Schneewind (1995), 206. 
64 Schneewind (1995), 218. 
65 Ibid., 215, 218-219. 
66 Ibid., 219. His pessimism with regard to the power of reason would grow even 
stronger; see Greene (1991b), 643. 
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4.3.4. Education 
Let us turn to Locke’s (highly influential) thoughts concerning education, 
then. Though Some Thoughts Concerning Education was written several years 
before, it first appeared in the bookshops, anonymously, in 1693.67 It was 
meant as a ‘small light’ for those parents “whose Concern for their dear little 
Ones makes them so irregularly bold, that they dare venture to consult their 
own Reason, in the Education of their Children, rather than wholly to rely 
upon Old Custom”.68 It as also meant to reach a large audience, as is evident 
from his translation of the first sentence, which was originally in Latin, into 
English. Mens sana in corpore sano now read ‘A sound mind in a sound body’, 
and this provided the basic structure of the text, of which the first 30 
paragraphs deal with the health of the body, and the rest (186 paragraphs) 
with that of the mind. After instructions on clothes, the washing of feet (“I 
would also advise his Feet to be washed every Day in cold Water; and to have 
his Shoes so thin, that they might leak and let in Water, when ever he comes 
near it.”69), swimming, the importance of being in the open air (and being 
able to breathe freely, which means that clothes should not be too tight), 
diet, drinking (‘only Small Beer’), fruit consumption (fruits like melons, 
peaches, plumbs, and grapes should be kept from children, because of their 
‘very tempting Taste’), sleep (Locke recommends a hard bed), and ‘Going to 
Stool’, Locke turns to the mind: 
 
“Due Care being had to keep the Body in Strength and Vigor, so that it 
may be able to obey and execute the Orders of the Mind; the next and 
principal Business is, to set the Mind right, that on all Occasions it may be 
disposed to consent to nothing, but what may be suitable to the Dignity 
and Excellency of a rational Creature.”70 
 
It is clear from this passage that Locke believed that people could to a large 
extent be made the way one saw fit. Children’s minds were like a tabula rasa, a 
blank sheet, a ‘white Paper’, to be filled with the letters we wish to inscribe 
on them. A children’s mind is like “Wax, to be moulded and fashioned as 
one pleases”.71 
                                                 
67 Axtell (ed.) (1968), 14. 
68 Locke (1968), 325 (§ 216). It should be noted that Locke writes mainly for the 
parents of sons (of the higher and higher middle classes): “[T]he principal Aim of my 
Discourse is, how a young Gentleman should be brought up from his Infancy, 
which, in all things will not so perfectly suit the Education of Daughters; though 
where the Difference of Sex requires different Treatment, ’twill be no hard matter to 
distinguish.” (117, § 6). 
69 Ibid., 117-118 (§ 7). 
70 Ibid., 137 (§ 31). 
71 Ibid., 325 (§ 216); cf. 114 (§ 1): “[O]f all the Men we meet with, Nine Parts of Ten 
are what they are, Good or Evil, useful or not, by their Education. ’Tis that which 
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 Education aims at virtue.72 This entails not just virtuous behaviour, 
but a virtuous mind; the ‘young Man’ should acquire “a true relish of it, and 
[place] his Strength, his Glory, and his Pleasure in it”.73 Yet, on the whole, 
Locke places no explicit emphasis on thoughts and intentions – especially 
not if we compare his work with that of Kant, which, nevertheless, shows 
great similarities with Locke’s work.74 The foundation of virtue is the notion 
of God: 
 
“As the Foundation of [virtue], there ought very early to be imprinted on 
his Mind a true Notion of God, as of the independent Supreme Being, 
Author and Maker of all Things, from whom we receive all our Good, who 
loves us, and gives us all Things.”75 
 
At first, no further explanations should be given; in fact, it would generally 
be better if people accepted such a notion without asking much further 
about “a Being, which all must acknowledge incomprehensible”.76 If this is 
the foundation of all virtue, the road to virtue lies in self-denial. There is a 
very strong Stoic influence in Locke’s work on education, which shows itself 
in such statements as these: 
 
“As the Strength of the Body lies chiefly in being able to endure Hardships, 
so also does that of the Mind. And the great Principle and Foundation of 
all Vertue and Worth, is placed in this, That a Man is able to deny himself his 
own Desires, cross his own Inclinations, and purely follow what Reason 
directs as best, tho’ the Appetite lean the other way.”77 
 
“It seems plain to me, that the Principle of all Vertue and Excellency lies in 
a Power of denying ourselves the Satisfaction of our own Desires, where 
Reason does not authorize them.”78 
 
 We are to acquire and improve this power through custom and early 
practice. Locke often emphasizes that education should begin early, when 
                                                                                                               
makes the great Difference in Mankind.”, and 115 (§ 2): “I imagine the Minds of 
Children as easily turned this or that way, as Water it self...”; cf. also Locke (1979), 
63-64 (Book I, ch. II, §27). 
72 Locke (1968), 170 (§ 70), 241 (§ 135), and 313 (§ 200). 
73 Ibid., 170 (§ 70). 
74 See Kant [1803]. Note that his definition of conscience in the Essay also only 
mentions actions, not thoughts. On the other hand, note that Locke thinks that 
shame, not pain, should be the most effective element in punishment. 
75 Locke (1968), 241 (§ 136). 
76 Ibid., 242 (§ 136). 
77 Ibid., 138 (§ 33). 
78 Ibid., 143 (§ 38). 
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children’s minds are most susceptible to learning, and least influenced by 
undesirable doctrines and bad examples. Education is a process by which 
children are enabled to make the transition from being disciplined to self-
discipline, from heteronomy to autonomy. Because of their ‘Want of 
Judgment’, children ‘stand in need of Restraint and Discipline’.79 This should 
not be misunderstood, however. Discipline does not mean that a harsh 
regime is imposed on children, a regime based on frequent chastisement. 
Children “should look upon their Parents as their Lords, their Absolute 
Governors”, they should hold them in awe and respect. This means that 
parents should ‘carry a strict hand over children’, but it does not entail 
‘Imperiousness and Severity’.80 “[T]hose children who have been most 
chastised, seldom make the best Men.”81 Their spirits should not be ‘abased 
and broken much’; this would give them ‘dejected minds’ and ‘low spirits’, 
whereas the child’s spirit should be kept up.82 Locke emphasizes time and 
again that beating and other ‘servile punishments’ are generally to be 
avoided, not in the least because they have adverse effects.83 In fact, 
 
“there is one, and but one Fault, for which (...) Children should be Beaten; 
and that is, Obstinacy or Rebellion. And in this too, I would have it ordered 
so, if it can be, that the shame of the Whipping, and not the Pain, should be 
the greatest part of the Punishment. Shame of doing amiss, and deserving 
Chastisement, is the only true Restraint belonging to Vertue.”84 
 
Like Kant would later, Locke stresses that reward and punishment should 
not become children’s motives for action. Corporeal punishment will often 
have that effect, which means that the child comes “to cherish that Principle 
in him, which it is our Business to root out and destroy”, namely to seek his 
own (sensual) pleasure. The ‘Shame of Suffering for having done Amiss’ 
should be more effective than the pain of punishment.85 
 Parents should be reasonable, set a good example for their children, 
and earn their respect by being strict but fair. Children are able to see when 
their parents act out of caprice, or when they have lost their temper. Respect 
and awe are instilled on children’s minds by fairness, calm and deliberate 
action, and the strict observance of a small number of rules. When a child is 
punished by a parent it respects and whose authority it accepts, it will be 
ashamed, and (if old enough) see that it deserved punishment; that is, it will 
see the reasonableness of its punishment. 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 145 (§ 40). 
80 Ibid., 145-146 (§ 40, 41, 43). 
81 Ibid., 147 (§ 43). 
82 Ibid., 148 (§ 46). 
83 Ibid., 147 (§ 44), 148 (§ 47), 172 (§ 72), 176 (§ 77). 
84 Ibid., 177 (§ 78). 
85 Ibid., 149 (§ 48). 
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“Good and Evil, Reward and Punishment, are the only Motives to a rational 
Creature: these are the Spur and Reins, whereby all Mankind are set on 
work, and guided, and therefore they are to be made use of to Children too. 
For I advise their Parents and Governors always to carry this in their 
Minds, that Children are to be treated as rational Creatures.”86 
 
This entails using the right sort of reward and punishment: ‘esteem’ and 
‘disgrace’. A ‘Love of Credit’ and an ‘Apprehension of Shame and Disgrace’ 
will ‘put into them the true Principle’ and ‘incline them to the right’.87 The 
‘Fear and Awe’ children should feel for their parents when they are young, 
and which gives parents ‘the first Power over their Minds’, should give way 
to ‘Love and Friendship’ later, which enables them to hold this power.88 
 In line with the importance Locke here ascribes to esteem in the 
education of children, he says about ‘Reputation’: 
 
“That though it be not the true Principle and Measure of Vertue, (for that 
is the Knowledge of a Man’s Duty, and the Satisfaction it is to obey his 
Maker, in following the Dictates of the Light God has given him, with the 
Hopes of Acceptation and Reward) yet it is that, which comes nearest to it: 
And being the Testimony and Applause that other People’s Reason, as it 
were by a common Consent, gives to vertuous and well-ordered Actions, it 
is the proper Guide and Encouragement of Children, till they grow able to 
judge for themselves, and to find what is right by their own Reason.”89 
  
The approval and disapproval of others, and the consequent gladness or 
shame, are critical to the acquisition of virtue. The final goal, however, is to 
transcend this ‘social’ stage, so to speak, and to come to rely upon one’s own 
Reason. One might be tempted to say ‘conscience’ instead of ‘Reason’, but 
that would be a mistake. When Locke speaks of ‘the Dictates of the Light 
God has given [man]’, he means ‘Reason’, not ‘conscience’.90 In fact, Locke 
does not even once use the word ‘conscience’ in the whole work on 
education.91 He does use the metaphor of ‘the Candle of the Lord’, which 
                                                 
86 Ibid., 152 (§ 54). 
87 Ibid., 152-153 (§ 56). 
88 Ibid., 146 (§ 42). 
89 Ibid., 155-156 (§ 61). 
90 Cf. the second and third letter concerning toleration, in which he often speaks of 
the ‘light of their own reason, and dictates of their own consciences’. 
91 Axtell notes that “Locke’s ethics always had a pragmatic element in them, because 
he, like Addison, saw that young English gentlemen would not be wholly motivated 
by the high, idealistic considerations of ‘inner conscience’, ‘esteem’, and whatever 
else was promised as a proper reward for good behavior. So material rewards were 
added as further inducements to study (Addison) and moral good naturedness 
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was traditionally associated with ‘synderesis’, but only to refer to ‘the light of 
Reason’ – though, on the other hand, to discover the truths of ethics was 
Reason’s main business.92 He does use the traditional language of 
‘synderesis’, when he writes about “the Candle of the Lord set up by himself 
in Men’s minds, which it is impossible for the Breath or Power of Man 
wholly to extinguish”.93 
 Locke envisaged quite a liberal sort of education. Young children 
should be left to themselves and allowed to play, so long as this remained 
compatible with respect for those present.94 Parents should observe their 
natural abilities, dispositions, and inclinations, and work with these, instead 
of against them. When children do not feel like doing or learning anything, 
that is the right time “to teach the Mind to get the Mastery over it self”.95 
Children should be taught primarily by example, not by rules “which they 
often do not understand, and constantly as soon forget as given”: “But pray 
remember, Children are not to be taught by Rules, which will be always slipping 
out of their Memories.” It is far better to make them repeat actions until they 
perform them correctly, so that they acquire the right habits.96 Children 
should be treated as rational creatures, and they ‘love to be treated’ as such 
‘sooner than is imagined’.97 The reasoning done with children should be on a 
level appropriate to their age. With young children, it is mostly a matter of 
showing them “by the Mildness of your Carriage, and the Composure even 
in your Correction of them, that what you do is reasonable in you, and useful 
and necessary for them: And that it is not out of Caprichio, Passion, or Fancy, 
that you command or forbid them any Thing.”98 Locke’s work on education 
obviously aims at the education of parents, as much as that of their children. 
                                                                                                               
(Locke).” (Note to § 110, p. 213 of Locke [1968].) It also seems, though, that Locke 
had more faith in ‘esteem’ than ‘conscience’. 
92 Cf. Greene (1991b), “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis”, 642-
643. Kittsteiner (1995), 241, writes: “[B]ei Locke leuchtet ‘the candle of the Lord’ 
nicht etwa zu schwach, so daß sie verstärkt werden könnte – dieses innere Licht war 
nur eine Illusion.” That is true in the sense that Locke did not believe in an innate 
knowledge of or drive towards the good; it does ignore Locke’s own use of this 
mystic symbolism. 
93 Locke (1979), 552 (Book IV, ch. III, § 20). As to the popularity of the metaphor 
of ‘light’, see Ryle (1970), 152-153: “The metaphor of ‘light’ seemed peculiarly 
appropriate, since Galilean science dealt so largely with the optically discovered 
world. ‘Consciousness’ was imported to play in the mental world the part played by 
light in the mechanical world.” Ryle started out by saying that the concept of 
consciousness derived from that of conscience; its metaphorical representation 
derived from the metaphor of the “God-given ‘light’ of private conscience”. 
94 Locke (1968), 156 (§ 63). 
95 Ibid., 174 (§ 75). 
96 Ibid., 157 (§ 64), 158 (§ 66); for the importance of example, see also 182 (§ 82). 
97 Ibid., 181 (§ 81). 
98 Idem. 
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Self-command is not just something to be taught to children; it is the sign of 
a good parent, and it is primarily through exercising it oneself that a parent 
teaches his child the same. 
 As to the more exclusively moral part of the education of children: 
Locke makes some remarks on the cruelty of children, in particular towards 
‘Birds, Butterflies, and such other poor Animals’. He notes – and for Kant 
this would be the only reason not to be cruel to animals – that 
 
“the Custom of Tormenting and Killing of Beasts, will, by Degrees, harden 
their Minds even towards Men; and they who delight in the Suffering and 
Destruction of inferiour Creatures, will not be apt to be very 
compassionate, or benign to those of their own kind.”99 
 
Hence, children should be “bred up in an Abhorrence of killing, or 
tormenting any living Creature; and be taught not to spoil or destroy any 
thing, unless it be for the Preservation or Advantage of some other, that is 
Nobler” – of which the latter is a somewhat utilitarian principle.100 The 
‘Sentiments of Humanity’ should be instilled in them (to be benign, 
compassionate, et cetera); among other ways by teaching them to be civil 
‘towards their Inferiours and the meaner sort of People, particularly 
Servants’.101 When the foundations of virtue are laid, they should learn 
always to be truthful, good-natured, and just. The latter entails a restraint of 
self-love, injustice generally resulting from its excess.102 A child should learn 
The Lord’s Prayer, the Creed, and the Ten Commandments by heart.103 
Simply reading the Bible generally does more harm then good, because much 
of it cannot be understood just like that. Locke says he is “apt to think, that 
this in some Men has been the very Reason, why they never had clear and 
distinct Thoughts of it all their Life time”.104 The Golden Rule and some 
other moral rules from the Bible are suitable for children.105 Locke advises to 
make use of a catechism, and to use moral rules for memory training.106 
Since the knowledge of virtue is gained mostly through practice and the love 
of reputation, Locke doubts whether any other ‘moral discourses’ need to be 
read, apart from what the Bible offers, at least until the child has reached the 
age at which he can read ‘Tully’s Offices’. For when that has been read, Locke 
                                                 
99 Ibid., 225-226 (§ 116). 
100 Idem. 
101 Ibid., 227 (§ 117). 
102 Ibid., 244 (§ 139). 
103 Ibid., 260 (§ 157). 
104 Ibid., 261 (§ 158). 
105 Ibid., 261 (§ 159). 
106 Ibid., 262 (§ 159). 
 224 
advises to read works by Pufendorf and Grotius, so that they will get to 
know the law and the organisation of society.107 
 Approaching the end of Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke 
once more warns against rhetoric and the use of artificial terms, which 
distract from the truth. Truth is to be found through ‘a mature and due 
Consideration of Things’.108 He summarizes what moral education amounts 
to as follows: 
 
“Teach him to get a Mastery over his Inclinations, and submit his Appetite to 
Reason. This being obtained, and by constant practice settled into Habit , 
the hardest part of the Task is over. To bring a young Man to this, I know 
nothing which so much contributes as the love of Praise and 
Commendation, which should therefore be instilled into him by all Arts 
imaginable. Make his Mind as sensible of Credit and shame as may be: And 
when you have done that, you have put a Principle into him, which will 
influence his Actions, when you are not by, to which the fear of a little 
smart of a Rod is not comparable, and which will be the proper Stock, 
whereon afterwards to graft the true Principles of Morality and 
Religion.”109 
 
 
4.4. INFLUENCE 
Hobbes’ and Locke’s influence can hardly be underestimated; that is true for 
‘conscience’, just as much as for more standard themes in moral and political 
philosophy. Hobbes and Locke launched the first full-scale attack on 
conscience. Their attitude was characterized by distrust. In their view, 
religious enthusiasts had used the term so liberally, had abused the term so 
much, that it had become a term to be avoided, unless used to signify 
nothing more than it really signified: people’s own private opinions or 
judgements (in moral matters, and concerning themselves). Their attack on 
conscience is at the same time an attack on the abuse of language. They 
unmasked what people called conscience and looked into the eyes of 
subjective opinion. But they were after objective truth, and this could only be 
found by the correct, non-idiosyncratic use of language. They were no less 
after complete certainty than the people they criticized, but they wished to 
replace subjective by objective certainty.110 They strove for the fixation of 
                                                 
107 Ibid., 294 (§ 185-186). 
108 Ibid., 296-297 (§ 188-189). 
109 Ibid., 313-314 (§ 200). 
110 See Locke (1979), 706 (Book IV, ch. XIX, § 16): “But it is not the strength of our 
private perswasion within our selves, that can warrant [an apprehended Truth] to be 
a Light or Motion from Heaven: Nothing can do that but the written Word of GOD 
without us, or that Standard of Reason which is common to us with all Men.” It 
should be noted that Locke’s remarks on reading the (whole) Bible, which he advises 
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meaning in their own way. In Hobbes’ wake, Locke envisaged a science of 
morality, as the core business of mankind – a project that would be picked 
up by later thinkers, and broadened to a science of man. The doctrinalization 
of which the excessive use of (thereby) worn-out symbolizations was the 
symptom, was met by Hobbes and Locke with hostility to metaphor and an 
equally indicative understanding of ‘conscience’. They could not accept the 
symbolic nature of the term, because there were too many worn-out symbols 
around. They could only see symbolism as a perversion of meaning. This was 
not just a deficiency on their part. Others shared their worries about the 
abuse of language, which in this form and on this scale, connected with 
‘opinions’, was a relatively new phenomenon, connected with the spread of 
the pamphlet as a means of communication. Fifty years after Locke, non-
conformist minister John Reynolds writes: 
 
“[T]he Men of this last Age and Generation (…) have been tempted to 
suspect that Devotion, Religion and Conscience are but empty Names; 
Cloaks for Ambition and rising Designs.”111 
 
 Though they were not completely consistent in their rejection of the 
term ‘conscience’, they virtually discarded it – in Locke’s case in his later 
writings. It is remarkable that in Locke’s work on education the word 
‘conscience’ does not occur even once. This is one of the most striking 
differences with Kant’s Über Pädagogik, in which the concept of conscience 
has a prominent place. Kittsteiner speaks of ‘die Entwertung des religiösen 
Gewissens’ in the seventeenth century, and of ‘der Wiederaufstieg des 
moralischen Gewissens’ in the eighteenth.112 The difference between Locke 
and Kant illustrates this characterization perfectly. Schneewind remarks that 
Locke’s failures were sometimes as significant as his successes.113 Among 
those failures is his failure to provide a clear and systematic exposition of his 
ethics. Schneewind explains how this failure “drew attention to the moral 
consequences of empiricism in a way that previous empiricist ethics had not 
                                                                                                               
against in the case of children (who are better served by learning the Lord’s Prayer, 
the Creed, the Ten Commandments and a Catechism by heart) stimulate a non-
critical reading of the Bible and an orthodox bent of mind. Children under a certain 
age cannot be expected to read the Bible critically, of course, but what Locke in fact 
suggests is that certain truths are preselected for them, that these are almost literally 
stamped on their minds, and that they do not start reading the whole Bible for 
themselves until they have come of age – which makes it doubtful whether they will 
then still be able to read critically, and to question the truths that were instilled in 
them. 
111 The Pleasure and Benefit of being Religious (1740), 51. 
112 Kittsteiner (1995), 229, 254. 
113 Schneewind (1995), 199. 
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done”.114 In Locke’s work, ethics is overshadowed by epistemology. He “was 
more interested in the epistemology of natural law than in working out a 
code”.115 As all our ideas come from experience, and experience only “shows 
us how things are and teaches us what we enjoy”, and therefore “yields no 
inherently normative ideas”, the empiricist epistemology allows no other 
source of normativity than God’s will. Locke’s epistemology necessitates a 
voluntaristic approach to God and morality. “God’s will then can only be 
understood as arbitrary.”116 Schneewind then points out the “striking fact 
that after Locke no major thinker tried to work out a Grotian theory of 
natural law in voluntarist terms. (...) [T]he post-Lockean philosophers all 
turned to new ways of attempting to understand morality.”117 This includes 
new ways of understanding conscience. 
 But Locke’s influence (nor that of Hobbes) was not just negative. 
Hobbes and Locke stood in the Grotian natural law tradition – even if in 
another sense they constituted their own tradition, based on a more one-
sidedly pessimistic anthropology. In this tradition, “natural law provides the 
solution to the problem of how rational beings, constituted as we are, can 
live together”.118 Both Hobbes and Locke continued this line of thinking, 
making morality a social matter, both in origin and application. Morality is 
increasingly (and more and more exclusively) about social relations, justice, 
behaviour in society. Locke, especially, drew attention to the social origins of 
morality.119 His refutation of the notion of innate ideas (including innate 
practical principles) depended for a large part on what he recognized as the 
influence of upbringing on people’s moral ideas (and vocabulary). The 
people he criticized for their abuse of words (like ‘conscience’) were evidence 
of the pervertive potential of education. It is just those people, whose 
                                                 
114 Ibid., 220. 
115 Ibid., 221. 
116 Idem. There is an important difference with Hobbes here: Hobbes in effect 
applied a voluntaristic concept of God to the Sovereign. Before the civil state, 
therefore, there is no right or wrong, justice or injustice. Locke does not accept the 
complete amorality of the state of nature; there are moral limits to the power one 
man can exert over another even there. There are ‘criminals’ in the state of nature, 
and these cannot be punished as one fancies, but only “so far as calm reason and 
conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his Transgression” (Locke [1999], 272 
[The Second Treatise, § 8]). Locke also makes room for conscience in the judgement of 
whether a monarch should be overthrown or not. (See part II). Thus, he seems to 
allow for some natural ability of man to recognize good and evil after all. For him, 
good and evil, right and wrong, depend on God’s will, as revealed by Reason and 
Revelation. 
117 Ibid., 222. 
118 Ibid., 209. 
119 I am speaking of morality in the sense of people’s actual morality here, not of 
Locke’s science of morality. 
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unshakeable views were identified by Locke as the result of faulty education, 
that provided the clearest evidence for the power of education, and the basis 
for Locke’s belief in the pliability of man. Locke’s confidence in the 
perfective potential of education was not as great as the perversion he saw as 
the result of it in other people, for he realized – and in Kant this awareness 
would be even stronger – that perversion might very well come more easily 
to man than its opposite. But he was confident nonetheless, and this 
confidence carried over into the next century, magnified by the relative 
tranquillity and prosperity of the time, and broadened to a confidence in the 
malleability of society. Sheldon Wolin, discussing Locke, rightly remarks that 
“the growing distrust of conscience stimulated the search for a new kind of 
conscience, social rather than individual, one that would be an internalized 
expression of external rules rather than the externalized expression of 
internal convictions.”120 
 Hobbes’ and Locke’s pessimistic view of human nature was rejected 
by those in the eighteenth century who sought a new anchorage for 
conscience – among them Locke’s pupil, the Earl of Shaftesbury. Others, 
like Mandeville, elaborated it. The picture of society as developed in the 
eighteenth century incorporated the idea of competitiveness, each individual 
striving for his own good. Locke also laid the groundwork for the Humean 
view of morality as based on approval and disapproval, a view that would 
strongly influence Smith. With his remarks about the use of a child’s love of 
praise and dislike of shame, Locke drew attention to the importance of 
emotions for morality. The last quotation I gave from his work on education 
in effect anticipates a Freudian view of conscience. The internalization of the 
approval and disapproval of others in the form of feelings of ‘credit’ and 
‘shame’ constitutes an internal check on immoral action that is more 
effective than any external sanction. Note that ‘shame’ is indeed internalized; 
the distinction between guilt and shame is often simplified, so that guilt is 
seen as the result of internalization of moral rules, and shame as the result of 
the confrontation with a disapproving other. In fact, one can be ashamed 
when there is no one around, for things that no one else would disapprove 
of. Guilt and shame are often so strongly intertwined that they are hard to 
distinguish from each other.121 
 Descartes and Spinoza, Kittsteiner notes, treated the concept of 
conscience ‘nicht viel rücksichtsvoller als Hobbes und Locke’.122 They share 
the same distrust of the religious conscience, and reduced the concept of 
conscience to one of its aspects: the ‘Gewissensbiß’ (literally the ‘bite’, and 
more freely translated the ‘sting of conscience’) and ‘Reue’ (remorse). 
Descartes’ well-known works are not full of moral philosophy, to say the 
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121 I will look into the distinction in more detail in chapter 8. 
122 Kittsteiner (1995), 244. 
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least, but there are some remarks about conscience in Les passions de l’âme and 
his correspondence. In a letter to Princess Elisabeth he says that it is difficult 
to determine “how far reason orders us to interest ourselves in the public; 
yet that is not something in which one must be very exact: it suffices to 
satisfy one’s conscience, and in doing that, one can grant very much to one’s 
inclination.”123 Clearly, these are not the words of someone who holds 
conscience in great esteem. Furthermore, in Les passions de l’âme, the ‘pangs of 
conscience’ are explained to arise mechanically, in Mock’s words, from 
doubts about past or future actions.124 Both Descartes and Spinoza (1632-
1677) see conscience as a form of sadness or mournfulness (‘tristitia’).125 
With Descartes, reason replaces conscience as our moral guide. The 
‘synderesis’ is replaced by ‘free will’, which, however, suffers from the same 
problem: it is too weak. But Descartes felt confident that it could be 
strengthened by reason: “Das Vertrauen auf diese Waffen der Vernunft führt 
Descartes dazu, eine den Stoikern nahestehende Position einzunehmen: ‘Es 
gibt keine Seele, die so schwach ist, daß sie nicht, wenn sie richtig geleitet 
wird, eine absolute Macht über ihre Leidenschaften erlangen kann.’”126 We 
see familiar themes in Descartes: the idea of morality based on science, the 
Stoic fight against the passions, the hope and confidence placed in reason. 
But while Descartes did not leave much of a concept of conscience, except 
perhaps in a feeble form of functionalism, and while Hobbes and Locke 
demoted it (or saw it demoted) to the rank of private opinion, the eighteenth 
century would revive conscience: “Alle Aussagen aus dem 18. Jahrhundert 
zeigen seine glorreiche Auferstehung; es bedarf keiner theologischen 
Strafinstanzen mehr und keiner äußerlichen Ratgeber. Die Kasuistik 
verschwindet vor diesem innerlich gefühlten Gewissen ebensosehr wie die 
meditativen Praktiken zur Bewahrung des Gnadenstandes. Allmählich 
scheint es aus sich selbst heraus jene verstärkende Kraft zu entfalten, nach 
der Theologen und Philosophen immer gesucht haben.”127 
 Locke expresses an abhorrence of external authority, of the dictates 
of either tradition and custom, or other persons. His work on education was 
meant for parents who ‘dare venture to consult their own Reason’ – an 
anticipation, it seems, of Kant’s sapere aude. But people needed to be taught 
to think for themselves first. If this was somewhat naively ignored in the first 
half of the next century, this flaw would be well made up for in the second, 
in which conscience was once again recognized as standing in need of 
education.
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126 Kittsteiner (1995), 246-247; he quotes from René Descartes, Die Leidenschaften der 
Seele, K. Hammacher (ed.), 1984, art. 50, 85 ff. 
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5. Between symbol and doctrine (4): Conscience grounded 
 in Nature and Reason 
 
 
5.1. CONSCIENCE AS A FACULTY 
After the devastating seventeenth-century critique of the religious 
conscience, eighteenth-century philosophers sought, in a more optimistic 
climate, for a new, less-problematic anchorage for conscience than the God 
of the Protestants or Catholics could be. They weakened, but did not sever, 
the conceptual ties between conscience and God. The new anchorage was 
found in Nature, or Reason, or both. Some British authors gave conscience a 
new name – impressed, perhaps, by the Hobbesian and Lockean critique of 
conscience, but in line with their empiricism. For them, conscience became 
the ‘moral sense’. 
 
5.1.1. The moral sense 
The conception of conscience as a faculty was born just as much from 
Protestant casuistry, with its emphasis on the ‘fact’ that ‘everybody has a 
conscience’, as from its critique. The Reformation was a movement directed 
against authority, but it replaced the authority of the Church with that of the 
Bible, ‘properly’ understood.1 To make sure that this authority was indeed 
properly understood, Protestantism developed its own casuistry, and 
Protestant ministers instructed their flocks in order that their ‘erring 
consciences’ would be edified.2 The situation that thus developed, in which 
Catholics and Protestants alike – as well as different groups within their own 
ranks – proclaimed the superiority and sanctity of their own conscience, 
would work on the nerves of people like Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), as we 
have seen. Other (often slightly later) thinkers had fewer problems than 
Hobbes with the notion of conscience in itself, but tried to give it a new 
footing. Butler is a prime example of that category. 
 Bishop Joseph Butler, Langston says, is one of a number of 
Protestant thinkers “who rejected casuistry out of a concern for the 
development of character”.3 Butler was not very much concerned with the 
development of character, however; he believed that conscience, if “freed from 
                                                 
1 Andrew (1999), 212, draws attention to a particularly vivid metaphor used by 
Luther to describe the relation between the Bible and the conscience: “Luther 
asserted that the two Testaments are two testicles and conscience is a woman’s 
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2 Kittsteiner (1995), 196. He points out that we should understand this ‘erring 
conscience’ not as a conscience that deviates from doctrine, but as “eine prinzipiell 
andere Auffassung der Religion in der Differenz zwischen ‘normsetzenden 
Schichten’ und dem Glauben des Volkes.” 
3 Langston (2001), 80. 
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its lack of power”, would lead men to virtue.4 Butler developed his views of 
conscience in the context of discussions concerning human nature: is man 
intrinsically good or bad? More specifically: is man governed by self-love, or 
is there also a natural disposition towards benevolence? Hobbes had placed 
the idea that man is essentially selfish squarely in the foreground of attention 
– or at least, that is what people took from his work. Butler, however, sided 
with the Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1671-1713) and 
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) in rejecting Hobbes’ position as one-sided. 
 Shaftesbury saw egoism as a natural element of human nature; in a 
moral person, self-concern and altruistic or benevolent impulses are in 
harmony. Virtue depends on the proper balance between man’s different 
affections. Everyone is (initially) able to distinguish virtue from vice, by 
means of the moral sense or conscience, “a faculty which is analogous to that 
whereby men perceive differences between harmonies and discords, 
proportion and lack of proportion”.5 Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733) 
criticized Shaftesbury, maintaining that ‘private vices’ often led to ‘public 
benefits’. Hutcheson went to the other extreme, placing much more 
emphasis on benevolence, holding that the moral worth of actions only 
comes from their benevolent quality. Self-love is at best (that is, when it is 
‘calm self-love’) morally indifferent. Hutcheson, too, described the moral 
sense (which, under the influence of Butler, he also called ‘conscience’) as 
analogous to a sense of beauty. The primary object of the moral sense is the 
kindness or benevolence in actions, more specifically, “the inward affections 
and dispositions which by reasoning we infer from the actions observed”.6 
Hutcheson distinguishes between antecedent and subsequent conscience: 
“Antecedent conscience is the faculty of moral decision or judgment and 
prefers that which appears most conducive to the virtue and happiness of 
mankind. Subsequent conscience has as its object past actions in relation to 
the motives or affections from which they sprang.”7 There is a strong 
utilitarian element in the idea of the antecedent conscience; indeed, 
Hutcheson held “that in equal degrees of happiness, expected to proceed 
from the action, the virtue is in proportion to the number of persons to 
whom the happiness shall extend ... so that that action is best which procures 
the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, and that worst which in like 
manner occasions misery.”8 The influence on Hume of both the idea of the 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 82. 
5 Copleston (1964), 186. For Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Mandeville, and Butler, see 
182-202. 
6 Ibid., 191; quoted from Hutcheson, System of Moral Philosophy, 1, 1, 5. 
7 Ibid., 194. 
8 Ibid., 193; quoted from Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue (1725), II, 3. 
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antecedent conscience and that of the subsequent conscience is evident – but 
that is for 2.4. 
 Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, then, sought a new, not so obviously 
religious, anchorage for conscience. They found it in nature, but this must be 
understood as Nature, with a capital ‘N’. Proper Enlightenment thinkers, they 
were anti-authoritarian. While John Locke (1632-1704) had still implied that 
good and evil depend on the will of the divine law-maker, his pupil 
Shaftesbury, as well as Hutcheson, saw the foundation of morality in the 
harmonious order of nature.9 They did not attempt to prove, but simply 
stated or assumed as unproblematic that everyone has a moral sense that 
enables him to distinguish right from wrong, virtue from vice.10 In this 
respect, they were in agreement with the Protestant casuists discussed above. 
This moral sense or conscience is obviously a much broader notion than 
most notions of conscience we have encountered so far. It does not apply 
exclusively to the ‘owner’ of the moral sense, but distinguishes between 
virtue and vice in general. Butler, and after him Adam Smith, would restrict 
its field of application to the individual again.11 For the present purpose, 
what is most important about Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s moral theory is 
that they posited a moral sense as a universally present, fixed element of 
human nature – whose operation, admittedly, may be hindered by the 
influence of false ideas.12 They combined the doctrine of the universality of 
the presence of conscience with an optimistic faith in the universality of its 
dictates. 
 
5.1.2. Joseph Butler 
Joseph Butler (1692-1752) had much in common with Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, but he thought much more systematically about the place of 
conscience (not, for him, the ‘moral sense’) in human nature. Again, the 
treatment of conscience is related to a discussion concerning self-love. For 
Butler, self-love (‘reasonable self-love’, or ‘moderate self-love’, at least) was 
                                                 
9 See part II for Locke’s cynical remarks about the authority of conscience. 
10 It is worth noting that in this same period, there were those who claimed that 
there was a special religious or spiritual sense, and that this idea, as that of the moral 
sense, fits in with the empiricist climate of the time (in England). See Campbell 
(1991), 64: “The Cambridge Platonist John Smith (1618-1652) began his ‘Discourse 
concerning the True Way or Method of Attaining Divine Knowledge’ with the 
proposition, ‘That divine things are understood rather by a spiritual sensation than 
by verbal description, or mere speculation.’”; quoted by Campbell from Gerald R. 
Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, A Library of Protestant Thought, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1968, 76. 
11 Though in Smith’s case the term ‘moral sense’ is inappropriate; Smith himself 
rejects it. On the other hand, he is much closer to ‘moral sense’ theorists than he 
would have liked. 
12 The ‘moral sense’ is closer to ‘synderesis’ than ‘conscientia’, obviously. 
 232 
the natural desire people have for their own happiness. As a general desire, it 
could not conflict with benevolence, which was but a particular affection. 
Happiness (or ‘satisfaction’), the object of self-love, “consists only in the 
enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our several 
particular appetites, passions and affections”.13 But what does he mean by 
‘nature’?14 Butler discusses this explicitly, and rejects what we might call 
morally neutral senses of the term. Copleston explains that according to 
Butler, “the ‘principles’ (...) of man form a hierarchy, in which one principle 
is superior and possesses authority”: 
 
“There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, 
which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as 
his external actions: which passes judgment upon himself and them; 
pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, 
good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust...”15 
 
Copleston summarizes: “In so far as conscience rules, therefore, a man acts 
according to his nature, while in so far as some principle other than 
conscience dictates his actions, these actions can be called disproportionate 
to his nature. And to act in accordance with nature is to attain happiness.”16 
 Just as there was no hair upon Butler’s head (or in his wig) that 
doubted the existence of God, Butler entertained no doubts concerning the 
existence of conscience as a natural endowment of man. In this respect he 
did not differ from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson – or, for that matter, from 
virtually any reasonable man in his time. He did differ from them in having a 
more pessimistic view of the world, which, as Willey points out, need not 
surprise us, given that Butler was “the champion of orthodoxy” in his time.17 
Despite what may appear to us as defects in the constitution of the world, 
there was proof enough for Butler that, as Willey says, “God is governing the 
world righteously”. The strongest evidence that this is the case “is to be 
found in our own conscience: we know (...) that ‘upon the whole’, virtue 
produces happiness and vice misery”.18 
 Yet, it is important to see that, even though following conscience 
and obtaining happiness generally coincide, to pursue one’s own happiness 
and to follow one’s conscience are not the same thing. Nor does our 
conscience tell us to do something because it is conducive to our happiness. 
                                                 
13 Copleston (1964), 196; he quotes from Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the 
Rolls Chapel, (Gladstone’s edition, 1896), 11, 6; (Gladstone vol.) II, p. 196. 
14 For Butler on this question, see also Willey (1968), 85-87. 
15 Copleston (1964), 198; quoted from Butler, Sermons, 11, 10; II, p. 79. 
16 Idem. Hence, Copleston notes, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between 
conscience and self-love in Butler’s thought. 
17 Willey (1968), 77. 
18 Ibid., 79. 
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To follow conscience, first of all, is to act in accordance with human nature. 
Secondly, conscience tells us which action is in conformity with our nature.19 
“The goodness or badness of actions arises simply ‘from their being what 
they are; namely, what becomes such creatures as we are, what the state of 
the case requires, or the contrary’.”20 Butler believed that reasonable people 
were generally very well able to discern what the proper course of action was 
in various circumstances: 
 
“[L]et any plain honest man, before he engages in any course of action, ask 
himself, Is this I am going about right, or is it wrong? Is it good, or is it 
evil? I do not in the least doubt, but that this question would be answered 
agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost any fair man in almost any 
circumstance.”21 
 
“[I]n general there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard of it (of 
virtue). It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in 
public; it is that which every man you meet puts on the show of: it is that 
which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the 
face of the earth make it their business and endeavour to enforce the 
practice of upon mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common 
good.”22 
 
 Conscience is ‘naturally’ superior over the other constituents of 
human nature. It is possible to act against a certain passion without 
contradicting nature; it is not possible to act against self-love without doing 
so. Hence the natural superiority of the principle of self-love. That 
conscience (or ‘reflection’) is ‘naturally’ the most superior principle of all is 
for Butler, in Willey’s words, ‘still more emphatically’ clear.23 It may not 
always be superior in power – in fact, it often is not – but it is certainly 
superior in authority. 
 
“Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it had manifest authority, it 
would absolutely govern the world.”24 
 
“It is by the possession of that ‘magisterial faculty’, conscience, which is 
‘natural’ to man, that he becomes a moral agent, and a law to himself.”25 We 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 85. 
20 Copleston (1964), 200; quoted from the preface to the Sermons, 33; p. 25. 
21 Idem; quoted from Butler’s Sermons, 3, 4; II, p. 70. Cf. Willey (1968), 96. 
22 Ibid., 201; quoted from Joseph Butler, Dissertation of the Nature of Virtue, 3; I, pp. 
399-400. 
23 Willey (1968), 90. 
24 Idem; he quotes from Joseph Butler, Three Sermons on Human Nature, 3rd ed., 1855, 
70. 
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are to obey conscience, simply because “[y]our obligation to obey this law is 
its being the law of your nature”. Hence, Willey writes that “[t]he imperative 
of conscience is ‘categorical’”.26 “Conscience does not only offer itself to 
show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority 
with it...”27 
 There is a strongly anti-utilitarian element in Butler’s thought, then. 
He takes issue with authors who imagine “the whole of virtue to consist in 
singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the 
happiness of mankind in the present state”; he seems to allude to 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson here.28 For Butler, conscience is concerned with 
right conduct, regardless of the consequences of that conduct. We are simply 
unable, given the complexity of the world, to succeed in making the right 
moral calculus each time we are to decide upon what to do. It would be 
dangerous to try it; the only safe way to decide is to rely upon one’s 
conscience and one’s sense of duty.29 Self-love and virtue may generally lead 
to the same thing (happiness), but this is not guaranteed in this life; 
exceptions to the general rule “all shall be set right at the final distribution of 
things”.30 But however this may be, the only moral motive for virtuous 
action is that it is right and good; the proper reason to do what is right is that 
our conscience tells us to. “Moral action springs only from according to 
conscience the ‘absolute authority which is due to it’.”31 
 Butler, to sum up, emphasizes the element of authority – his 
restriction (in line with the greater part of the history of thought on the 
subject, but against Shaftesbury and Hutcheson) of the judgement of 
conscience to its ‘owner’, and his insistence on deontological rather than 
utilitarian considerations, are both related to that (either as support, or 
consequence, or both). He shared with Enlightenment thinkers an emphasis 
on the autonomy of conscience, it being a ‘law unto itself’. David White 
remarks: “Butler does sometimes refer to the conscience as the voice of 
God, but contrary to what is sometimes alleged, he never relies on divine 
authority in asserting the supremacy, the universality or the reliability of 
conscience. Butler clearly believes in the autonomy of the conscience as a 
secular organ of knowledge.”32 His thought also constitutes a further step in 
the process of ‘doctrinalization’, in the sense that the existence of conscience 
as an in fact rather mysterious entity is simply posited and seen as beyond 
                                                                                                               
25 Idem. 
26 Ibid., 91; he quotes from Butler, Three Sermons, 78. 
27 Copleston (964), 201; citation from Butler, Sermons, 3, 6; II, p. 71. 
28 Willey (1968), 92; quoted from Butler, Three Sermons, 99. 
29 Ibid., 93. 
30 Ibid., 91. 
31 Ibid., 87. 
32 White, “Joseph Butler (1692-1752)”. 
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question, and because it is equally assumed that concerning the contents of 
conscience reasonable men will be in virtual agreement. Here is something 
else that Butler had in common with Enlightenment thought: universalism 
with regard to human nature, and universalism with regard to morality. We 
will see the same in the next subsection, which deals with the thought of 
Adam Smith, and in the subsection after that, concerning Kant – Kant, 
however, made the most impressive effort to provide his universalism with a 
foundation. Butler transformed the moral sense theory significantly, placing 
far greater emphasis on reason and reflection. The latter is sometimes 
identified with conscience; but then it must be an ambiguous notion, for 
Butler also famously spoke of a: 
 
“moral faculty, whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or 
divine reason, whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or 
as a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including 
both.”33 
 
Finally, in view of the following sections, it is worth to consider Copleston’s 
observation that “we find in both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, with their 
emphasis on virtue and character, a point of departure for an ethics based on 
the idea of the self-perfection of man or on the harmonious and complete 
development of human nature rather than on the principles of hedonistic 
utilitarianism. And in so far as Butler adumbrated the idea of a hierarchy of 
principles in man under the dominating influence of conscience, he helped 
to develop this idea.”34 
 
 
5.2. CONSCIENCE AS AN AGENT OF THE PERFECTION OF MAN AND 
 SOCIETY 
 
5.2.1. Adam Smith 
After Hume probably the most famous Scottish philosopher, Adam Smith 
(1723-1790) derives his fame mostly from his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations. He wrote another major work, however, namely The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments; and it is this work that is of interest to me here. Its 
first line clearly reveals to what discussion he wishes to contribute: 
 
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
                                                 
33 Copleston (1964), 211; 198. 
34 Ibid., 212. 
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render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it.”35 
 
The book shows the influence, firstly, of Stoic philosophy, and secondly, of 
his forerunner Hutcheson, and his contemporary and friend David Hume.36 
In their introduction to The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Raphael and Macfie 
point out that “[b]oth Hutcheson and Hume gave prominence, in their 
ethical theories, to the approval of ‘a spectator’ or of ‘every spectator’, even 
of ‘a judicious spectator’” and that “[t]he originality of Adam Smith’s 
impartial spectator lies in his development of the idea so as to explain the 
source and nature of conscience, i.e. of a man’s capacity to judge his own 
actions and especially of his sense of duty.”37 
 This original contribution was directly related to the problem of the 
authority of conscience. Hence, the only chapter in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments which has ‘conscience’ in its title is called “Of the Influence and 
Authority of Conscience”. In a letter to William Strahan, whom he asks to 
read the revised manuscript of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith writes: 
 
“I know how much I shall be benefitted and I shall at the same time 
preserve the pretious right of private judgement for the sake of which our 
forefathers kicked out the Pope and the Pretender. I believe you to be 
much more infallible than the Pope, but as I am a Protestant my conscience 
makes me scruple to submit to any unscriptural authority.”38 
 
‘Any unscriptural authority’ means: ‘any unscriptural authority but my own 
reason and conscience’. It is a matter of conscience not to ‘submit to’ any 
external authority apart from the Bible. So Smith’s attempt to give 
conscience an authority of its own flowed from his Protestantism as much as 
his being an Enlightenment philosopher. It is important not to ‘give all the 
credit’ (or blame, of course) to the Enlightenment; not to forget, that is, that 
a puritan like Milton wrote: 
 
“A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because 
his pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other 
reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his 
heresy. 
 There is not any burden that some would not gladlier post off to 
another than the charge and care of their religion.”39 
                                                 
35 Smith (1982b), 1. There are several other explicit references to Hobbes; see ibid., 
315-319, and cf. Smith (1982a), introduction, paragraph 2. 
36 Shaftesbury is twice mentioned; the influence of Butler is indirect. 
37 Smith (1982b), Introduction, 15. 
38 Smith (1987), Letter 50. 
39 Milton (1918), §§ 61-62. 
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 Now, Smith endeavours to explain the authority of conscience, to 
give it a foundation. In a couple of places, he contrasts his own position with 
that of Hutcheson and, possibly, Henry Home (Lord Kames), both of whom 
had put forward a ‘moral sense’ theory. Recall the quotation from the latter 
in chapter 1: 
 
“[C]onscience, or the moral sense, is none of our principles of action, but 
their guide and director. (...) [T]he authority of conscience does not consist 
merely in an act of reflection. It arises from a direct perception, which we 
have upon presenting the object, without the intervention of any sort of 
reflection. And the authority lies in this circumstance, that we perceive the 
action to be our duty (...). It is in this manner that the moral sense, with 
regard to some actions, plainly bears upon it the marks of authority over all 
our appetites and passions. It is the voice of God within us which 
commands our strictest obedience, just as much as when his will is declared 
by express revelation.”40 
 
In views like this and those of Hutcheson, we see the advent of a particular 
form of ethical intuitionism, which invites an obvious critique: where does 
the authority of this intuition come from? Everybody can say they have a 
moral sense that simply tells them, immediately, what is wrong and what is 
right; but what if people ‘sense’ different things, morally? And if people have 
such an infallible moral sense, how come we do not see its effects more 
clearly? It is along this line that Smith expresses the following criticism: 
 
“So partial are the views of mankind with regard to the propriety of their 
own conduct, both at the time of action and after it; and so difficult is it for 
them to view it in the light in which any indifferent spectator would 
consider it. But if it was by a peculiar faculty, such as the moral sense is 
supposed to be, that they judged of their own conduct, if they were endued 
with a particular power of perception, which distinguished the beauty or 
deformity of passions and affections; as their own passions would be more 
immediately exposed to the view of this faculty, it would judge with more 
accuracy concerning them, than concerning those of other men, of which it 
had only a more distant prospect.”41 
 
And in his discussion of ‘systems of moral philosophy’, he vents his most 
elaborate criticism of Hutcheson’s position. Smith sees no need to suppose 
                                                 
40 Home (1976), Essay II, Chapter III, 45. It may very well be that Smith’s criticism 
of ‘moral sense’ theories was also directed at Lord Kames, for he knew his work, 
which was published a year before the first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments; 
moreover, he lectured in Edinburgh under the patronage of Lord Kames. 
41 Smith (1982b), 158 (III.4.5); the editors note that this is a criticism of Hutcheson. 
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that there is a special sense of right and wrong.42 He asks how we come to 
(dis)approve of another’s (dis)approbation of a third man’s conduct. The 
answer seems obvious to him: we approve of his (dis)approbation when it 
coincides with our own, and disapprove when it does not. So in this case, the 
“coincidence or opposition of sentiments, between the observer and the 
person observed, constitutes moral approbation or disapprobation”. Which 
leads Smith to the following rhetorical questions: 
 
“And if it does so in this one case, I would ask, why not in every other? Or 
to what purpose imagine a new power of perception in order to account for 
those sentiments?”43 
 
He then continues with two very important paragraphs, which criticize not 
only moral sense theories, but also the idea of conscience as a faculty, and 
testifies to an awareness that ‘conscience’ is in part a linguistic problem. The 
paragraphs are therefore highly important for an evaluation of Smith’s own 
theory of conscience, which is why I quote from them extensively: 
 
“Against every account of the principle of approbation, which makes it 
depend upon a peculiar sentiment, distinct from every other, I would 
object; that it is strange that this sentiment, which Providence undoubtedly 
intended to be the governing principle of human nature, should hitherto 
have been so little taken notice of, as not to have got a name in any 
language. The word moral sense is of very late formation, and cannot yet be 
considered as making part of the English tongue. The word approbation 
has but within these few years been appropriated to denote peculiarly any 
thing of this kind. (...) The word conscience does not immediately denote 
any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove.”44 
 
The phrase “which Providence (...) human nature” is an (unconscious) 
reference to Butler. The passage itself, however, is directed against 
Hutcheson. Smith uses ‘sentiment’ and ‘faculty’ interchangeably here. He 
opposes any moral theory which makes approbation and disapprobation 
depend on one sentiment, one sense, or one faculty especially set up for that 
task. He notices how recent such a faculty conception of conscience is: there 
is not even a name for the faculty yet. That is, the name that was invented, 
‘moral sense’, is rejected as being ‘not yet part of the English tongue’, and 
another likely candidate, ‘conscience’, is also disqualified for the task. Smith 
simply states that the term ‘does not immediately denote any moral faculty 
by which we approve or disapprove’. ‘Moral sense’ theorists had tried to give 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 321 (VII.iii.3.2 and 4 introduces Hutcheson’s theory, in particular the idea of 
a ‘new power of perception he called a moral sense’. 
43 Ibid., 325 (VII.iii.3.14). 
44 Ibid., 326 (VII.iii.3.15). 
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people’s judgements of right and wrong an extra-religious foundation, 
independent of external authorities; they had come up with the idea of a 
special ‘moral sense’, a faculty which enables us to distinguish right from 
wrong. They were not unaware of the need for instruction of this moral 
sense. Thomas Reid (1710-1796), for instance, compared conscience to 
seeds, implanted in the mind by God, which needed to be cultivated in order 
to make them flourish.45 Reid compared conscience to our external senses, in 
that “we are born under a necessity of trusting them”; they are all we have, 
and they give us all the security we have.46 Smith rejects this attempt to 
ground the authority of conscience, both because he judged it too weak, and 
because it required the postulation of a special faculty. But he appears 
somewhat ambiguous in this regard: 
 
“Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and 
properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary 
to its directions.”47 
 
Given what follows in the next paragraph, I take this to mean that when 
people speak of conscience, or in their experience of conscience, they 
suppose that a moral faculty exists (on the basis of which conscience 
operates), while in fact there is no such thing. Smith might be saying 
something similar to what Kant says when he speaks about the external 
judge that we must suppose to operate when our conscience accuses us – 
that is, he says that this is how people think, though he does not say, like 
Kant, that they must think this way. But another option is that we should not 
take the singular (‘faculty’, not ‘faculties’) too literally, and that Smith refers 
to the operation of several known faculties, upon which the operation of 
conscience depends. I will come back to this further on. 
 “When we approve of any character or action,” Smith says, “the 
sentiments which we feel, are, according to the foregoing system [and here 
he seems to refer to his own, not Hutcheson’s], derived from four sources 
(...)”. These are: sympathy with the motives of the agent, sympathy with the 
gratitude of the beneficiary of the actions, an observation that the agent’s 
conduct “has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two 
sympathies generally act”, and the perception of the beauty which the actions 
derive from their utility. 
 
                                                 
45 Hence the old idea of ‘synderesis’ was incorporated in a (cautious) Enlightenment 
view of the perfectibility of man, which clearly betrays a Lockean influence. The 
‘seed’ metaphor constitutes a middle position between an idea of conscience as 
‘given’ and the idea that conscience needs to be created. Cf. Porter (1990), 19-20. 
46 See chapter 10. 
47 Smith (1982b), 326 (VII.iii.3.15). 
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“After deducting, in any one particular case, all that must be acknowledged 
to proceed from some one or other of these four principles, I should be 
glad to know what remains, and I shall freely allow this overplus to be 
ascribed to a moral sense, or to any other peculiar faculty, provided any 
body will ascertain precisely what this overplus is.”48 
 
The implication is clear: we will not find any ‘overplus’. Smith, then, rejects 
the idea of a special faculty that enables us to distinguish right from wrong 
and underlies our feelings of approbation and disapprobation. Our 
conscience depends, not on the existence of one such faculty, but on the 
operation of several other, well-established and generally recognized, 
principles. Smith appears to have a very dynamic concept of conscience, 
then, very different from a faculty view or a moral sense view of conscience. 
 It would be unwise, however, uncritically to adopt Smith’s own 
comparison between his view and that of the moral sense theorists. Though 
his critique does support the idea put forward in this chapter that a 
progressive ‘solidification’ of conscience occurred in this period – that is, 
conscience was more and more perceived as something ‘solid’ – Smith 
himself contributed to this process, in spite of his criticism, and despite the 
fact that his terminology shows that he was aware of the symbolic nature of 
the terms he used. 
 Smith does not believe conscience to be innate, but he does speak of 
the ‘judge within’, ‘inmate of the breast’, ‘abstract man’, ‘representative of 
mankind’, and ‘substitute of the Deity’ as something or someone ‘whom 
nature [Nature draft 4] has constituted (...) the supreme judge’ of all our 
actions.49 And conscience arises because we have “a regard to the sentiments 
of the real or supposed spectator of our conduct”, which is a “great 
discipline which Nature has established for the acquisition of (...) every 
virtue”.50 So, even if conscience is not something people are born with, it is 
natural that they develop it. Ordinarily, then, no man will be without a 
conscience – even if it functions poorly – and hence Smith’s position is not 
too different in this respect from the one he criticizes. 
 The process by which conscience develops is initially a process of 
the development of self-command. “A very young child has no self-
command,” so Smith notes. “While it remains under the custody of such 
partial protectors [as its nurse or its parents], its anger is the first and, 
perhaps, its only passion which it is taught to moderate.” At school, the child 
finds that, to avoid the hatred or contempt of other children, and even for its 
                                                 
48 Idem (VII.iii.3.16). 
49 Ibid., 130 (from a piece of text from eds. 2-5 and some drafts, inserted by the 
editors at III.2.31). 
50 Ibid., 145 (III.3.21). 
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own safety, it has to moderate all its other passions as well, “to the degree 
which its play-fellows and companions are likely to be pleased with”. 
 
“It thus enters the great school of self-command, it studies to be more and 
more master of itself, and begins to exercise over its own feelings a 
discipline which the practice of the longest life is very seldom sufficient to 
bring to complete perfection.”51 
 
The Stoic influence is clear.52 Increasing self-command is not only a matter 
of increasing autonomy, in the sense that one is less ruled by uncontrolled 
passions, but also a matter of freeing oneself from them to some extent in 
order to gain a certain peace of mind, and a certain independence from 
external goods that excite the passions. Yet even more important is the social 
element: self-command is primarily a virtue because it is agreeable to others, 
and because it corrects one’s passions to such a degree that others can 
sympathize with them. 
 More precisely, I should say: “to such a degree that an impartial 
spectator can sympathize with them”, for although the development of 
conscience starts from a concern with the opinions and feelings of real 
spectators, this soon turns into a concern for what an imagined impartial 
spectator would feel and think of one’s motives and actions. We internalize 
this impartial point of view, and hence Smith speaks of ‘the impartial 
spectator’ as ‘the man within’ (and many other terms). When we look at 
ourselves through the eyes of the impartial spectator, we see ourselves in the 
proper perspective; that is, no longer with the partiality to ourselves that we 
naturally have: 
 
“[W]hat is it that prompt the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean 
upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of 
others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of 
benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus 
capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger 
power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It 
is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man 
within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever 
we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with 
a voice capable of astounding the most presumptuous of our passions, that 
we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it 
(...). It is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves (...).”53 
                                                 
51 Idem (III.3.22). 
52 It is also quite likely that Smith was acquainted with Locke’s work on education, 
with which his own work shows important similarities. Compare, for instance, what 
Locke said about ‘Reputation’ with the role of the real spectator in Smith’s theory. 
53 Ibid., 137 (III.3.4). 
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Having this impartial spectator to judge our motives and conduct also makes 
us independent from the praise or blame of other, real spectators, whose 
judgements also tend to be partial: 
 
“In order to defend ourselves from such partial judgments, we soon learn 
to set up in our own minds a judge between ourselves and those we live 
with. We conceive ourselves as acting in the presence of a person quite 
candid and equitable, of one who has no particular relation either to 
ourselves, or to those whose interests are affected by our conduct, who is 
neither father, nor brother, nor friend either to them or to us, but is merely 
a man in general, an impartial spectator who considers our conduct with 
the same indifference with which we regard that of other people.”54 
 
Indeed, after the publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith 
came to think less of real spectators than he at first did.55 Whereas the real 
spectator is concerned with real praise and blame, the imagined impartial 
spectator judges the praise- or blameworthiness of our motives and conduct. 
To be praiseworthy is to be the proper object of praise; hence, a sense of 
propriety underlies the moral judgements of the impartial spectator. They 
also depend on a sense of merit, which is the desert for the intended 
beneficial effects of an action. 
 Now, regarding these, in relation to the origin of the general rules of 
morality, Smith says the following: 
 
“[T]he general rules of morality (...) are ultimately founded upon experience 
of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of 
merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of.”56 
 
The passage is intended to demonstrate that rules are secondary in morality – 
a point that Smith also elaborates in his critique of casuistry – but in the 
present context it is of greater importance that he speaks of ‘moral 
faculties’.57 We saw earlier that Smith wrote that ‘conscience supposes the 
existence of some such faculty’; it now seems that there are at least two, 
upon which the operation of conscience depends. But further on, it becomes 
clear that Smith uses the term ‘faculty’ here in a different sense from that in 
which he used it when he spoke of Hutcheson’s ‘moral sense’ as a faculty: 
 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 129 (from a piece of text from eds. 2-5, inserted by the editors at III.2.31). 
See also 131 (III.2.32). 
55 On this shift, see ibid., Introduction, 16. 
56 Ibid., 159 
57 Smith’s view of the necessity of using general rules and the superiority of perfect 
sensitivity to the situation is Aristotelian; cf. Nussbaum (1992). 
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“Upon whatever we suppose that our moral faculties are founded, whether 
upon a certain modification of reason, upon an original instinct, called a 
moral sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it cannot be 
doubted, that they were given us for the direction of our conduct in this 
life. They carry along with them the most evident badges of this authority, 
which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of 
all our actions (...). Our moral faculties are by no means, as some have 
pretended, upon a level in this respect with the other faculties and appetites 
of our nature (...). No other faculty or principle of action judges of any 
other. (...) But it is the peculiar office of those faculties now under our 
consideration to judge, to bestow censure or applause upon all the other 
principles of our nature. They may be considered as a sort of senses of 
which those principles are the objects. Every sense is supreme over its own 
objects. (...) The very essence of each of those qualities consists in its being 
fitted to please the sense to which it is addressed. It belongs to our moral 
faculties, in the same manner to determine (...) when and how far every 
other principle of our nature ought either to be indulged or restrained. 
What is agreeable to our moral faculties, is fit, right, and proper to be done; 
the contrary wrong, unfit, and improper.”58 
 
In this passage, very clearly reminiscent of Butler, Smith speaks of the moral 
sense as something suggested by others to underlie the moral faculties, rather 
than being a moral faculty itself. It seems that this is where we should insert 
Smith’s remarks concerning the four sources of approval or disapproval, if 
we are to understand Smith correctly. The moral faculties (the sense of 
propriety, the sense of merit, and, perhaps, the sense of duty) depend on 
those sources, and conscience (‘our consciousness of having acted agreeably 
or contrary to [the] directions [of the moral faculties]’) in turn depends on 
the moral faculties. But this, too, seems inconsistent, for Smith sometimes 
equates conscience and the impartial spectator, of which he tells us that he 
often needs to be awakened – and only when we view our own conduct (or 
that of others, for that matter) with the eyes of the impartial spectator do we 
have a (proper) sense of propriety or merit.59 Raphael and Macfie note that 
Smith’s remark that the moral faculties ‘may be considered as a sort of 
senses’ is inconsistent with his criticism of Hutcheson.60 And it is at least 
unclear whether the sense of duty is a moral faculty on a par with the others, 
for it replaces them (to a certain extent), in people who lack the proper moral 
sensitivity. The way Smith writes about it, the sense of duty also seems to 
replace conscience, or the impartial spectator, while at the same time being 
able to effect the same emotions of guilt and remorse. The sense of duty 
appears to be a surrogate conscience for the common people.61 Smith’s 
                                                 
58 Smith (1982b), 165 (III.5.5). 
59 Ibid., 134 (III.3.1). 
60 Ibid., 164, note 1. 
61 Ibid., 162-163 (III.5.1). 
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belief in the perfectibility of man was very limited, but he did believe in 
discipline and education, which could make almost any man “act upon 
almost any occasion with tolerable decency”.62 
 Smith’s contribution to reflection on conscience, then, is rather 
ambiguous. He saw his own view as markedly different from that of 
Hutcheson, but he is inconsistent in his criticism. He speaks of moral 
faculties, even though he does not see conscience as a (single) faculty. The 
way he speaks of conscience suggests a strong insistent reality, and it shows 
that he is aware of the symbolic nature of the terms he uses. The latter is 
especially clear from the great number of designations of conscience: ‘the 
man within’, ‘the (representative of the) impartial spectator’, ‘the great judge 
and arbiter of our conduct’, ‘the inhabitant of the breast’, ‘demigod within 
the breast’, ‘inmate of the breast’, ‘impartial judge’, ‘tribunal within our 
breast’, and so on; he also speaks of the ‘natural pangs of an affrighted 
conscience’ as ‘the daemons, the avenging furies, which, in this life, haunt the 
guilty’.63 And we have seen that he also spoke of ‘reason, principle, 
conscience’, and of the same as a ‘power’ and a ‘forcible motive’. Where he 
actually defines conscience, he calls it a consciousness of having acted in 
accordance with or against the directions of the supposedly existing moral 
faculty. Adam Smith’s view is not far from the fluid concept I propose in 
chapter 8; conceptually, Smith also seems to view conscience as a mode of 
consciousness that forces itself upon people on certain occasions. At the 
same time, however, we can see how he may have contributed to the 
‘solidification’ of conscience. He speaks of moral faculties; he speaks so 
frequently of the ‘impartial spectator’ as a ‘man within’ that to the reader this 
‘person’ seems to acquire a life of its own, and to become a real presence, in 
a sense – in other words, the frequent use of the symbol wears it out, renders 
it powerless. Finally, conscience as Smith sees it is very inflexible; it is solely 
concerned with keeping a person’s motives within the bounds of eternal 
propriety – a propriety that can be determined objectively, once and for all, if 
we reason well enough. Reflection upon the ‘infinite perfections’ of the 
‘Author of nature’, as well as ‘examination of the works of nature’ tell us that 
the purpose the Deity intended when he created mankind (and ‘all other 
rational creatures’) was that they should be happy. It is clear to Smith that 
“by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily 
pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind”, 
which is why we can be said to “co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as 
far as in our power the plan of Providence”.64 Smith’s confidence in reason 
is impressive; his confidence in conscience much less so. Conscience (which 
is apparently not the same as reason after all) is corruptible, and easily 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 163. 
63 For the last metaphor see ibid., 118 (III.2.9). 
64 Ibid., 166 (III.5.7). 
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silenced; moreover, it is fallible – God is the final Judge. Socrates was vain to 
think “that he had secret and frequent intimations from some invisible and 
divine Being”.65 To illustrate my point concerning Smith’s confidence in his 
knowledge regarding the propriety of things: in view of the customs of his 
time, I have no doubt that Smith would have condemned the conscience of a 
vegetarian as resulting from an excessive, that is: improper, concern for the 
well-being of animals – a greater concern for their well-being than the 
‘impartial spectator’ would be able to sympathize with. 
 Smith argued against Hutcheson, but he argued with Hutcheson 
against Hobbes.66 His criticism of Hutcheson was only partly justified. For 
Hutcheson, the moral sense was not a self-sufficient sense or instinct; as 
Copleston points out about Hutcheson’s views as found in his later works, 
“[t]he affections are Nature’s voice, and Nature’s voice echoes the voice of 
God. But this voice needs interpretation and right reason, as one of the 
functions of conscience or the moral faculty, issues commands. It is called by 
Hutcheson, using a Stoic phrase, το ηγεμονικον [‘to hegemonikon’]. Here the 
moral sense, become the moral faculty, takes on a rationalistic colouring.”67 
For Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Nature had a capital ‘N’. Smith uses the 
term in both ways, sometimes writing ‘Nature’, and sometimes ‘nature’ when 
he means ‘Nature’. His worldview is not markedly different. He did 
contribute a view – as it would turn out a highly influential view – 
concerning the origins and development of conscience, and he had a keen 
awareness of the linguistic problems inherent in conceptualizing conscience. 
Some further considerations concerning Smith in his historical context will 
follow after the next section, which deals with Kant’s concept(s) of 
conscience. 
 
5.2.2. Immanuel Kant 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is often called the greatest modern philosopher. 
His philosophical system departed in many ways from what preceded it. 
Despite many continuities with earlier thought, this also holds true for his 
concept of conscience, which was incorporated in Kant’s ethics.68 I will 
discuss Kant’s view of conscience under a number of headings: 1) 
Autonomy; 2) The definition of conscience; 3) The relation to casuistry; 4) 
The education of conscience. 
 
                                                 
65 About the imperfection of conscience see, for instance, ibid., 247 (VI.iii.25); 
concerning Socrates see 251 (VI.iii.28). 
66 See ibid., 318 (VII.3.2.), and 9, the first sentence of the book. See also 2.3.2.7. 
67 Copleston (1964), 194. 
68 It is generally the case with modern philosophers that they incorporated 
conscience in their philosophical systems, so that it was assimilated according to the 
requirements of the system. Cf. Stoker (1925), 23-24. 
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5.2.2.1. Autonomy 
 
“Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschüldeten 
Unmündigkeit.”69 
 
Thus begins Kant’s famous essay “Was ist Aufklärung?” He speaks of 
conscience twice in this essay. In the second paragraph, Kant writes: 
 
“Habe ich ein Buch, daß für mich Verstand hat, einen Seelforscher, der für 
mich Gewissen hat, einen Arzt der für mich die Diät beurtheilt, u.s.w., so 
brauche ich mich ja nicht selbst zu bemühen.”70 
 
The similarity with the passage from Milton quoted in the previous 
subsection is striking. The second time conscience is mentioned is in the 
following passage, near the end of the essay: 
 
“Ein Fürst, der es seiner nicht unwürdig findet, zu sagen : daß er es für 
Pflicht halte, in Religionsdingen den Menschen nichts vorzuschreiben, 
sondern ihnen darin volle Freiheit zu lassen, der also selbst den 
hochmütigen Namen der  Toleranz  von sich ablehnt : ist selbst aufgeklärt, 
und verdient von der dankbaren Welt und Nachwelt als derjenige gepriesen 
zu werden, der zuerst das menschliche Geschlecht der Unmündigkeit, 
wenigstens von Seiten der Regierung, entschlug, und jedem frei ließ, sich in 
allem, was Gewissensangelegenheit ist, seiner eigenen Vernunft zu 
bedienen.”71 
 
Kant’s message is clear: it is time that people start to think from themselves, 
and cease to depend on external authorities. The very position of conscience 
in the text – once occurring at the beginning, and once at the end – shows 
the importance of conscience in the general context of ‘Aufklärung’. In the 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Bloßen Vernunft Kant emphasizes that the right 
way to use the Bible is as a means to teach virtue, that it “für sich allein auf 
die Annehmung moralischer Maximen schlechterdings keinen einfluß haben 
kann und soll”, and that people can know what they need to do in order to 
be worthy of salvation ‘ohne alle Schriftgelehrsamkeit’.72 Against the casuists, 
Kant writes: 
 
“Es ist hier nicht die Frage: wie das Gewissen geleitet werden solle (denn 
das will keinen Leiter: es ist genug eines zu haben); sondern wie dieses 
                                                 
69 Kant [1784], 481. 
70 Ibid., 482. 
71 Ibid., 491-492. (Words that in the original are stressed by an increased space 
between the letters are here printed with underlining.) 
72 Kant (1995a), 162 (III.ii). 
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selbst zum Leitfaden in den bedenklichsten moralischen Entschließungen 
dienen könne.”73 
 
In the Metaphysik der Sitten, finally, Conscience is described as ‘ein Geschäfte 
des Menschen mit sich selbst’.74 
 Conscience, then, is nobody’s business except one’s own. No one 
should do something merely because someone else tells him to. While the 
Reformation launched the first assault on external authority, the 
Enlightenment, unsatisfied with the result, launched the second. This was a 
full-scale assault. There could be no authority, not even the Bible, other than 
Reason. Man was a creature endowed with Reason – if only he could be 
taught to use it. This was the other side of the coin: the destruction of 
heteronomy in the sense of external authorities giving people the law is not 
the destruction of heteronomy per se – that is, it does not create autonomy. 
As long as people are governed by their emotions and passions, there can be 
no autonomy. Autonomy means that the will is a law unto itself. This is the 
‘oberstes Prinzip der Sittlichkeit’, to choose in accordance with the 
Categorical Imperative: 
 
“Das Prinzip der Autonomie ist also: nicht anders zu wählen als so, daß die 
Maximen seiner Wahl in demselben Wollen zugleich als allgemeines Gesetz 
mit begriffen seien.”75 
 
Heteronomy of the will entails that it is the object of the will, not the will 
itself, that gives the law: 
 
“Wenn der Wille irgend worin anders, als in der Tauglichkeit seiner Maximen 
zu seiner eigenen allgemeinen Gesetzgebung (...) das Gesetz sucht, das ihn 
bestimmen soll, so kommt jederzeit Heteronomie heraus. Der Wille gibt 
alsdann sich nicht selbst, sondern das Objekt durch sein Verhältnis zum 
Willen gibt diesem das Gesetz.”76 
 
This may be the case, for instance, when the relation between will and object 
is determined by a ‘Neigung’. Hence, in order to be autonomous, people 
must control their emotions and conquer their passions: 
 
“Zur inneren Freiheit aber werden zwei Stücke erfordert: seiner selbst in 
einem gegebenen Fall Meister (animus sui compos) und über sich selbst Herr 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 222 (IV.ii.4). 
74 Kant (1995b), 528 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]). 
75 Kant (2002), 95. 
76 Ibid., 96. 
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zu sein (imperium in semetipsum), d. i. seine Affecten zu zähmen und seine 
Leidenschaften zu beherrschen.”77 
 
Kant’s emphasis on self-command resembles the Stoic self-command 
applauded by Smith, but whereas for the latter self-command was itself a 
form of propriety, a matter of constraining one’s conduct within the bounds 
of propriety, ultimately related to what is agreeable, what the impartial 
spectator could approve of, for Kant self-command is a prerequisite, the 
precondition, for being moral. We should not control our passions because 
this is what morality requires, but there would be no morality if there were 
no autonomy, no control of the passions – hence, morality requires self-
command in another sense, namely as a precondition of itself. Moreover, 
moral autonomy is part of the definition of a person: 
 
“Person ist dasjenige Subject, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig 
sind. Die moralische Persönlichkeit ist also nichts anders, als die Freiheit 
eines vernünftigen Wesens unter moralischen Gesetzen (...), woraus dann 
folgt, daß eine Person keinen anderen Gesetzen als denen, die sie (entweder 
allein, oder wenigstens zugleich mit anderen) sich selbst giebt, unterworfen 
ist.”78 
 
 The rejection of external authority must be understood in the 
context of the freshness of the religious strife of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century; the emphasis on autonomy belongs to the prospective, 
rather than retrospective, context – if there can be such a thing as a 
prospective context – of a changing society, a new view of history, and a new 
idea of man’s place in both. I will come back to this theme under point D. 
 
5.2.2.2. The definition of conscience 
Kant left us with a large number of definitions and descriptions of 
conscience. The most comprehensive study of them is Heubult’s Die 
Gewissenslehre Kants in ihrer Endform von 1797.79 I will not look into all these 
different formulations. Instead, my main focus will be on the conception that 
(arguably) fits in best with the better-known aspects of his philosophy; that 
is, with Kant’s conception of conscience in its ‘Endform’. In the 
‘Tugendlehre’ of the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant describes conscience as 
follows: 
 
“Gewissen ist die dem Menschen in jedem Fall eines Gesetzes seine Pflicht 
zum Lossprechen oder Verurtheilen vorhaltende praktische Vernunft. Seine 
                                                 
77 Kant (1995b), 492 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’, ‘Anmerkung’ between XIV and 
XV). 
78 Ibid., 267-268 (‘Einleitung in die Metaphysik der Sitten’, IV). 
79 Heubult (1980). 
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Beziehung also ist nicht die auf ein Object, sondern blos aufs Subject (das 
moralische Gefühl durch ihren Act zu afficiren); also eine unausbleibliche 
Thatsache, nicht eine Obliegenheit und Pflicht.”80 
 
Conscience, then, is contentless. That is, it does not present the subject with 
knowledge; it does not tell anyone anything he did not already know. It only 
asks whether he did his duty. As Patton puts it: “It asks whether we honestly 
believed that our action was not wrong and whether we took the trouble 
necessary to justify our belief.”81 Depending on the answer, our conscience 
either acquits or condemns us. Kant, then, puts forward a formalistic, or 
functionalistic, concept of conscience.82 Conscience works on the basis of 
what a person considers to be his duty; it does not itself judge what it is a 
person’s duty to do, and the judgement may be wrong. Conscience, however, 
cannot be wrong: ‘ein irrendes Gewissen’ is ‘ein Unding’. A person (in 
possession of his full mental capacities) cannot be mistaken as to whether he 
judged something to be his duty or not. The only judgement that conscience 
can make is that a person either did what he held to be his duty, or did what 
he believed to be wrong and against his duty. 
 There is no escaping conscience, either. People naturally have a 
number of predispositions that make them susceptible to the idea of duty. 
These are “das moralische Gefühl, das Gewissen, die Liebe des Nächsten 
und die Achtung für sich selbst”.83 There can be no duty to have these, 
because they are preconditions for the susceptibility for the concept of duty. 
The ‘moral feeling’, which is “die Empfänglichkeit für Lust oder unlust blos 
aus dem Bewußtsein der Übereinstimmung oder des Widerstreits unserer 
Handlung mit dem Pflichtgesetze”, must not be identified with the Scottish 
‘moral sense’. Kant is critical of this notion: 
 
“Wir haben aber für das (Sittlich-) Gute und Böse eben so wenig einen 
besonderen Sinn, als wir einen solchen für die Wahrheit haben, ob man 
sich gleich oft so ausdrückt, sondern Empfänglichkeit der freien Willkür für 
die Bewegung derselben durch praktische reine Vernunft (und ihr Gesetz), 
und das ist es, was wir das moralische Gefühl nennen.”84 
 
The next paragraph deals with conscience; 
 
                                                 
80 Kant (1995b), 484 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’ XIIb). 
81 Patton (1979), 242. 
82 Cf. Kittsteiner (1995), 280: “Kant kritisiert das religiös orientierte Gewissen; 
anders als die Philosophen des 17. Jahrhunderts verwirft er es deshalb aber nicht als 
Instanz, sondern er setzt es in seine Funktionen wieder ein.” 
83 Kant (1995b), 482 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’ XII). 
84 Ibid., 483 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’ XIIa). 
 250 
“Eben so ist das Gewissen nicht etwas Erwerbliches, und es giebt keine 
Pflicht sich eines anzuschaffen; sondern jeder Mensch, als sittliches Wesen, 
hat ein solches ursprünglich in sich.”85 
 
There can be no such thing as a duty to have a conscience, for one would 
need a conscience to conceive of that duty. The same goes for acting 
according to conscience: 
 
“Nach Gewissen zu handeln kann also selbst nicht Pflicht sein, weil es 
sonst noch ein zweites Gewissen geben müßte, um sich des Acts des 
ersteren bewußt zu werden.”86 
 
Hence, there is no such thing as ‘being without a conscience’ 
(‘Gewissenlosigkeit’); when people use that term, they can only mean that 
someone does not listen to his conscience. Everybody has a conscience, and 
it speaks ineluctably. One can pay no attention to it, but one cannot stop 
hearing it: 
 
“Jeder Mensch hat Gewissen [sic] und findet sich durch einen inneren 
Richter beobachtet, bedroht, und überhaupt im Respect (mit Furcht 
verbundener Achtung) gehalten, und diese über die Gesetze in ihm 
wachende Gewalt ist nicht etwas, was er sich selbst (willkürlich) macht, 
sondern es ist seinem Wesen einverleibt. Es folgt ihm wie sein Schatten, 
wenn er zu entfliehen gedenkt. Er kann sich zwar durch Lüste und 
Zerstreuungen betäuben oder in Schlaf bringen, aber nicht vermeiden dann 
und wann zu sich selbst zu kommen oder zu erwachen, wo er alsbald die 
furchtbare Stimme desselben vernimmt. er kann es in seiner äußersten 
Verworfenheit allenfalls dahin bringen, sich daran gar nicht mehr zu 
kehren, aber sie zu hören, kann er doch nicht vermeiden.”87 
 
Nor can conscience be corrupted; if someone thinks that a person’s 
conscience may judge him too mildly, he is mistaken: 
 
“Denn eben darum, weil sie frei ist und selbst über ihn, den Menschen, 
sprechen soll, ist sie unbestechlich, und wenn mann ihm in einem solchen 
Zustande nur sagt, daß es wenigstens möglich sei, er werde bald vor einem 
Richter stehen müssen, so darf man ihn nur seinem eigenen Nachdenken 
überlassen, welches ihn aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach mit der größten 
Strenge richten wird.”88 
 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 484 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’ XIIb). 
86 Ibid., 485 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’ XIIb). 
87 Ibid., 527-528 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]). 
88 Kant (1995a), 87-88 (note to II.i.c). 
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 Kant has in common with the Protestant casuists or the moral sense 
theorists discussed earlier, then, the idea that every man has a conscience. 
But where Balduin, as Kittsteiner remarked, used many qualifications to 
express a factually non-existent conscience, Kant rejects such qualifications 
on the grounds that everyone has a conscience, and this conscience cannot 
err, because that would be a logical impossibility.89 His criticism of moral 
sense theorists points to an important feature of his concept of conscience – 
a feature that is grossly overlooked by Douglas Langston, when he says that 
Kant “positioned conscience as the faculty that acts as a judge to ensure that 
moral beings do their duties” and that “under the influence of Butler and 
Kant, conscience is conceived of as an independent entity (a faculty) that is 
infallible, directive, and punitive, and the guarantor of morality”.90 This 
feature is almost the exact opposite of what Langston perceives in Kant’s 
work: it is a strong awareness of the fact that the term ‘Gewissen’ does not 
correspond with a separate entity. There is only one place in Kant’s work (as 
far as I know) in which he speaks of conscience as a faculty, namely in the 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, where he mentions the “Richteraussprüche 
desjenigen wundersamen Vermögens in uns, welches wir Gewissen 
nennen”.91 ‘Vermögen’ could be translated as ‘faculty’. In all other places 
where conscience is mentioned – most importantly: in all places where 
conscience is more elaborately discussed – it is not called a ‘faculty’. 
 That is not to say that the conceptualization is always consistent – in 
fact, it is hard to view everything Kant says in the Metaphysik der Sitten alone 
as consistent. Patton, for instance, points out the difficulty of reconciling the 
view of conscience as a predisposition to be affected by notions of duty, and 
the view that conscience is practical reason in one of its functions, or an 
intellectual disposition.92 Furthermore, in 1793 Kant wrote that conscience 
was “die sich selbst richtende moralische Urtheilskraft”, rather than 
‘praktische Vernunft’ in one of its functions, and also: “Das Gewissen ist ein 
Bewußtsein, das für sich selbst Pflicht ist.”93 This is quite problematic in 
view of the 1797 position, that to have or act according to conscience could 
not itself be a duty, because one would need another conscience to become 
aware of that duty, and so on, ad infinitum. Patton gives a plausible 
interpretation, namely that we “have a duty to apply what conscience we may 
                                                 
89 Kant also remarks that to say that someone has an ‘accomodating conscience’ 
(‘weites Gewissen’) is to say that he has none, that he is ‘gewissenlos’; Kant (1995b), 
530 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]). But this is impossible, which means 
that the formula ‘accommodating conscience’ is a contradiction in terms. 
Alternatively, ‘gewissenlos’ would have to be taken as ‘displaying a tendency to have 
no regard for conscience at all’; cf. Patton (1979), 242. 
90 Langston (2001), 84. 
91 Kant (1998), 157 (I.i.3). 
92 Patton (1979), 241. 
93 Kant (1995a), 222 (IV.ii.4). 
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have. This means only that we have a duty to be sincere and impartial in 
examining the evidence for our own innocence or guilt.”94 I will return to 
this definition of conscience under point C. 
 Kant’s conceptualization of conscience is consistent in not turning 
conscience into an entity. Whether it is a function or mode of the 
‘Urtheilskraft’ or the ‘praktische Vernunft’, it has the character of a process 
that occurs within the subject’s consciousness. That Kant writes: “Jeder 
Mensch hat Gewissen” instead of “Jeder Mensch hat ein Gewissen”, and 
that he does so immediately after the association of conscience with a 
complete internal judicial process, may not be a coincidence. On the other 
hand, it would be unwise to draw too strong a conclusion from this single 
occurrence of ‘Gewissen’ without an article, for it is indeed a single 
occurrence; everywhere else Kant uses either an article or a possessive 
pronoun. Nevertheless, to speak of ‘Gewissen’ rather than ‘ein Gewissen’ fits 
in with Kant’s conception of conscience as essentially a process of thought, 
which people can engage in with more or less vigour, and to which they can 
attend to a greater or lesser degree. 
 In this regard it is also important to note Kant’s use of metaphors, 
especially those relating to the judicial process. He writes: 
 
“Das Bewußtsein eines inneren Gerichtshofes im Menschen ‘vor welchem 
sich seine Gedanken einander verklagen oder entschuldigen’ ist das 
Gewissen.”95 
 
A bit further on, he adds: 
 
“Diese ursprüngliche intellectuelle und (weil sie Pflichtvorstellung ist) 
moralische Anlage, Gewissen genannt, hat nun das Besondere in sich, daß, 
obzwar dieses sein geschäfte ein Geschäfte des Menschen mit sich selbst 
ist, dieser sich doch durch seine Vernunft genöthigt sieht, es als auf den 
Geheiß einer anderen Person zu treiben. Denn der Handel ist hier die 
Führung einer Rechtssache (causa) vor Gericht. Daß aber der durch sein 
Gewissen Angeklagte mit dem Richter als eine und dieselbe Person 
                                                 
94 Patton (1979), 249. Cf. Kant (1995a), 223 (IV.ii.4): “[H]ier richtet die Vernunft 
sich selbst, ob sie auch wirklich jene Beurtheilung der Handlungen mit aller 
Behutsamkeit (ob sie recht oder unrecht sind) übernommen habe...” It is perhaps 
also possible that the supposed inconsistency can be resolved along the same lines as 
the general antinomy of having a duty to oneself, the solution of which requires the 
distinction between ‘homo noumenon’ and ‘homo phaenomenon’; see Kant (1995b), 
501-503 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i, ‘Einleitung’, § 1-3); the same distinction is 
used to explain how conscience can be both prosecutor and prosecuted. Cf. also the 
title of the ‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1, § 13, which deals with conscience: 
“Von der Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst, als den angeborenen Richter über 
sich selbst’. 
95 Kant (1995b), 527 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]). 
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vorgestellt werde, ist eine ungereimte Vorstellungsart von einem 
Gerichtshofe; denn da würde ja der Ankläger jederzeit verlieren. – Also 
wird sich das Gewissen des Menschen bei allen Pflichten einen Anderen 
(als den Menschen überhaupt, d. i.) als sich selbst, zum Richter seiner 
Handlungen denken müssen, wenn es nicht mit sich selbst im Widerspruch 
stehen soll. Dieser Andere mag nun eine wirkliche, oder blos idealische 
Person sein, welche die Vernunft sich selbst schafft.”96 
 
Kant uses a metaphor, and he is (of course, I would say in his case) well 
aware of that. This is not symbolic language in the sense that Kant gives a 
symbolic expression of experiences of conscience; rather, he uses symbolic 
language in a primarily indicative way, namely to indicate something which 
cannot literally be indicated. To make the metaphor work, the reader will 
have to integrate certain experiences in it; but this remains far from 
surrender to the symbolism. Kant tries to give us a way of imagining 
conscience in a manner that renders it consistent with his overarching 
philosophical system. For to resolve the ‘Ungereimtheit’ of the split self, the 
person that both judges and is judged by himself, Kant needs to introduce 
the distinction between man as phenomenon and man as noumenon: 
 
“Ich, der Kläger und doch auch Angeklagter, bin eben derselbe Mensch 
(numero idem), aber als Subject der moralischen (...) Gesetzgebung, wo der 
Mensch einem Gesetz Unterthan ist, das er sich selbst giebt (homo 
noumenon), ist er ein Anderer als der mit Vernunft begabte Sinnenmensch 
(specie diversus), aber nur in praktischer Rücksicht zu betrachten...”97 
 
The former, homo noumenon, is the accuser and judge; the latter the accused 
and judged. The paradox in the metaphor is the result of a problem that is at 
the core of Kant’s philosophy: how can man be determined and free at the 
same time? With regard to this view of conscience, a serious problem 
remains, of course, for how can Kant guarantee the purity of a noumenal self 
that is imagined by phenomenal self? 
 The resemblance between Kant’s ‘imagined real or ideal person’ and 
Adam Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ is striking. Kant is not consistent in his 
employment of the ‘inner court’ metaphor; he also speaks of conscience as 
being the judge (rather than the consciousness of the inner court).98 Smith’s 
                                                 
96 Ibid., 528 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]). 
97 Idem (note to the ‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]). See ibid., 501-503 
(‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i, ‘Einleitung’, § 1-3), and cf. Kant (1998), 156-157 
(I.i.3). 
98 One could also wonder whether conscience is supposed to be a consciousness of 
an inner court, which would be the object of that consciousness (which would 
render conscience nothing more than an awareness of things that are happening in 
the mind, in which it does not participate), or a consciousness that takes the form of an 
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impartial spectator also judges, and sometimes the emphasis lies more on 
viewing ourselves through the eyes of the spectator, so that the spectator as a 
‘man within’ recedes into the background, making way for the idea of a 
perspective on ourselves, a certain way of regarding ourselves and our 
conduct. Kant was, indeed, familiar with Smith’s theory.99 Kittsteiner quotes: 
 
“In Smiths system: warum nimmt der Unpartheyische richter (der nicht 
einer von den participanten ist) sich dessen, was allgemein gut ist, an? und 
warum hat er daran irgend ein wohlgefallen?” 
 
and he comments: “Mit diesem Hinweis deckt Kant selbst die Grundlage 
seiner eigenen These der Differenzierung des Ichs auf; zugleich zeigt seine 
Anfrage an Smith, was ihm bei diesem Ansatz fehlt: die verbindliche 
Allgemeinheit des Kategorischen Imperativs.”100 Kant struggles with the 
problem of moral motivation, considers Smith’s solution, and rejects it. 
Smith, Kittsteiner notes, followed in Locke’s footsteps. The acquisition of 
conscience is a process of socialization; it starts with the interiorization of 
the other’s perspective. Kant declines this solution, Kittsteiner says, “weil er 
relativistische Konsequenzen für eine Moral befürchtet”.101 This may be true, 
but it is worth noting that it entails a misconception of Smith’s theory, which 
(especially in the sixth edition) emphatically stresses the difference between 
the impartial and the real spectator, Smith’s confidence in the latter of which 
was also small (and increasingly so).102 Kant’s own solution to the problem 
of moral motivation, by the way, shows some signs of desperation (or else it 
is a consequence of reason reaching its limits): Kant’s answer to the question 
how conscience can be a consciousness that is a duty to itself is as follows: 
 
“Es ist ein moralischer Grundsatz, der keines Beweises bedarf: man soll 
nichts auf die Gefahr wagen, daß es unrecht sei.”103 
                                                                                                               
inner court; that is, a way of conceiving of one’s own actions as those of a person on 
trial. Cf. Kant (1995b), 530 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]): “Wenn die 
That beschlossen ist, tritt im Gewissen zuerst der Ankläger, aber zugleich mit ihm 
auch ein Anwalt (Advocat) auf...” (My italics.) This, to me, suggests the latter of the 
two alternatives. 
99 In view of the striking similarities between Kant’s theory and that of Joseph 
Butler, it is remarkable that Kant does not seem to have been directly familiar with 
the latter’s work. 
100 Kittsteiner (1995), 281; he quotes from Immanuël Kant, Reflexionen zur 
Moralphilosophie, in Kants Werke, Akademie Textausgabe, Berlin 1968, Vol. XIX, 185 
(No. 6864). 
101 Ibid., 282. 
102 Besides, Smith’s view of what was ‘proper’ also had a more ‘objective’ foundation 
in his Stoic conception of a pre-established order in the world, and in society. 
103 Kant (1995a), 222 (IV.ii.4). 
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To ask why not is to ask one question too many.104 
 Despite this difference between Kant’s and Smith’s views, they are 
in many respects similar. The reason why in conscience we must conceive of 
our accuser and judge as another person is that otherwise ‘the accuser would 
always lose’ – in other words: impartiality is what is at stake here. Referring 
to § 14 and § 15 of the ‘Ethische Elementarlehre’ in the Metaphysik der Sitten, 
Patton writes: “The first duty of man towards himself is to know himself (...). 
From this there follows a direct duty to be impartial in judging ourselves 
before the law and sincere in our admissions of moral worth or 
worthlessness.”105 The function of Smith’s impartial spectator is to make 
man see himself in the proper perspective, just as (in)significant as everybody 
else – as in the utilitarian adagium: ‘all counting for one, and none for more 
than one’. Another important similarity between the positions of Kant and 
Smith lies in the relation of conscience to God. Concerning the imagined 
other in the court of conscience, Kant writes: 
 
“Eine solche idealische Person (der autorisirte Gewissensrichter) muß ein 
Herzenskündiger sein; denn der Gerichtshof ist im Inneren des Menschen 
aufgeschlagen – zugleich muß er aber auch allverpflichtend, d. i. eine solche 
Person sein, oder als eine solche gedacht werden, in Verhältniß auf welche 
alle Pflichten überhaupt auch als ihre Gebote anzusehen sind: weil das 
Gewissen über alle freie Handlungen der innere Richter ist. – Da nun ein 
solches moralisches Wesen zugleich alle Gewalt (im Himmel und auf 
Erden) haben muß, weil es sonst nicht (...) seinen Gesetzen den ihnen 
angemessenen Effect verschaffen könnte, ein solches über alles 
machthabende moralische Wesen aber Gott heißt: so wird das Gewissen als 
subjectives Princip einer vor Gott seiner Thaten wegen zu leistenden 
Verantwortung gedacht werden müssen: ja es wird der letztere Begriff 
(wenn gleich nur auf dunkele Art) in jenem moralischen Selbstbewußtsein 
jederzeit enthalten sein.”106 
 
For Kant, the concept of conscience inevitably leads to the idea of God as 
the Almighty, to whom we account for our deeds. Our duties must be 
thought of as his commands. What was reality for Paul, for Augustine, and 
                                                 
104 Cf. Kant (2002), 124-125 (III, ‘Von der äußersten Grenze aller praktischen 
Philosophie’): “[W]ie das bloße Prinzip der Allgemeingültigkeit aller ihrer Maximen [die der 
Reinen Vernunft] als Gesetze (...) ohne alle Materie (Gegenstand) des Willens, woran 
man zum voraus irgend ein Interesse nehmen dürfe, für sich selbst eine Triebfeder 
abgeben und ein Interesse, welches rein moralisch heißen würde, bewirken, oder mit 
anderen Worten: wie reine Vernunft praktisch sein könne, das zu erklären, dazu ist alle 
menschliche Vernunft gänzlich unvermögend, und alle Mühe und Arbeit, hiervon 
Erklärung zu suchen, ist verloren.” 
105 Patton (1979), 247. 
106 Kant (1995b), 529 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]). 
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for Luther – the reality of the ‘coram deo’ – has become something only a 
few steps away from a thought-experiment in Kant’s philosophy. But as it is, 
it is still more than that: it does not have the freedom from commitment of a 
thought-experiment – it is how we must think of conscience.107 However this 
may be, the main point is that we find similar suggestions in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. 
 
“Since these [the moral faculties], therefore, were plainly intended to be the 
governing principles of human nature, the rules which they prescribe are to 
be regarded as the commands and laws of the Deity, promulgated by those 
vicegerents which he has thus set up within us.”108 
 
For Smith, too, it is not a case of it being so, that the dictates of conscience are 
in fact those of God – but we must regard them as such.109 Even if the last 
clause was also intended to be part of our way of regarding the rules given by 
the moral faculties, however, the phrase ‘were plainly intended’ shows that 
for Smith there really is a superhuman reality behind conscience – indeed, 
behind everything. This is Nature; but as it is hard to think of Nature as 
commanding us, we must suppose this to be the work of the Deity. While 
Smith and Kant use the same manoeuvre to enforce the authority of 
conscience, then, they ground this authority differently. For Kant, the 
authority of conscience is grounded in Reason; in Smith’s case, it is finally 
grounded in Nature, and Reason can testify to this. 
 Another interesting issue is raised by the quotation from Kant 
above. “Eine solche idealische Person,” Kant says, “muß ein 
Herzenskündiger sein.” Does he mean to say that conscience judges our 
motives for action? Patton also discusses the matter. He sees as an implication 
of Kant’s use of judicial metaphors that, as courts are concerned with 
external actions rather than inner motives, so too the conscience proclaims 
us guilty when we have broken the moral law, not when we had the wrong 
motive.110 But, as Patton points out, Kant argues that the first command of 
all duties to ourselves is the following: 
 
“Erkenne (erforsche, ergründe) dich selbst nicht nach deiner physischen 
Vollkommenheit (der Tauglichkeit oder Untauglichkeit zu allerlei dir 
beliebigen oder auch gebotenen Zwecke), sondern nach der moralischen in 
                                                 
107 However, (idem): “Dieses will nun nicht so viel sagen als: der Mensch, durch die 
Idee, zu welcher ihn sein Gewissen unvermeidlich leitet, sei berechtigt, noch weniger 
aber: er sei durch dasselbe verbunden ein solches höchste Wesen außer sich als 
wirklich anzunehmen...” 
108 Smith (1982b), 165. 
109 Both Kant and Smith also introduce the postulate of immortality. See Kant 
(1998), 194-197 (I.II.2.IV), and Smith, (1982b) 132 and 169 (III.2.33 and III.5.10). 
110 Patton (1979), 242. 
 257 
Beziehung auf deine Pflicht – dein Herz, – ob es gut oder böse sei, ob die 
Quelle deiner Handlungen lauter oder unlauter, und was entweder als 
ursprünglich zur Substanz des Menschen gehörend, oder als abgeleitet 
(erworben oder zugezogen) ihm selbst zugerechnet werden kann und zum 
moralischen Zustande gehören mag.”111 
 
Now, Patton says that “[i]f we take this, as we reasonably may, to be the 
work of conscience, conscience would seem to be concerned with our 
motives as well as with our own judgements about the rightness or 
wrongness of our actions”.112 It is unclear whether we can indeed ‘reasonably 
take this to be the work of conscience’, for Kant never explicitly says that 
conscience judges motives. Rather, he says things like: “[W]enn es aber zur 
That kommt oder gekommen ist, so pricht das Gewissen unwillkürlich und 
unvermeidlich.”113 Moreover, however this may be, Kant also says that it is 
 
“dem Menschen nicht möglich so in die Tiefe seines eigenen Herzens 
einzuschauen, daß er jemals von der Reinigkeit seiner moralischen Absicht 
und der Lauterkeit seiner Gesinnung auch nur in einer Handlung völlig 
gewiß sein könnte...”114 
 
This, by the way, explains why Kant deems it possible that a purely moral act 
has never occurred.115 It is implausible, then, that Kant would hold that 
conscience is concerned with the motives for action. 
 But what are the implications of this conclusion? How does this 
relate to Kant’s statement that “[e]s ist überall nichts in der Welt, ja 
überhaupt auch außer derselben zu denken möglich, was ohne 
Einschränkung für gut könnte gehalten werden, als allein ein GUTER 
WILLE”?116 And how to his insistence that moral worth depends on the 
motive for action, on the intention?117 It seems that the conclusion must be 
                                                 
111 Kant (1995b), 531 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.2 [§ 14]). 
112 Patton (1979), 243. 
113 Kant (1995b), 485 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’ XIIb). 
114 Ibid., 475 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’ VIII.1). Cf. ibid., 538 (‘Ethische 
Elementarlehre’ I.i.2.2): “Die Tiefen des menschlichen Herzens sind unergründlich. 
Wer kennt sich gnugsam, wenn die Triebfeder zur Pflichtbeobachtung von ihm 
gefühlt wird, ob sie gänzlich aus der Vorstellung des Gesetzes hervorgehe, oder ob 
nicht manche andere, sinnliche Antriebe mitwirken...” 
115 See Kant (2002), 49 (II, paragraph 3), Kant (1995a), 93 (note), and Kant (1995b). 
116 Kant (2002), 28 (I, paragraph 1). 
117 See, for instance, Kant (1995a), 176 (III, ‘Allgemeine Anmerkung’): “Das höchste, 
für Menschen nie völlig erreichbare Ziel der moralischen Vollkommenheit endlicher 
Geschöpfe ist aber die Liebe des Gesetzes.”; Kant (1995b), 262 (‘Einleitung in die 
Metaphysik der Sitten’ III): “Man nennt die bloße Übereinstimmung oder 
Nichtübereinstimmung einer Handlung mit dem Gesetze ohne Rücksicht auf die 
Triebfeder derselben die Legalität (Gesetzmäßigkeit), diejenige aber, in welcher die 
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that conscience does not relate to morality in optima forma. However 
important a principle it may be, it cannot say anything about what makes an 
action truly moral, namely that it was done for the sake of duty alone. The other 
way around: had someone reached the pinnacle of morality – something that 
is factually out of reach for human beings – this person, though he would 
still have a conscience, would have no need for it anymore. Someone who 
has the ‘Liebe des Gesetzes’ need not be reminded of his duty. Again, a 
remarkable similarity with Adam Smith’s views comes in view. For Smith, 
duty is born from necessity, simply because most people do not have a very 
refined moral sensitivity; therefore, they need moral rules and the duty to 
stick to these rules. This, however, is not the pinnacle of morality, but a 
surrogate used for want of the real thing. Kant’s conscience is, in the final 
reckoning, in a similar position to Smith’s duty; he may not so clearly see it 
as merely the next-best thing, but this is probably because Kant does not 
know anybody who has even come close to moral perfection, rather than 
because conscience is in fact not merely the next-best thing. Conscience is 
necessary because people generally do not have the pure ‘Gesinnung’ that 
perfect morality requires. An important difference between Kant and Smith 
lights up at the same time: Smith’s conscience is concerned with inner 
motives. Moral perfection, for Smith, would lie in the complete 
interiorization of and identification with the impartial spectator. But Smith, 
too, is aware of the fallibility of the impartial spectator, as it is, after all, a 
human construct.118 Finally, it is worth noting that Kant and Hume also both 
agree and completely disagree with each other with regard to the locus of 
moral worth. They agree that moral worth depends on intentions and 
motives; they fully disagree in what constitutes a worthy motive. The only 
truly moral motive for Kant is duty itself; for Hume, the opposite is true: 
something done from nothing other than a sense of duty is morally 
worthless.119 
 The last question I will consider with regard to Kant’s descriptions 
of conscience is how they relate to experience. I have already said that Kant’s 
symbolic language is not primarily expressive of experiences of conscience, 
but rather used in an indicative fashion. With Kant, as with Smith, 
conscience is too much locked up in a philosophical system for the concept 
to do justice to the plurality of experiences of conscience. Kant’s conceptual 
                                                                                                               
Idee der Pflicht aus dem Gesetze zugleich die Triebfeder der Handlung ist, die 
Moralität (Sittlichkeit) derselben.”; Kant (1999b), 33 (‘Siebenter Satz’): “Alles gute 
(...) das nicht auf moralisch-gute Gesinnung gepropft ist, ist nichts als lauter Schein 
und schimmerndes Elend.”; cf. also Kant (1998), 240ff, especially 250 (part II, 
‘Methodenlehre’), and Kant (2002), part I, 37-38. 
118 See, for instance, Smith (1982b), 131 (III.2.32) and 247 (VI.iii.25). 
119 Hume (2000), 308: “In short, it may be established as an undoubted maxim, that 
no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce 
it, distinct from the sense of its morality.” 
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inconsistencies are at least partly due to other aspects of the experience of 
conscience bursting through the systematic framework. But there is a 
relation with experience. Kant’s concept of conscience suggests a particular, 
(to me) readily recognizable phenomenology of conscience: that of the 
nagging feeling or the accusing voice that haunts you when you know you 
have done something wrong – that is, something which you held to be 
wrong. It happens quite often that people do things while, even at the time 
of the action (or before), they know they should not do it. Then there is the 
contrast between acknowledged duty and an action that contradicts this 
knowledge and this duty. Kant reduces conscience to this particular 
manifestation of it, and this makes his concept one-sided, but it is 
nevertheless a recognizable concept of conscience, with a recognizable 
relation to experience. 
 
5.2.2.3. The relation to casuistry 
“In [Kant’s] moralphilosophie”, Kittsteiner says, “führt die Kasuistik ein – 
zumeist nur wenig beachtetes – Nachleben.”120 There is no place for it in the 
‘Rechtslehre’, because its duties are strict: they are to be fulfilled by 
prescribed actions. In ethics, duties are ‘wide’; that is, they relate to the 
maxims for action, rather than to the actions themselves. And so the question 
may arise how a certain maxim is to be applied in a particular case, which 
leads to casuistry.121 Kant discusses several ‘cases of conscience’: suicide, sex 
for other purposes than procreation, and intoxication, for instance. Another 
– famous – example is the question whether one is allowed to lie to save 
someone’s life, about which Kant wrote an article in 1797: “Über ein 
vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen”. Where casuistry would have 
said: “Yes, under such extreme circumstances as brought forward here, 
where a person’s life depends on it, you may lie”, Kant answers: “No”, 
adding a curious amplification, which need not bother us here. So, 
Kittsteiner asks, what is the function of this example for Kant? “Handelt es 
sich überhaupt noch um ein Beispiel im Sinne der Kasuistik?” His answer 
begins with the observation that “Kant (...) der Kasuistik einen neuen Begriff 
des Gewissens gegenüber[stellt]”.122 It is not a question for him how the 
conscience should be guided, for, as we have seen, it needs no guide. 
Conscience does not judge actions (as cases) as exemplifications of a 
particular law, for that is the work of practical reason. Conscience is practical 
reason asking itself “ob sie auch wirklich jene Beurtheilung der Handlungen 
mit aller Behutsamkeit (ob sie recht oder unrecht sind) übernommen habe, 
und stellt den Menschen wider oder für sich selbst zum Zeugen auf, daß 
                                                 
120 Kittsteiner (1995), 205. 
121 Kant (1995b), 497 (‘Einleitung zur Tugendlehre’ XVIII, ‘Anmerkung’). 
122 Kittsteiner (1995), 206. 
 260 
dieses geschehen oder nicht geschehen sei.”123 So Kant departs from 
traditional casuistry, which he labels ‘eine Art von Dialektik des Gewissens’, 
which is explained by Kittsteiner as a “‘natürliche Dialektik’ die im Namen 
der Affekte und Wünsche gegen das moralische Gesetz und den 
Kategorischen Imperativ rebelliert”.124 Casuistry is the ally of desires and 
impulses that run counter to the moral law. “Die Kasuistik ist überhaupt nur 
entstanden aus der Neigung der Sinne, die Erhabenheit des Sittengesetzes zu 
ruinieren.”125 
 Kant opposes the laxity of casuistry with the rigour of Reason.126 He 
shares the Pascalian contempt for probabilism: 
 
“Es ist auch nicht schlechthin nothwendig, von allen möglichen 
Handlungen zu wissen, ob sie recht oder unrecht sind. Aber von der, die 
ich unternehmen will, muß ich nicht allein urtheilen und meinen, sondern 
auch gewiß sein, daß sie nicht unrecht sei, und diese Forderung ist ein 
Postulat des Gewissens, welchem der Probabilismus, d. i. der Grundsatz 
entgegengesetzt ist: daß die bloße Meinung, eine Handlung könne wohl 
recht sein, schon hinreichend sei, sie zu unternehmen.”127 
 
In its stead, Kant places the Categorical Imperative. What is right is right, and 
what is wrong is wrong – no matter what the circumstances or consequences 
are.128 The most striking example of this line of reasoning is the following: 
 
“Es sei z. B. der Fall: daß jemand ein anvertrautes fremdes Gut (depositum) 
in Händen habe, dessen Eigentümer tot ist, und daß die Erben desselben 
davon nichts wissen, noch je etwas erfahren können. Man trage diesen Fall 
                                                 
123 Kant (1995a), 223 (IV.ii.4). 
124 Kittsteiner (1995), 207. 
125 Idem. 
126 I will come back to Kittsteiner’s remark that “Kants Ethik wäre mißverstanden, 
wollte man sie nur mit dem Etikett des ‘Rigorismus’ bekleiden” (Kittsteiner [1995], 
285). 
127 Kant (1995a), 222 (IV.ii.4). 
128 The similarities between Kant’s and Thomas Aquinas’ views of conscience are 
often remarked upon, and rightly so, but here is an important difference. As Little 
points out, “it seems clear that Kant does place greater stress upon conscience as 
accuser and judge than as guide and director, which is Thomas’ emphasis. For 
Thomas, conscience, properly associated with the principles of συντηρησις, directs 
man, above all, to his good, or his ultimate happiness. (...) But Kant will not agree 
that conscience is first of all grounded in the rational pursuit of happiness, or in 
prudence. ‘We must (...) differentiate between the judgment of prudence and the 
judgment of conscience (...). (...) [H]e who has a sense of the wickedness of the deed itself, be 
the consequences what they may, has a conscience’.” Little (1971), 23-24; he quotes from 
Immanuël Kant, Lectures on Ethics, L. Infield (transl.), Harper & Row, New York, 
1963, 130; the italics are Little’s. 
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selbst einem Kinde von etwa acht oder neun Jahren vor, und zugleich, daß 
der Inhaber dieses Depositums, (ohne sein Verschulden) gerade um diese 
Zeit in gänzlichen Verfall seiner Glücksumstände geraten, eine traurige, 
durch Mangel niedergedrückte Familie von Frau und Kindern um sich 
sehe, aus welcher Not er sich augenblicklich ziehen würde, wenn er jenes 
Pfand sich zueignete; zugleich sei er Menschenfreund und wohltätig, jene 
Erben aber reich, lieblos und dabei im höchsten Grad üppig und 
verschwenderisch, so daß es eben so gut wäre, als ob dieser Zusatz zu 
ihrem Vermögen ins Meer geworfen würde. Und nun frage man, ob es 
unter diesen Umständen für erlaubt gehalten werden könne, dieses 
Depositum in eigenen Nutzen zu verwenden. Ohne Zweifel wird der 
Befragte antworten: Nein! und statt aller Gründe nur bloß sagen können: es 
ist unrecht, d. i. es widerstreitet der Pflicht. Nichts ist klärer als dieses...”129 
 
Here is a situation in which the answer of casuists would be clear; in which, I 
assume, our answer would be clear as well – and it would be the opposite of 
Kant’s answer. Preceding the above example is a statement concerning the 
concept of duty – that, in its total purity, it is so much simpler, clearer, so 
much more easily applicable for everybody, and more natural, than any 
motive relating to ‘Glückseligkeit’; and not only that: even in the judgement 
of those of the meanest intellectual capacities, it is a much stronger and 
much more effective motive. Kant is obviously very pleased with the 
concept of duty, and his satisfaction with it seems to be, at least partly, of an 
aesthetic nature. It is the clarity, simplicity, and purity of the concept that 
makes it so attractive – much like a mathematical proof. Kant, rather than 
rejecting the rigorous adherence to duty in view of the complexities of the 
world, applauds it for its simplicity. In this respect it is quite interesting that 
Kant says that even an eight- or nine-year-old child would know the answer. 
In the psychology of moral development, strict adherence to unquestionable 
rules belongs to the first stage (both in Piaget’s and in Kohlberg’s theory); an 
eight- or nine-year-old child will typically be in that stage, and say that 
something should not be done ‘because it is bad’ or ‘because it is against the 
law’. We regard this as immature moral thinking; Kant does not hesitate to 
invoke it as support for his argument. He maintains that it is that simple, and 
that it is so simple that even a child that age understands it. Moreover, he 
does not consider the difference that there must be between the reasoning of 
a child of that age and his own reasoning, which, in Kohlbergian terms, 
belongs at least partly to stage four (the second stage on the level of 
conventional morality). It is also unlikely that the child would have the same 
                                                 
129 Kant (1999c), 132. Kittsteiner (1995), 207, points out that Kant had discussed the 
case for the first time five years earlier, in 1788. 
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kind of ‘Achtung’ for the law Kant had, but however this may be, the child’s 
reasoning is equally simple and rigorous as Kant’s.130 
 Kant came from a pietistic family. His way of life showed the 
concern for order and discipline that we would expect from someone in that 
environment. The above example of moral reasoning also shows Kant to be 
a puritan, whether he was a devout Christian or not. He had (and advocated, 
as we will see under D) a puritan’s lifestyle, and he had a great concern for 
purity. From the latter derives his attitude to traditional casuistry, to which 
he opposed his own kind of casuistry, which Kittsteiner dubs the ‘negative 
Kasuistik’ of the Categorical Imperative, “die auf alle Anfragen aus dem 
Bereich des Besonderen und Einzelnen immer nur mit der stereotypen 
Antwort bereitsteht: ‘Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit 
zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne’.”131 Kant 
freed people from external authorities, from people who ‘guided’ their 
consciences; but while the casuists were willing to take the contingencies of 
life into account, Kant stressed the categorical nature of the moral 
imperative. ‘Thou shalt not’ knows of no contingencies. The orthodoxy of 
Reason was accompanied by another feature of this faculty: it offered the 
way to salvation. Our first duty, Kant wrote, is to know ourselves. ‘Moral 
self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom.’ To come to such 
wisdom requires, first of all, that inner hindrances be removed; that is: an evil 
will. Next, it requires 
 
“die Entwicklung der nie verlierbaren ursprünglichen Anlage eines guten 
Willens in ihm zu entwickeln (nur die Höllenfahrt des Selbsterkenntnisses 
bahnt den Weg zur Vergötterung).”132 
 
The bracketed remark is in truly Lutheran vein, with that important 
exception that for Kant man awaits no other grace than that which he 
bestows upon himself. Reason, autonomy, and morality are what distinguish 
man from beast. In the pinnacle of morality, the ‘Achtung’ and the ‘Liebe’ 
for the moral law, man realizes his full dignity. In this context Kant speaks of 
the ‘sublime’, ‘das Erhabene’. 
 
“[D]ie echte Triebfeder der reinen praktischen Vernunft (...) ist keine 
andere, als das reine moralische Gesetz selber, so fern es uns die 
Erhabenheit unserer eigenen übersinnlichen Existenz spüren läßt...”133 
 
                                                 
130 Kant refers to (young) children in support of his arguments elsewhere, too; see, 
for instance, Kant (2002), part II, 53-54 (note 2); Kant (1998), 160 (I.I.3). 
131 Kittsteiner (1995), 208. 
132 Kant (1995b), 531 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.2 [§ 14]). 
133 Kant (1998), 142 (I.I.3); also quoted in Kittsteiner (1995), 277. 
 263 
Kittsteiner comments: “Dieses Gefühl der ‘Erhabenheit’ kann erst 
erwachsen auf der Ausschaltung der ‘Gnade’ aus den Funktionen des 
Gewissens. Der ideale Bürger der Aufklärung naht sich Gott nicht mehr als 
unveränderlicher Sünder, der passiv die rechtfertigende Gnade empfängt; an 
Stelle des erlösenden Opfers Christi bringt er das mit sich selbst 
versöhnende Opfer in eigenen Person: im schmerzhaften Einschränken der 
Lust, im Abbruch an der Neigung, in der Niederschlagung der Selbstliebe. 
Hat er diese Leistung aber erbracht, so gehört auch das Gefühl des 
Triumphes ihm selbst. Was Kant der Gnade nimmt, gibt er dem Gefühl der 
menschlichen Würde.”134 Hence Kittsteiner’s caution that Kant’s ethics 
cannot merely be labeled an ethics of ‘rigourism’: “nicht zu übersehen ist der 
Anteil des narzißtischen Gewinns der Selbstbilligung, wenn ihr auch alle 
Züge einer möglichen Herkunft aus einer sozialen Billigung abgeschnitten 
sind. Auch die Annahme durch einen gnädigen Gott ist ausgestrichen; das 
ich spricht seine Gnade selbst aus.”135 
 In conclusion, however valuable Kittsteiner’s observation may be, it 
seems to me that we should take care not to think too much of the ‘feeling 
of Triumph’ adhering to the ‘self-justification’. First of all, Kant’s emphasis 
on the difficult way to this triumph is far greater than that on the triumph 
itself; his work is full of examples of the most stringent orthodoxy. A very 
striking one is the following: 
 
“Die Absicht derer, die am Ende des Lebens einen Geistlichen rufen 
lassen, ist gewöhnlich: daß sie an ihm einen Tröster haben wollen; nicht 
wegen der physischen Leiden (...), sondern wegen der moralischen, nämlich 
der Vorwürfe des Gewissens. Hier sollte nun dieses eher aufgeregt und 
geschärft werden um, was noch Gutes zu thun, oder Böses in seinen übrig 
bleibenden Folgen zu vernichten (repariren) sei, ja nicht zu verabsäumen 
(...). An dessen Statt aber gleichsam Opium fürs Gewissen zu geben, ist 
Verschuldigung an ihm selbst und andern, ihn Überlebenden; ganz wider 
die Endabsicht, wozu ein solcher Gewissensbeistand am Ende des Lebens 
für nöthig gehalten werden kann.”136 
 
Secondly, once the battle is won, the war is not over: “[S]eine Freiheit, die 
beständig angefochten wird, zu behaupten, muß er forthin immer zur 
Kampfe gerüstet bleiben.”137 Thirdly, Kant stresses the negative nature of 
the (feeling of) the good conscience; as to the acquittal by one’s conscience, 
it should be noted 
 
                                                 
134 Kittsteiner (1995), 277. 
135 Ibid., 285. 
136 Kant (1995a), 97 (II.1c). 
137 Ibid., 112 (III). 
 264 
“daß [der rechtskräftige Spruch des Gewissens über den menschen, ihn 
loszusprechen] nie eine Belohnung (praemium), als Gewinn von etwas, was 
vorher nicht sein war, beschließen kann, sondern nur ein Frohsein, der 
Gefahr, strafbar befunden zu werden, entgangen zu sein, enthalte und 
daher die Seligkeit in dem trostreichen Zuspruch seines Gewissens nicht 
positiv (als Freude), sondern nur negativ (Beruhigung nach 
vorhergegangener Bangigkeit) ist, was der Tugend, als einem Kampf gegen 
die Einflüsse des bösen Princip im Menschen, allein beigelegt werden 
kann.”138 
 
5.2.2.4. The education of conscience 
Adam Smith expressed his view of man in the following lines: 
 
“None but those of the happiest mould are capable of suiting, with exact 
justness, their sentiments and behaviour to the smallest difference of 
situation, and of acting upon all occasions with the most delicate and 
accurate propriety. The coarse clay of which the bulk of mankind are 
formed, cannot be wrought up to such perfection. There is scarce any man, 
however, who by discipline, education, and example, may not be so 
impressed with a regard to general rules, as to act upon almost every 
occasion with tolerable decency, and through the whole of his life to avoid 
any considerable degree of blame.”139 
 
I quote him here in order to show something of what belonged to the 
standard repertoire of eighteenth century thought – for compare the above 
with these remarks Kant makes: 
 
“[A]us so krummem Holze, als woraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann 
nichts ganz gerades gezimmert werden. Nur die Annäherung zu dieser Idee 
ist uns von der Natur auferlegt.”140 
 
“Welchen Ertrag wird der Fortschritt zum Besseren dem 
Menschengeschlecht abwerfen? 
 Nicht ein immer wachsendes Quantum der Moralität in der 
Gesinnung, sondern Vermehrung der produkte ihrer Legalität in 
pflichtmäßigen Handlungen, durch welche Triebfeder sie auch veranlaßt 
sein mögen; d. i. in den guten Taten der Menschen, die immer zahlreicher 
und besser ausfallen werden, also in den Phänomenen der sittlichen 
Beschaffenheit des Menschengeschlechts, wird der Ertrag (das Resultat) der 
Bearbeitung desselben zum Besseren allein gesetzt werden können.”141 
 
                                                 
138 Kant (1995b), 530 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.1 [§ 13]). 
139 Smith (1982b), 162-163 (III.5.1). 
140 Kant (1999b), 29 (‘Sechster Satz’). 
141 Kant (1999a), 197-198 (II, question 9). 
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Kant was concerned with and for the moral improvement of mankind – a 
difficult task, so he (like other Enlightenment thinkers) realized. Man needs 
to conquer evil in himself first, and he cannot do so alone, because “der 
Mensch ist ein Tier, das, wenn es unter andern seiner Gattung lebt, einen Herrn 
nötig hat.” Otherwise, he would misuse his freedom in all manner of ways. 
Even if, as a reasonable creature, he desires a law to limit the freedom of all, 
his ‘selbstsüchtige tierische Neigung’ will seduce him to make an exception 
for himself. 
 
“Er bedarf also einen Herrn, der ihm den eigenen Willen breche und ihn 
nötige, einem allgemeingültigen Willen, dabei jeder frei sein kann, zu 
gehorchen.”142 
 
In line with this somewhat frightening remark, Kant believes that the 
improvement of mankind – the German part of it, I suppose, to begin with – 
should be furthered, and should proceed, ‘top-down’, rather than ‘bottom-
up’. We cannot expect the education of the young at home or in schools to 
produce good citizens and to raise them “zum Guten, was immer weiter 
fortschreiten und sich erhalten kann”, as long as this education is not part of 
a unified programme, designed by the state for this exact purpose.143 
 Kant did his best to think along with the state in order to come to a 
proper programme of education. A crucial precondition for (some) success is 
that there is something that (moral) education can link up with. There is 
indeed in the human constitution such a point of contact; this is the Kantian 
rendering of the principle of ‘synderesis’ (though he did not use that term).144 
He gives us different formulations of this principle; in Die Religion innerhalb 
der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, where Kant discusses the question how a 
naturally evil man can turn himself into a good man, he says: 
 
“Freilich muß hiebei vorausgesetzt werden, daß ein Keim des Guten in 
seiner ganzen Reinigkeit übrig geblieben, nicht vertilgt oder verderbt 
werden konnte, welcher gewiß nicht die Selbstliebe sein kann, die, als 
Princip aller unserer Maximen angenommen, gerade die Quelle alles Bösen 
ist. Die Wiederherstellung der ursprünglichen Anlage zum Guten in uns ist 
also nicht Erwerbung einer verlornen Triebfeder zum Guten; denn diese, 
die in der Achtung fürs moralische Gesetz besteht, haben wir nie verlieren 
können, und wäre das letztere möglich, so würden wir sie auch nie wieder 
erwerben.”145 
 
                                                 
142 Kant (1999b), 28 (‘Sechster Satz’). 
143 Kant (1999a), 199 (II, question 10). 
144 Cf. Kittsteiner (1995), 273. 
145 Kant (1995a), 60-62 (I, ‘Allgemeine Anmerkung’). 
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Here, Kant’s ‘synderesis’ is the respect for the moral law that is implanted in 
man as a seed of the good – exactly like Reid’s conscience, which was also 
compared to a seed that had to be cultivated. Kant emphasizes that it is not 
enough to give the seed the freedom to develop; we must actively engage the 
enemy within us. The cultivation of good requires a fight against evil.146 
Elsewhere, Kant speaks of the removal of the obstacles on the road to 
wisdom, and “die Entwickelung der nie verlierbaren ursprünglichen Anlage 
eines guten Willens”.147 The Kantian ‘synderesis’, then, is of a more affective 
nature than conscience – although we must remember that Kant also 
counted ‘conscience’ among the ‘Ästhetische Vorbegriffe der Emfänglichkeit 
des Gemüths für Pflichtbegriffe überhaupt’. Kant’s conscience, at any rate, 
has some features of what was traditionally called ‘synderesis’; for one, that 
every man is born with a conscience. Then again, that was Bonaventure’s 
position too. It seems, in fact, that Kant is much closer to Bonaventure than 
to Aquinas, with whom he is usually associated. Like Bonaventure, Kant 
distinguishes between an affective or volitional element (analogous to 
Bonaventure’s ‘synderesis’), and an intellectual element (‘conscience’); for 
both thinkers, both ‘synderesis’ and conscience are innate.148 There is, then, 
in Kant’s thought, a point of contact for moral education in man. Instruction 
has the double task of stimulating the cultivation of this innate disposition 
towards the good, and of aiding the battle against the natural evil in man. 
 Kant laid down the basic principles of such an education in his small 
work Über Pädagogik, in which conscience has an important place.149 The 
basic need for education is posited in the first paragraph: 
 
“Der Mensch ist das einzige Geschöpf, das erzogen werden muß. Unter der 
Erziehung nämlich verstehen wir die Wartung (Verpflegung, Unterhaltung), 
Disziplin (Zucht) und Unterweisung nebst der Bildung. Demzufolge ist der 
Mensch Säugling -- Zögling -- und Lehrling.”150 
 
                                                 
146 Ibid., 72 (II). 
147 Kant (1995b), 531 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’, I.i.2.2 [§ 14]). 
148 Langston misses this resemblance completely, but then, we have already seen that 
he unjustly blamed Kant for propounding a faculty view of conscience. As to the 
comparison between Bonaventure and Kant: for the former, the liability to err arises 
with the applied conscience; in Kant’s system, practical reason occupies this place. 
149 It is also worth noting that the Metaphysik der Sitten ends with the ‘Ethische 
Methodenlehre’, which contains an ‘ethische Didaktik’ and an ‘ethische Ascetik’. The 
former is concerned with the acquisition of the virtues, ‘the first and most necessary 
instrument’ for which is a moral catechism, modelled after the religious catechism, but 
independent from it. The latter concerns the ‘culture of virtue’; it is “eine Art von 
Diätetik für den Menschen, sich moralisch gesund zu erhalten” (Kant [1995b], 575-
592). 
150 Kant [1803], 1. 
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 Education as Kant sees it aims at the cultivation of conscience – not 
merely at controlling outward behaviour. This is evident from his preference 
for moral rather than physical punishment: 
 
“Alle Übertretung eines Gebotes bei einem Kinde ist eine Ermangelung des 
Gehorsams, und diese zieht Strafe nach sich. Auch bei einer unachtsamen 
Übertretung des Gebotes ist Strafe nicht unnötig. Diese Strafe ist entweder 
PHYSISCH oder MORALISCH.  
 MORALISCH straft man, wenn man der Neigung, geehrt und 
geliebt zu werden, die Hülfsmittel der Moralität sind, Abbruch tut, z. E. 
wenn man das Kind beschämt, ihm frostig und kalt begegnet. Diese 
Neigungen müssen soviel als möglich erhalten werden. Daher ist diese Art 
zu strafen die beste, weil sie der Moralität zu Hilfe kommt, z. E. wenn ein 
Kind lügt, so ist ein Blick der Verachtung Strafe genug und die 
zweckmäßigste Strafe.  
 PHYSISCHE Strafen bestehen entweder in Verweigerungen des 
Begehrten oder in Zufügung der Strafen. Die erstere Art derselben ist mit 
der moralischen verwandt und ist negativ. Die andern Strafen müssen mit 
Behutsamkeit ausgeübt werden, damit nicht eine INDOLES SERVILIS 
entspringe. Daß man Kindern Belohnungen erteilt, taugt nicht, sie werden 
dadurch eigennützig, und es entspringt daraus eine INDOLES 
MERCENARIA.”151 
 
Kant does not want children to become ‘merchants’, trading good behaviour 
for rewards, or ‘slaves’, obeying from fear of physical punishment; he wants 
them to develop a conscience, and the method by which parents can 
stimulate this comes down to the same thing Smith says about the natural 
development of conscience: the approval and disapproval of the people 
around us make us set up in ourselves an impartial spectator, which, in turn, 
becomes (more or less) independent from the approval or disapproval of real 
spectators – as Kant envisages conscience to be. For the exact reason that 
education has to educate for autonomy, Kant rejects ‘Disziplin’, by which he 
means that outward obedience is enforced by means of punishment (and 
reward). That is, discipline is necessary to counter the animal tendencies in 
man, to control the inner savage, but cultivation is necessary to make man 
moral.152 Kant shows himself to be a true Enlightenment pedagogue, in 
emphasizing that children need to understand what they did wrong, and why it 
was wrong. Parents should give reasons and stimulate the child’s 
susceptibility to them, even when the child is still very young. It should be 
given the concepts of (what is) good and (what is) evil at an early age. 
Discipline (in the sense explained above) only leads to a habit that is easily 
lost; to punish bad and to reward good behaviour leads a child to do good 
                                                 
151 Ibid., 103-104. 
152 Ibid., 22. 
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merely ‘um es gut zu haben’.153 Hence, parents should make use of a child’s 
moral emotions (for instance by showing contempt, rather than punishing a 
child that tells a lie), and ‘moral culture’ should be based on maxims. This will 
give the child the necessary independence in a world where good behaviour 
is often not rewarded by others: 
 
“[Die Kinder] müssen lernen, die Verabscheuung des Ekels und der 
Ungereimtheit an die Stelle der des Hasses zu setzen; innern Abscheu statt 
des äußern vor Menschen und der göttlichen Strafen, Selbstschätzung und 
innere Würde statt der Meinung der Menschen -- innern Wert der 
Handlung und das Tun statt der Worte und Gemütsbewegung, -- Verstand 
statt des Gefühles -- und Fröhlichkeit und Frömmigkeit bei guter Laune 
statt der grämischen, schüchternen und finstern Andacht eintreten zu 
lassen.”154 
 
If one wishes to ground morality, Kant says, one should not punish. 
 
“Moralität ist etwas so Heiliges und Erhabenes, daß man sie nicht so 
wegwerfen und mit Disziplin in einen Rang setzen darf. Die erste 
Bemühung bei der moralischen Erziehung ist, einen Charakter zu gründen. 
Der Charakter besteht in der Fertigkeit, nach Maximen zu handeln.”155 
 
 At first these will be school maxims; later they will be those of 
mankind. In the beginning the child will obey laws; later, it will obey maxims, 
which are subjective laws that reason gives itself.156 In what follows Kant 
introduces the concept of conscience, but again in a ‘synderesis’-like fashion: 
 
“Zuerst muß man bei dem Kinde von dem Gesetze, das es in sich hat, 
anfangen. Der Mensch ist sich selbst verachtenswürdig, wenn er lasterhaft 
ist.”157 
 
“Das Gesetz in uns heißt Gewissen. Das Gewissen ist eigentlich die 
Applikation unserer Handlungen auf dieses Gesetz. Die Vorwürfe 
desselben werden ohne Effekt sein, wenn man es sich nicht als den 
Repräsentanten Gottes denkt, der seinen erhabenen Stuhl über uns, aber 
auch in uns einen Richterstuhl aufgeschlagen hat. Wenn die Religion nicht 
zur moralischen Gewissenhaftigkeit hinzukommt: so ist sie ohne Wirkung. 
                                                 
153 Ibid., 98-99. Cf. Little’s remark that for both Calvin and Kant, “the conscience is 
precisely not free, so long as it adopts as a starting-point prudential calculations” 
(Little [1971], 27). 
154 Ibid., 129. 
155 Ibid., 100. 
156 Idem. 
157 Ibid., 133. 
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Religion ohne moralische Gewissenhaftigkeit ist ein abergläubischer 
Dienst.”158 
 
Religion is nothing (or nothing good) if it does not serve a moral purpose. 
There are those who praise God – his power, and his wisdom – without 
wondering whether and how they fulfil his laws. “Diese Lobpreisungen sind 
ein Opiat für das Gewissen solcher Leute und ein Polster, auf dem es ruhig 
schlafen soll.”159 
 Towards the conclusion of his work on education, Kant connects 
his instructions for the youth with an ideal of the citizen and of society. The 
youth should be taught not to esteem himself in relation to others; to be 
conscientious, rather than merely to appear so; to be content with regard to 
outward circumstances, to be patient in work, and moderate in pleasure. 
 
“Wenn man nicht bloß Vergnügungen verlangt, sondern auch geduldig im 
Arbeiten sein will, so wird man ein brauchbares Glied des gemeinen 
Wesens und bewahrt sich vor Langeweile.”160 
 
By means of self-discipline, Kant says, people can train themselves to 
become ‘cheerful’ companions in society.161 The youth must be stimulated to 
regard many things as their duty, and to see the value of things as lying, not 
in their correspondence with our inclinations, but in their being our duty. 
Moreover, they must be encouraged in their 
 
“Menschenliebe gegen andere und dann auch auf weltbürgerliche 
Gesinnungen. In unserer Seele ist etwas, daß wir Interesse nehmen 1) an 
unserm Selbst, 2) an andern, mit denen wir aufgewachsen sind, und dann 
muß 3) noch ein Interesse am Weltbesten stattfinden. Man muß Kinder mit 
diesem Interesse bekannt machen, damit sie ihre Seelen daran erwärmen 
mögen. Sie müssen sich freuen über das Weltbeste, wenn es auch nicht der 
Vorteil ihres Vaterlandes oder ihr eigner Gewinn ist.”162 
 
With Kant, then, we see that conscience, though often couched in traditional 
formulations, is a key term in a new anthropology and a new view of society. 
If individuals cannot hope to achieve the end of moral progress in their own 
                                                 
158 Ibid., 134. 
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160 Ibid., 144. 
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lives, they can at least comfort themselves with the thought that mankind 
may reach it.163 The last duty for the educator, then, is to point man towards 
 
“die Notwendigkeit endlich der Abrechnung mit sich selbst an jedem Tage, 
damit man am Ende des Lebens einen Überschlag machen könne in betreff 
des Wertes seines Lebens.”164 
 
 
5.3. EVALUATION: PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW CONSCIENCE 
In a sense, Kant epitomizes the Enlightenment problem of grounding the 
authority of conscience, while he, in fact, made the most impressive effort to 
find a basis for it. A failure is simply most noticeable when a serious attempt 
was made. The problem is old, but for those in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century who attempted to redefine conscience and to provide it 
with a new anchorage, be it in Nature or Reason, it went back most directly 
to Hobbes and Locke, for the latter of whom the authority of conscience 
might just as well have been the authority of some old woman. Locke’s view 
was related to his rejection of any innate ideas and principles. Traditionally, 
conscience had been thought of as at least partly innate and God-given. 
Enlightenment thinkers sought a compromise, and found it in a combination 
of an innate disposition that required cultivation on the one hand, and 
acquired knowledge on the other. Despite the ingenuity of the compromise 
between the ideas of conscience as innate or acquired, symbolized in the 
seed-metaphor, however, the seeds were sown for further, more damaging 
criticism than that from which this compromise had emerged. Conceptually, 
the connection between conscience and God was gradually weakened, with 
serious implications for the authority of conscience. Several thinkers came to 
see conscience as a faculty, thus paving the way, as Langston rightly points 
out, for a rejection of conscience through a rejection of the notion of 
faculties. More generally, the term ‘conscience’ was more and more used in 
an (increasingly) indicative way, which would encourage later thinkers to 
search for what was indicated by the sign ‘conscience’ – a search that would 
lead to nothing. The more or less exclusive association, mostly by moral 
sense theorists, of conscience with the affects caused another problem. It 
constituted the beginning of the intuitionist concept of conscience, and with 
that, of the mythologization of conscience that was a prerequisite for 
nineteenth-century demythologization. The latter also related to what would 
                                                 
163 See Kant (1999b), 29 (note to the ‘Sechster Satz’): “Die Rolle des Menschen ist 
also sehr künstlich. Wie es mit den Einwohnern anderer Planeten und ihrer Nature 
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then be considered as the myth of Reason, more accurately: of man as a 
reasonable and rational creature. In retrospect then – but only in retrospect – 
we can say that the prospects for the new concept(s) of conscience were 
gloomy. 
 Especially in Smith and Kant, we have seen a remarkable Stoic 
influence. The elements of self-command, ‘autarkeia’, and (in Smith’s case) a 
form of ‘oikeosis’ come to mind. Related to the latter is a feature that 
characterized Enlightenment thought in general, a feature we might call 
‘universalism’. Enlightenment thinkers spoke about (and for) all mankind, so 
they thought. We have seen Bishop Butler speak with confidence of ‘all civil 
constitutions over the face of the earth’. When Kant spoke of the dignity of 
man, he did not merely refer to the Prussians, but to mankind, and to that in 
it that distinguished man from beast. But there is a rub. Smith’s The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, for instance, speaks in the language of universalism, but its 
pages breathe parochialism – in style, but often also in content. He writes, 
for instance: 
 
“I cannot (...) be induced to believe that our sense even of external beauty 
is founded altogether on custom. The utility of any form, its  fitness for the 
useful purposes for which it was intended, evidently recommends it, and 
renders it agreeable to us, independent of custom. Certain colours are more 
agreeable than others...”165 
 
And when he speaks of the ‘rude forests of nature’ that have been turned 
into ‘agreeable and fertile plains’, I cannot believe that Smith’s sense of what 
is agreeable can lay claim to universality.166 
 Enlightenment ‘universality’ is bound up with a new conception of 
history and society. This is remarkable in view of the Stoic influence on 
Enlightenment thought. The ‘Weltanschauung’ of Stoicism emphasized the 
uncontrollability of the external world, in view of which man needs to 
control himself, in order to free himself from the external world. It is as a 
‘Weltanschauung’ that Stoicism was highly influential in the Renaissance and 
in the Enlightenment. But in the latter period, paradoxically, the Stoic 
                                                 
165 Smith (1982b), 199 (V.1.9) (my italics). This is not to say that Smith does not 
recognize differences in custom; he speaks of differences between countries, as well 
as between ‘savages’ and ‘civilized’ people. 
166 Ibid., 183 (IV.1.10). A third example: when Smith writes (210, V.2.15) that “[o]ne 
who, in flying from an enemy, whom it was impossible to resist, should throw down 
his infant, because it retarded his flight, would surely be excusable; since, by 
attempting to save it, he could only hope for the consolation of dying with it”, this 
seems to reflect a time when parental feelings for children were in certain respects 
less intense than many people today would expect. Even if the behaviour is 
understandable, it is highly problematic (to me, anyway); Smith speaks too strongly 
and too easily in the cold voice of reason here. 
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worldview and anthropology are deployed as a crucial instrument in the 
worldly project of the self-realization and perfection of man and society – 
this is what we might call the ‘inverted Stoicism’ of the Enlightenment. On 
the one hand, this strategy is still based on the thought that external goods 
(including the praise of others) are beyond our control; on the other hand it 
is driven by the idea of the malleability and perfectibility of society. Self-
command is no longer just an instrument of individual ‘autarkeia’, but also, 
and more importantly, a tool for the adjustment of social relations. In this 
form, Stoicism was in many respects the reasonable Christian faith of the 
modern world.167 
 The eighteenth century saw the birth of philosophical history, which 
entailed the attempt to write a universal history of mankind from its savage 
beginnings to its civilized state (in Western Europe). References to the 
‘savage’ (whether considered as ‘noble’ or not) serve a double purpose: on 
the one hand, they are essential to a contrastive construction of European 
(civilized) identity; on the other, they serve to support a linear progress view 
of the development of society. Smith speaks with limited knowledge but less 
limited admiration of savages and barbarians; to him, the savage is noble in 
many respects – though that does not inhibit his view of human progress.168 
Even Kant, who hardly ventured beyond the borders of his hometown 
Königsberg, felt at liberty to write about the ‘Arathapescau- und den 
Hundsribben-Indianen’, living in perpetual state of war with each other, a 
war with no other purpose than ‘bloß das Todtschlagen’.169 In Kant’s case 
the admiration was lacking. Enlightenment thinkers in general saw human 
progress, including the moral improvement of man himself, as an attainable 
ideal.170 They believed in a science of human nature as a means to attain this 
ideal.171 The knowledge this provided could be used to educate people to 
their full humanity. Kant advised: “lebe der Natur gemäß”, but also: “mache 
dich vollkommener, als die bloße Natur dich schuf”.172 Individual (moral) 
progress went hand in hand with that of society (and Western society 
represented the progress of mankind) – an ethics of self-realization with a 
political programme. Under the influence of social contract theory, society 
came to be seen, atomistically, as a collection of individuals, each with their 
own motion; hence they often collided. This element of competition had to 
harnessed and restrained, but could then be put to use, as Smith explained 
                                                 
167 See chapter 3 and Salomon (1963), chapter 1. 
168 Ibid., 205ff. (V.2.8ff.). 
169 Kant (1995a), 45 (first note to I.III). 
170 Kant did make some reservations, which I have noted before. 
171 A science which, in Hobbes’ days, was still in its infancy, as Smith observes 
(Smith [1982b], 319; VII.iii.2.5). 
172 Kant (1995b), 504 (‘Ethische Elementarlehre’ I, § 4). Cf. Smith (1982b), 168 
(III.5.9). 
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most clearly in his seminal Wealth of Nations. That Smith conceived of society 
as a collection of individuals is also evident from his remark that 
 
“[w]e are no more concerned for the destruction or loss of a single man, 
because this man is a member or part of society, and because we should be 
concerned for the destruction of society, than we are concerned for the loss 
of a single guinea, because this guinea is part of a thousand guineas, and 
because we should be concerned for the loss of the whole sum.”173 
 
The word ‘member’ suggests an organic metaphor, but the comparison of 
society to a bag of guineas destroys it. There are no relations among guineas; 
hence the whole is not more than the sum of the parts.174 Smith probably 
believed that the whole of society was more than the sum of its parts, but 
without being aware of it he expressed a different view. Every man is just 
one man for himself, but as he lives in society, his relations with other 
individuals must be regulated. That this is what morality is concerned with is 
a view that emerges from the thought of both Smith and Kant, even if both 
sought to go beyond that, grounding morality in Nature or Reason. It is 
fitting that both Kant and Smith see the principle of justice as basic to 
society.175 Their views of conscience fit in this framework. Little rightly 
observes that conscience, for Kant, “has to do initially and basically with 
what is owed or not owed to another”, since “[t]he very act of conceiving of 
another is, for Kant, to conceive of one to whom respect is owed”.176 
 There is thus an egalitarian aspect to Enlightenment ethics and social 
and political philosophy, which may be considered as good, but there is also 
a downside. Kittsteiner aptly remarks that, with the new (progress) view of 
society, the moral conduct of a simple head of the family “bekommt eine 
welthistorische Dimension”. Hence the strictness of the moral imperative, 
that now applies equally to everyone: “nicht mehr nur für eine Elite von 
‘Wiedergeborenen’, sondern für den universalisierten Begriff des 
Menschen”.177 The old ‘coram deo’ has become a ‘coram societate’. 
Kittsteiner explains how for Kant, Smith, and Rousseau (whom I will discuss 
shortly), conscience relates to society – and society includes everybody.178 
                                                 
173 Smith (1982b), 89 (II.ii.3.10). 
174 Cf. Kant (1995b), 375 (‘Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre II, ‘Das 
Staatsrecht’, § 45): “Ein Staat (civitas) ist die Vereinigung einer Menge von Menschen 
unter Rechtsgesetzen.” (My italics.) 
175 Smith (1982b), 86 (II.ii.3.4), sees beneficence as the “ornament which 
embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building”, while justice “is the 
main pillar that upholds the whole edifice”. 
176 Little (1971), 24. 
177 Kittsteiner (1995), 210. 
178 We find a clear expression (and in some respects a radicalization) of this aspect of 
Enlightenment views of conscience in Ritchie (1891), 141: “[T]he dictates of a man’s 
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“Die Moralphilosophie der Aufklärung redet nicht mehr in zwei Diskursen, 
sondern nur noch in einer Sprache. Verstärkung für die Gewissen erhofft sie 
nicht mehr aus den Gnadenmitteln der Kirche, sondern aus der Struktur 
dieser neuen Gesellschaft selbst.”179 Equality had to paid for by discipline, of 
which freedom and autonomy were to be the result. The old ‘package deal’ 
for the common people, rejected by Enlightenment philosophers, consisted 
of: 1) obedience; 2a) a reward in heaven, or 2b) a punishment in hell 
(preceded by one in conscience). The philosophers’ ‘new deal’ contained: 1) 
obedience (with a view to later autonomy); 2) the philosophers’ word that 
one would probably be rewarded for good behaviour with happiness in this 
life; 3) the comforting thought, (which, for some philosophers, was indeed 
merely a thought), that the unfairness of this life would be redressed in the 
life hereafter. It is questionable whether this constituted a great improvement 
in the eyes of those for whom the new deal was designed. 
 What all this meant for the experience, symbolization, and 
conceptualization of conscience cannot be summarized in a few words; 
besides, the legacy of Enlightenment thought is highly ambiguous. It might 
be thought that the faculty view of conscience, the view of conscience as a 
‘solid’ entity, corresponds to a stronger and more regular experience of 
conscience. The very insistence on the need for moral education, which 
brings with it a strong emphasis on the element of authority, suggests that 
this can only have been true for an elite; nevertheless, it seems likely that for 
this group, conscience had become a stronger reality. On the one hand, this 
would have contributed to the increasingly indicative understanding of 
conscience. On the other hand, and in combination with this indicative 
understanding, it would have contributed to the strength of the symbol of 
conscience. This is a paradox, of course, but it seems probable that the 
strength of a symbol depends on a certain degree of ‘forgetfulness’ of its 
symbolic nature. A total surrender to a symbol implies such forgetfulness to a 
certain extent. This is what makes symbols so brittle. Those who remain 
aware of the symbolic nature of symbols retain a measure of distance 
between themselves and the symbol, and will not so easily be carried away by 
it. Those, on the other hand, who forget that a symbol is ‘just’ a symbol, will 
be able to surrender themselves to it in full, and be carried away by it. Such 
forgetfulness, however, at the same time undermines the power of the 
symbol. This would also be the lot of the eighteenth-century concept of 
                                                                                                               
conscience will on the whole correspond to the better spirit of the community round 
him, or at least to what he regards as such; and therefore the man who 
[conscientiously] disobeys a law is acting in the interests of what he conceives to be 
the future well-being of society.” This is a radicalization of Enlightenment views in 
the sense that conscience is not just formed by society, and does not merely serve 
the interests of society, but also has those interests as its object. 
179 Ibid., 215. 
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conscience. Through the forgetfulness of the symbolic nature of conscience 
inherent in it (which occurred despite the use of metaphors), it contributed 
to the mythologization of conscience which was a prerequisite for its later 
demythologization. Through its emphasis on the social nature of conscience 
(both in origin and in application), it invited deconstruction as a mere 
product of the human mind, a symbol of subjectivity. Finally, with respect to 
Kant: his concept of conscience suffered from the same problems twentieth-
century functionalist concepts of conscience had to face. One of them is the 
problem of the subjectivity of conscience, to which the functionalist concept 
of conscience provides a solution by leaving it aside – hence, the problem 
remains. All Enlightenment concepts of conscience suffered from this fatal 
flaw: they leaned to heavily on the requirement not to ask any further 
questions. 
 
 
5.4. SOME NOTES ON THE ROMANTIC CONSCIENCE 
“The Romantic movement was the protest of the non-specialist against what 
the Age of Reason had made of human life.”180 It was a protest against 
formality, in favour of spontaneity; against common sense, in favour of 
feeling and intuition, against the explanation of nature, and for an attitude of 
admiration and wonder in view of its mysteries. As mysticism was a reaction 
to scholasticism, then, Romanticism was a reaction to the cult of reason. Late 
medieval religious movements, humanism, and the Reformation renounced 
the corruption of society, and, more importantly, the church. Romantic 
thought despised the corruption that pervaded modern society, and sought 
to revive a purer man, in tune with Nature and his own true self. This, at 
least, is the opposition between Enlightenment and Romanticism drawn to 
its extreme. In reality, they are hard to define independent from each other. 
As always, in reality, the distinctions that worked so well in theory are no 
more than blurry outlines at best. Feelings, for most intellectuals (a term I 
use to include both the philosophers and the artists of the period), did not 
replace reason, but got to work alongside it. “Sensationalist psychology had 
always insisted that knowledge came from the sense, that the passions were 
the winds which alone could drive the ship forward, even if their excess 
might overwhelm it. Conversely, the new cult of sensibility, though it 
emphasized conflict and apparent disharmony in man and nature, remained 
true to the belief in a providential order within which all ‘natural’ aspirations 
could be reconciled.”181 
 Romanticism had consequences for ethics and morality. There was a 
tendency, as Copleston writes, to ‘ethical subjectivism’; “to depreciate fixed 
universal moral laws or rules in favour of the free development of the self in 
                                                 
180 Cragg (1979), 283. 
181 Hampson (1968), 187. 
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accordance with values rooted in and corresponding to the individual 
personality”, “to emphasize the free pursuit by the individual of his own 
moral ideal (the fulfilment of his own ‘Idea’) rather than obedience to 
universal laws dictated by the impersonal practical reason”.182 Thus we find 
in Diderot’s Neveu de Rameau the following dialogue, quoted by Hampson: 
 
“‘The point is, father, that in the last resort the wise man is subject to no 
law...’ 
‘Don’t speak so loudly.’ 
‘Since all laws are subject to exceptions, the wise man must judge for 
himself when to submit and when to free himself from them.’ 
‘I should not be too worried if there were one or two people like you in the 
town, but if they all thought that way I should go and live somewhere 
else.’”183 
 
The ethical subjectivism Copleston speaks of received what may be its most 
poignant expression in the work of Emerson (1803-1882) and Thoreau 
(1817-1862). For them, there was hardly a greater virtue than conscientious 
non-conformism. Emerson writes: 
 
“Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist. He who would gather 
immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must 
explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your 
own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the 
world.”184 
 
Rousseau, too, in some of his works expresses a moral subjectivist view: 
 
“Whatever I feel to be right is right. Whatever I feel to be wrong is wrong. 
The conscience is the best of all casuists... Reason deceives us only too 
often and we have acquired the right to reject it only too well, but 
conscience never deceives.”185 
 
                                                 
182 Copleston (1963), 14. 
183 Hampson (1968), 190. 
184 Emerson (1981), 141. Cf. Thoreau (1993), 3: “A very few, as heroes, patriots, 
martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men, serve the State with their consciences 
also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part...”, and 7: “Action from principle, - 
the perception and the performance of right, - changes things and relations; it is 
essentially revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with any thing which was. It 
not only divides states and churches, it divides families; aye, it divides the individual, 
separating the diabolical in him from the divine.” 
185 Rousseau, Nouvelle Héloise, quoted in Hampson (1968), 195; cf. Rousseau (1991b), 
286: “The best of all casuists is the conscience; and it is only when one haggles with 
it that one has recourse to the subtleties of reasoning.” 
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 Rousseau is a perfect example of someone in the twilight zone 
between Enlightenment and Romanticism. This makes him very interesting. 
There seems to be a tension between what he writes about conscience in 
Nouvelle Héloise, Julie, and other works on the one hand, and what he says 
about morality (and not about conscience) in The Social Contract. Whereas the 
common Enlightenment view was that ‘self-love and social’ are the same, 
Rousseau saw that both nature and society are full of conflict.186 Society, 
moreover, was corrupt. “Empirical observation of existing society and 
utilitarian arithmetic provide neither the solution to moral problems nor a 
sense of obligation sufficient to drive us to discharge unwelcome duties. To 
know what we should do we must ‘consult the inner light’, rentrer en soi-même, 
seek the innate principle of justice and virtue au fond de nos âmes.”187 Everyone 
has such an inner light, it “speaks at least as clearly to the peasant as to the 
philosopher”, Hampson writes.188 But conscience is the ‘love of the good’, 
the ‘love of order’, the ‘voice of the soul’ that calls us (back) to our humanity 
– it is not knowledge.189 It stands in need of enlightenment.190 Reason and 
conscience may combine to oppose convention, the existing social order. 
But in The Social Contract Rousseau says that “each of us puts his person and all his 
power in common under the supreme direction of the general will”.191 Moreover, he 
writes that the passage from the natural to the civil state 
 
“produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for 
instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had 
formerly lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of 
physical impulses and right of appetite, does man, who so far had only 
considered himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and 
to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations.”192 
 
It seems that the two positions are reconcilable, if we take Rousseau to mean 
that man, au fond, is a social creature, with a natural love of the good, which 
is a love of order, which order is a societal order. Conscience calls man to his 
                                                 
186 Hampson (1968), 189-190. 
187 Ibid., 195. 
188 Idem. 
189 See Bendik-Keymer, “Rousseauian Conscience”, 20-21. Bendik-Keymer contrasts 
Rousseau’s position with those of Butler and Smith, of whom he gives interesting 
discussions. In Nouvelle Héloise, Rousseau writes: “Dieu ne l'a point animé pour rester 
immobile dans un quiétisme éternel; mais il lui a donné la liberté pour faire le bien, la 
conscience pour le vouloir, et la raison pour le choisir.” Cf. Hampson (1968), 194. 
190 Ibid., 22. Rousseau is not completely consistent on this point, as is clear from the 
quotation above, in which conscience is called ‘the best of all casuists’. Cf. Hampson 
(1968), 184-185, 198. 
191 Rousseau (1991b), 192 (ch. 6 of The Social Contract; italics in original). 
192 Ibid., 195 (ch. 8). 
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humanity – this brings him into society. But when society becomes corrupt, 
it is also conscience that comes to oppose this society, exactly by calling the 
individual back to true humanity. When the societal order becomes corrupt, 
it comes closer to that state of nature in which there is no justice, no right. It 
is in such a situation that conscience, as the love of order and the good, 
speaks up, and guided by reason leads man towards a just society, which is 
what Rousseau envisaged in The Social Contract.193 
 More than forty years before Kant, Rousseau wrote his famous work 
on education, Emile. Kant hailed its publication as an event comparable to 
the French Revolution.194 Emile concerns the question of how to return 
corrupted man to himself – a new ‘natural’ self, that of the citizen. This 
requires a ‘healing education’, which Rousseau tries to design in Emile.195 
Such an education would raise children to morally autonomous and 
independent citizens – the same goal Kant later envisaged. But there is an 
important difference between Rousseau and Kant. Whereas the latter, 
despite his assertion that in man a seed of the good remains, had a rather 
pessimistic view of human nature, Rousseau saw man as naturally good. He 
emphasized the innateness of conscience, although he also recognized that it 
needed to be informed by reason.196 Rousseau saw conscience as a matter of 
intuition and feeling – but it was not to be mistaken for bodily emotions: 
“Conscience is the voice of the soul; the passions are the voice of the body. 
Is it surprising that these two languages often are contradictory?”197 
Sometimes he appears to trust conscience more than reason: 
 
“Too often reason deceives us. (…) But conscience never deceives; it is 
man’s true guide. It is to the soul what instinct is to the body; he who 
follows conscience obeys nature and does not fear being led astray.”198 
 
 Rousseau was well aware of those who criticized the idea of an 
innate conscience. Thus, when he writes: 
 
“There is in the depths of souls, then, an innate principle of justice and 
virtue according to which, in spite of our own maxims, we judge our 
actions and those of others as good or bad. It is to this principle that I give 
the name conscience.” 
                                                 
193 Given what Rousseau says about the change in man that is the result of the 
passage from a state of nature to a civil state, there also seems to be a double view of 
conscience in the sense that for Rousseau there is both a ‘natural’ conscience (‘the 
love of order’) and a ‘civil’ conscience (‘the voice of duty’). 
194 Rousseau (1991a), 4 (translator’s introduction). 
195 Ibid., 3. 
196 Ibid., 286, 289; 67. 
197 Ibid., 286. 
198 Ibid., 286-287. 
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- he immediately continues: 
 
“But at this word I hear the clamor of those who are allegedly wise ringing 
on all sides: errors of childhood, prejudices of education, they all cry in a 
chorus. Nothing exists in the human mind other than what is introduced by 
experience, and we judge a thing on no ground other than that of acquired 
ideas. They go farther. They dare to reject this evident and universal accord 
of all nations.”199 
 
In what follows, Rousseau criticizes Montaigne, imploring him whether he 
can honestly say that there is any place on earth where “it is a crime to keep 
one’s faith (…), where the good man is contemptible and the perfidious one 
honored”. Rousseau is optimistic about human nature: “love of the good and 
hatred of the bad are as natural as the love of ourselves”; these are natural 
sentiments, not acquired ideas, and “[t]he acts of the conscience are not 
judgements but sentiments”.200 Rousseau’s concept of conscience was 
egalitarian, for everyone is born with a conscience; moreover, it is the 
concept of something divine and immortal. It is only because in society men 
forget the language of nature that so few listen to conscience. In the 
combination of these elements lies the revolutionary potential of the 
Rousseauian conscience: 
 
“Conscience, conscience! Divine instinct, immortal and celestial voice (…); 
infallible judge of good and bad which makes man like unto God (…). (…) 
Thank heaven, we are delivered from all that terrifying apparatus of 
philosophy. We can be men without being scholars.”201 
 
 We can see how Rousseau could influence many different thinkers, 
with widely divergent views. On the one hand he could inspire “the revolt of 
the individual against conventional values and restraint of every kind” that 
reached its climax in the German Sturm und Drang.202 Individualists, almost 
anarchists, like Emerson and Thoreau picked up on the same aspect of 
                                                 
199 Ibid., 289. Cf. 382: “A rule prior to opinion exists for the whole human species.” 
200 Ibid., 290. 
201 Idem. I should note that the Stoicism that is a part of Enlightenment ethics is just 
as much a part of Rousseau’s. That conscience is a natural sentiment does not mean 
that people should just follow their inclinations, of whatever kind they be: “Who, 
then, is the virtuous man? It is he who knows how to conquer his affections; for 
then he follows his reason and his conscience; he does his duty; he keeps himself in 
order, and nothing can make him deviate from it. Up to now you were only 
apparently free. You had only the precarious freedom of a slave to whom nothing 
has been commanded. Now be really free. Learn to become your own master. 
Command your heart, Emile, and you will be virtuous.” (Ibid., 444-445.) 
202 Hampson (1968), 201. 
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Rousseau’s thought. On the other hand, Rousseau influenced philosophers 
like Kant and the German philosophical Romantics. Hegel is often counted 
as one of them, but it is clear that he was not a Romantic in any more 
popular sense, and that he is not the clearest exponent of philosophical 
Romanticism. His view of conscience is Rousseauian; Hegel envisaged that 
the subjective conscience would (have to) be taken up in the Sittlichkeit, so as 
to become identical with the common good.203 Rousseau’s ethic was 
romantic in that it was an ethic of self-realization; in this respect, though in a 
more complicated way perhaps, Hegel’s ethic was Rousseauian and 
romantic.204 Rousseau also seems to anticipate Heidegger’s concept of 
conscience. For Heidegger, conscience was the voice that calls the individual 
to an ‘Eigentlich’ (‘authentic’) existence; it is a call to live one’s own life, 
instead of having it lived for one by ‘das Man’.205 
 It is not hard to see how some form of the Romantic conscience 
could (later) be an inspiration to conscientious objectors (like Thoreau). The 
Romantic conscience, the ‘inner voice’, was a symbol rather than a 
concept.206 It expressed a feeling of inspiration, rather than an experience of 
authority. Like the Enlightenment conscience, it rejected external authority – 
but the Romantic rejection had the character of a revolt. It distinguished 
itself from the more traditionally religious conscience in being heroic. This 
conscience did not make cowards of men, but it empowered them. The 
Miltonian puritan conscience did the same, but the Romantic conscience was 
more in touch with the general spirit of the age, which was primarily 
interested in man’s present life and his relations to nature and society – the 
Romantics were interested in infinity, but spoke of it in naturalistic terms. 
                                                 
203 Thus Hegel provided his own solution to the Rousseauian problem: “‘The 
problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the 
whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, 
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as 
before.’” (Rousseau [1991b], 191). 
204 Bendik-Keymer, “Rousseauian Conscience”, 24; Beiser (2005), 39. Beiser says 
that “[t]he romantic ethic of self-realization has to be conceived in contrast against 
its two main alternatives: the utilitarianism of Bentham and Helvetius (...) and the 
ethics of duty of Kant and Fichte”. We have seen, however, that Kant’s ethic also 
includes the element of self-realization. Hegel’s position with respect to conscience 
is of course more nuanced and complicated than sketched above; cf. Beiser (2005), 
203-204. 
205 See 1.5.2; for Heidegger’s concept of conscience see 7.1.4, Kukla (2002), and 
Schalow (1998). 
206 Cf. Copleston (1963), 18: “The typical romantic was inclined to conceive the 
infinite totality aesthetically, as an organic whole with which man felt himself to be 
one, the means of apprehending this unity being intuition and feeling rather than 
conceptual thought. For conceptual thought tends to fix and perpetuate defined 
limits and boundaries, whereas romanticism tends to dissolve limits and boundaries 
in the infinite flow of Life.” 
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 Though I speak of the Romantic conscience, it was in line with the 
spirit of the age that many Romantics would scorn conscience as a product 
and symptom of outdated and withered religious beliefs. Schiller, in The 
Robbers, writes: 
 
“Conscience! oh yes, a useful scarecrow to frighten sparrows away from 
cherry-trees; it is something like a fairly written bill of exchange with which 
your bankrupt merchant staves off the evil day.”207 
 
He also speaks of “a conscience after the newest fashion, one that will 
stretch handsomely as occasion may require”, and of ‘that howling beast, 
conscience’.208 But the rejection of the concept, understood in a particular 
(narrow) way, does not mean that the Romantics did not have their own 
symbolizations of conscience. These were often ambiguous, but they made 
explicit what Enlightenment thought tried to obscure: the mythical character 
of (the authority of) conscience.209 Where Kant would give ‘conscience’ a 
prominent place among those characteristics of human beings that set them 
apart from animals, Goethe avoids the term in his poem Das Göttliche – but 
the gist of it is not very different: 
 
“Edel sei der Mensch, / Hülfreich und gut! / Denn das allein / 
Unterscheidet ihn / Von allen Wesen, / Die wir kennen. 
 
Heil den unbekannten / Höhern Wesen, / Die wir ahnen! / Ihnen gleiche 
der Mensch; / Sein Beispiel lehr uns / Jene glauben. 
 
(...) 
 
Nur allein der Mensch / Vermag das Unmögliche: / Er unterscheidet, / 
Wählet und richtet (...) 
 
Er allein darf / Den Guten lohnen, / Den Bösen strafen, / Heilen und 
retten (...) 
 
(...) 
 
Der edle Mensch / Sei hülfreich und gut! / Unermüdet schaff er / Das 
Nützliche, Rechte, / Sei uns ein Vorbild / Jener geahneten Wesen!”210 
                                                 
207 Schiller [1778]. 
208 Schiller [1778], Act 1, Scene 1; Act 1, Scene 2. 
209 See Begemann (1991). 
210 Goethe (1989). See also the third verse of the poem “Vermächtnis” (297): “Sofort 
nun wende dich nach innen, / Das Zentrum findest du dadrinnen, / Woran kein 
Edler zweifeln mag. / Wirst keine Regel da vermissen: / Denn das selbständige 
Gewissen / Ist Sonne deinem Sittentag.” (Also quoted in Reiner [1976], 302.) 
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Conscience is ennobled by the example of a Higher Being, whose existence 
we suspect, in Kantian terms: imagine. 
 The Romantic imagination was often stirred by the wonders of 
nature, and it was surrounded by nature that Rousseau “was most aware of 
his own individuality and of that inner voice which he believed to be attuned 
to God.”211 Hampson notes that this “emotional communion with a deity 
who was formless but felt, who spoke in terms of feelings of guilt and virtue 
rather than through awareness of logic and order, set Rousseau apart in 
France”.212 But it shows that Romanticism could go hand in hand with a 
conscience that was traditional in the sense that it could trouble the 
individual with feelings of guilt. Romanticism, insofar as it can be 
distinguished from the Enlightenment, both anticipated nineteenth criticism 
of conscience, and stimulated the mythologization of conscience that invited 
such criticism, a demythologization. It exposed the feeble foundation of 
conscience, partly by its own critique, partly by attempts to find a stronger 
one. Whitehead described Romantic emotion as “essentially the excitement 
consequent on the transition from the bare facts to the first realisations of 
the import of their unexplored relationships”.213 With the nineteenth-century 
exploration of these relationships – the relations between human nature, 
society, morality, education, feelings, emotions, reason, (et cetera), and 
conscience – the excitement would wane, and not much of conscience 
remain. 
                                                 
211 Hampson (1968), 206. 
212 Ibid., 206-207. 
213 Whitehead (1962), 28. 
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A Romantic expression of conscience: Wordsworth’s The Prelude,
or Growth of a Poet’s Mind (1805) 
 
In his autobiographical poem The Prelude, or Growth of a Poet’s Mind 
(1805) William Wordsworth describes a fearful experience from his 
childhood. One evening, when he was walking outside alone as he often 
did, he came upon a small boat tied to a willow tree at the edge of a lake. 
He stole it; that is, he took it without permission to row unto the moon-lit 
lake with it. 
 
“(...) It was an act of stealth 
And troubled pleasure; not without the voice 
Of mountain-echoes did my Boat move on (...) 
 
Rocks rose up above the ‘Cavern of the Willow tree’ whence he got the 
boat, and he fixed his eyes on its ‘craggy ridge’, which formed the 
horizon. 
 
(...) lustily 
I dipp’d my oars into the silent Lake 
(...) 
When from behind that craggy Steep, till then 
The bound of the horizon, a huge Cliff, 
As if with voluntary power instinct, 
Uprear’d its head. I struck, and struck again, 
And, growing still in stature, the huge Cliff 
Rose up between me and the stars, and still, 
With measur’d motion, like a living thing, 
Strode after me. With trembling hands I turn’d, 
And through the silent water stole my way 
Back to the Cavern of the Willow tree.” 
 
The experience described here (in retrospect, obviously) is commonly 
seen as an expression of conscience. Several passages in the context of 
this part of The Prelude add plausibility to such an interpretation. Nature 
is presented as the source of conscience. The experience may literally be 
phantastic, illusory, hallucinatory – and yet it is an experience of 
conscience, and this experience is about something: the hallucination 
shows itself as a way of experiencing moral normativity. Wordsworth’s 
example may serve here as a reminder of the fact that conscience is 
primarily a matter of experience and its symbolic expression – an 
expression that need not include the term ‘conscience’. 
 
William Wordsworth, The Prelude, or Growth of a Poet’s Mind, (Text of 1805), 
Oxford University Press, London, 1969, 11-12. 
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6. Between symbol and doctrine (5): the second wave of 
 criticism – the nineteenth century 
 
“With respect to blushing from strictly moral causes, we meet with the 
same fundamental principle as before, namely, regard for the opinion of 
others. It is not the conscience which raises a blush, for a man may 
sincerely regret some slight fault committed in solitude, or he may suffer 
the deepest remorse for an undetected crime, but he will not blush. (...) [A] 
man may be convinced that God witnesses all his actions, and he may feel 
deeply conscious of some fault and pray for forgiveness; but this will not, 
as a lady who is a great blusher believes, ever excite a blush. The 
explanation of this difference between the knowledge by God and man of 
our actions lies, I presume, in man's disapprobation of immoral conduct 
being somewhat akin in nature to his depreciation of our personal 
appearance, so that through association both lead to similar results; whereas 
the disapprobation of God brings up no such association.” 
CHARLES DARWIN, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, John 
Murray, London, 1872, 333-334. 
 
“[T]he season of Fiction is now over...” 
JEREMY BENTHAM, The Theory of Fictions, 122, in C. K. Ogden, Bentham’s 
Theory of Fictions, Routledge, London, 2000. 
 
 
6.1. PREPARATIONS: FROM ‘NATURE’ TO ‘NATURE’ 
Enlightenment philosophers (still) tended to think of nature as Nature; that 
is, with reverence. It was a beautiful, harmonious system, that provided for 
everything. Its wisdom was sometimes beyond man’s intelligence, but that its 
arrangements were wise was beyond question. Adam Smith notes that people 
tend to judge actions by their consequences, rather than the intentions 
behind them. “That the world judges by the event, and not by the design, has 
been in all ages the complaint, and is the great discouragement of virtue. (...) 
Nature, however, when she implanted the seeds of this irregularity in the 
human breast, seems, as upon all other occasions, to have intended the 
happiness and perfection of the species.”1 Smith also tells us that “to raise 
and support [the immense fabric of human society] seems in this world (...) 
to have been the peculiar and darling care of Nature”.2 But another image of 
nature also emerges from his work – or at least another side to this one. He 
writes that 
 
“self-preservation, and the propagation of the species, are the great ends 
which Nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals. (...) 
                                                 
1 Smith (1982b), 104-105 (II.iii.3.1-2). 
2 Ibid., 86 (II.ii.3.4). 
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[I]t has not been entrusted to the slow and uncertain determinations of our 
reason, to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has 
directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate instincts. 
Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of pleasure, 
and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, 
and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends 
which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.”3 
 
The implications are ambiguous. Nature always has man’s happiness in view; 
it has a Director (also called the Author of nature), who intends the same; yet 
there is also a darker side to nature – not everything seems, at first sight, to 
be arranged in a desirable way, not everything is harmonious. The most basic 
drives and instincts, that in themselves (for Smith) are not worthy of esteem, 
are the means Nature uses to reach more noble ends.4 
 But for all the ambiguity, there was a clear trend towards an 
understanding of ‘nature’ that precluded its being written with a capital ‘N’. 
Neither Hobbes nor Locke would have agreed that ‘self-love and social’ were 
the same. They emphasized the violence in nature, the violence that was 
nature, which left people with no other option than to live in society, 
governed by a sovereign ruler. It is nature in this sense, a name for the blind 
collision of forces – as well as, on another level, for a closed, law-governed, 
mechanical system – that increasingly attracts the philosopher’s attention. 
This is equally true for human nature. With Hobbes and Locke, all the 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 77-78 (II.i.5.10). 
4 The idea of ‘natural instincts’ was far from new. Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) saw 
religion as a ‘natural instinct’, that all men share, and that had inspired Egyptian 
priests, Hebrew prophets and Platonic philosophers alike (Dupré [1993], 200-201). 
Robert Greene traces the term to Jean Gerson (1363-1429) and Christopher St. 
German (1460-1541), and states that the popularity of Calvin’s Institutes contributed 
greatly to the term becoming “part of the vocabulary in which man’s natural 
knowledge of God was discussed” (Greene [1991a], 215). The ‘natural instinct’ 
terminology was adopted by, for example, Edward Herbert (1583-1648) and Francis 
Bacon (1561-1626). The latter speaks of an ‘inward instinct’. Greene describes 
Herbert’s concept of ‘natural instinct’ as “the immediate instrument or manifestation 
of universal divine providence intending and inclining the world and all that it 
contains towards its own preservation and the full realization of its own nature” 
(Greene [1991a], 216-217). Rousseau, to conclude, in one place refers to conscience 
not as a ‘natural instinct’, but as an ‘instinct divin’, a divine instinct (see chapter 5). 
With these authors, the notion of a ‘natural instinct’ hovers somewhere in between 
the old idea of ‘synderesis’ and the idea of a blind impulse. In Herbert’s case, the 
ideas of self-preservation and self-realization go hand in hand, as many eighteenth-
century philosophers would in fact agree. Both self-preservation and self-realization 
require ‘sociality’, for man is a social being, a ‘zoon politikon’. If self-preservation 
and self-realization both tend in that direction, is it strange that Alexander Pope 
(1688-1744) wrote that ‘self love and social’ would be the same? (See Porter [2001], 
175-176.) 
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ingredients were there for a new recipe for man – a recipe that did not 
include a divine part of human nature like the spark of conscience. Of course 
they did not move that quickly. Man still had possession of that noble faculty 
of Reason, even if John Doe did not inspire much confidence in the use to 
which that faculty was put. “The proper study of mankind is man,” wrote 
Alexander Pope, and the new study of man was interested in psychology, 
rather than pneumatology; it studied the faculties of the psyche, rather than 
the immortal soul.5 Just as we can dissect the body and analyze its parts, so, 
the adherents to the science of man thought, we ought to be able to dissect 
and analyze the mind. Hence Roy Porter called his chapter on the British 
Enlightenment study of man “Anatomizing Human Nature”. He quotes 
Thomas Reid, who said that “it must be by an anatomy of the mind that we 
can discover its powers and principles”.6 
 David Hume (1711-1776) was a key figure in this movement. The 
subtitle of his A Treatise of Human Nature was Being an Attempt to Introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects – an echo, so Porter 
suggests, of the following remark by Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727), from the 
final pages of his Opticks: “And if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by 
pursuing this Method, shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral 
Philosophy will also be enlarged.”7 Hume conceived of nature as the 
unknowable reality that gives rise (in an unknowable way) to all our 
experiences. He simply assumed, as a matter of common sense, that there 
was such a nature, a ‘real order of existence’, in Willey’s words, and he 
assumed that our ideas could be correct representations of nature. The 
distinction between correct and false ideas can only be made on the basis of 
the ‘vivacity, or firmness, or steadiness’ of correct ideas; fictitious ideas feel 
different.8 (This, by the way, is a far cry from Hobbes’ and Locke’s views on 
subjective certainty.) As sensible men agree about reality, ‘nature’ can be said 
to be “the mental habit of all men – except perhaps lunatics, lovers, and 
poets”.9 There is nothing exalted, then, about what Hume calls ‘nature’. He 
notes that ‘nature’ is a word “than which there is none more ambiguous and 
equivocal”.10 It can be meant as the opposite of the miraculous, in which 
case “not only the distinction betwixt vice and virtue is natural, but also 
every event, which has ever happen’d in the world, excepting those miracles, on 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 156, 170. 
6 Ibid., 163; quoted from Gladys Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Enquiry of the 
Eighteenth Century, Kelley, New York, 1968, 131. 
7 Porter (2001), 161; quoted from Sir Isaac Newton, Opticks, or A Treatise of the 
Reflexions, Refractions, Inflections & Colours of Light, (Smith and Walford, London, 1704), 
William and John Innys, London, 1721, Query 31, 381. Cf. Hume (2000), 
I(ntroduction) 15; cf. also Willey (1968), 111-112. 
8 Willey (1968), 114-115; Hume (2000), 68 (1.3.7). 
9 Willey (1968), 118. 
10 Hume (2000), 304 (3.1.2). 
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which our religion is founded”. ‘Nature’ may also be the opposite of ‘rare and 
unusual’, and Hume states that 
 
“[w]e may only affirm on this head, that if ever there was any thing, which 
cou’d be call’d natural in this sense, the sentiments of morality certainly 
may; since there never was any nation of the world, nor any single person 
in any nation, who was utterly depriv’d of them, and who never, in any 
instance, show’d the least approbation or dislike of manners. These 
sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without 
entirely confounding the human mind by disease or madness, ’tis 
impossible to extirpate and destroy them.”11 
 
Finally, ‘nature’ may be opposed to ‘artifice’, “and in that sense it may be 
disputed, whether the notions of virtue are natural or not”.12 Justice is an 
example of an artificial virtue, as it produces “pleasure and approbation by 
means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and 
necessities of mankind”.13 In the above quotation about the ‘naturalness’ of 
the moral sentiments, Hume appears to be of one mind with the casuists 
discussed in chapter 3, as well as with Butler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. 
The last sentence recalls ancient formulas regarding ‘synderesis’, the ‘spark of 
conscience which was not even extinguished in the breast of Cain’. But 
Hume replaces both ‘synderesis’ and conscience with moral sentiments, with 
feelings of approbation and disapprobation. Hume bases morality on ‘nature’ 
in a new way, anticipated by Hobbes and Locke, for the former of whom 
“Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which 
in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different”.14 In a 
discussion “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature”, Hume notes 
that in order to acquire knowledge of human nature, man is often compared 
to animals, or one man to another. The only useful comparison, however, is 
that between “the different motives or actuating principles of human nature, 
in order to regulate our judgment concerning it”.15 For, “[w]ere our selfish 
and vicious principles so much predominant above our social and virtuous, 
as is asserted by some philosophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 305 (3.1.2). Willey (1968, 122) notes that Hume “is aware (...) that different 
ages and races have approved different things, but for his purpose it is sufficient to 
make a catalogue of the qualities approved and condemned by his own age and 
social group. The moral judgments of this group, he evidently feels, are sufficiently 
representative to be taken as those of average humanity.” In Hume, then, we find 
that same remarkable feature of parochialism parading as universalism that appears 
to have been so widespread in his time. 
12 Idem. 
13 Ibid., 307 (3.2.1). 
14 Hobbes (2000), 110 (ch. 15). 
15 Hume (1987), Essay XI. 
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contemptible notion of human nature.”16 Human nature is not defined by 
anything ‘metaphysical’, a divine spark, a mysterious moral faculty, but by 
man’s motives for action.17 Yet, and this is an important difference with 
Locke, “natural affection, love of virtue, resentment, and all the other 
passions, arise immediately from nature” – Locke’s rejection of innate ideas 
went too far for Hume.18 
 But what about conscience? Hume uses the term but four times in 
his Treatise, and on one of these occasions in an hypothesis that he refutes 
because of the implications of ‘conscience’ in this hypothesis.19 The most 
significant passage is that in which he says: 
 
“Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a 
principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.”20 
 
Hume identifies ‘conscience’ with the ‘sense of morals’ (the moral sense), a 
concept which he prefers, probably because ‘conscience’ has metaphysical 
and religious connotations which he wishes to avoid. Hume advocates a 
‘moral sense’ theory. Morality is not a matter of the discovery of moral truth, 
and living up to that truth, for it is not a characteristic of the relations 
between objects. Hence Hume’s famous remark about the transition from ‘is’ 
to ‘ought’ in the propositions put forward by philosophers.21 Moral 
distinctions are not discovered by reason, but result from a moral sense, 
from a feeling or sentiment. 
 
“Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and 
cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, 
but perceptions in the mind...”22 
 
Hume sees as the ‘most probable hypothesis’ regarding the origin of the 
distinction between vice and virtue, the view that “from a primary 
constitution of nature certain characters and passions, by the very view and 
                                                 
16 Idem. 
17 Hume takes issue with Hobbes and his followers here, and refutes the idea that all 
man’s actions are purely the result of self-love. 
18 Hume (2000), 408 (Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, § 6). 
19 The hypothesis was that “men may be bound by conscience to submit to a tyrannical 
government against their own and the public interest” (Hume [2000], 353 [3.2.9]). 
The other places where ‘conscience’ is mentioned are 202 (2.1.10), 295 (3.1.1), and 
349 (3.2.8). 
20 Hume (2000), 295 (3.1.1). 
21 Ibid., 302 (3.1.2). 
22 Ibid., 301 (3.1.1). The sentence continues: “And this discovery in morals, like that 
other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative 
sciences; tho’, like that too, it has little or no influence on practice.” 
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contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner excite a 
pleasure”.23 “To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction 
of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character.” And this “very 
feeling constitutes our praise or admiration”.24 Now, not every ‘pain’ (or 
‘uneasiness’) or ‘pleasure’ that we feel when contemplating someone’s 
character or actions is of a moral nature. We may feel ‘unease’ because this 
person or action has a relation to our interests. “’Tis only when a character is 
consider’d in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it 
causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil.”25 
This idea of impartiality, we have seen, was an important (if not the most 
important) feature of Adam Smith’s theory. Hume’s idea of the moral sense 
leads him to postulate its infallibility, a feature of conscience in many 
traditional concepts. The moral sense is infallible, simply because “[t]he 
distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain, which 
results from the view of any sentiment, or character; and (...) that pleasure or 
pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it”.26 The pain or pleasure 
need not be ours; we may contemplate the influence of a character on others, 
and by sympathy, a keystone of Hume’s moral theory, feel the pain or pleasure 
that they would feel. 
 
“[S]elf-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: But a 
sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which 
attends that virtue. This latter principle of sympathy is too weak to controul 
our passions; but has sufficient force to influence our taste, and give us the 
sentiments of approbation or blame.”27 
 
Sympathy is a natural part of man’s constitution. It “produces, in many 
instances, our sentiments of morals, as well as those of beauty”.28 As, in 
Hume’s view, the approbation or disapprobation which results from it 
depends on the good (the pain or pleasure) to which the contemplated 
character or motive for action gives rise, his ethics can be called utilitarian. 
But they are not consequentialist in the sense that the praise or blame 
attaches to the consequences of actions; it is the character and motives that 
are the objects of moral judgement, and they are judged in light of their 
utility, their contribution to happiness, to the social good. In this emphasis 
on motives, on intentions, lies both a great resemblance with Kant’s theory, and 
a great difference between Kant and Hume. For Kant, too, moral worth 
depends on intentions, not consequences. But whereas for Kant, intended 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 193-194 (2.1.7). 
24 Ibid., 303 (3.1.2). 
25 Idem. See also 372 (3.3.1). 
26 Ibid., 350 (3.2.8). 
27 Ibid., 320-321 (3.2.2). 
28 Ibid., 369 (3.3.1). 
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consequences are irrelevant, because moral worth solely depends on whether 
something was done from a sense of duty or not, and for the sake of duty, the 
opposite holds true for Hume: 
 
“[I]t may be established as an undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, 
or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from 
the sense of its morality.”29 
 
For Hume, moral actions should flow from the nature of persons; to do 
good purely from a sense of duty is a poor, if necessary, alternative.30 His 
aesthetic theory of morals, with its emphasis on feelings, discards or 
transforms many traditional elements of concepts of conscience. The sense 
of duty and obligation is inevitably weakened. Sometimes, traditional views 
seep through: 
 
“And who can think any advantages of fortune a sufficient compensation 
for the least breach of the social virtues, when he considers, that not only his 
character with regard to others, but also his peace and inward satisfaction 
entirely depend upon his strict observance of them; and that a mind will 
never be able to bear its own survey, that has been wanting in its part to 
mankind and society?”31 
 
What is traditional here is the introspection; what is modern is that morality 
is purely social – conscience monitors one’s contribution to the happiness of 
‘mankind and society’. Generally, we do not find the traditional element of 
introspection in Hume’s theory. Willey rightly remarks that “with Hume, we 
hear little about self-approval, or of the morality of living for some principle 
in the teeth of society’s disapproval. (...) Your virtue may be described as ‘my 
approval of you’; my virtue is ‘your approval of me’.”32 The essence of 
human nature was no longer seen to lie in Reason, but rather in “instincts, 
emotions, and ‘sensibilities’”.33 “Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume had 
prepared the way by proclaiming that our moral judgments, like our aesthetic 
judgments, are not the offspring of Reason at all; but proceed from an inner 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 308 (3.2.1). 
30 Rather than fight his own nature, as many of Hume’s contemporaries urged, man, 
Hume thought, ought to accept his natural feelings and put them to good use in 
society. “Conduct was thus programmatically naturalized. Society had developed so 
as to meet certain basic needs – for security, self-esteem, and so forth. The science 
of human nature confirmed that these pragmatic actions were grounded in 
psychological realities, and hence were not to be disavowed lightly in the name of 
any specious transcendental value system, abstract metaphysics or utopian vision.” 
(Porter [2001], 179). 
31 Hume (2000), 395 (3.3.6). 
32 Willey (1968), 123. 
33 Ibid., 108. 
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sentiment or feeling which is unanalysable.”34 The theoretical basis of 
conscience – of the authority of conscience – was weakened, but that would 
not have worried Hume very much. 
 
 
6.2. JEREMY BENTHAM 
If Hume was good at debunking traditionally esteemed notions, Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832) was a star in this game. His The Theory of Fictions (1789) 
is one great attempt to separate the real from the fictitious, and the useful 
fictions from the harmful ones. If there ever was a mind less open to 
symbolism and more addicted to the idea of tangible reality and its indication 
by proper language, I would not like to meet him. Bentham seems to lack the 
imagination (which is, for him, a ‘fictitious entity’) to conceive of any other 
mode of communication than that of the indication of real, existent objects. 
Bentham believes – incorrectly, as we have seen in chapter 2 – that all words 
can be traced back to words with an exclusively material referent.35 As words 
were ‘invented’ to designate real entities, and people associated real entities 
with words, they naturally came to ‘attribute reality to every object thus 
designated’.36 Thus, the names of fictitious entities came into being. 
 
“Faculties, powers of the mind, dispositions: all these are unreal; all these 
are but so many fictitious entities.”37 
 
And there are many, many other examples: ‘physical fictitious entities’ 
(‘substance’, ‘quantity’, ‘quality’, ‘relation’, ‘places’, ‘time’, et cetera), ‘political 
and quasi-political fictitious entities’ (‘obligation’, ‘right’, ‘power’, ‘privilege’, 
‘command’, ‘prohibition’, ‘judgment’, and so on), and many others. All these 
must ultimately relate to something material: 
 
“Every fictitious entity bears some relation to some real entity, and can no 
otherwise be understood than in so far as that relation is perceived – a 
conception of that relation is obtained.”38 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 108-109. Cf. Thomas Reid: “Our moral judgments are not like those we 
form in speculative matters, dry and unaffecting, but, from their nature, are 
necessarily accompanied with affections and feelings (…)”, and “Moral conduct is 
the business of every man; and therefore the knowledge of it ought to be within the 
reach of all. (…) But the bulk of mankind cannot follow long trains of reasoning. 
(…) Conscience commands and forbids with more authority (…) without the labour 
of reasoning. Its voice is heard by every man…”; Reid (1999), essay III, chapter VII: 
“Of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation”, 592, 594. 
35 Bentham (2000), 63. 
36 Ibid., 17. 
37 Ibid., 10. 
38 Ibid., 12. 
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Hence, the ‘political and quasi-political fictitious entities’ just mentioned find 
their sense (in more than one meaning of the word) in pleasure and pain ‘– 
but principally pain’.39 
 For my present purpose, the moral words are the most interesting.40 
In Anarchical Fallacies, in which, in response to the French Declaration of Rights, 
Bentham – in true Hobbesian and Lockean fashion – berates the abuse of 
words and its dangers, he famously criticizes the idea of natural rights: 
 
“That which has no existence cannot be destroyed -- that which cannot be 
destroyed cannot require anything to preserve it from destruction. Natural 
rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical 
nonsense, -- nonsense upon stilts.”41 
 
Similarly, in The Theory of Fictions, he notes that “[t]he word right is the name 
of a fictitious entity”, but he adds that it is “one of those objects the 
existence of which is feigned for the purpose of discourse – by a fiction so 
necessary that without it human discourse could not be carried on”, and also 
adds in a footnote that “[t]hough fictitious, the language cannot be termed 
deceptious – in intention at least, whatsoever in some cases may without 
intention be the result”.42 The afterthought shows his concern that fictitious 
language might lead to dangerous confusions. With respect to natural, moral, 
and political right, Bentham observes that only in the latter case “the word 
right has any determinate and intelligible meaning”; only in this case “the 
existence of a certain matter of fact is asserted”, this being “a disposition, on 
the part of those by whom the powers of government are exercised, to cause 
him to possess, and so far as depends upon them to have the faculty of 
enjoying, the benefit to which he has the right”.43 With respect to duties, 
rights, and obligations, he tells his readers that, when he refers to these as 
fictitious entities, he wants “it not for a moment to be supposed that, in 
either instance, the reality of the object is meant to be denied in any sense in 
which in ordinary language the reality of it is assumed”. But by means of a 
rhetorical question he makes clear that they would indeed not exist if there 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 38. 
40 Bentham distinguished between five types of ‘ethical fictitious entities’; ibid., 156. 
41 Bentham (1843), Art. 2. 
42 Bentham (2000), 118. He also remarks (on page 73) that “at the very first step that 
can be taken in the field of language, fiction, in the simplest, or almost the simplest, 
case in which language can be employed, becomes a necessary resource”. If that is 
indeed the case, one may wonder whether it is not Bentham himself who abuses 
language, stretching the meaning of the words ‘fictitious’ and ‘fiction’ far beyond 
their ordinary bounds. 
43 Ibid., 119. 
 294 
were no such things as the sensations of pain and pleasure – in which he 
shows his indebtedness to Hume.44 
 Bentham always wishes to ‘return’ to a tangible reality as the basis 
and ultimate meaning of words. Thus, when I say that someone ‘should’, or 
‘ought to’ do something, ‘nothing more do I express than my satisfaction at 
the idea of’ him doing this.45 There are two ways to trace a notion back to its 
‘real’ roots. By means of paraphrasis we find the roots of the idea, and by 
archetypation we find the roots of the word, that is: the etymology. “Thus, in 
the case of obligation, (...) the root of the idea is in the ideas of pain and 
pleasure. But the root of the word (...) lies in a material image, employed as 
an archetype or emblem: viz. the image of a cord, or any other tie or band (from 
the Latin ligo, to bind) by which the object in question is bound or fastened to 
any other, the person in question bound to a certain course of practice.”46 
 Bentham could have followed the same procedure with ‘conscience’, 
as Hobbes in fact did, but the word is not mentioned in The Theory of Fictions. 
In Deontology, however, he calls conscience ‘a thing of fictitious existence, 
supposed to occupy a seat in the mind’.47 Thus, Bentham illustrates exactly 
that loss of meaning which occurs when a relation of symbolization is 
mistaken for a relation of indication; that is, when a symbol is taken to be a 
sign. Smith’s ‘man within’ is literalized to the point of absurdity. This is what 
the faculty view of conscience – what the gradual solidification of conscience 
– led up to: the inability to conceive of the term as being anything other than 
indicative, and the subsequent failure to find any existent object indicated. 
Doctrinalization thus led to the rejection of conscience as a meaningful 
notion. Using the methods of paraphrasis and archetypation, Bentham might 
have been able to ‘rescue’ the word itself – relating it to ‘satisfaction’, 
perhaps, in the same way he did with the moral ‘should’ and ‘ought’ – but by 
my knowledge he never made such an attempt. 
 Of course there was another term around to designate the same 
‘thing’ as ‘conscience’; namely, the ‘moral sense’. In chapter 2 of his 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, which deals with ‘principles 
adverse to that of utility’, Bentham devotes a long footnote to this and 
equivalent fictions – to which category, of course, it belongs. The paragraph 
to which the footnote is attached states the following: 
 
“The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of 
right may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. One 
account may serve to for all of them. They consist all of them in so many 
contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external 
standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's 
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sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The phrases different, but the 
principle the same.”48 
 
Bentham subscribes to the Hobbesian and Lockean view that what is often 
called ‘conscience’ – or, in this case, ‘moral sense’ – is in fact nothing but a 
person’s private opinion or feeling. Hence, the word ‘moral sense’, as what it 
is usually intended to mean, is nonsensical. People have tried to hide the true 
nature of their private moral judgements by a host of invented phrases: 
 
“1. One man says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right 
and what is wrong; and that it is called a moral sense: and then he goes to 
work at his ease, and says, such a thing is right, and such a thing is wrong—
why? ‘because my moral sense tells me it is’. 
2. Another man comes and alters the phrase: leaving out moral, and putting 
in common, in the room of it. He then tells you, that his common sense 
teaches him what is right and wrong, as surely as the other's moral sense 
did: meaning by common sense, a sense of some kind or other, which he 
says, is possessed by all mankind: the sense of those, whose sense is not the 
same as the author's, being struck out of the account as not worth 
taking.”49 
 
Bentham then observes that ‘common sense’ serves its purpose as a cloaking 
device better than ‘moral sense’, 
 
“for a moral sense being a new thing, a man may feel about him a good 
while without being able to find it out: but common sense is as old as the 
creation, and there is no man but would be ashamed to be thought not to 
have as much of it as his neighbours.”50 
 
He asserts the same thing about ‘moral sense’, then, that Hobbes claimed for 
‘conscience’ in its private sense. The difference is that ‘moral sense’ was 
indeed a relatively new term. Bentham chose to see it not as a new word for 
something that used to be expressed in other terms, but as a new word for a 
new thing. That the indicative understanding of the term is followed by an 
attempt to find the existent object it indicates is clear from the words: ‘a man 
may feel about him (...) without being able to find it out’. Bentham then goes 
on to enumerate alternative fictions: ‘understanding’ (used in a certain way), 
‘an eternal and immutable Rule of Right’, the idea of the ‘Fitness of Things’, 
the ‘Law of Nature’, and as equivalents thereof ‘Law of Reason’, ‘Right 
Reason’, ‘Natural Justice’, ‘Natural Equity’, ‘Good Order’. He finds the last 
three ‘much more tolerable than the others’, 
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50 Idem. 
 296 
“because they do not very explicitly claim to be any thing more than 
phrases: they insist but feebly upon the being looked upon as so many 
positive standards of themselves, and seem content to be taken, upon 
occasion, for phrases expressive of the conformity of the thing in question 
to the proper standard, whatever that may be.”51 
 
But he makes sure that his readers do not misunderstand him: 
 
“On most occasions, however, it will be better to say utility: utility is clearer, 
as referring more explicitly to pain and pleasure.”52 
 
He does not mean to say that all moral sentiments must be derived from ‘a 
view of utility’ – he ‘does not know’, and ‘does not care’; what he means to 
say is that the only criterion of justification is that of utility: the usefulness, the 
conduciveness to the happiness of society, of an action. His theory of 
language and his utilitarian ethics combine to refute the notion of ‘moral 
sense’. 
 There is a further motive behind the attack on conscience. I already 
pointed out that Bentham’s interest in the ‘proper’ use of language was not 
merely academic; as with Hobbes and Locke, it had its origin in a concern 
regarding the dangers of the abuse of language. In Bentham’s case, this 
concern was fuelled by the situation in France and the revolutionary mood 
throughout Europe, including Britain. He perceived that 
 
“[t]he mischief common to all [the aforementioned] ways of thinking and 
arguing (which, in truth, as we have seen, are but one and the same 
method, couched in different forms of words) [often serves] as a cloke, and 
pretense, and aliment, to despotism: if not a despotism in practice, a 
despotism however in disposition: which is but too apt, when pretense and 
power offer, to show itself in practice.”53 
 
For if a man is an infallible judge of right and wrong in private matters, why 
would he not be the same in public matters? His distrust of many moral 
words, including ‘conscience’ and ‘moral sense’, was related to a fear of 
religious fanaticism. In a later chapter of An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation, Bentham discussed the power of religion as motive for 
action, and added the following footnote to his argument: 
 
“If a man happen to take it into his head to assassinate with his own hands, 
or with the sword of justice, those whom he calls heretics, that is, people 
who think, or perhaps only speak, differently upon a subject which neither 
party understands, he will be as much inclined to do this at one time as at 
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another. Fanaticism never sleeps: it is never glutted: it is never stopped by 
philanthropy; for it makes a merit of trampling on philanthropy: it is never 
stopped by conscience; for it has pressed conscience into its service. 
Avarice, lust, and vengeance, have piety, benevolence, honour; fanaticism 
has nothing to oppose it.”54 
 
Here, he does use the term conscience, but immediately gives a reason not to 
trust it: it is in the service of religious fanaticism. In The Theory of Fictions he 
expresses his mistrust of the intentions of people who speak readily of 
‘Justice’, ‘Right Reason’, and the ‘Law of Nature’, “all which are so many 
ways of intimating that a man is firmly persuaded of the truth of this or that 
moral proposition, though he either thinks he need not, or finds he can’t, tell 
why”: 
 
“Men were too obviously and too generally interested in the observance of 
these rules to entertain any doubts concerning the force of any arguments 
they saw employed in their support. It is an old observation, how Interest 
smooths the road to Faith.”55 
 
 It is remarkable that ‘conscience’ is not mentioned here, the appeal 
to which until this day is considered by certain people as a knockdown 
argument. And there is a particular irony to Bentham’s remark, if we 
consider that his thought, and liberal thought in general, can be seen as 
bearing a great part of the responsibility for the shift from ‘conscience’ to 
‘interest’ identified by Sheldon Wolin.56 He writes: “The decline of the 
individual conscience in liberal theory ushered in a new social world where 
men, no longer able to communicate on the basis of a common interior life, 
were reduced to knowing each other solely from the outside; that is, on the 
basis of socially acquired responses and values.” In Locke’s view of the 
human condition, “[m]an becomes conscious of his fellows only when he 
and they collide”. “It was this realization which later caused Bentham to 
declare that it was futile ‘to dive into the unfathomable regions of motives, 
which cannot be known.’ All that men could know for certain was the 
consequences of an individual’s actions, never his reasons for doing them.”57 
Wolin maintains that the “basic assertion, that each was the best judge of his 
own interests (...) rested squarely on the belief that no individual could truly 
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is favourable to one’s case].) 
57 Ibid., 305. 
 298 
understand another”.58 In The Theory of Fictions Bentham says: “To no other 
man’s is the mind of any man immediately present. (...) Yonder stands a 
certain portion of matter.”59 A behaviourist avant la lettre, Bentham explains 
that it is through action involving, and reference to, real objects that we find 
out the meaning of ‘mind’. 
 Bentham, then, was not interested in conscience. “And Bentham 
also made it abundantly clear that men no longer had any real incentive to 
that self-knowledge which leads to the examination of the inner life. 
 
But by interest he is at the same time diverted from any close examination 
into the springs by which his own conduct is determined. From such 
knowledge he has not, in any ordinary shape, any thing to gain, - he finds 
not in it any source of enjoyment. 
 
At the same time, since every act of will and of the intellect was reducible to 
interest, there remained nothing to examine internally: man’s soul had been 
factored out.”60 It is in the individual’s interest to abide by society’s 
standards, “the generalized expression of the wants, values, and expectations 
held by most of the members”.61 This set of values is to be internalized, so 
that the conscience of the individual mirrors the values of society, rather 
than enabling the individual to take a critical stance towards those values. 
Thus, Bentham takes Adam Smith an important step further. Smith’s 
‘impartial spectator’ implied the possibility of conflict with the real spectator. 
For Bentham, there is no such distinction. Moreover, the individual is not 
merely cautioned to abide by social norms, but also, as Wolin points out, 
advised in how to use them: “‘It is every man’s interest to stand well in the 
affections of other men’ so as to amass a ‘good-will fund’ rather than an ‘ill-
will fund.’”62 Bentham envisaged a society in which penal law would decrease 
in importance in direct proportion to the increasing influence of “the ‘moral 
law’ enforced by public opinion”.63 The ‘moral sanction’ would ‘grow 
stronger and stronger’, through the power of public opinion. Everyone 
would be the check on everyone else’s actions: 
 
“A whole kingdom, the great globe itself, will become a gymnasium, in 
which every man exercises himself before the eyes of every other man. 
Every gesture, every turn of limb or feature, in those whose motions have a 
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visible influence on the general happiness, will be noticed and marked 
down.”64 
 
This societal variant of the Panopticon suggests that Bentham, in keeping 
with his ethical theory and his theory of language, desired to ‘return’ to a 
more literal meaning of ‘conscience’, of ‘con-scientia’ – that of shared 
knowledge, here in the sense that everyone will be witness to what everybody 
else does. Insofar as the presence of real spectators leads to the 
internalization of social values, this conception of conscience marks the 
provisional end of a particular conceptual development. To the extent that 
the ‘science’ in ‘conscience’ is that of others, this implies a return to the 
prehistory of conscience. 
 
 
6.3. CHARLES DARWIN 
Bentham looked for conscience and found nothing but a fiction; Charles 
Darwin (1809-1882), searched for it in his own field of expertise and found 
“a highly complex sentiment – originating in the social instincts, largely 
guided by the approbation or disapprobation of our fellow-men, ruled by 
reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, and 
confirmed by instruction and habit”.65 This was what conscience ultimately 
became, if it developed to its full potential, and Darwin still seems to feel it 
deserves the highest respect. But he made the same mistake Bentham made – 
though ‘mistake’ is somewhat harsh a word, given that it was the natural 
consequence of a long conceptual development – in taking ‘conscience’ to be 
a purely indicative notion. That does not mean that there is no constructive 
side to Darwin’s view. Both Darwin and Freud drew attention to aspects of 
conscience that one could only neglect at one’s own peril. Their concepts of 
conscience were in many respects superior to those of the eighteenth-century 
optimists, and it is likely that popular conceptions of conscience in their day 
could do with a bit of demythologizing. Nevertheless, someone who is 
interested in the twentieth-century rejection of conscience by philosophers 
and psychologists alike, will inevitably wind up reading what people like 
Darwin and Freud wrote on the subject. My present interest in Darwin’s 
concept of conscience, then, regards especially the loss of meaning that 
occurs in it. 
 With regard to conscience, we might say that Charles Darwin is a 
combination of Adam Smith and the theory of evolution. But we recognize 
many elements of that theory in earlier authors. We find the importance of 
the drive towards self-preservation in Hobbes and Locke; the ‘social 
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instincts’ are also prefigured in their work. The following remark seems to 
echo Bentham: 
 
“As we cannot distinguish between motives, we rank all actions of a certain 
class as moral, if performed by a moral being. A moral being is one who is 
capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of 
approving or disapproving of them.”66 
 
And Darwin’s depiction of conscience as a ‘sentiment’ goes back to Hume 
and the moral sense theorists. With his attention to the development of 
conscience, he stands in the tradition of Locke and Smith, and it is the 
latter’s work especially that seems to have left his mark on Darwin’s thought. 
 According to Darwin, “any animal (…) endowed with well-marked 
social instincts (…) would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as 
soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well 
developed, as in man”.67 Conscience is the result of the combination of 
social instincts and the power to reflect upon one’s past or future deeds. 
 
“A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past actions and 
their motives—of approving of some and disapproving of others; and the 
fact that man is the one being who certainly deserves this designation, is the 
greatest of all distinctions between him and the lower animals.”68 
 
But reflection is certainly not the whole thing: 
 
“But in the fourth chapter I have endeavoured to shew that the moral sense 
follows, firstly, from the enduring and ever-present nature of the social 
instincts; secondly, from man's appreciation of the approbation and 
disapprobation of his fellows; and thirdly, from the high activity of his 
mental faculties, with past impressions extremely vivid; and in these latter 
respects he differs from the lower animals. Owing to this condition of 
mind, man cannot avoid looking both backwards and forwards, and 
comparing past impressions. Hence after some temporary desire or passion 
has mastered his social instincts, he reflects and compares the now 
weakened impression of such past impulses with the ever-present social 
instincts; and he then feels that sense of dissatisfaction which all unsatisfied 
instincts leave behind them, he therefore resolves to act differently for the 
future,—and this is conscience.”69 
 
The social instincts are at odds with ‘temporary desires or passions’. Smith’s 
Stoicism seems to have got hold on Darwin, too. Conscience is a matter of 
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self-command, by which Darwin means the mastery over one’s impulses and 
passions, everything that is hot and passionate as opposed to cool, reasoned, 
and reasonable. Thus, he writes the following about the dog’s conscience: 
 
“Besides love and sympathy, animals exhibit other qualities connected with 
the social instincts, which in us would be called moral; and I agree with 
Agassiz that dogs possess something very like a conscience. 
 Dogs posses some power of self-command, and this does not 
appear to be wholly the result of fear.”70 
 
Conscience, though a natural phenomenon, is also a battle against nature. 
Though when we pass from Smith to Hume, we (once again) make the 
transition from Nature to nature, it is not complete. Darwin still 
distinguishes between a higher and a lower nature. For a good Victorian, the 
passions obviously belong to the latter category. About the social instincts, 
Darwin says in one place that “[a]s they are highly beneficial to the species, 
they have in all probability been acquired through natural selection”.71 But in 
a footnote he also says: 
 
“To do good in return for evil, to love your enemy, is a height of morality 
to which it may be doubted whether the social instincts would, by 
themselves, have ever led us. It is necessary that these instincts, together 
with sympathy, should have been highly cultivated and extended by the aid 
of reason, instruction, and the love or fear of God, before any such golden 
rule would ever be thought of and obeyed.”72 
 
Morality has its natural origin in the social instincts, but its highest 
manifestations are cultural achievements. He mentions the ‘love or fear of 
God’ here, but elsewhere he makes it clear that we have no need to assume 
the existence of ‘a special God-implanted conscience’, and, moreover, he 
speaks of ‘the reverence or fear of the Gods, or Spirits believed in by each 
man’ as a ‘most important, although not necessary’ element, ‘especially in 
cases of remorse’.73 Conscience is not implanted by God, though it may be 
strengthened by fear of God. Importantly, God has nothing to do with the 
content of conscience, which is totally dependent on the approbation and 
disapprobation of one’s fellow men, and ultimately on the survival or 
happiness of the species. Survival and happiness are not the same thing, of 
course, but it seems that although the first is primary, conscience proceeds to 
‘take an interest’, so to speak, in the second: 
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“As all men desire their own happiness, praise or blame is bestowed on 
actions and motives, according as they lead to this end; and as happiness is 
an essential part of the general good, the greatest-happiness principle 
indirectly serves as a nearly safe standard of right and wrong.”74 
 
 Darwin’s concept of conscience is not without consequences for 
other ethical notions. ‘Authority’, for instance, gives way to force, or 
‘enduringness’: “[A]fter their gratification when past and weaker impressions 
are judged by the ever-enduring social instinct (...) retribution will surely 
come”.75 
 
“Man prompted by his conscience, will through long habit acquire such 
perfect self-command, that his desires and passions will at last yield 
instantly and without a struggle to his social sympathies and instincts, 
including his feeling for the judgment of his fellows. (...) Thus at last man 
comes to feel, through acquired and perhaps inherited habit, that it is best 
for him to obey his more persistent impulses.”76 
 
When a man’s desires are stronger than his social instincts, and his 
conscience cannot master them, “then he is essentially a bad man; and the 
sole restraining motive left is the fear of punishment, and the conviction that 
in the long run it would be best for his own selfish interests to regard the 
good of others rather than his own.”77 Why is he a bad man? Because his 
conscience has not ‘power, as it has right’. But in what sense is a man 
responsible for the strength and development of his own conscience? If his 
social instincts are weak, this is surely not his fault, for he was born with 
them. If his ‘appreciation of the approbation and disapprobation of his 
fellows’ is weak, what could he have done to make it stronger?78 Perhaps his 
‘fellows’ have been negligent in showing their (dis)approbation. And how 
should his mental faculties correct a failure of the previous two building 
blocks of conscience? Darwin may speak of ‘the conviction that in the long 
run it would be best for his own selfish interests to regard the good of others 
rather than his own’, but a conviction is all it is. It is plain enough that 
‘selfish interests’ are sometimes better served by disregarding the good of 
others. One’s ‘mental faculties’ can be very instructive in this respect. Once 
again, the problem is that of moral motivation – not so much its weakness, 
but its ground. Darwin describes how man come to ‘behave themselves’ in 
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society. But he cannot tell us why people should behave morally; or, there is 
no other meaning to these words: 
 
“The imperious word ought seems merely to imply the consciousness of the 
existence of a rule of conduct, however it may have originated. Formerly it 
must have been often vehemently urged that an insulted gentleman ought to 
fight a duel. We even say that a pointer ought to point, and a retriever to 
retrieve game. If they fail to do so, they fail in their duty and act wrongly.”79 
 
Darwin makes no distinction between a moral and a non-moral ‘ought’. Any 
‘rule’ of conduct gives rise to a ‘duty’. Darwin makes it clear that he does 
 
“not wish to maintain that any strictly social animal, if its intellectual 
faculties were to become as active and as highly developed as in man, 
would acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours. (…) they might have a 
sense of right and wrong, though led by it to follow different lines of 
conduct. If (…) men were reared under precisely the same conditions as 
hive-bees, there can hardly be any doubt that our unmarried females would, 
like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and 
mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think 
of interfering. Nevertheless, the bee, or any other social animal, would gain 
in our supposed case (…) some feeling of right or wrong, or a 
conscience.”80 
 
Morality is just what the survival (and possibly, when survival is not directly 
at stake anymore, the happiness) of one’s species requires, and that is all 
there is to it. Conscience is the individualized, interiorized agent of the 
interests of the community. 
 The social instincts do not extend beyond the boundaries of one’s 
own community.81 Moral standards differ between communities: “It has 
been recorded that an Indian Thug conscientiously regretted that he had not 
robbed and strangled as many travellers as did his father before him.” In 
order to ‘demonstrate’ the moral inferiority of such a view and practice, 
Darwin needs to take recourse to the opposition between the ‘rude’ and the 
‘refined’, the barbaric and the civilized: “In a rude state of civilisation the 
robbery of strangers is, indeed, generally considered as honourable.”82 
Reason plays a part in the advance of civilization; its function is to help 
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people perceive what is in their own and the public interest, and that these 
two coincide. Reason may heighten the sensitivity of conscience, and “may 
even somewhat compensate for weak social affections and sympathies”. “But 
with the less civilised nations reason often errs, and many bad customs and 
base superstitions come within the same scope, and are then esteemed as 
high virtues, and their breach as heavy crimes.” Hence the value of 
education. But the influence of reason must not be overstated: “The moral 
nature of man has reached its present standard, partly through the 
advancement of his reasoning powers and consequently of a just public 
opinion, but especially from his sympathies having been rendered more 
tender and widely diffused through the effects of habit, example, instruction, 
and reflection.” Darwin even thinks it possible that ‘virtuous tendencies may 
be inherited’. Another civilizing and moralizing agent has been the belief in 
the existence of ‘an all-seeing Deity’, the idea of which is not innate, but 
arises only in a long-developed culture. 83 Still, if the rhetoric of ‘civilization’ 
is ignored, there is nothing in all this to counter the moral relativism implied 
in Darwin’s theory. Even if “[u]ltimately man does not accept the praise or 
blame of his fellows as his sole guide”, and “conscience then becomes the 
supreme judge and monitor” (as Smith also maintained), this is merely a 
matter of fact, for that conscience knows no other criterion than that of the 
interests of the particular community to which its ‘owner’ belongs. 
 Darwin did not accept the relativistic consequences of his theory 
himself, if we are to judge by his autobiography.84 He writes that after 
reflection, man finds “in accordance with the verdict of all the wisest men 
that the highest satisfaction is derived from following certain impulses, 
namely the social instincts”. He will then receive the approbation of his 
fellows. 
 
“His reason may occasionally tell him to act in opposition to the opinion of 
others, whose approbation he will then not receive; but he will still have the 
solid satisfaction of knowing that he has followed his innermost guide or 
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conscience. – As for myself I believe that I have acted rightly in steadily 
following and devoting my life to science.”85 
 
He seems, privately, to have had a somewhat romantic conception of 
conscience. It is a strange mixture of conceptual thought and symbolic 
expression. Conscience is closely allied to vocation – a vocation, no doubt, 
that Darwin would have seen as beneficial to society.86 But whatever the role 
of conscience in his private life, the implications of his public views are clear. 
By defining conscience as a ‘sentiment’, based on social instincts and societal 
approval and disapproval, it has lost much of its depth, and with it its 
possible critical function. It has also lost its personal quality, having become 
the guardian of the rules prevalent in a certain community in a certain time – 
rules that will differ from community to community. It has become very 
difficult to see why an individual’s ‘conscience’, especially if it were at odds 
with social values, would deserve special respect, or even merit 
consideration. This is no reason to simply reject or ignore Darwin’s views. 
There are many valuable insights in his theory; the challenge is to incorporate 
them in a viable concept of conscience. 
 
 
6.4. SIGMUND FREUD 
As Darwin’s concept of conscience was, in a sense, the natural consequence 
of the development of Anglo-Saxon thought on the subject, so Freud’s 
concept of conscience was, in certain respects at least, the natural 
consequence of continental, in particular Kantian thought. The Freudian 
concept, however, is also more clearly a critique of the preceding tradition. It 
was not the first critique. Two philosophers stand out as major influences on 
Freud, and for a good understanding of the Freudian concept of conscience 
it will be helpful to say a few words about them. 
 Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), in many respects a Romantic 
philosopher, challenged the anchorage conscience had found in Reason. 
According to Mokrosch, it was the experience of the unpleasant reality of the 
French Revolution (contrasting sharply with the Enlightenment ideology 
behind it) that led Schopenhauer to his view of man as a being driven by a 
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blind Will, a ‘burning greed’, the source of suffering.87 According to 
Schopenhauer, the conscience consists “etwa aus 1/5 Menschenfurcht, 1/5 
Deisidämonie, 1/5 Vorurteil, 1/5 Eitelkeit und 1/5 Gewohnheit”.88 He also 
observed: “Religiöse Leute, jedes Glaubens, verstehen unter Gewissen sehr 
oft nichts anderes, als die Dogmen und Vorschriften ihrer Religion und die 
in Beziehung auf diese vorgenommene Selbstprüfung.”89 This is a critique of 
doctrinalization, but it is partly misdirected, for the religious people to whom 
he refers will probably mean something else by ‘conscience’ themselves, 
though the meaning of the term as it can be derived from their actual (non-
reflective) use of it may come down to what Schopenhauer says. That is, 
their dogmas may constitute the contents of their consciences, but that does 
not mean that when they say ‘my conscience’, they mean ‘my dogmas’. 
 Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) did not merely criticize rationalist 
concepts of conscience; he despised it as a Jewish-Christian invention. I 
quoted him in chapter 1: 
 
“Was ist jüdische, was ist christliche Moral? Der Zufall um seine Unschuld 
gebracht; das Unglück mit dem Begriff ‘Sünde’ beschmutzt; das 
Wohlbefinden als Gefahr, als ‘Versuchung’; das physiologische 
Übelbefinden mit dem Gewissens-Wurm vergiftet…”90 
 
Nietzsche loathed Christian morality as something that stifled the strong, the 
creative, the powerful, while nourishing the weak, the sick, the disabled. In 
the above quotation, he anticipates the notion of ‘moral luck’ (in this case 
‘moral bad luck’) – a blind spot in ethical theory until the nineteen-seventies. 
And everything that makes people feel good is called ‘temptation’, is 
burdened with guilt. Hume had spoken sarcastically of “[c]elibacy, fasting, 
penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole 
train of monkish virtues”.91 Nietzsche devotes the third part of his Zur 
Genealogie der Moral to a cynical critique of asceticism. The second part deals 
with “’Schuld’, Schlechtes Gewissen’ und Verwandtes”. Conscience is here 
described as an awareness of responsibility, sunk to the ultimate depths of 
man, becoming a dominating instinct.92 How did this instinct arise? It is the 
‘tiefe Erkrankung’ that is the result of the greatest change man has ever 
experienced: “jener Veränderung, als er sich engültig in den Bann der 
                                                 
87 Mokrosch (1983), 9-10. 
88 Arthur Schopenhauer, Über die Grundlegungen der Moral, § 3, quoted in: Mokrosch 
(1983), 11. 
89 Grimm and Grimm (1911), 6220; quoted from Schopenhauer, Über die 
Grundlegungen der Moral. 
90 Nietzsche (1969), 192 (§ 25). 
91 Hume (1902), 219. 
92 Nietzsche (1983), 48. 
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Gesellschaft und des Friedens eingeschlossen fand”.93 This forced man to 
suppress his natural instincts, and make shift with his consciousness, ‘ihr 
ärmlichstes und fehlgreifendstes Organ’.94 The instincts of freedom, ‘die 
Feindschaft, die Grausamkeit, die Lust an der Verfolgung, am Überfall, am 
Wechsel, an der Zerstörung’ – all these were barred from expression, with 
great consequences. 
 
“Alle Instinkte, welche sich nicht nach außen entladen, wenden sich nach innen 
– dies ist das, was ich die Verinnerlichung des Menschen nenne: damit wächst 
erst das an den Menschen heran, was man später seine ‘Seele’ nennt. (...) 
Jene furchtbaren Bollwerke, mit denen sich die staatliche Organisation 
gegen die alten Instinkte der Freiheit schützte (...) brachten zuwege, daß alle 
jene Instinkte des wilden, freien, schweifenden Menschen sich rückwärts, 
sich gegen den Menschen selbst wandten.”95 
 
“Dieser gewaltsam latent gemachte Instinkt der Freiheit (...), dieser 
zurückgedrängte, zurückgetretene, ins Innere eingekerkerte und zuletzt nur 
an sich selbst noch sich entladende und auslassende Instinkt der Freiheit: 
das, nur das ist in seinem Anbeginn das schlechte Gewissen.”96 
 
Conscience represses a latent instinct for freedom; it is the instinct for 
freedom turned inward. It is a societal perversion of natural man – and yet 
Nietzsche says: “Man hüte sich, von diesem ganzen Phänomen (...) gering zu 
denken...”97 It is still that original force that is capable of great things, though 
in an inner, smaller form, and turned backwards. The bad conscience is a 
sickness, yes, “aber eine Krankheit, wie die Schwangerschaft eine Krankheit 
ist.”98 Conscience bears the child of its own defeat, the (re)discovery of 
freedom. Nietzsche expresses the messianic hope that one day, ‘in a stronger 
time’, a man must come, “der erlösende Mensch der großen Liebe und 
Verachtung, der schöpferische Geist”, that will deliver us from the curse of 
the present ideal.99 This is a man ‘beyond good and evil’, a man, in a sense, 
with a ‘transmoral conscience’.100 This man, ‘Antichrist und Antinihilist’ 
would inaugurate a new era, which would constitute a return to the original 
condition of freedom, but in a more sublime sense; the beauty that would be 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 71. 
94 Ibid., 72. 
95 Idem. 
96 Ibid., 74. 
97 Ibid., 75. 
98 Ibid., 76. 
99 Ibid., 84. 
100 Tillich (1969), 78. 
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discovered would be heightened and intensified by the contrast with the 
present ugliness.101 
 Freud’s concept of conscience has a strong connection with 
Nietzsche’s. In Das Unbehagen in der Kultur he speaks of a battle between 
‘culture’ and what we might call ‘nature’, in particular the 
‘Agressionsneigung’, that Freud sees as an ‘ursprüngliche, selbständige 
Triebanlage des Menschen’.102 Culture is described as a ‘special process’ that 
takes place through mankind [‘der über die Menschheit abläuft’], a process in 
the service of ‘Eros’, “der vereinzelte menschliche Individuen, später 
Familien, dann Stämme, Völker, Nationen zu einer großen Einheit, der 
Menschheit, zusammenfassen wolle” – why, we do not know.103 This 
‘Programm der Kultur’ resists the natural aggressive instinct (‘Trieb’) of man, 
the sibling and major representative of the ‘Todestrieb’. So there is a battle 
between ‘Eros’ and ‘Tod’, between ‘Lebenstrieb’ and ‘Destruktionstrieb’. 
Freud then asks the following question: 
 
“Welcher Mittel bedient such die Kultur, um die ihr entgegenstehende 
Aggression zu hemmen, unschädlich zu machen, vielleicht 
auszuschalten?”104 
 
This is something we can learn, Freud says, by studying the psychological 
development of the individual. Something very remarkable occurs: 
 
“Die Aggression wird introjiziert, verinnerlicht, eigentlich aber dorthin 
zurückgeschickt, woher sie gekommen ist, also gegen das eigene Ich 
gewendet. Dort wird sie von einem Anteil des Ichs übernommen, das sich 
als Über-Ich dem übrigen entgegenstellt, und nun als ‘Gewissen’ gegen das 
ich dieselbe strenge Aggressionsbereitschaft ausübt, die das ich gerne an 
anderen, fremden Individuen befriedigt hätte. Die Spannung zwischen dem 
gestrengen Über-Ich und dem ihm unterworfenen Ich heißen wir 
Schuldbewußtsein; sie äußert sich als Strafbedürfnis. Die Kultur bewältigt 
also die gefährliche Aggressionslust des Individuums, indem sie es 
schwächt, entwaffnet und durch eine Instanz in seinem Inneren, wie durch 
eine Besatzung in der eroberten Stadt, überwachen läßt.”105 
 
Conscience is a function of the superego (‘Über-Ich’). It is the superego in its 
judging and threatening function; the superego also commands the 
                                                 
101 Nietzsche (1983), 75. There is thus a structural resemblance between Nietzsche’s 
view of conscience and the Christian idea of synderesis. Both are signs of an original 
state from which we have fallen – a better, natural state, which we long to return to. 
102 Freud (1948a), 481. 
103 Idem. 
104 Ibid., 482. 
105 Ibid., 482-483. 
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individual.106 The above view of the origin of conscience is not just 
Nietzschean, but also seems very much in line with traditional Christian 
thought: man is inherently evil, and conscience battles this evil by fighting 
man’s ‘animal’ nature. But this is not the Freudian view. How, he asks, do we 
come to feel guilty? The traditional answer is: because we have done – or 
contemplated doing – something wrong, something we call ‘bad’. But how 
do we distinguish between good and bad (or evil)? “Ein ursprüngliches, 
sozusagen natürliches Unterscheidungsvermögen für Gut und Böse darf man 
ablehnen.”107 There is no such thing as an innate conscience. After 
Nietzsche, he observes: “Das Böse ist oft gar nicht das dem Ich Schädliche 
oder Gefährliche, im Gegenteil auch etwas, was ihm erwünscht ist, ihm 
Vergnügen bereitet.” The conclusion is clear: 
 
“Darin zeigt sich also fremder Einfluß; dieser bestimmt, was Gut und Böse 
heißen soll.”108 
 
 This ‘foreign influence’ is first of all that of the parents, on whose 
loving care the child depends. The first and primary motive for the child to 
act in such a way as pleases its parents is the fear of losing their love.109 Loss 
of love would also entail loss of protection, and the risk of punishment. The 
fear for those (‘bad’) things that will lead to loss of love is called ‘bad 
conscience’, “aber eigentlich verdient er diesen Namen nicht, denn auf dieser 
Stufe ist das Schuldbewußtsein offenbar nur Angst vor dem Liebesverlust, 
‘soziale’ Angst”.110 Many adults do not venture beyond this stage, though in 
their case society has taken the place of the Father, or both parents. This, 
Freud observes, is why many people will do ‘bad’ things, if only they know 
they will not be found out. “Eine große Änderung tritt erst ein, wenn die 
Autorität durch die Aufrichtung eines Über-Ichs verinnerlicht wird.” Only 
                                                 
106 Langston (2001), 89. He quotes Freud: “We call this agency the superego and are 
aware of it in its judicial function as our conscience.” (Sigmund Freud, An Outline of 
Psycho-Analysis, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1964, 205.) Cf. 
Freud (1948a), 496: “Das Über-Ich ist eine von uns erschlossense Instanz, das 
Gewissen eine Funktion, die wir ihm neben anderen zuschreiben, die die 
Handlungen und Absichten des Ichs zu überwachen und zu beurteilen hat, eine 
zensorische Tätigkeit ausübt.” Langston incorrectly assigns the monitoring function 
to the superego, not the conscience. 
107 Freud (1948a), 483. 
108 Idem. 
109 Idem. Langston (2001), 90, writes: “Freud indicates that the ‘torments caused by 
the reproaches of conscience correspond precisely to a child’s fear of loss of love’ 
(206) and are clearly connected to a feeling of anxiety (146).” Langston refers to 
Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. 
110 Freud (1948a), 484. 
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then can we truly speak of conscience and feelings of guilt. The difference 
between doing wrong and only contemplating it now vanishes completely, 
“denn vor dem Über-Ich kann sich nichts verbergen, auch Gedanken 
nicht”.111 This leads to a remarkable paradox: the more virtuous a person is, 
the stronger will his awareness of sinfulness be. That he abstains from the 
satisfaction of his instincts and urges does not absolve him; on the contrary: 
not only is the existence of the impulse enough to anger the conscience, it 
actually heightens the feeling of guilt. ‘Every bit of aggression, the satisfaction 
of which we forgo’, is adopted by the superego, “und dessen Aggression 
(gegen das Ich) steigert”. “Jeder triebverzicht wird nun eine dynamische 
Quelle des gewissens, jeder neue Verzicht steigert dessen Strenge und 
Intoleranz...”112 
 The Freudian conscience is purely authoritarian. It is the extension 
of paternal – and ultimately, societal – authority within the ego. In the 
tripartite division of the psyche Freud makes, the ‘id’ represents the original 
instincts, the ‘ego’ the intermediary between the ‘id’ and the external world 
that enables the controlled satisfaction of instinctual demands, and the 
‘superego’ the internalized authority of the parents and society, which 
controls the ego.113 Conscience is the superego in its judicial function. 
Neither the conscience nor the superego as a whole operates exclusively on a 
conscious level; the operation of both is often unconscious. This is enabled 
by the fact that the internalization of paternal authority is a process of 
identification. The superego, and therefore conscience, is the result of the way 
the Oedipus (or, in the case of girls, Electra) complex is resolved. Both 
because of the attraction to the mother, and due to the dissatisfaction caused 
by having to abide by parental (primarily fatherly) rules, the young boy 
wishes to take the place of his father. Unable to do so, he identifies himself 
with his father; that is, with the primary authority figure. “Diese 
Identifizierung mit der Autoritätsperson in der Phantasie geht ins 
Unbewußte über, verfestigt sich hier und bringt ein vom bewußten Ich 
abgespaltenes zweites Ich zustande, das Über-Ich oder Ich-Ideal.”114 
Conscience reproaches an individual when he fails to live up to the ego-ideal; 
conscience is the ‘guardian’ of the ego-ideal.115 
 Kant had explained conscience in terms of an ‘inner court’ in which 
we must imagine ourselves to be judged by a ‘real or ideal person’. Freud 
takes the Kantian view one important step further: in conscience we are 
judged by a real person (or real persons), with whom we have identified 
                                                 
111 Idem. 
112 Ibid., 488. Freud does not really mean ‘jede Triebverzicht’, but only that of the 
aggressive instincts. 
113 See Langston (2001), 88-89. 
114 Reiner (1976), 304. 
115 Freud (1949), 163. 
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ourselves. If we are raised by a Lockean ‘old woman’, than our moral 
principles will have the authority of an old woman – no more, no less. Of 
course the superego is dynamic; parental influence is not the only influence – 
even doctors (psycho-therapists) may influence (or ‘correct’) the superego.116 
This does not necessarily mean that what the super-ego says is not really 
worth listening to; it does not even vitiate the possibility of moral truth. But 
it is likely to lead to a certain moral relativism. Gerhard Funke points out 
that anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and philosophers have 
relativized the dictates of conscience by placing the genesis of conscience, 
and the ‘quaestio facti’ instead of the ‘quaestio iuris’ in the foreground. In the 
work of Locke, Nietzsche, Freud, and others, “handelt es sich [immer] um 
die Rückführung des Sollens auf außer-sittliche Tatbestände, zugleich um die 
Reduktion des Inhalts der ‘Stimme des Gewissens’ auf empirische 
Realfaktoren”.117 
 Like Darwin, Freud took ‘conscience’ to be an indicative notion, and 
hence started to search for what was indicated by it – that is, a ‘natural’ (but 
in Freud’s case also very much a ‘cultural’) phenomenon. Both Nietzsche 
and Freud present us with a socio-psychological reduction of conscience. 
The one-sidedness of Freud’s concept of conscience – that is, its exclusive 
emphasis on the element of authority – eliminates the possibility of 
autonomy for the conscience.118 Even though conscience is the result of the 
internalization of authority, it remains in a significant sense heteronomous. 
Through conscience, one’s parents and society control the individual. 
Freud’s perspective is very much a therapeutic one. Conscience is an 
oppressive and suppressing force within the individual. The ‘fear of 
conscience’ develops from the ‘fear of castration’.119 The ‘Katastrophe des 
Ödipus-Komplexes – die Abwendung vom Inzest, die Einsetzung von 
Gewissen und Moral’ can be seen as ‘einen Sieg der Generation über das 
Individuum’.120 Such phrases, but in fact the whole of Freud’s theory, 
suggest the pathological character of conscience. It is not surprising that 
Freud quotes Shakespeare: “So macht Gewissen Feige aus uns allen...” – he 
sees the feeling of guilt as ‘das wichtigste Problem der Kulturentwicklung’, 
and believes that “der Preis für den Kulturfortschritt in der Glückseinbuße 
                                                 
116 Langston (2001), 88; Blum (1958), 184. 
117 Funke (1976), 256. 
118 Cf. Reiner (1976), 305. Bishop Butler also stressed the authority of conscience, 
but in a very different way; for him, the authority of conscience was the authority of 
man’s nature. Hence it was not at odds with the autonomy of conscience. But there 
are also similarities between Butler and Freud; Freud has been called ‘Butler in 
fancy-dress’, id, ego, and super-ego taking the place of particular impulses, the 
regulative principles of cool self-love and benevolence, and conscience, respectively. 
See Mace (1964), 105. 
119 Sigmund Freud (1948c), 170. 
120 Sigmund Freud (1948b), 29. 
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durch die Erhöhung des Schuldgefühls bezahlt wird”.121 These are very 
strong statements, hard to verify (if at all), and certainly one-sided. Later 
psychoanalysis would correct Freud in this respect; for instance in the work 
of Erich Fromm. Freud also pushed both philosophical and psychological 
conceptualization in the direction of functionalism, that focuses on the 
function of conscience in the personality (or sees conscience as a function of 
the personality). The content of conscience recedes from view; in Freud’s 
concept, there is content, but this is wholly derived from the person itself, 
and ultimately from other people (parents, society). There is no hint of an 
idea that conscience might (occasionally) reveal something about a non-
subjective moral reality; that it might actually make a positive contribution to 
a person’s life and that of others. Despite the merits of the Freudian concept 
– which there surely are, for Freud makes an important correction to popular 
naive concepts of conscience, and rightly points out the problems of a moral 
education that is too rigid (or otherwise flawed) – it is not surprising that 
conscience, in the twentieth century, lost virtually all relevance to 
philosophers (ethicists) and psychologists alike. 
 
 
6.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There are many ways in which one could characterize the conceptual history 
of conscience – it could be described in terms of (or related to processes of) 
secularization, individualization, interiorization, or (as Voegelin would prefer) 
immanentization. Of these four I find the last the most useful. There is 
indeed a tendency to immanentize the transcendent to which the conscience 
relates. The true self takes the place of the divine law; the father that of the 
‘synderesis’. But in the first case there is still a form of transcendence – and 
even in the second, where conscience transcends the individual socially. A 
disadvantage of the ‘immanentization view’ is that it focuses too much on 
the last few centuries of North-Western Europe, perhaps anachronistically 
interpreting the older past in light of the more recent. Besides, conscience 
was always seen as something of the ‘in-between’, the ‘metaxy’, as Voegelin 
would say with Plato, for it was always partly immanent and partly 
transcendent; a shift of balance does seem to have occurred, but that is what 
it is. 
 Of course I have not finished with the conceptual history of 
conscience; I have not considered the twentieth century (and the next) yet. 
There is a good reason for that. I see the chapters 2 to 6 as a unity. The next 
chapter, which deals with some twentieth-century concepts, is a record of a 
fresh start in some respects. There are clear links with previous concepts, of 
course, but especially the first half of the twentieth century constitutes a 
unique caesura in the conceptual history of conscience. For the first time in 
                                                 
121 Freud (1948a), 494. 
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two millennia, the prime candidates to think about the subject choose to 
avoid the concept. For most ethicists and psychologists, this is still the case. 
Only in theology did conscience remain a valid concept. This is why I have 
written my conceptual history of conscience from the perspective of loss of 
meaning. And this is why I came to speak of the symbol of conscience, and of 
symbolizations, not just conceptualizations of conscience. If I would have to 
characterize the history of expressions of and thought on conscience as it has 
influenced Western-European thought, action, and feeling in one phrase, I 
would say that it is the history of the gradually progressing forgetfulness of 
the symbolic aspect of expressions of conscience, in favour of an 
increasingly indicative understanding of the terms that had come to be the 
most stable expressions for experiences of conscience – in particular the 
term ‘conscience’ itself. 
 But the reality is always more complex, which is why I have drawn 
attention to persistent and new symbolizations, as well as to the interweaving 
of symbolizations and conceptualizations, and of the influence of both on 
the experience of conscience. Nevertheless, the dominant trend was towards 
an indicative understanding of conscience, which means that it was no longer 
seen as a symbolic expression of a certain class of experiences. The then 
developing conceptual history of conscience is a history of doctrinalization, 
in the sense of a fixation of meaning. This ultimately led to a rejection of 
conscience as a meaningful concept. In retrospect, we can say that the 
Enlightenment concepts of conscience were indeed grounded in Nature and 
Reason; they would not really come afloat anymore. The following chapter 
deals with a few attempts to make sense of conscience anew. Being purely 
functionalist concepts, they avoid a naive indicative view of conscience to 
some extent; they also deal with other problems that had arisen in preceding 
centuries: if conscience must be considered to be purely subjective in its 
dictates, how can it still be important? Why would one (have to) listen to it? 
Such questions are particularly relevant with a view to the ‘problem’ of 
conscientious objection – a problem that is as old as conscience, but in its 
well-known form also marks a significant break between the twentieth 
century and the preceding ones. 
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7. Twentieth-century concepts of conscience 
 
“Die klassischen Titel des Subjekts - Bewußtsein, Willensfreiheit, Geist, 
Reflexion - werden eigentümlich undifferenziert und gehaltlos erscheinen. 
Ihr appeal wird verblassen, und wer in ihrem Namen Moral zu treiben 
sucht, wird prüfen müssen, wie weit die guten Namen noch wirken.” 
NIKLAS LUHMANN AND STEPHAN H. PFÜRTNER  (EDS.), Theorietechnik und 
Moral 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
7.1.1. Twentieth-century functionalism and the conceptual history of 
 conscience 
‘Die guten Namen’, ‘die klassischen Titel des Subjekts’ – conscience, 
although not mentioned by Luhmann in this passage, was surely one of 
them, and twentieth-century philosophers (and psychologists, and others) 
certainly tested its validity. Most of them, however, did so privately, and 
rejected the concept. That is, we must assume that they did, or else that they 
rejected it without even considering its validity. The charity principle obliges 
us to assume the former. Even considering the prehistory of twentieth-
century ethics, it is quite remarkable that there has hardly been an ethicist of 
some stature that really used the concept of conscience. An occasional use of 
the term as an ordinary language concept is usually all. In dictionaries and 
encyclopedias of ethics, ‘conscience’ tends to be an historical entry, 
discussing the use made of the term by scholastics, Butler, and Kant. 
MacIntyre, in his short history of ethics, mentions conscience a couple of 
times, but at the latest in connection with John Stuart Mill.1 The term does 
not appear in the index to Mary Warnock’s Ethics Since 1900.2 It is quite safe 
to conclude that the concept of conscience is unimportant in twentieth-
century ethics. 
 In the foregoing chapters, I presented my view of the background of 
this situation. A gradual doctrinalization and an increasingly indicative 
understanding of conscience undermined itself by provoking the question 
what exactly was ‘pointed out’ by the word ‘conscience’, to what existent 
entity the term referred, and because this could not be shown, or because 
what was found was not very dignified, the concept was eventually dropped 
by most philosophers and psychologists. When the idea of conscience as a 
separate moral faculty was disproven, the reaction of many was to drop the 
concept altogether – which was not a necessary step, of course. Hence, some 
did not take that step, and sought a different solution. I have described 
                                                 
1 MacIntyre (1998). 
2 Warnock (1967). 
 316 
doctrinalization in terms of the fixation of meaning. This could apply to a) 
the meaning of the term ‘conscience’, and b) the contents of conscience. In 
the first case, it is the concept of conscience that is fixated. In the second, it 
is not the formal side of conscience, but its contents that become fixated. 
The scholastics formally did so only with the ‘synderesis’, but effectively 
fixated the contents of ‘conscientia’ as well, which enabled them to speak 
confidently and elaborately of a ‘conscientia erronea’. After the Reformation, 
opposing religious parties seemed to think that the experience of conscience 
could only be a specifiable and specified experience – the experience that 
certain specified things are objectively wrong, and equally specified things 
objectively right. Anyone who claimed another experience of conscience 
obviously had a false conscience. Nineteenth-century criticism dealt 
decisively with the view that conscience is an objective source of moral 
knowledge, or an objective judge of right and wrong. Twentieth-century 
concepts of conscience attempt to deal with this problem of the diversity of 
the ‘dictates’ of people’s consciences. 
 Some authors say that conscience has become subjective. In one 
sense, this is nonsense. Conscience has not become subjective, because it has 
always been subjective. We must not confuse the reflection on conscience 
with the experiential phenomenon. If concepts of conscience tend 
increasingly towards the view that conscience is subjective, nothing happens 
to conscience itself. But of course concepts do not change for nothing. So, 
in another sense, the idea that conscience has become subjective is not 
nonsensical. The observation behind it could be that whereas once there was 
a large commonality to people’s experiences of conscience – both in form 
and in contents – we are now faced with an unprecedented diversity in this 
respect. What my conscience ‘says’ may differ radically from what your 
conscience ‘says’, and while my conscience may exclusively issue commands, 
pronounce judgements, and measure out punishments, yours may a tempting 
voice of inspiration, a moral muse. The way in which conscience manifests 
itself, when it does, and what it ‘says’, seems to depend on the peculiarities of 
the subject (the individual) in question. While those authors who speak of 
the subjectivization of conscience from the perspective of a dogmatic 
conception of conscience are plainly in the wrong, because they fail to 
recognize that conscience has always been a matter of subjective experience 
and its symbolic expression, those who point out the loss of a formerly 
existing commonality, an intersubjectivity, in the experience of conscience, 
need to be taken seriously.3 
 Twentieth-century concepts of conscience virtually always tend to 
some form of functionalism. They focus on the form, rather than the 
                                                 
3 That an experience is subjective does not mean that it is necessarily devoid of truth, 
or out of contact with reality, as advocates of an ‘objective’ conscience seem to 
assume. They fail to appreciate the nature of the subject-object relation. 
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contents of conscience, and they tend to interpret this form in terms of a 
function of the personality or of consciousness.4 The idea that conscience is 
purely subjective could lead to the (Hobbesian) idea that it is just a matter of 
opinion, and hence that there is no reason to take conscientious objection 
more seriously than ‘normal’ objection. On this view, there is nothing special 
about conscientious objection. We generally think otherwise and see 
conscientious objection as a special, more important kind of objection. 
Functionalist concepts of conscience can be seen as attempts to vindicate 
this intuition, without recourse to presupposed contents of conscience.5 
                                                 
4 Some examples are: Luhmann (1965) and Luhmann (1973), Rotenstreich (1993), 
Childress (1979), Fuss (1964), Jenkins (1955), and, a bit earlier, Ryle (1971) [1940]. 
Ryle does use the term ‘faculty’, but this must not be misunderstood. Two 
quotations should be enough to illustrate his point of view: “…conscience…is a 
conduct regulating faculty.” (Ryle [1971], 188); “Conscience is not something other 
than, prior to or posterior to moral convictions; it is having those convictions in an 
operative degree, i.e. being disposed to behave accordingly.” (Ryle [1971], 189). Fuss 
states: “The role of conscience is purely and simply to ‘enforce’ our moral 
knowledge or belief with a tendency to act in accordance with what we know or 
believe. So regarded, it is a function of unification or integration…” (Fuss [1964], 
118). According to Jenkins, “Conscience has a structure before it acquires a 
content.” (Jenkins [1955], 269-270). He criticizes psycho-analytical (and related) 
concepts of conscience for being ‘too narrow’ and for still focusing attention ‘on a 
specific content of conscience’ (Jenkins [1955], 269). Childress (1979), 319, describes 
conscience as a “mode of consciousness resulting from the application of [moral] 
standards to his conduct”; it “is not itself the standard”. Rotenstreich speaks of 
conscience as “one of those manifestations of consciousness where judging becomes 
prominent”, a ‘controlling authority’, directed toward “particular acts and deeds (…) 
but also to the constant aspect of our personality”. It plays a role in shaping the 
personality. (Rotenstreich [1993], 30-33). Rotenstreich does not refer to Luhmann, 
but their views are quite similar in some respects, though Luhmann provides us with 
a more systematic and unified view. Luhmann (1965), 285, says: “Das Gewissen ist 
nicht eine Stimme, sondern eine Funktion.” His views will be thoroughly discussed 
in this chapter. An example of the rare combination of a form of functionalism with 
ethical objectivism can be found in Vivas (1963), 91, and 123-124: “It is (…) the 
person, which decides moral perplexities and which in the performance of this, its 
most important function, is called ‘conscience.’”; “The conscience decides upon, but 
does not constitute, the right.” 
5 They are neutral with regard to the contents of conscience. This situation reflects 
Rawls’ remark that in times of moral insecurity, a shift of emphasis occurs from 
first- to second-order virtues. Among the second-order virtues are conscientiousness 
and integrity. These are exactly the things functionalist approaches to conscience 
centre around, in an attempt to meet the present-day need for a secular concept of 
conscience, that retains, as much as possible, the dignity and authority assigned to 
conscience when it was still generally held to be the Voice of God in man. Apart 
from seeing functionalist concepts as such attempts, we may also note that they are 
the result of the influence of a psychology that had in turn been influenced by post-
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These non-substantialist accounts of conscience are the dominant kind of 
concept in (especially the second half) of the twentieth century.6 The most 
systematically developed functionalist concept of conscience is the one put 
forward by Niklas Luhmann. He describes conscience as a (reflective) 
function of the personality. At the core of Luhmann’s concept lies the 
notion of integrity. The function of conscience is to guard its owner’s 
integrity. In Luhmann’s theory, the content of conscience is linked to a 
person’s biography. No one can randomly choose the contents of his or her 
conscience, yet they are different in every person. The question of conscience 
is: “Can I identify myself with this action?”, or in other words: “Can I do this 
and still be me?”. This means that in cases of conscience, the whole 
personality is at stake. This goes some way towards an explanation of the 
significance commonly attached to conscience. 
 
7.1.2. Late nineteenth-century concepts of conscience 
Luhmann’s concept of conscience is the most systematically elaborated 
concept, but it was not the first ‘post-faculty-view’ of conscience. At the 
close of the nineteenth century the notion of faculty was still in use, but 
views of conscience were changing. Henry Sturt quotes a critic who wrote 
that 
 
“to most of those who are seeking to know themselves conscience appears 
now as a perplexing abstraction, now as a phantom will o’ the wisp; leading 
them on with momentary flashes of brightness when they give no particular 
heed to it, but fading indistinguishably into the other constituents of 
consciousness when they try to fix it with a steady gaze. An analysis which 
should succeed in grasping the reality and holding it firmly before us until 
we know it for what it is, would be a welcome addition to the literature of 
Ethics.”7 
 
On the one hand, we see that conscience is spoken of as a ‘constituent of 
consciousness’, which is a far more sophisticated view than the view that 
conscience is, in Sturt’s words, a ‘divinely sent monitor’. On the other hand, 
we see the expression of the differentiating consciousness, demanding the 
dissection of the mind in order to grasp the ‘thing’ that is conscience. Sturt 
                                                                                                               
Darwinian biology: “As psychology came under the influence of post-Darwinian 
biology, it drifted away from its previous concern with mental elements, or what 
might be called mental morphology, and began to occupy itself with questions of the 
functional significance of mental activity.” (Klein [1930], 246.) 
6 There is a boom in articles about conscience in the post-war period. This is 
probably related to the practice of conscientious objection in the context of the Cold 
War, protests against the A-bomb, and, in the case of the United States, the war in 
Vietnam. 
7 Sturt (1896), 343. 
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himself seeks clarity by offsetting his own analysis against the popular view 
of conscience as a ‘divinely sent monitor’, a view that he calls ‘the external 
view’. He holds that “one’s everyday conscience must be a part or faculty of 
one’s very self. (…) We must drop the external view of conscience, and 
perhaps drop the term itself to a large extent, as suggesting externalism.” He 
then gives his view concerning the rejection of the notion of conscience by 
contemporary philosophers: 
 
“It is due to these considerations that we hear but little of ‘conscience’ in 
recent works on moral philosophy. There is a very justifiable tendency to 
replace it by such terms as moral sense, moral faculty and moral ideal, none 
of which imply that the guiding principle of a man’s ethical judgment is 
anything independent of his personality. (…) It may be taken for granted 
now that conscience cannot be understood apart from the rest of our 
ethical experience.”8 
 
Although Sturt still uses the notion of ‘faculties’, he moves away from a view 
of conscience as an agent independent from the person, an authority to be 
obeyed. He notes that “moral judgments are reached by a sort of intuition”, 
and emphasizes the relation between acts of moral judgement and the self. 
Together, “they may be seen to form a coherent, orderly system”, and “to 
explain this regularity and permanence of the moral functions, we must 
suppose that in the mind of each of us there exists a sort of permanent 
moral structure”.9 He explains this in terms of a ‘personal moral ideal’, which 
regulates our conduct. “[B]oth the influence of our environment and the 
native systematising instinct of the mind”, urging us to be consistent, 
“induce us to round off our moral ideal and bring all its parts to harmony 
and order.” The moral ideal can be ignored; one can choose to identify 
oneself with it, or to reject it. This is why “[t]he voice of conscience needs to 
be reinforced by the voice of self-interest”.10 This is a pretty down-to-earth 
view of conscience. It does not insist on the objectivity of conscience; it does 
not see conscience as some mysterious faculty, but recognizes the influence 
of socialization; it is not naive with regard to the efficacy of conscience. In 
fact, making conscience more or less a function of the self, it comes close to 
Luhmann’s concept of conscience. In its intuitionist aspect, it is a precursor 
of those (early) twentieth-century ethicists that would be alone in using a 
concept of conscience, namely the ethical intuitionists.11 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 344. 
9 Ibid., 344, 346. 
10 Ibid., 351. 
11 Among them are H.A. Prichard and G.E. Moore. Ethical intuitionism also goes 
back to the moral sense theories. Moore is only an intuitionist with respect to moral 
ends, not particular judgements; we are able to intuit what is good in itself, what 
ought to be – not what we ought to do. See Moore (1988), chapter V, § 90. 
 320 
 And there were other concepts. In 1892, C.N. Starcke spoke of 
conscience as a ‘feeling of a particular kind’.12 He also defined it as “our 
sensibility to what others have good reason to think about us”, and as “our 
consciousness of conformity to (...) that part of [the moral code (the whole 
sum of our experience, accumulated and sifted through the ages, of what 
constitutes a good reason why our fellow-men should be satisfied or 
dissatisfied with us)] which has impressed our intelligence”.13 In its 
distinction between the actual satisfaction of others and their having good 
reasons to be satisfied by your conduct, Starcke’s view is reminiscent of 
Smith’s. However, with his concept of a ‘good reason’, which he defines as 
“one founded upon the real, fully perceived character of our actions, and in 
our full apprehension of the laws according to which men are pleased or 
displeased”, he built into his theory an assumption of attainable objectivity 
which (from a purely functionalist perspective, at any rate) is problematic. 
 
7.1.3. John Dewey 
The greatest exception, in the English language area, to the ‘rule’ that the 
more important philosophers did not bother to think about the concept of 
conscience, is John Dewey (1859-1952). He wrote most extensively on 
conscience in his Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics (1891), but the concept 
remains of importance in his later work.14 Dewey starts out by saying that 
 
“[t]he practical consciousness, or the recognition of ends and relations of 
action, is what is usually termed conscience. The analysis of conscience shows 
that it involves three elements, which may be distinguished in theory, 
although they have no separate existence in the actual fact of conscience 
itself. These three elements are (1) the knowledge of certain specific forms 
of conduct, (2) the recognition of the authority or obligatoriness of the 
forms, and (3) the emotional factors which cluster about this 
recognition.”15 
 
He goes on to say that “[c]onscience in this sense is no peculiar, separate 
faculty of mind”.16 Dewey rejects a faculty view of conscience, but this does 
not lead him to reject the concept altogether. Instead, he redefines it: 
conscience “is simply intelligence dealing with a certain subject-matter”; it “is 
distinguished not by the kind of mental activity at work, but by the kind of 
material the mind works upon. Intelligence deals with the nature and 
relations of things, and we call it understanding; intelligence deals with the 
                                                 
12 Starcke (1892), 348. 
13 Ibid., 371. 
14 See, for instance, Dewey (1985), chapter 5: “From Custom to Conscience”, and 
chapter 14, § 4: “Conscience and Deliberation”; see also Dewey (1980). 
15 Dewey (1969), part 3, chapter 1: “The Formation and Growth of Ideals”, 354. 
16 Ibid., 355. 
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relations of persons and deeds, and it is termed conscience.”17 This is 
problematic for a number of reasons, which I will not all enumerate here. 
One problem is that it simply appears to be empirically false to say that as 
soon as ‘intelligence’ deals with a specific subject matter, it is (called) 
conscience. One can think about the same subject matter in different ways; it 
is possible to contemplate ‘the relations of persons and deeds’, even the 
relations of oneself to one’s own deeds, in a fairly disinterested manner – this 
is not conscience.18 It is also possible to do so in an interested or concerned 
manner that is still not conscience. Most moral reasoning involves a certain 
degree of concern, of involvement, but that does not mean it involves (or 
occurs in) conscience. Finally, it is possible to think about these things in a 
particular way, with a specific form of concern that would be called 
conscience. So we can have (more or less interested) consciousness of things, 
and we can have conscience of the same things; we can be conscious of them, or, 
we might say, conscient. That is not to say that we can be conscient of 
everything we can be conscious of; consciousness is the broader notion, so 
we can be simply conscious of everything we can be conscient of. It is true, 
then, that there is a difference between conscience and plain consciousness 
(if there is such a thing – maybe I should say: some other form of 
consciousness) on the level of subject matter. But subject matter is not a 
conclusive criterion to distinguish between the two. The subjective form of our 
awareness makes a crucial difference – how we are aware of the subject 
matter. 
 Dewey criticizes faculty views of conscience on several grounds: 
“Aside from the fact that large numbers of men declare that no amount of 
introspection reveals any such machinery within themselves, this separate 
faculty seems quite superfluous.”19 This remark is followed by one that in 
some respects anticipates Ryle’s concept of conscience: “The real distinction 
is not between the consciousness of an action with, and without, the 
recognition of duty, but between a consciousness which is and one which is 
not capable of conduct.”20 As soon as someone is able to conceive of an end 
to be realized, Dewey holds, he has an awareness of obligation, of duty. The 
‘ought’ is simply part of the notion of ‘end’, of practical ideas. “The practical 
situation is itself an activity (...). But the agent, in order to determine his 
course of action in view of the situation, has to fix it (...). So his abstracting 
intellect cuts a cross-section through its on-going, and says ‘This is the 
                                                 
17 Idem. 
18 Psychopathology provides extreme examples of this possibility. See, for instance, 
Porter (1996) and Ramsay (2000). A ‘lack of conscience’ or a ‘defective conscience’, 
in this literature, is attributed to a lack of affective response, to an emotional 
disability; cognitive impairments may also lead to a ‘defective’ or ‘incomplete’ 
conscience, however; see Le Sage (2004), chapter 3. 
19 Dewey (1969), 360. 
20 Idem. 
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situation.’ Now the judgment ‘This ought to be the situation,’ (...) is simply 
restoring the movement which the mind has temporarily put out of sight.”21 
This practical orientation – which was to be expected from a pragmatist – 
also shows in his view of conscientiousness, which is for Dewey not a matter 
of prying into one’s own motives to see if they are pure, and with the object 
of retaining their purity, but ‘the habit of considering what ought to be 
done’.22 It is not a subjective, but an objective ‘analysis’, by which Dewey means 
that it concerns conduct, not motives or ‘subjective states of emotion’. In his 
Ethics, he makes the same point: 
 
“[G]enuine conscientiousness (...) is not an anxious prying into motives, a 
fingering of the inner springs of action to detect whether or not a ‘motive’ 
is good. Genuine conscientiousness has an objective outlook; it is 
intelligent attention and care to the quality of an act in view of its 
consequences for general happiness; it is not anxious solicitude for one’s 
own virtuous state.”23 
 
 I will not look into Dewey’s work in any more detail. It is interesting, 
with a view to the discussion of Ryle’s concept of conscience below, to see 
that Dewey moved in a somewhat similar direction in certain respects. But 
there is also an important difference between them. Dewey’s definition of 
conscience does not limit its area of application to the individual; his 
elaboration of the concept is such that we can infer that it has a peculiar 
relation to the self, but Dewey nowhere explicates this relation. For Ryle, on 
the contrary, the main question is: “Why can my conscience pass judgment 
only on my actions?”24 His answer to that question will occupy us in 7.2. 
 
7.1.4. Martin Heidegger 
In Germany (or in the German language), several books on conscience were 
published in the first half of the twentieth century. One major philosopher 
made use of a concept of conscience: Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). I have 
mentioned his concept of conscience before; it is ontological, rather than 
ethical, though it has ethical overtones. It is strikingly different from Dewey’s 
concept; whereas the latter’s is social (because conscience concerns conduct 
and the general happiness), Heidegger’s conscience is in a sense anti-social, in 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 361. 
22 Ibid., 364. 
23 Dewey (1985), 272-273. The aversion to the purely ‘subjective’, self-involved 
conscience has much to do with the Hegelian streak of Dewey’s work, which is 
clearly present throughout his ethical writings, and explicitly in Dewey (1969), 357-
358, where a footnote is added to remark on his indebtedness to Hegel, and Hegel is 
quoted with approval: “To be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition 
of one’s country.” 
24 Ryle (1971), 185. 
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so far as by sociality we mean life in ‘das Man’. The Heideggerian (silent) ‘call 
of conscience’ is a call to authenticity, to take up one’s own life project. 
Heidegger’s ‘Gewissen’ is a good example of the interweaving of symbolic 
and conceptual language. In its symbolic aspect, it expresses what we might 
call a ‘romantic’ experience of conscience, reminiscent of Rousseau. 
 Heidegger explains that ‘Dasein’, the human way of being, is ‘lost’ 
(‘verloren’) in ‘das Man’. It needs to find itself, and for that purpose, it needs 
to be shown its possible authenticity (‘Eigentlichkeit’) first. “Das Dasein 
bedarf der Bezeugung eines Selbstseinkönnens, das es der Möglichkeit nach je 
schon ist.” The goal is a form of self-realization; ‘Dasein’ needs something to 
testify to the possibility of this self-realization; it needs something to assure it 
that this is possible. This assurance is almost a form of reassurance, without 
which Dasein could never bring itself to seek what in potentiality it already 
is. This (re)assurance comes from conscience; it is what “der alltäglichen 
Selbstauslegung des Daseins bekannt [ist] als Stimme des Gewissens”.25 
 He then addresses the problem of the controversiality, the disputed 
nature and existence, of conscience: 
 
“Daß die ‘Tatsache’ des Gewissens umstritten, seine Instanzfunktion für 
die Existenz des Daseins verschieden eingeschätzt und das, ‘was es sagt’, 
mannigfaltig ausgelegt wird, dürfte nur dann zu einer Preisgabe dieses 
Phänomens verleiten, wenn die ‘Zweifelhaftigkeit’ dieses Faktums bzw. die 
seiner Auslegung nicht gerade bewiese, daß hier ein ursprüngliches Phänomen 
des Daseins vorliegt.”26 
 
His ‘rein existenzialen Untersuchung’ of conscience ‘mit fundamental-
ontologischer Absicht’ precedes any psychological study of the phenomenon, 
as well as any biological “‘Erklärung’, das heißt Auflösung des Phänomens”. 
It is equally distant, Heidegger maintains, from theological interpretations of 
conscience.27 In his own terminology, he makes a similar point to that which 
I have been stressing in the foregoing chapters: 
 
“Das Gewissen ist als Phänomen des Daseins keine vorkommende und 
zuweilen vorhandene Tatsache. Es ‘ist’ nur in der Seinsart des Daseins und 
bekundet sich als Faktum je nur mit und in der faktischen Existenz. Die 
Forderung eines ‘induktiven empirischen Beweises’ für die ‘Tatsächlichkeit’ 
des Gewissens und die Rechtmäßigkeit seiner ‘Stimme’ beruht auf einer 
ontologischen Verkehrung des Phänomens. Diese Verkehrung teilt aber 
auch jede überlegene Kritik des Gewissens als einer nur zeitweise 
vorkommenden und nicht ‘allgemein festgestellten und feststellbaren 
Tatsache’. Unter solche Beweise und Gegenbeweise läßt sich das Faktum 
des Gewissens überhaupt nicht stellen. Das ist kein Mangel, sondern nur 
                                                 
25 Heidegger (1984), 268 (part 2, chapter 2, § 54). 
26 Idem. 
27 Ibid., 268-269. 
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das Kennzeichen seiner ontologischen Andersartigkeit gegenüber 
umweltlich Vorhandenem.”28 
 
Conscience makes itself felt (or heard), so to speak, by making something 
else felt: it opens up the possibility of authentic existence, in contrast with 
the present inauthenticity. But, although it figures in experience – although it 
is experience – it belongs (in the terms I have used previously) to insistent, 
rather than existent reality. The common understanding of conscience, as well 
as existing theories of conscience, have always grasped something of the 
phenomenon, but (in my view) have always misunderstood their own 
relation to it, and have thereby misunderstood the phenomenon itself. 
Because of the difference between Heidegger’s concept of conscience and 
ordinary views, “bedarf die existenziale Interpretation der Bewährung durch 
eine Kritik der vulgären Gewissensauslegung”.29 
 Although Heidegger’s ‘Gewissen’ is not a moral but an ontological 
notion, Heidegger does relate himself to more traditional work on the 
subject; he mentions Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, and also M. 
Kähler, A. Ritschl, and H. G. Stoker, whose Das Gewissen was published in 
1925. Willy Bremi, in his Was ist das Gewissen? (1934) discusses Heidegger’s 
concept of conscience in four pages, making just as much room for 
Heidegger’s concept of conscience as for Kant’s.30 
 ‘Gewissen’ is an ontological notion; any moral conscience is only an 
ontic possibility, for which ‘Gewissen’ is the precondition. Conscience, for 
Heidegger, ‘erschließt’, ‘opens up’, “und gehört deshalb in den Umkreis der 
existenzialen Phänomene, die das Sein des Da als Erschlossenheit 
konstituieren”.31 ‘Dasein’ loses itself in the ‘publicity of the They’, where it 
listens to the noise of the ‘Gerede’; this is when ‘Dasein’ must be brought 
back to itself, for which purpose it is called by conscience. ‘Dasein’ is 
personally addressed; the call calls forth a different kind of hearing, and it 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 269. 
29 Idem. For this, see § 59 (289-295). Cf. 271-272: “Die Betrachtung vermeidet von 
Anfang an den Weg, der sich zunächst für eine Interpretation des Gewissens 
anbietet: man führt das Gewissen auf eines der Seelenvermögen, Verstand, Wille 
oder Gefühl, zurück oder erklärt es als ein Mischprodukt aus diesen. Angesichts 
eines Phänomens von der Art des Gewissens springt das ontologisch-
anthropologisch Unzureichende eines freischwebenden Rahmens von klassifizierten 
Seelenvermögen oder personalen Akten in die Augen.”; and 278: “Liegt der Grund 
der abwegigen ‘Erklärungen’ des Gewissens nicht am Ende darin, daß man schon 
für die Fixierung des phänomenalen Befundes des Rufes den Blick zu kurz 
genommen und stillschweigend das Dasein in einer zufälligen ontologischen 
Bestimmtheit bzw. Unbestimmtheit vorausgesetzt hat?” 
30 Bremi (1934), 153-157. 
31 Heidegger (1984), 270. 
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speaks in the mode of silence.32 Heidegger then makes an interesting point: 
“Die Charakteristik des Gewissens als Ruf ist keineswegs nur ein ‘Bild’, etwa 
wie die Kantische Gerichtshofvorstellung vom Gewissen.”33 The Kantian 
conception of conscience as a court of law is just an image. In other words: 
though it is a metaphor, it is not a symbol in the full sense of the word. 
Heidegger’s remark supports the reservations I made about the Kantian use 
of metaphor in chapter 5. The ‘Call’ of conscience Heidegger speaks of, the 
‘Stimme des Gewissens’, is not a mere image. It must not be taken literally, 
either. The voice must be understood as the ‘Zu-verstehen-geben’. 
Conscience ‘gives something to understand’. But what? 
 In conscience, Dasein calls itself to itself, to its own 
‘Selbstseinkönnen’; this is the peculiar characteristic of ‘Dasein’, that it is not 
merely, but that it can be, that it can make its being its own. What the Call 
opens up, Heidegger says, is unequivocal. It is only in the way it is heard that 
misunderstandings can arise, that it can be interpreted ‘inauthentically’.34 
That ‘Dasein’ calls itself, that the caller and the called are the same and yet 
different, is the reason why the voice of conscience has often been 
interpreted as that of a strange power. This interpretation has in turn be the 
subject of biological reductionist explanations. 
 
“Beide Deutungen überspringen vorschnell den phänomenalen Befund. 
Erleichtert wird das Verfahren durch eine unausgesprochen leitende, 
ontologisch dogmatische These: was ist, das heißt so tatsächlich wie der 
Ruf, muß vorhanden sein; was sich nicht als vorhanden objektiv nachweisen 
läßt, ist überhaupt nicht.”35 
  
This limited view of existence has led both to narrow concepts of conscience 
and to reductionist critique. But there is ‘being’ beyond ‘Vorhandenheit’. The 
Call of conscience is not that of a strange power, but that of ‘Dasein’ in its 
‘Unheimlichkeit’ (‘uncanniness’), the ‘Dasein’ that is not at home in the 
world. This ‘Dasein’ calls ‘Dasein’ that is lost in the They in the uncanny 
mode of silence, and calls it back in the ‘Verschwiegenheit’ (‘taciturnity’, but 
also ‘secrecy’) of existent ‘Seinkönnen’. The Call is rooted in ‘Angst’, in 
anxiety; the uncanniness threatens the ‘selbstvergessene Verlorenheit’. So 
Heidegger comes to the following conclusion: 
 
“Das Gewissen offenbart sich als Ruf der Sorge: der Rufer ist das Dasein, sich 
ängstigend in der Geworfenheit (Schon-sein-in...) um sein Seinkönnen. Der 
Angerufene ist eben dieses Dasein, aufgerufen zu seinem eigensten 
Seinkönnen (Sich-vorweg...). Und aufgerufen ist das Dasein durch den 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 271, 273. 
33 Ibid., 271. 
34 Ibid., 274. 
35 Ibid., 275. 
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Anruf aus dem Verfallen in das Man (Schon-sein-bei der besorgten Welt). 
Der Ruf des Gewissens, das heißt dieses selbst, hat seine ontologische 
Möglichkeit darin, daß das Dasein im Grunde seines Seins Sorge ist.”36 
 
 This is a highly important point. The ontological possibility of 
conscience lies in the fact that ‘Dasein’ is, in the ground of its being, ‘Care’. 
‘Dasein’ is fundamentally characterized by a particular was of being 
interested in the world. As Whitehead said that the subject ‘has a concern’ 
for the object, so Heidegger characterizes the relation between ‘Dasein’ and 
(itself-in-the) world as fundamentally one of ‘Care’. “Das Sein des Daseins ist 
die Sorge.”37 This ‘Care’ is a care for one’s own being as one’s own: “Der 
eigene geworfene Grund zu zein, ist das Seinkönnen, darum es der Sorge 
geht.”38 ‘Dasein’ is ‘thrown’ in existence, it is ‘geworfen’, but it can also 
‘design’ itself (‘entwerfen’); it is a ‘geworfenes Entwurf’. What conscience 
calls up to, is for ‘Dasein’ to take its own being in its own hands. It confronts 
‘Dasein’ with its threatening freedom; it is through fear that ‘Dasein’ comes 
to know its freedom.39 But “[i]n der Struktur der Geworfenheit sowohl wie 
in der des Entwurfs liegt wesenhaft eine Nichtigkeit. (...) Die Sorge selbst ist in 
ihrem Wesen durch und durch von Nichtigkeit durchsetzt.”40 ‘Dasein’ can only live 
some of its possibilities; its being entails the not-being of other (former) 
possibilities. This is in fact Heidegger’s version of the Christian doctrine of 
original sin – it is the meaning he gives to the concept of ‘guilt’. “Seiendes, 
dessen Sein Sorge ist (...), ist im Grunde seines Seins schuldig...”41 This is the 
condition of possibility of what is ordinarily called ‘guilt’. It is also the 
precondition for conscience: “[N]ur weil das Dasein im Grunde seines Seins 
schuldig ist und als geworfen verfallendes sich im selbst verschließt, ist das 
Gewissen möglich, wenn anders der Ruf dieses Schuldigsein im Grunde zu 
verstehen gibt.”42 ‘Dasein’ cannot be not-guilty. It can only be guilty 
authentically; it can choose itself.43 
 
“Mit dieser Wahl ermöglicht sich das Dasein sein eigenstes Schuldigsein, 
das dem Man-selbst verschlossen bleibt. (...) Das Rufverstehen ist das 
Wählen – nicht des Gewissens, das als solches nicht gewählt werden kann. 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 277-278. 
37 Ibid., 284. 
38 Idem. 
39 Hence Bremi (1934), 153 and 156, points out the similarities between Heidegger 
on the one hand and Luther and Kierkegaard on the other. 
40 Heidegger (1984), 285. 
41 Ibid., 286. 
42 Idem. 
43 Ibid., 287. 
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Gewählt wird das Gewissen-haben als Freisein für das eigenste Schuldigsein. 
Anrufverstehen besagt: Gewissen-haben-wollen.”44 
 
‘Dasein’ can appropriate its own guilt; make it its own. The choice for having-
(a-)conscience is the choice to care, to be concerned. It is the basic 
commitment that makes it possible for people to have an ultimate concern. 
There is either this basic concern, or mere indifference. 
 Heidegger defines conscience as “der Ruf der Sorge aus der 
Unheimlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins, der das Dasein zum eigensten 
Schuldigseinkönnen aufruft”.45 From the perspective of ordinary 
interpretations of conscience Heidegger reverses what happens: the voice of 
conscience comes after the deed, and proclaims guilt that is already there – so 
how can it be an ‘Aufruf zu...’? Heidegger replies: “Daß die Stimme als 
nachfolgende Gewissensregung gefaßt wird, beweist noch nicht ein 
ursprüngliches Verstehen des Gewissensphänomens.” Ordinary 
interpretations do not probe deep enough. Kant defined conscience in 
different ways. According to one definition it belonged to the preconditions 
for the susceptibility for the concept of duty; similarly, Heidegger posits an 
ontological conscience before conscience as it is ordinarily understood, an 
ontological guilt before ‘ordinary’ guilt. There is a ‘Schuldigsein’ before ‘jede 
Verschuldung’, and at the same time the ‘Schuldigsein’ follows the Call, instead 
if preceding it. It is only appropriated after the Call; this is what was called 
for. 
 When Heidegger summarizes the relation between conscience and 
the ‘existentials’ of ‘Befindlichkeit’, ‘Verstehen’, and ‘Rede’, he introduces 
one more notion that is worth considering: 
 
“Die im Gewissen-haben-wollen liegende Erschlossenheit des Daseins wird 
demnach konstituiert durch die Befindlichkeit der Angst, durch das 
Verstehen als Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste Schuldigsein und durch die 
Rede als Verschwiegenheit. Diese ausgezeichnete, im Dasein selbst durch 
sein Gewissen bezeugte eigentliche Erschlossenheit – das verschwiegene, 
angstbereite Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste Schuldigsein – nennen wir die 
Entschlossenheit.”46 
 
‘Entschlossenheit’ (‘resolve’, ‘resoluteness’, ‘firmness’, ‘purposefulness’) is a 
mode of ‘Erschlossenheit’ (‘openness’). It is ‘eigentliche Erschlossenheit’; 
‘Dasein’ affirms its openness, and takes its own being upon itself. The 
‘Entschlossenheit’ does not isolate ‘Dasein’ from its world; rather, it “bringt 
das Selbst gerade in das jeweilige besorgende Sein bei Zuhandenem und 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 288. 
45 Ibid., 289. 
46 Ibid., 296-297. 
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stößt es in das fürsorgende Mitsein mit den Anderen”.47 ‘Entschlossenheit’, 
then, is the term which represents the element of inspiration in Heidegger’s 
symbolic conceptualization of conscience: “Die Entschlossenheit zu sich 
selbst bringt das Dasein erst in die Möglichkeit, die mitseienden Anderen 
‘sein’ zu lassen in ihrem eigensten Seinkönnen (...). Das entschlossene Dasein 
kann zum ‘Gewissen’ der Anderen werden.” ‘Entschlossenheit’ does not 
entail certainty with respect to the course to take. “Zur Entschlossenheit 
gehört notwendig die Unbestimmtheit (...). Ihrer selbst sicher ist die 
Entschlossenheit nur als Entschluß.”48 This double-sidedness, this 
combination of certainty and uncertainty, is also, as I will explain in the 
chapter on “Aspects of Conscientious Objection” in part III, an essential 
characteristic of conscience and conscientious objection. ‘Entschlossenheit’ 
is a part of conscience; by definition, it requires (or embodies) courage – in 
Tillich’s words: ‘the courage to be’.49 
 
 
7.2. GILBERT RYLE 
It is hard to assess Heidegger’s influence on (popular) thought on 
conscience, though one can see how a popularized version of his concept of 
conscience may have been at the back of many a conscientious objector’s 
mind. The indebtedness of philosophical concepts of conscience to Gilbert 
Ryle is at least more often explicitly admitted.50 Langston even claims that 
“[h]is essay has been definitive in modern philosophical discussions about 
conscience”.51 I would not know about that, but it is clear enough that the 
road Ryle takes is, in a general sense, that taken by most authors on the 
subject after him: the road of functionalism. Ryle shifts attention away from 
the contents of conscience, towards its function and its formal 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 298. 
48 Idem. 
49 See Tillich (1970), 15: “The courage to be is the ethical act in which man affirms 
his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his 
essential self-affirmation.” 
50 Bernard Wand (1961) takes Ryle and Broad as the starting-points for his own 
discussion of conscience. McGuire (1963), 258, refers to Ryle when he says that “it is 
essential to our notion of conscience that a man’s conscience has to do exclusively 
with his own acts”. Childress (1979), 319, note 10, refers to Ryle in support of his 
own view that “conscience does not so much indicate that an act committed is 
wrong, as that an act ‘known’ (...) to be wrong, has been committed”. Many other 
concepts of conscience may have been influenced by Ryle, but he is not mentioned 
by (for instance) Jenkins, Fuss, or Rotenstreich; nor does his name appear in Bahm 
(1965), Olson (1959), and Earle (1970). Luhmann, though he does use English and 
American literature, does not mention Ryle either. 
51 Langston (2001), 92. 
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characteristics. It is not merely a shift of attention, for traditional notions 
related to conscience are redefined – most notably that of authority. 
 
7.2.1. Ryle’s concept of conscience 
Ryle’s “Conscience and Moral Convictions” was originally published in 
Analysis, in 1940. The main question Ryle tries to answer is: “Why can my 
conscience pass judgment only on my actions?”52 The reason why he asks this 
question is remarkable: he says that he “had always vaguely supposed that 
‘Conscience’ is ordinarily used to signify any sort of knowledge or conviction 
about what is right and wrong”; but then, dealing with moral sense theories 
and ‘intellectual theories like those of Kant and Price’, he “noticed that 
‘conscience’ is not used in this way. We limit the verdicts of conscience to 
judgments about the rightness or wrongness of the acts only of the owner of 
that conscience.”53 In English, ‘conscience’ is sometimes used in that very 
general way Ryle describes, but it seems that Ryle had missed out on the 
more particular meaning of the term, and the huge tradition behind it. His 
conclusion that the term is not used in that general way is wrong, but the 
more exclusive meaning is both more important historically, and more 
interesting.54 That traditional interpretations of conscience had escaped 
Ryle’s notice means that he can approach the subject from a fresh angle. 
When he sets out to answer the above question, he does not resort to 
traditional explanations. 
 His answer is as follows. First, he rules out that the difference 
between judging oneself and judging others, in the latter case of which one 
cannot say that one’s conscience (dis)approves of the conduct of others, is a 
difference between “my having knowledge of myself and only opinions about 
other people. If God is omniscient it would still be absurd to say that his 
conscience chided me for my behaviour.”55 Verdicts of conscience, rather 
than recording moral sense perceptions, are applications of general rules, 
imperatives or codes. They depend on a person holding these principles, 
having certain convictions. Now, according to Ryle, one can have 
convictions in degrees; that is, one can be convinced of something to a 
greater or lesser degree. One can accept a certain principle, without being 
moved to action by it. On the other hand, real acceptance of a principle 
seems to imply that it does motivate one to a certain kind of behaviour. When 
a principle is ‘part of someone’s intellectual furniture’ but ‘not of his real 
nature’; when “[i]t is not operative on his volitions, emotions, and behaviour 
                                                 
52 Ryle (1971), 185. 
53 Idem. 
54 Ryle is also wrong when he says that “[w]ith the Reformation (...) ‘Conscience’ 
began to have the narrower meaning of the knowledge by self-inspection of my 
duties and faults” (186). 
55 Idem. 
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(...) this is rather fishy.”56 “So,” Ryle says, “there seems to be a sense in 
which real acceptance of a principle (does not lead to, but) is being disposed 
to behave in accordance with it. To ‘know’ a rule of conduct is to be 
regulated in one’s conduct.”57 Ryle suggests: “let us label as ‘operative’ the 
knowledge or conviction which manifests itself in the disposition to behave 
(…) in accordance with the principle which is said to be known or 
accepted”.58 Here lies the answer to Ryle’s initial question, for I cannot have 
an operative conviction about someone else’s duty. My conviction “cannot 
issue in the required behaviour” – at least not directly.59 
 An internal conflict may arise when someone experiences an impulse 
contrary to an operatively accepted principle. In this case “there will not only 
exist a conflict between the temptation and the abstract principle; there will 
be actually experienced a conflict between the temptation and the disposition 
which is the operatively accepted principle. He will feel a tension because he 
is the two tendencies to act that are in conflict. (...) His knowledge or 
conviction of the principle is not an external censor but an internal 
competitor.”60 
 This means that conscience is not merely a judge of conduct, but a 
‘conduct-regulating faculty’. Here Ryle shows the same practical orientation 
we saw with Dewey – or even a stronger one. It has direct consequences for 
the meaning of ‘authority’: 
 
“We credit conscience with authority as well as with knowledge. That is, we 
use the word ‘conscience’ for those moral convictions which issue not in 
verdicts but in behaving or trying to behave.”61 
 
‘Authority’ loses its traditional meaning in Ryle’s concept of conscience – or 
it retains only one of its aspects. It is not a matter of right: conscience does 
not have the right to demand obedience; it has not proven itself an infallible 
or even a trustworthy moral expert; it is not divinely placed at the top of a 
hierarchy of human principles – it is solely a matter of power. For Darwin, as 
we have seen, the authority of conscience was a matter of its being a more 
forceful or a more enduring principle; for Ryle, it is a matter of the power to 
influence conduct. But one does not actually obey conscience – one has it, 
and this means one is disposed to act in certain ways. To say that conscience 
has authority is to make the analytical judgement that conscience is not 
academic knowledge, but conviction embodied in behaviour and dispositions 
to behave in certain ways: 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 187. 
57 Idem. 
58 Ibid., 187-188. 
59 Ibid., 188. 
60 Idem. 
61 Idem. 
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“Conscience is not something other than, prior to or posterior to moral 
convictions; it is having those convictions in an operative degree, i.e. being 
disposed to behave accordingly. And it is active or calls for attention when 
this disposition is balked by some contrary inclination. Conscience has 
nothing to say when the really honest man is asked a question and when he 
has no temptation to deceive. (...) Conscience is awake only when there is 
such a conflict. The test for the existence of such a conflict is the 
occurrence of attention to the problem of what is to be done. Pangs or 
qualms of conscience can occur only when I am both disposed to act in 
one way and disposed to act in another and when one of these dispositions 
is an operative moral principle.”62 
 
 Ryle draws attention to the fact that much of our behaviour is 
habitual. We go about our business without reflection or special attention, so 
long as the activity of the autopilot is not disturbed. In Heidegger’s example, 
we use a hammer without noticing the hammer, without attending to it – until 
the hammer breaks, its utility is gone, and our activity interrupted. Only then 
do we focus our attention on the hammer. In Polanyi’s terms: the hammer 
comes in focal awareness only once it has lost its meaning as a hammer. 
Similarly, conscience is ‘awake’ or ‘active’ only when its operation is 
counteracted. This is an interesting observation. It would seem that it would 
have to commend itself to an advocate of a virtue-ethical approach to 
conscience like Douglas Langston, but he does not pick up on this point. 
Traditional concepts of conscience emphasize(d) its negative function. A 
‘good conscience’ was often defined as the (blissful) absence of a bad one, 
though sometimes in more positive terms. The emphasis on the negative 
function of conscience, on its tendency to manifest itself when something 
goes or went wrong (or some wrong was [about to be] committed), may be 
explained in Ryle’s terms: as long as everything runs smoothly, you do not 
really notice the movement; it is when there is a bump in the road, or an 
engine problem, that we become aware of it. Only then does one ‘consult’ 
one’s conscience: 
 
“Consulting my conscience entails attending introspectively to my 
conflicting dispositions to act. Hence I cannot (logically) consult my 
conscience about what you are to do. Having a conscience to ‘consult’ is 
having a (partially) operative moral conviction.”63 
 
Once more Ryle answers his initial question. His answer implies that a 
perfectly good (wo)man would never experience an active conscience – unless, 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 189. 
63 Idem. 
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perhaps, in tragic situations. The same, I suppose, goes for the perfectly bad 
(wo)man. 
 He goes on to discuss other kinds of convictions, which also dispose 
one to certain kinds of behaviour. This leads to the idea that “conscience (...) 
is one species, among others, of scrupulousness; and scrupulousness is the 
operative acceptance of a rule or principle which consists in the disposition 
to behave, in all modes of behaviour (...) in accordance with the rule.”64 The 
discussion of scrupulousness parallels that of conscience. 
 
7.2.2. Critical remarks65 
That Ryle was unfamiliar with the traditional meaning of ‘conscience’ (as 
applying only to one’s own acts and thoughts) has a disadvantage as well as 
the aforementioned advantage. It has the consequence that Ryle is unaware 
of the loss of meaning that occurs in his concept. For what he does is that he 
reduces the meaning of ‘conscience’ to that of a combination of other terms: 
‘having moral convictions in an operative degree’. Bergson wrote that 
“[a]nalyzing (...) consists in expressing a thing in terms of what is not it” – no 
analysis escapes this. This means, however, that the analyst should be aware 
of the reduction and the consequent loss of meaning that occurs. If Ryle had 
said that ‘having moral convictions in an operative degree’ is an aspect of 
conscience, it would have been much less problematic.66 His reduction of the 
once so exalted conscience to the down-to-earth ‘having moral convictions 
in an operative degree’ is unsurprising in view of the myth-busting Ryle 
engaged in in his The Concept of Mind. Just as there is no ‘Ghost-in-the-
Machine’, there is also no mysterious faculty of conscience, an infallible 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 191. 
65 Langston (in chapter 6) is highly critical of Ryle, but most of his criticism is 
misplaced. He mistakenly puts Ryle down as a follower of Freud with regard to his 
concept of conscience; then, he says that “Ryle is not consistent in following this 
Freudian tack” (96). I will point out some other mistakes, without arguing for the 
fact that they are indeed mistakes: Langston misinterprets Ryle’s ‘answer’ to the 
question (that Ryle does not really ask himself) why Ryle thinks that conscience is a 
form of scrupulousness (94; see Ryle [1971], 191). Secondly, he sees ‘striking 
dissimilarities’ between scrupulousness and conscience that do not exist (95; Ryle 
[1971], 189 and 191). Thirdly, he claims that on Ryle’s view, one cannot act against 
one’s conscience, which is nonsense (96). His statement that “it is not surprising that 
Ryle finds little interest in classical problems about following one’s conscience” is 
therefore equally nonsensical. Finally, his claim that later discussions of conscience 
base the view that it has only personal authority on Ryle’s arguments not only cannot 
be proven, but is simply implausible in the extreme (98). 
66 Ryle is aware that he did not discuss the subject exhaustively, as is clear from his 
remark that he did not try “to show what the differences are between conscience 
and other sorts of scrupulousness” (193). 
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source of moral knowledge. There are only moral convictions, and when 
these are operative in a person, this person has a conscience. 
 Though myth busting is in itself a respectable line of business, Ryle’s 
concept of conscience is not without its problems. With his functionalistic 
concept of conscience – functionalistic in presenting conscience as a 
‘conduct-regulating faculty’ – Ryle is able to deal with the problem of the 
diversity of the dictates of different consciences. As people have different 
moral convictions, so they have different consciences. Apart from seeing 
conscience as a moral phenomenon, Ryle eschews any reference to the content 
of conscience. Conscience is not a source of moral knowledge; it is having 
moral convictions in an operative degree. But what counts as a moral 
conviction? Ryle is silent on that point. His concept of conscience provides 
accommodation for whatever ‘moral’ principles people come up with. The 
question is whether that does not stretch the concept beyond plausible limits. 
If both Gandhi’s conscience and that of a Nazi, responsible for the death of 
millions of Jews, can indeed pass under the same heading, how much have 
we learned about conscience?67 And if we are willing to use the same term 
for both, we must explain the difference between the two in some other way. 
 Another problem arises because Ryle identifies conscience with 
(partly) operative moral convictions, with dispositions to behave in a certain way. 
But it does not seem to be true that conscience is only active when a real 
disposition is “balked by some contrary inclination”.68 Imagine someone who, 
every time he finds himself in a particular kind of situation (which does not 
occur too often, but with larger intervals), does the wrong thing and feels 
guilt or remorse about that, and resolves to do better next time. Yet, next 
time, he once again does the wrong thing, and feels guilt et cetera. This does 
not seem very far-fetched to me; on the contrary, I believe this is quite 
conceivable. Now, in this situation, one can hardly say that this person has a 
disposition to do what would be the right thing in the situation in question – in 
fact, he never does the right thing. What he does have, is a clear idea about 
what is right and, more generally, about what kind of person he wants to be 
(or so one might assume). Because the situation does not occur too regularly, 
he does not get used to doing the wrong thing, so that his conscience does 
not get ‘blunted’. Instead, his conviction about what is right and his resolve 
to do the right thing next time get the time to build up and gain strength 
again – though never enough to actually make him do the right thing. In 
conclusion, conscience is not necessarily connected with what we would 
ordinarily call a disposition. Ryle’s concept of conscience is too narrow in 
this respect. 
 A further question is whether we should use the term ‘conscience’ 
for habitual behaviour, as Ryle does. The ‘really honest man’ Ryle talks about 
                                                 
67 Himmler’s conscience would be a case in point; see Bennet (1994), 299-300. 
68 Ryle (1971), 189. 
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has operative moral convictions, and therefore a conscience. But, in Ryle’s 
terms, this conscience is not active (or awake). He adduces another example: 
“God would calculate (if at all) with 100% scrupulousness and 0% scruples. 
Similarly, he would always do the right thing and would never wonder what 
he ought to do. He would never consult his conscience and would never 
have pangs of conscience.”69 But would it make sense to say he had a 
conscience at all? Did not the symbol of conscience arise exactly because of 
the experience of a divergence between conduct (or thoughts) and a standard 
of conduct? And should we not reserve the term ‘conscience’ for the 
situation in which someone in some (not necessarily cognitive) manner 
attends to his or her own conduct or thoughts? Whitehead described 
consciousness as a ‘mode of attention’; in the next chapter I will 
conceptualize conscience (as other authors have done) as a mode of 
consciousness – hence, conscience is also a mode of attention. Does the 
moral saint, who never has reason to attend to what he does because he does 
‘the right thing’ habitually, have a ‘sleeping’ conscience, ready to wake up in 
the inconceivable situation that the moral saint will some day at least hesitate 
about what to do? It would be odd to claim that. But if we ignore Ryle’s 
example of God, it seems that he might have a point. He appears to agree 
(more or less) that conscience is a mode of attention; for Ryle, to say that 
conscience is active is to say that it calls for attention. In so far as (in non-
saints) behaviour is habitual, it is not a matter of active conscience – which is 
not to say that conscience did not play a role in the formation of these 
habits, for it is likely that it did. But in the case of non-saints (that is: people 
like you and me) it makes sense to speak of a ‘sleeping’ conscience. In our 
case, the possibility that our dispositions are ‘balked by some contrary 
inclination’ always lurks in the background. When such a conflict actually 
occurs, conscience is immediately aroused; this potentiality was always 
already inherent in the situation. Hence, for ordinary people, it makes sense 
to speak of (an inactive) conscience also in relation to habitual behaviour – 
because with the kind of creature we are, a habit is never a guarantee for a 
certain kind of conduct. 
 A final remark I would like to make is that the ‘pangs or qualms of 
conscience’ Ryle mentions are a very specific sort of emotion or feeling. Why 
would this specific emotion occur when certain dispositions are balked? The 
answer that suggests itself is: because the dispositions stem from moral 
convictions. With other forms of scrupulousness, other emotions will occur. 
But what makes the moral so special? Ryle does not address this question. 
Nor does he ask whether conscience is a more important form of 
scrupulousness than that relating, for instance, to a sense of decorum. To 
me, it seems essential to a concept of conscience that it addresses these 
questions. 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 191. 
 335 
7.3. NIKLAS LUHMANN 
Social theorist Niklas Luhmann wrote three articles on the subject of 
conscience, which together present a consistent functionalist view of 
conscience, and the most systematic elaboration of a concept of conscience 
in the twentieth century.70 He is of the opinion that the old, substantialist 
concepts of conscience need to be discarded in favour of a functionalist 
concept that does not suffer from the limitations imposed on it by a 
particular (religious) morality. He makes clear that he wants to counter 
subjectivist tendencies, when he points out what confusion arises from the 
idea of conscience as an inner Voice one can heed, but also ignore: 
 
“Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht trennt auf Grund dieser Vorstellung (…) 
scharf zwischen Gewissensentscheidung und faktischem Verhalten und 
meint, daß Gewissensentscheidungen auch dann beachtet werden müßten, 
wenn der Betreffende aus Willensschwäche oder Bequemlichkeit (!) nicht 
nach ihnen lebe.”71 
 
Such a suggestion sends shivers across Luhmann’s spine (and from what I 
have said about Ryle, it is clear that similar shivers would visit his spine). The 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, in this particular case, completely delivered itself up to 
the caprice of the individual. Luhmann’s concept of conscience does not 
allow such foolishness. 
 
7.3.1. Conscience as a function 
In two of the three articles Luhmann wrote on the subject, he wrote about 
conscience in the context of a discussion on freedom of conscience. In the 
German debate on that topic, Luhmann’s texts would prove to be a 
definitive turning point. In this section, I will be concerned with his concept 
of conscience only, not with his view of freedom of conscience, which will 
figure in part II, chapter 11. 
 The first thing to do is to see what the ontological status of 
conscience is in Luhmann’s view, for this is where his concept (like other 
functionalist concepts) departs most radically from ‘the’ tradition of thought 
on conscience. ‘Old’ theories of conscience referred to it as a ‘moral sense’ 
or ‘moral faculty’, or assigned a special ‘place’ for it in some other way. It 
acquired the shape of a separate ‘entity’. In Luhmann’s theory, conscience is 
                                                 
70 Two of them have been mentioned. The third one is: Luhmann (1970). 
71 Luhmann (1965), 285. [On the basis of this idea the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (highest 
administrative tribunal) sharply distinguishes between dictate/decision of conscience 
and actual behaviour and thinks that dictates/decisions of conscience should be 
taken into account, also when the person involved, either due to weakness of will or 
for reasons of convenience (!), does not live by them.] 
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no such thing. We can no longer, Luhmann states, view conscience as part of 
the eternal ‘nature’ of man and as an organ of natural moral knowledge.72 
 
“Das Gewissen ist nicht eine Stimme, sondern eine Funktion.” 73 
 
That conscience ‘is’ a function, is shorthand for: “ ‘conscience’ is the name 
we give to a certain function that is fulfilled by our consciousness”. When 
Luhmann speaks of conscience as a “Kontrollinstanz” [supervisor / control 
agency], he may seem to give more ‘body’ to it, but this is surely not his 
intention. It is simply almost impossible to speak of conscience in another 
way. Therefore, we must keep in mind that for Luhmann, conscience is not a 
separate entity, but a reflective function. 
 It is a function of the personality. The phenomenon of conscience 
lies “im Bereich derjenigen Strukturen und Prozesse (…) die zur 
Selbstidentifikation der Persönlichkeit beitragen”.74 This self-identification can be 
described as the “Konstitution eines besonderen Systems in einer Umwelt 
mit der Möglichkeit, Grenzen zu ziehen, Handlungen zuzurechnen und 
Erleben reflexiv auf die eigene Identität zu richten”.75 In connection with 
this, conscience is defined as 
 
“jene normative Selbstbestimmung der Persönlichkeit, die diese gegenüber 
einem Überschuß an organischen und psychisch-möglichen 
Verhaltenspotentialen als Steuerungssystem konstituiert”.76 
 
In a social context, personal identity arises of necessity, due to 1) the fact 
that persons are confronted with an infinity of possibilities, from which they 
have to chose, and 2) the patterns of expectation of the social environment. 
There is a social demand for unity, continuity and consistency in the 
behaviour of individuals, a demand that is conjoined with approval of 
integrity.77 Besides that, self-identification is a form of ‘Sinnbildung’ 
                                                 
72 Luhmann (1973), 233. 
73 Luhmann (1965), 285. [Conscience is not a voice, but a function.] 
74 Luhmann (1973), 224. [in the range of those structures and processes (…) that 
contribute to the self-identification of the personality.] 
75 Idem. [constitution of a special system within an environment with the potentiality 
of drawing boundaries, attributing acts and turning experience reflexively towards 
the own identity.] 
76 Ibid., 232. [that normative self-determination of the personality, that constitutes 
this personality as steering system over against a surplus of organic and psychic-
possible potentialities for acting.] 
77 In this respect, Luhmann’s account of the origin of the phenomenon of 
conscience resembles that of Adam Smith and Charles Darwin. Where Luhmann 
speaks of ‘Achtung’ as lying at the basis of morality – a view that is presented as a 
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[construction of meaning]. That means that there is also a personal 
motivation to strive for integrity. 
 The function of conscience (read: the function we call conscience) is 
to guard the identity and integrity of its owner. An analysis of the concept of 
integrity falls beyond the scope of this article. A thorough analysis is 
provided by A.W. Musschenga, in his article “Integrity – Personal, Moral, 
and Professional”.78 For the present purpose, Luhmann’s terminology 
suffices. Conscience makes sure that “das Ich die Grenzen seiner 
Persönlichkeit nicht sprengt”, or at least not without serious consequences.79 
 
“Kann ich so handeln? oder: wie konnte ich so handeln? – das sind die 
Fragen des Gewissens.”80 
 
In other words, conscience entails the question: ‘Can I identify myself with 
this (past, present or future) action?’; ‘Can I do this and still be me?’.81 These 
are reflective questions; ‘the I’ takes the stance of ‘the other’, to measure 
itself against its own biographical standard, that includes ideals – who ‘the I’ 
desires to be. Luhmann identifies the function of conscience as lying in the 
“symbolic fixation and frustration-proof preservation of certain abstraction 
levels of the personality”, and in the “normative support and, with respect to 
contents, consistent molding of Ego/Alter integrations, that are anchored in 
the self-identification”.82 This does not mean that conscience reflects on 
every action and every decision: “Es deckt keineswegs den gesamten Bereich 
der ‘internalisierten’ sozialen Normen und Habitualitäten.”83 Conscience is 
concerned solely with actions and decisions that might put a person’s identity 
at stake. When someone is inclined to act in a way that is not compatible 
with who this person is and desires to be, his conscience will stir. There are 
                                                                                                               
consequence of his concept of conscience, Darwin and Smith speak of approval and 
disapproval, in combination with sympathy. 
78 In: Musschenga et al. (eds.) (2002). 
79 Luhmann (1965), 264 [the I does not exceed the boundaries of its personality]. 
80 Luhmann (1973), 235. 
81 Cf. Luhmann (1973), 231: “Die Kontrolle am Gewissen weist sich darin aus, daß 
man sich selbst vor die Frage stellt, ob man derselbe bleiben kann.” In a sense, 
Luhmann presents us with an ontic version of Heidegger’s concept of conscience; the 
Luhmannian conscience is concerned with authenticity on an ontic, rather than an 
ontological level. While the Heideggerian conscience conserves ‘true humanity’, one 
might say, the Luhmannian conscience is conservative in a more concrete sense; it 
tries to conserve a person’s identity. In this more concrete sense, the Heideggerian 
conscience is rather the opposite of conservative. 
82 Luhmann (1973), 235. On the Ego/Alter dialectic, see 225. 
83 Ibid., 231. 
 338 
then two possibilities: “mit Hilfe der Gewissen-Standards die biographischen 
Fakten oder mit Hilfe dieser Fakten die Standards zu überprüfen”.84 
 Self-definition, the building of one’s personality, proceeds by the 
reduction of possible ways of acting. Our physical and mental possibilities 
are far greater in number than the actions we allow ourselves to engage in. 
Luhmann points out that there is a difference between the organic and the 
personal system, which is most clearly perceived by the individual in the 
experience of death – first of all the death of others, and in the wake of that 
the possibility of his own death. It becomes clear to the individual that the 
intersubjectively constituted world-horizon will outlive him. “Das ermöglicht 
es (…) den Sinn des eigenen Lebens unabhängig von der Fortdauer des 
Lebens zu bestimmen.”85 We have seen that self-identification, with which 
the function of conscience is closely connected, is a form of ‘Sinnbildung’. 
From this perspective, it becomes understandable that the discrepancy 
between the organic and the personal system can reach such heights, that the 
latter comes to consider destroying the former. “Das Gewissen bezieht sich 
auf personale, nicht auf organische Identität und ist daher in der Lage, den 
eigenen Tod zu erwägen.”86 But then this possibility has to be present, of 
course. Therefore, Luhmann states that “Gewissen kann nur haben, wer sich 
selbst töten kann”.87 The possibility of suicide is the ultimate safeguard of 
human freedom. Killing oneself (one’s organic self) may be the only way to 
avoid acting against one’s conscience. But the death of one’s personal self is 
another possibility. In a decision of conscience, an individual may radically 
reject his own past, and start anew. 
 
“Im Gewissen entdeckt das Ich sich im Besitz seiner vollen Möglichkeiten: 
als potentieller Feind seines schon geformten Selbst, als drohende 
Zerstörung seiner Persönlichkeit. (…) Es muß zur Erhaltung des Sinnes 
der eigenen Persönlichkeit die Potentialitäten des Ich reduzieren, im 
Grenzfalle über den Tod des Ich verfügen können.”88 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 236 [to revise the biographical facts with the help of the standards of 
conscience, or the standards with the help of these facts]. 
85 Ibid., 231. [That makes it possible (…) to determine the meaning of one’s life 
independently from the continuance of life.] 
86 Idem. [Conscience is related to personal, not to organic identity and is therefore 
able to consider its own death.] 
87 Luhmann (1965), 269 [only who can kill himself, can have a conscience]. 
88 Ibid., 270. [In conscience, the I discovers itself in possession of its full capacities: 
as potential enemy of his already formed self, as threatening destruction of its 
personality. (…) To preserve the meaning of the own personality it has to reduce the 
potentialities of the I, (and) in extreme cases have the death of the I at its disposal.] 
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7.3.2. Critical remarks 
Inherent in many concepts of conscience is the mistaken idea that the 
concept states all there is to say about conscience. Luhmann, however, 
realizes that his concept of conscience was a concept from a particular 
perspective. Nor does he see his concept as correcting earlier, mistaken 
concepts. He understands that the kind of concept of conscience he 
propounds is the kind that fits a certain kind of social and psychological 
organization. His approach is necessitated by social developments, not by the 
inherent inadequacy of earlier concepts. They have either been rendered 
inadequate by changes in the structure of society and corresponding changes 
in individual psychology, or they fulfil another function, emphasizing other 
aspects of conscience.89 That is the general way in which Luhmann presents 
his own concept. On one occasion, however, Luhmann forgets himself and 
pretends that his functionalist view reveals what conscience really is, as 
opposed to the common use of the term, which “als eine euphemistische, 
honorifizierende, werbende Bezeichnung dient für Steuerungseinrichtungen, 
die in einer bestimmten Lage der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung 
unentbehrliche Funktionen übernehmen”.90 This reductionist view does not 
reappear in the 1973 article, where he does not forget, as he does here, that 
he looks at things through functionalist glasses. On this one occasion, 
Luhmann seems to think that he is the only one not wearing glasses, or that 
his are made of special, 100 % transparent, non-reality-deforming material. 
Moreover, he suggests that ‘conscience’ is simply a certain empirical fact or 
state of affairs: “Meine Vermutung ist, daβ der Begriff ‘Gewissen’ benutzt 
wird als Schutzmarke für ein solches System der Steuerung hochgradig 
selektiver Erlebnisverarbeitung. Was sonst sollte er als empirischen 
Tatbestand bezeichnen.” To see conscience (the term ‘conscience’) as a sort 
of cloaking device does not do justice to people’s experiences of conscience, 
nor to their self-understanding. Social theorists need not accept and adopt 
that self-understanding of course – or why would we need them? – but a 
‘scientific’ concept cannot simply claim to replace people’s self-
understanding and claim the status of the ‘true’ concept for itself. Most of 
the time, Luhmann displays his awareness that this is indeed too much to 
claim for his concept. 
 There is a problem with Luhmann’s concept of conscience that is 
shared by many modern concepts of conscience: it sees conscience one-
                                                 
89 Luhmann (1970), 12; Luhmann 1965, 278-279. Luhmann (1973), he presents his 
own view not as a replacement of ‘traditional’ views, but as a view of the matter 
under another aspect, and with a different aim and function. Theological and moral 
philosophical theories, for instance, “articulate the reality of conscience with a view 
to its perfection”, whereas Luhmann articulates it “with a view to its function”. 
90 Luhmann (1970), 16. [“serves as a euphemistic, honorific, advertizing designation 
for control devices that undertake indispensable functions in a particular state of 
societal development”] 
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sidedly from the perspective of the preservation of integrity, and forgets the 
intentionality of conscience – the fact that conscience is about something. 
Without denying the link between conscience and (the preservation of) 
integrity, one may note that the preservation of integrity is usually not a 
person’s motivation when acting morally and conscientiously. I may be 
conscious of my own striving to preserve my integrity, and perhaps it is 
always part of moral motivation; but to act according to conscience is 
primarily a matter of trying to do the right thing, without considering the 
consequences for one’s integrity. (This is one reason why there may be 
inconsistency between one’s conscientious actions.) By saying that 
conscience ‘is about something’ I do not counter Luhmann’s claim regarding 
the integrity-preserving function of conscience, but I approach the matter 
from another angle – one that is more sympathetic to people’s self-
understanding.91 
 Conscience can become the object of consciousness in its 
intentional mode.92 But conscience itself can be understood as a mode of 
consciousness (as I will explain more fully in the next chapter), and therefore 
it also knows the structures or modes of intentionality and luminosity. In the 
first mode, conscience can be said to be about something; in the second, 
something becomes luminous in conscience. (There is no sense in 
distinguishing further between ‘experiencing’ conscience in consciousness in 
its structure of luminosity and conscience itself having that structure.) That 
conscience can have the structure of luminosity also (or this, particularly) 
goes unrecognized by Luhmann and other contemporary authors. 
Conscience, being a mode of consciousness, is a point of contact with a 
reality outside the subject; in other words: reality extends into consciousness. 
This does not entail a naive objectivism – it is naive to suppose that there 
exists a subject in isolation from the ‘object’ reality. Pre-objective reality may 
be more or less transformed in becoming an object for a subject; the truth 
                                                 
91 Hence I disagree with Childress (1979), 327, where he says: “In appealing to 
conscience I indicate that I am trying to preserve a sense of myself, my wholeness 
and integrity, my good conscience, and that I cannot preserve these qualities if I 
submit to certain requirements of the state or society.” This may capture an aspect 
of some, perhaps many, conscientious objections; but what the objector primarily 
‘indicates’ is that a given action would be incompatible with his conception of what 
it means to be good. His conscience and his conscientious objections express 
ultimate concern; the aim at this ultimate concern produces the integrity of the 
objector. Hence, we can say that the objector tries to protect his integrity – but this 
is derivative, not primary. About integrity see especially chapter 15. 
92 In the strictly Voegelinian sense of ‘intentionality’, this is a deformation, for 
conscience does not belong to thing-reality; Voegelin would speak of ‘reflective 
distance’ where conscience is the object of reflection without deformative 
consequences. I will return to this in chapter 8. 
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relation may be stronger or weaker, and they come in various kinds, as we 
saw, for example, in Wordsworth’s case. 
 If we were to take the Luhmannian description of conscience to be 
all there was to conscience, we would have to ignore all such considerations 
of its ‘contents’, of what was ‘revealed’ in conscience. Conscience would be 
part of a more or less self-enclosed system – self-enclosed in the sense that 
its business would be with the self alone. Such a view is most strikingly 
expressed by Hannah Arendt, according to whom conscience “is not 
primarily interested in the world where the wrong is committed or in the 
consequences that the wrong will have for the future course of the world”; 
instead, “it trembles for the individual self and its integrity”.93 Hannah 
Arendt points to Socrates to corroborate this view, apparently forgetting that 
the Apology has Socrates say that ‘doing nothing unjust or impious’ is his 
‘whole concern’. Just as consciousness is intentional, so is conscience. It 
might be correct to say (as Luhmann does) that conscience functions as a 
guardian of one’s integrity, that the function of conscience in the personal 
system we call ‘self’ is to preserve that self in the face of threats to its stability 
– but that is something altogether different from saying that the conscience 
is (based in) a concern for the self, or that conscience is ‘not primarily 
interested in the world’. The experience of conscience as (I think) we all 
know it, is of something that is fundamentally interested in the world. 
Conscience ‘tells’ us to refrain from certain actions because of the harm they will 
produce, or because they are bad.94 Luhmann need not have made Arendt’s 
mistake, though his view of conscience is certainly one-sided. But in fact he 
does make the mistake of seeing his own concept as on the same level as 
(and therefore a competitor of) one that allows for the luminosity and 
intentionality of conscience: 
 
“Das Gewissen besorgt (...) nicht die Erkenntnis und Verkündung 
unverbrüchlicher Prinzipien, nach denen man handeln soll. Es leistet 
                                                 
93 Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations”, Social Research, Vol. 38, 
1971, 442, quoted in Larry May (1983), 60. Jenkins (1955), 265, too, says about 
conscience that “its concern is for the character of the self”. A concept of 
conscience like that put forward by Arendt would have been horror to many 
(especially British) Enlightenment philosophers, as well as to John Dewey. Cf. 
Wollheim (1986), 224: “[W]hatever may be the content of obligation, obligation 
itself is primarily self-directed. It is self-directed, though it may be other-regarding. 
For it expresses itself in a thought that a person has about what he ought to do (…).” 
This seems to me incorrect for morality as a whole (or obligation in general), but 
might hold in the case of conscience. That the ‘command’ is directed towards 
oneself does not mean that conscience is concerned with the self. Thus, Wollheim may 
have drawn attention to the source of Arendt’s (and other people’s) confusion. 
94 Earle (1970), 307, also omits this aspect when he writes that “[a] violation of one’s 
own conscience (…) is (…) like the threat of dissolution of one’s own deepest self.” 
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vielmehr die Einheit der Zurechnung von Prinzip und abweichendem Verhalten, und 
nur diese Einheit ist unverzichtbar und notwendig.”95 
 
 Another difficulty with Luhmann’s approach is that it presupposes a 
view of morality that few people, other than certain social theorists, would 
be willing to accept (and it is another question to what extent those who 
accept this view really ‘work with it’ in their everyday lives). In connection 
with this, Luhmann’s view allows for all kinds of matters to be called matters 
of conscience, that no one would ever refer to as such. It may be a matter of 
conscience to someone to be allowed to pursue his career under all 
circumstances, when this is constitutive of his identity and of his sense of 
meaning in life. For example, a very promising singer may ‘conscientiously’ 
object to military service, because this would fatally obstruct his 
development as a singer.96 This is simply not how we use the term 
‘conscientious’. Perhaps Luhmann himself was not completely convinced 
either. In theory, he widens the concepts of morality and conscience to 
encompass also what we would normally designate as non-moral matters. 
But in his examples, he tends to remain within the field of ‘ordinary’ 
morality. As examples of possible ‘gegenstrukturellen Verhaltens’ he 
mentions lying, hurting and killing.97 Examples of behaviour that has ‘nur 
periphere Bedeutung’ are drawn from the non-moral domain: accidentally 
nudging someone, or miscalculating. More significant behaviour would be: a 
scientist committing plagiarism, an officer showing fear, and adultery. We 
would consider the first and the last to be moral matters, and Luhmann 
himself states: “Handelt es sich (…) um sozial standardisierte Probleme und 
Verhaltenserwartungen, nennt man diese zentralen Kriterien Ehre. Geht die 
kritische Bedeutung dagegen auf die Struktur der individuellen Persönlichkeit 
zurück, so treffen wir auf das Phänomen des Gewissens.”98 Again, with respect 
to the meaning of ‘morality’, Luhmann’s relation to people’s self-
understanding is problematic. 
 Finally, I would like to note that Luhmann (over)dramatizes 
conscience, or at least that his focus is extremely narrow, lying only on the 
dramatic manifestations of conscience. It is a bit of a stretch to speak of the 
small crimes we all commit against our consciences in terms of the question: 
“Can I do this and still be me”; that is, conscience manifests itself far more 
often than we pose that question. The narrowness of Luhmann’s perspective 
is undoubtedly related to his aim in the articles in which he develops his 
concept of conscience, namely to construct a concept of conscience that can 
                                                 
95 Luhmann (1973), 238. 
96 The example was provided by A.W. Musschenga. 
97 Luhmann (1973), 229. 
98 Luhmann (1965), 265. Luhmann’s Darwinian view of morality also entails that the 
authority of conscience cannot be a matter of right, but only one of power. 
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be used in juridical contexts, in particular that of conscientious objection – 
but that does not remove the problem. 
 
 
7.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There are many more philosophical concepts of conscience than the few I 
have discussed above. In my view, they all suffer from one flaw or another 
(or from a number of flaws, of course), but I cannot argue for that here. At 
any rate, up to now no one has attempted to design a concept of conscience 
that deals with the problem of the synchronic and diachronic diversity of the 
‘dictates’ of conscience, while at the same time doing justice to people’s 
experience of conscience, and to their self-understanding. Anyone who 
desires more than a ‘local’, parochial understanding of conscience will have 
to regard existing concepts of conscience as flawed for this reason alone. 
 I have also not discussed non-philosophical concepts of conscience, 
of which psychological concepts would have been the most prominent 
candidates for inclusion in this chapter. The reasons for this have been 
discussed in the introduction to this book. In Luhmann’s concept of 
conscience, as well as in most other recent concepts of conscience, the 
influence of various psychological approaches is evident. It is not surprising, 
then, that they suffer from the same or similar problems. Theological 
concepts of conscience may not suffer from these problems, but I will not 
discuss them, because they tend to fit conscience into a particular theological 
perspective, which in turn tends to be coloured by a specific religious view. I 
do not wish to end up with some specific form of the Protestant or Catholic 
conscience; on the contrary, my purpose in the next chapter will be to devise 
a concept of conscience that accommodates all experiences of conscience, 
religious (in the traditional sense) or not; Catholic or Protestant, Christian or 
non-Christian. It is crucial that it deals with the synchronic and diachronic 
diversity of ‘dictates’ of conscience, while also doing justice to people’s 
diverse self-understandings, as well as to the phenomenology of conscience, 
that both gives rise to people’s self-understanding and results from it. 
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8. A fluid concept of conscience 
 
“To philosophize means to reverse the normal direction of the 
workings of thought.” 
 
“In so doing [the mind] will arrive at fluid concepts, capable of following 
reality in all its windings and of adopting the very movement of the inner 
life of things.” 
HENRI BERGSON, Introduction to Metaphysics, Philosophical Library, New 
York, 1961, 64; 63-64. 
 
 
8.1. THE SYMBOL AND CONCEPT OF CONSCIENCE 
‘Conscience’ is primarily a symbol, expressing experiences that belong to a 
certain class; we are able to recognize experiences of this class, and can 
therefore call them experiences of conscience. That we are able to recognize 
experiences of conscience entails the possibility of coming to see and speak 
of conscience as an intentional object; the possibility of thinking and 
speaking about it indicatively, rather than symbolically. Thus we form concepts 
of conscience, but these are deformations of reality in the sense that they 
freeze a fluid reality and cut it in to pieces, analyzing the frozen reality into 
(what are supposedly) its basic elements; they are deformations in a stronger 
sense, insofar as they suppose conscience to be something of the order of 
existents – and this is what indicative language generally tends towards. 
Voegelin distinguished between two structures of consciousness: luminosity 
and intentionality. Symbols are the natural extension of consciousness in its 
first structure; concepts belong to the latter. But we can think about these 
structures of consciousness, and about the whole of the reality in which we 
participate, and this led Voegelin to posit a third structure of consciousness, 
which he called reflective distance.1 “All philosophy is conducted in reflective 
distance within consciousness about consciousness.”2 Not all philosophy 
deforms reality – or not to the same extent, anyway, and Voegelin’s term 
‘reflective distance’ highlights the difference between reflecting on 
something in a legitimate way and mistaking what Voegelin calls ‘It-reality’, 
the reality that can only be expressed symbolically, for ‘thing-reality’, which 
we speak of in an indicative manner; for it is only through reflective distance 
that we can distinguish between the two. When reflective distance collapses, 
neither symbols nor concepts can be seen for what they are.3 
I do not agree with Voegelin that all philosophy distances itself 
enough from the everyday indicative mode of thought. (I mention the 
                                                 
1 See especially Voegelin (1984), 50-51, and Voegelin (2000), 54-56, and 58-59. 
2 Voegelin (2004c), 399. 
3 See Buijs (1998), 207-208. 
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indicative mode of thought, because this is what thought is most likely to 
lapse into when reflective distance collapses.4) Whether it does distance itself 
enough from it depends on whether it recognizes the status of its own 
language. Many philosophical concepts of conscience betray an indicative 
view of conscience – if this does not entail reification, then at least the 
attempt to pin down a fluid reality; to define the exact place of the concept 
of conscience in relation to its neighbouring concepts. All these concepts 
absolutize one or a few aspects of conscience at the cost of all others. So 
reflective distance is continually in danger of losing distance, of becoming 
indistinguishable from the structure of consciousness Voegelin calls 
intentionality, for which conscience then becomes the object, the ‘thing’ 
apprehended. 
 There is an illegitimate and a legitimate way of thinking and speaking 
indicatively about conscience, then. The legitimate form of indicative 
thought arrives at concepts, just as the illegitimate form, but it differs from 
the latter in that the concepts it arrives at are fluid concepts.5 A concept is ‘fluid’ 
when it meets two criteria: 1) it includes within itself an awareness of its own 
secondary nature, and of its own limitations, that shows in the fact that it 
does not reduce the conceptualized reality to one of its aspects, let alone 
reify it;6 2) it is designed so as to be able to adjust to a flowing reality. A 
disadvantage of concepts is that they tend to absolutize certain aspects of a 
phenomenon. The practice of analysis forces the philosopher out of the 
symbolic mode of thought, into the indicative mode. The problem is to 
maintain an awareness of the limitations of this mode, and of the symbolism 
which forms its background.7 My concept of conscience, which I take to be a 
fluid concept, is intended to do just that.8 Bergson said that there are two 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 208: “Waar men deze herinnerende distantie buiten werking zet, wordt het 
mogelijk met symbolen te gaan opereren alsof het begrippen zijn.” [“Where this 
remembering distance is put out of play, it becomes possible to operate with 
symbols as if they are concepts.”] 
5 Langston (2001), 123, expresses this possibility in his own terms; common 
concepts of conscience present it as some sort of entity, but we need not discard 
them: “As it turns out, we might be able to retain our ordinary notion of conscience 
while understanding that it is not in fact such an entity. The case of the electron 
presents a possible model for doing this.” Cf. 177: “Understood in the proper way, 
conscience can be seen as a useful analytical notion.” 
6 In other words: the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is avoided. 
7 If this is successfully done, one may speak of ‘reflective distance’. 
8 It is not a description of conscience that freezes and dissects a fluid reality; yet it is 
unavoidably a circumscription, which isolates a ‘part’ of a flowing reality, observing it 
from many sides, under different aspects. As description involves decision, so 
circumscription, we might say, involves circumcision; it goes around the ‘object’, 
making small cuts all around in order to arrive at a panoramic description – but still 
cutting, so as to get rid of certain elements for reasons of hygiene, religion, or 
otherwise. 
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ways of knowing. One consists of “going all around it, the second entering 
into it”.9 For Bergson, to grasp reality intuitively, sympathetically, was to 
form fluid concepts of it. While I share his criticism of analysis and of 
ordinary concepts (for which he tended to use the word ‘symbols’), I do not 
fully share his optimism with regard to our ability to grasp reality intuitively. 
Or, to say the least, as soon as we articulate what (perhaps) we have grasped 
intuitively, we lose something, we deform reality. But I do believe that it is 
possible to arrive at fluid concepts, that, while they share some of the 
characteristics of ordinary concepts, are also informed by what Bergson 
would call an intuitive grasp of reality. A fluid concept is still inevitably too 
clean; it is unavoidably restrictive. But that is acceptable as long as its 
limitations are recognized. Human consciousness reduces complexity; the 
challenge which a fluid concept is intended to meet is to do so while retaining 
complexity. 
 Why would I want to design a fluid concept of conscience, when I 
have already analyzed the symbol of conscience, and claimed that the 
symbolic mode of thought and speech is primary?10 That I have analyzed the 
symbol of conscience immediately points to the fact that as a philosopher I 
cannot remain in the symbolic mode myself, but am inevitably forced into 
the indicative, conceptual mode of thought. This is not a matter of choice. 
But why not be satisfied with the analysis of the symbol? The reasons for 
this are of a practical nature. Firstly, people who are so used to thinking of 
conscience indicatively that they cannot see the symbolic aspect that still 
resides in it may not be able to relate very easily to what I have said about the 
symbol of conscience. To use a fluid concept of conscience facilitates 
communication. In fact, it does so for everyone, for it is inevitable that in the 
remainder of this book I will speak, as I have done in the preceding chapters, 
about ‘his conscience’, ‘her conscience’, and so on – it is inevitable, that is, 
that I will speak about conscience indicatively, and it will be useful to have a 
fluid concept to which the term ‘conscience’ may then refer. Every time I use 
the term in this manner, it will be clear what I mean. Whereas uptil now, 
when I did not speak of the symbol of conscience, but of conscience as such, 
I had to rely on the reader’s pre-understanding of the term, from this chapter 
on I need no longer do so (or to a much lesser degree). The fluid concept of 
conscience is also meant to expel a certain vagueness that pertains to 
symbolic expressions of conscience, and to create a more unified image of 
                                                 
9 Bergson (1961), 1. 
10 I know people who maintain that we are better off without the concept of 
conscience, and argue against using it. A philosopher may indeed choose not to 
make use of the concept, but he has no power to stop others from using it. Both the 
symbolic expression of conscience and the indicative use of the term have a long 
tradition. In view of the importance that has been and still is attached to conscience, 
the most sensible thing to do seems to be to try to make sense of the way the term is 
used, and to strive for a legitimate indicative use of the term. 
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conscience than can be done by means of an analysis of the symbol of 
conscience in terms of its core elements.11 Naturally, the clarity gained comes 
at a price, but I have said enough about that above. Finally, it is worth noting 
that there is nothing unusual about having a concept for ‘things’ for which 
we also have symbols. ‘God’ can be said to be a symbol, but there are many 
concepts of God. The same holds true for ‘things’ as diverse as Freedom, 
Equality, Justice, Truth, one’s country, one’s favourite football club, and so 
on. I am an Ajax fan myself, but I use the term ‘Ajax’ both indicatively and 
symbolically (and often something in-between). I do not think anyone would 
find that problematic. 
 What is the relation between the symbol and the fluid concept of 
conscience? This is best illustrated by means of the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiences of conscience gave rise, primarily, to the symbol of conscience 
(and the symbol ‘conscience’), but also, indirectly, to an indicative use of the 
term. The latter, of course, could also have occurred if ‘conscience’ had not 
become the prime carrier of the symbol of conscience (which I only named 
the symbol of conscience because it did) – indeed, we have seen that ‘syneidos’ 
and ‘syneidesis’ were already used in a partially indicative manner, and that 
the term ‘moral sense’ was used to refer to a special sense or faculty that 
supposedly enabled people to distinguish right from wrong. The indicative 
use of the term ‘conscience’ and its predecessors gradually developed as the 
                                                 
11 That does not mean that I agree with Peter Fuss, who simply sweeps aside 
everyday expressions of and though about conscience, stating that “[t]he moral 
philosopher (...) is concerned with the precise nature of conscience” and therefore 
“fails to make the necessary distinctions at his peril”. (Fuss [1964], 117.) Instead of 
passing by everyday thought, the philosopher should try to make sense of it, as he 
should try to make sense of his or her own experiences. 
 
symbol of conscience 
 
 
 
experiences of a certain class, in a particular 
mode of consciousness 
 
 
 
 
indicative use of ‘conscience’ 
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relation between the experiences that originally engendered the symbol 
weakened. Paradoxically, this may have been the result of such experiences 
becoming more common, so that ‘conscience’ came to occur more regularly 
in ordinary language, as well as in philosophical reflection. As ‘all repetition is 
anti-spiritual’ (Oscar Wilde), the symbol of conscience gradually made way 
for an indicative use of the term, and for concepts of conscience that in turn 
influenced people’s experiences of conscience and the way they expressed 
these and interpreted them. 
 The arrow between the middle section (the experiences of 
conscience) and the symbol of conscience means that the symbol was 
engendered by those experiences. The double arrow between the experiences 
and the indicative use of ‘conscience’ suggests, on the one hand, that the 
experiences gave rise to indicative use of the term as well (albeit indirectly), 
and on the other, that it is the mode of consciousness in which people have 
experiences of conscience that the indicative use of the term ‘conscience’ 
must be understood to refer to. The latter must not be misunderstood: when 
people speak of ‘conscience’ in an indicative manner, they do not intend to 
refer to a mode of consciousness; this is not what they have in mind. If 
anything, they may have an old-fashioned faculty in mind. But if there is 
anything to which the term conscience might refer, it is a mode of 
consciousness. To think of conscience in this way is the best way to make 
sense of indicative use of the term, and of the variety of concepts of 
conscience. Indeed, to call that mode of consciousness in which we have 
experiences of conscience by that same name; that is, to say that conscience 
is a mode of consciousness, enables me to give a coherent interpretation of 
both symbolic and indicative uses of the term, of symbolic expressions of 
conscience and of previous conceptualizations of conscience. At the same 
time, I am able to take people’s experiences and interpretations of 
conscience seriously; when I interpret experiences of conscience as 
experiences that people have in a certain mode of consciousness, I do not 
reduce them to anything. Everything remains open. 
 The fluid concept of conscience is not on a par with the indicative 
use of the term ‘conscience’ in the figure above. It is the sediment of that 
structure of consciousness Voegelin called ‘reflective distance’. I have 
attempted to acquire an overview of the whole complex, including both 
indication, symbolism, and its source. The fluid concept of conscience 
locates it at this source. Conscience is that mode of consciousness in which 
people have experiences which they express in the symbol of conscience, 
and which people attempt to capture with their indicative use of the term, 
including their concepts of conscience. But in saying this I have not said 
anything substantial about conscience. The fluid concept needs a more 
concrete formulation; hence, I will define conscience as a concerned awareness of 
the moral quality of our own contribution to the process of reality, including our own being. 
What this means is the subject of the following sections. 
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I will start out by explaining the idea of conscience as a mode of 
consciousness and a concerned awareness. Rather than impose a rigid order 
on the elaboration of the fluid concept of conscience – as could be done, 
perhaps, by working through a list of traditional questions (is conscience a 
source of knowledge, yes or no? if yes, what kind of knowledge does it 
convey?; is it fallible? if it is not a source of knowledge, is it a source or 
container of something else, is it a drive towards the good, or something 
other than that? et cetera) – I will let the discussion of diverse aspects of the 
concept flow from the previous one. The section on conscience as a mode 
of consciousness starts out with a discussion of the relation between 
conscience and consciousness; this will give rise to an examination of the 
idea that conscience is a form of intuition, and the related problem of the 
subjectivity or objectivity of conscience – and so on. Sometimes I will start 
anew, from another angle. To proceed otherwise – if it would not turn out to 
be impossible, because discussions of different aspects of the concept will 
inevitably overlap – would only suggest an exactness that is a fake. It would 
suggest that conscience allows itself to be exactly defined and neatly 
compartmentalized, whereas in fact we are dealing with a fluid reality that we 
can only attempt to follow ‘in all its windings’. 
8.2, then, treats of conscience as a mode of consciousness. 8.3 
discusses the idea that the final aim of the development of conscience is a 
twofold openness. In 8.4, I elucidate the notion of ultimate concern. 8.5 
discusses the notions of luminosity and intentionality in relation to 
conscience. In 8.6 I turn to the question what it means that conscience is a 
concerned awareness of ‘the moral quality of our own contribution to the 
process of reality’. Finally, in 8.7, I discuss the relations between (the 
definition of) conscience and experience. 
 
 
8.2. CONSCIENCE AS A MODE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
8.2.1. Conscience and consciousness 
Why would I speak of conscience as a mode of consciousness? Because in 
conscience we are aware of things in a qualitatively different way from our 
‘ordinary’ consciousness. But is there such a thing as ‘ordinary’ 
consciousness or awareness of things? Are we not always in one or another 
mode of consciousness? Although it is not critical to my argument whether 
conscience is one of few or one of many modes of consciousness, I would 
argue that it is one of few modes of consciousness that ‘claim us’ as fully and 
strongly as conscience does. We enter into conscience with the whole 
person. In short, the phenomenology of conscience suggests the idea that it 
is best thought of (conceptually) as a mode of consciousness. The fact that 
we are often ‘thrown’ into conscience by certain events or situations (see 
8.2.2) lends strong support to this view. 
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I am by no means the first to suggest that conscience is to be 
understood as a mode of consciousness.12 James Childress wrote: 
“Conscience is a mode of consciousness and thought about one’s own acts 
and their value or disvalue.”13 Köhler also suggested that conscience is a kind 
of consciousness.14 And Karl Hörmann wrote: “G[ewissen] ist eine 
besondere Art des Bewußtseins: Der Mensch kommt zu einem Wissen, von 
dem er in eigenartiger Weise betroffen wird; ein Sollen wird ihm bewußt, das 
ihn nicht gleichgültig läßt.”15 Hörmann’s description is a valuable starting-
point. He elucidates: “Im G[ewissens]vorgang geht es nicht bloβ um ein 
intellektuelles Erkennen einer allg[emeinen] sittl[ichen] Wahrheit od[er] einer 
daraus gezogenen Folgerung auf das Konkrete hin, sondern darum, daβ der 
Mensch von einer sittl[ichen] Forderung konkret getroffen wird.” 
Conscience differs from ‘normal’ consciousness in that it is necessarily 
deeply concerned. “Sittl[iches] Wissen ist noch nicht G[ewissen]. Wissen 
kann kühl und distanziert aufgenommen werden; zum G[ewissen] gehört das 
Betroffensein. Es geht nicht nur um logische, sondern um existentielle 
Einsicht. G[ewissen] hat den Charakter des Erlebens, u[nd] zwar des 
Werterlebens.”16 
 Hörmann makes some important observations here. Whereas one 
may be conscious of something and remain unmoved by it, one cannot be 
indifferently conscient of anything. Conscience necessarily implies interest, 
concern. In many cases, ‘normal’ consciousness is not disinterested either, 
however, so conscience does not differ from ‘normal’ consciousness in that 
the former necessarily implies concern, whereas the latter is always 
unconcerned. But an important difference is that ‘normal’ consciousness may 
be disinterested. Another difference lies in the kind of concern that 
characterizes conscience, in comparison to the kinds of concern that may 
characterize ‘normal’ consciousness. This difference does not arise merely 
from the fact that conscience is concerned with moral matters (in a broad 
sense); moral knowledge need not be conscientious knowledge.17 One can be 
conscious of the (im)morality of some action, even one’s own action, 
without being conscientiously concerned – without being conscient of it. 
Nevertheless, there is a relation between the object of conscience and the 
type of concern that characterizes it. Feelings of guilt, that are the most 
common affective component of experiences of conscience, cannot be seen 
                                                 
12 The earliest example I found is Dole (1906), 419, where conscience is said to be 
one of several modes of consciousness. 
13 Childress (1979), 317. 
14 Köhler (1941). 
15 Hörmann (1976), section 1. Many terms were abbreviated in the lexicon; hence all 
the brackets. 
16 Ibid., section 3. 
17 I will elaborate on the meaning of ‘moral’ in a later section. 
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in isolation from that about which one feels guilty. It is not just a feeling; it is 
a feeling of something, and about something. When I say that conscience is a 
concerned awareness of the moral quality of our own contribution to the 
process of reality, including one’s own being, I understand the concerned 
awareness to be coloured by that of which it is an awareness. The fact that it 
is you who thinks or acts, that it is what you feel is the moral quality of your 
own contribution to the process of reality, and to your own being, which means 
that your character and moral identity are at stake – this fact does account in 
part for the peculiar nature of the affective components in experiences of 
conscience. Moral disapproval of another’s actions is never of the same kind 
(though sometimes of the same intensity) as moral disapproval of one’s own 
actions. 
 I have accepted the Whiteheadian view of consciousness as a mode 
of attention; conscience, then, is also a mode of attention. It is a way in 
which we attend to certain matters. Whitehead also explained consciousness 
as a possible subjective form of prehensions – the subjective form being how 
something is experienced. Joy or sorrow are subjective forms, but so is 
consciousness. To experience something consciously is different from 
experiencing (‘prehending’) something unconsciously.18 So conscience can 
also be regarded as a subjective form. Experiences of conscience often have 
guilt as an element in their subjective form, which enables us to recognize 
the experience as an experience of conscience, but guilt does not exhaust the 
subjective form of such experiences. Nor need it always be present as part of 
the subjective form. An inspirational experience of conscience, for instance, 
is not typically characterized by feelings of guilt or remorse.19 Whitehead says 
                                                 
18 There are also different kinds or degrees of consciousness; that I am conscious of 
something need not entail that I form the proposition: “There is a … over there.” 
Consciousness, of whatever degree, implies merely ‘an emphasis upon a selection of 
objects’. 
19 Shame may also be an important element in the subjective form of experiences of 
conscience. From cultural anthropology we have inherited the far too simple 
distinction between guilt cultures and shame cultures; guilt would then supposedly 
be the result of internalization of moral rules and principles, while shame would 
occur where rules and principles are not so much internalized, but rather 
experienced as external constraints. Another (more philosophical) way of putting the 
difference is to say that shame and guilt have different objects. One is ashamed 
when one has broken the rules of etiquette, but feels guilty when one has 
transgressed moral rules. This idea also does not hold. Guilt and shame can both be 
the result of internalization, and they can have the same object. What is different is 
the imagined ‘audience’ in front of which one has transgressed; in the case of guilt, 
this may be God or oneself, whereas in the case of shame it is usually other people, 
though it may also be oneself. Cf. Wollheim (1986), 230. There are many other 
differences between guilt and shame. The best article available is Lamb (1983). Lamb 
demonstrates, for instance, that shame has many more possible objects than guilt. 
See chapter 13 for examples of inspirational experiences of conscience. 
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that “there are many species of subjective forms, such as emotions, 
valuations, purposes, adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc.”20 He does 
not say much about the differences between the two. I would say that 
consciousness and conscience are more complex types of subjective form 
than, say, anger or joy. Also, the feeling of guilt and conscience are not on a 
par. It makes sense to say that guilt is an element in the subjective form that 
is conscience – not the other way around. In other words: conscience is a 
subjective form with a higher level of integration. 
 So conscience entails that I am aware of the moral quality of my 
own contribution to the process of reality, including my own being, in a 
particular way. It entails a concerned awareness – but as Whitehead explains, it 
is a general truth that ‘the subject has a concern for the object’; in 
Heideggerian terms: that ‘Dasein’ is characterized by ‘Sorge’. This is only a 
necessary precondition for conscience; but conscience entails more than this 
type of concern. The concerned awareness that is conscience relates to, and 
is shaped by, an ultimate concern. It is in light of one’s ultimate concern, and 
because one is ultimately concerned (or concerned for an ultimate), that one 
prehends one’s own contribution to the process of reality. What one judges 
to be, or experiences as, the moral quality of that contribution depends on 
the concrete form one has given or gives to one’s ultimate concern. 
 I have spoken of conscience as a mode of consciousness, but also as a 
concerned awareness. So what is it? A mode of consciousness, which is a way 
of being aware of something, or simply a concrete awareness? The term can 
be applied to both. It is a mode of consciousness, how something is 
experienced, a way of being aware of something. This way entails: an attitude 
of concern, and relating what one is aware of to a moral-religious standard – 
not necessarily a concrete, articulated standard, but possibly only a dimly 
perceived value-ideal. In this mode of consciousness the moral quality of 
one’s own contribution to the process of reality (including one’s own being) 
lights up. But one finds oneself in this mode of consciousness only 
temporarily; to be in it all of the time is a recipe for madness. In other words: 
we are dealing with transitive consciousness: our concrete, momentary 
awareness of something. For this reason, one can also speak of conscience 
simply as a concerned awareness of a specific kind – as the concrete 
awareness, rather than the way in which one is aware. The mode of 
consciousness is co-constitutive of the contents of consciousness. These things 
are inseparable, which is not surprising, given that consciousness is a mode 
of attention, which means that every mode of consciousness is a different 
mode of attention, which in turn results in different (even if only differently 
experienced) contents of consciousness. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Whitehead (1985), 24. 
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8.2.2. Intuition, feelings, and objectivity 
Usually, people do not enter the mode of consciousness I call conscience by 
choice. Rather, we are thrown into this mode by confrontation with 
something that triggers this reaction. There must be some susceptibility to 
moral or moral-religious value for this to happen; Kant recognized this, as 
did Heidegger. The voluntaristic scholastic view of ‘synderesis’ conveys a 
similar awareness. Someone who really ‘doesn’t care’ cannot be thrown or 
forced into that mode of consciousness that is conscience. But as soon as 
someone’s cares, as soon as there is some sensitivity to value, the possibility 
of conscience arises. Insofar as it is (part of) someone’s ultimate concern to 
live a morally good life, to be a good person, he or she will have a number of 
more concrete concerns in which this ultimate concern finds expression. 
Supporting aid organisations, perhaps, voting for (or participating in) a 
certain political party, trying not to waste water and electricity, et cetera. This 
means, on the one hand, that conscience often does not enter into activities 
relating to these concerns, because they have become part of one’s routine; 
on the other hand, when something pertaining to one of these concerns 
occurs – something apart from one’s habitual activities – conscience will ‘stir’ 
quite easily. Let us say, for example, that I care about the environment – or 
that I see myself as someone who does, because I think one ought to care 
about the environment – and that for this reason I try to minimize my 
energy consumption, only travel by public transport, and so on. Imagine, 
also, that I am rather sloppy when it comes to separating my green waste 
from my dry waste, and lazily and habitually dump it all together. (Imagine, I 
say.) Now, if someone were to point out to me that this is not very 
consistent with my concern for the environment, this remark may be the 
trigger for a concerned awareness of the moral quality of my ‘waste disposal 
conduct’; it may throw me into this mode of consciousness. 
 Because we are often thrown into conscience, it has been described as 
an intuition of moral-religious value. It often has the character of an 
immediate perception (or, preferably, prehension) of moral quality. Elmar 
Holenstein neatly summarizes: “Unter einer Intuition versteht man ein 
unmittelbares Erfassen von etwas, vor allem von Beziehungen, von 
Zusammenhängen. Ist der Gegenstand einer Intuition ein Wert, spricht man 
gemeinhin von ‘Gewissen’.”21 What conscience ‘intuits’ tends to present 
itself as self-evident. But is it really an intuition of something that needs no 
further ‘proof’? Holenstein rightly regards such a suggestion as problematic. 
The seeming self-evidence of intuitions is no guarantee that they are not 
illusory. He comes to this conclusion: “Intuition, in bezug auf Werte als ‘Gewissen’ 
bezeichnet, hat keine juristische, sondern eine heuristische Funktion.”22 Intuition 
may save people a lot of trouble and deliberation, but, Holenstein argues, the 
                                                 
21 Holenstein (1985), 77. 
22 Idem; cf. 82. 
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final judgement can only come from reason (‘Vernunft’).23 As I said, it is 
because we are often thrown into conscience that it is thought of as a form of 
intuition. But it is only for that reason that conscience has been regarded as 
conveying intuitive (infallible) knowledge – and this reason cannot support 
the inference drawn from it. Conscience is a mode of consciousness, not a 
source of knowledge; in conscience we prehend things in light of our 
ultimate concern (in its aspect of the Good). It does not so much tell us 
anything we did not know, but makes us see things in light of what we 
already ‘know’, and it relates things to our ultimate concern that we did not 
consider in that light before we entered this mode of consciousness. 
 Just now I wrote ‘makes us see’, but virtually inevitable though such 
phrases are, they are also deceptive. Conscience does not make us see 
anything; it is our seeing things in a certain light. We must resist any urge to 
turn conscience into an independent agent. We speak of ‘my conscience’, 
‘your conscience’, ‘her conscience’ and so on, as easily as about ‘my bike’ and 
‘your bike’. We say that we ‘have’ a conscience, which does all kinds of 
things. All this suggests the stable presence of a thing with certain 
characteristics, or an independent agent with certain abilities. But conscience 
is not a stable presence; it is only because our ultimate concerns are relatively 
stable over time – though not in case of a conversion – and because for that 
reason ‘our conscience stirs’ at comparable occasions and for roughly the 
same reasons, that we come to think of it as a stable presence.24 It is the idea 
of conscience as an independent agent that makes people attribute all kinds 
of characteristics to conscience, and makes them ask, for instance, whether 
conscience is infallible or not. The question is absurd; no-one would ask 
whether consciousness is infallible or not, and conscience is best understood 
(conceptually) as a mode of consciousness. 
 Does that mean that we cannot come to know anything new in 
conscience? I believe it does not, although it depends, of course, on what 
one would be willing to count as new. In a sense, we ‘know’ something we 
did not know before when we relate something to our ultimate concern that 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 82. Holenstein wonders why people often appeal to their conscience, only to 
subsequently back up their views by empirical claims and reasons that others can 
also understand. He says that two meanings of ‘conscience’ are often confused; the 
first is that of conscience as ‘moral consciousness’. Conscience is distinguished from 
other faculties by its contents. The second meaning of ‘conscience’ is more 
psychological; conscience is then a mode or level of consciousness concerned with 
(interiorized) ethical values, which is characterized by the fact that its approval or 
disapproval of actions is grounded in nothing but its own certainty, as opposed to a 
judgement that can be argued for and debated. I disagree with Holenstein. 
Conscience must indeed be understood as a mode of consciousness, but that does 
not preclude the possibility that moral judgement is a part of it; it is not, as 
Holenstein says, an ‘außerrationale Instanz’. 
24 Cf. Fuss (1964), 116-117; Childress (1979), 322. 
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we previously did not see in that light. But our ultimate concern and its more 
concrete expression in a (usually incompletely or even very minimally 
articulated) moral-religious standard have not changed. But conscience, like 
consciousness, belongs to what Whitehead called the supplemental and the 
mental phase of prehensions. The latter phase offers the possibility of the 
prehension of possibilities, including ideals. Therefore, it is an important 
source of creativity. The mental phase allows the influx of novelty. In 
conscience, then, we may become aware of an unrealized possibility or value 
(or of such a realization being balked in the situation at hand).25 In this 
respect, it is interesting to consider what Jonathan Bennett has written about 
the conscience of Huckleberry Finn.26 
 
8.2.2.1. The conscience of Huckleberry Finn 
Bennett draws attention to the possibility of a conflict between (bad) morality 
and sympathy.27 He discusses not only Huckleberry Finn’s conscience (from 
Mark Twain’s novel The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn), but also the 
conscience of Calvinist minister, philosopher and theologian Jonathan 
Edwards (1703-1758), as well as that of Heinrich Himmler, leader of the SS 
in the German Nazi regime. In the novel, Huck Finn helps his slave friend 
Jim to escape from his owner, Miss Watson. Rafting down the Mississippi, 
they come close to the point where Jim will be legally free. Then, Huck’s 
conscience begins to stir, because Huck is to blame for helping a slave, who 
was another person’s property escape: 
 
“Conscience says to me: ‘What had poor Miss Watson done to you, that 
you could see her nigger go off right under your eyes and never say one 
single word? What did that poor old woman do to you, that you could treat 
her so mean?…’ I got to feeling so mean and so miserable I most wished I 
was dead.”28 
 
                                                 
25 Conscience, then, is not a source of knowledge. But we can come to know things 
through conscience. Conscience may lead to knowledge in a similar way as looking at 
something may. Iris Murdoch (1974) rightly emphasizes the importance of looking 
and (loving) attention in ethics. In conscience we attend to things in a particular way, 
and this may disclose the world in a new way and in new aspects. See especially 
Murdoch (1974a), 31 and 34; Murdoch (1974b), 68ff.; Murdoch (1974c), 90-93, 100-
101. 
26 Jonathan Bennett, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn”, in Philosophy, Vol. 49, 
1974, 123-134, reprinted as Bennett (1994). 
27 Bennett (1994), 293, says he uses the term ‘sympathy’ “to cover every sort of 
fellow-feeling, as when one feels pity over someone’s loneliness, or horrified 
compassion over his pain, or when one feels a shrinking reluctance to act in a way 
which will bring misfortune to someone else”. 
28 Bennett (1994), 297, quoted from Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 
chapter 16. 
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His conscience torments him even more once Jim has told him of his plan to 
save money and buy his wife and children out of slavery, adding that he 
would steal his children if they could not be bought. Huck finally tells his 
conscience that “it ain’t too late, yet” and decides to paddle to the shore at 
daybreak, and give Jim up. “I felt easy, and happy, and light as a feather, right 
off. All my troubles was gone.” They return when Jim tells him that “Pooty 
soon I’ll be a-shout’n for joy, en I’ll say, it’s all on accounts o’ Huck I’s a free 
man”, that Huck is the best friend he ever had, and his only friend, and more 
things to the same effect. Huck tells us: “I was paddling off, all in a sweat to 
tell on him; but when he says this, it seemed to kind of take the tuck all out 
of me.” In the end, in Bennett’s interpretation, sympathy triumphs over 
conscience and morality.29 
 I dispute this interpretation. It is clear enough what counts as 
morality for Huck, and what according to Huck is the right thing to do: he 
should ‘tell on’ Jim; it was wrong to help him escape from ‘poor Miss 
Watson’. What Huck identifies as his conscience is also clear enough; it 
corresponds with his morality, telling him that he is doing the wrong thing. 
Bennett explains the situation as follows: “On the side of conscience we 
have principles, arguments, considerations, ways of looking at things: (…) 
‘What had poor Miss Watson done to you?’ ‘This is what comes of my not 
thinking’ (…). On the other side, the side of feeling, we get nothing like 
that.” On this side, Bennett argues, we find no considerations or principles; 
only that Jim’s words “seemed to kind of take the tuck all out of me”, or 
“Well, I just felt sick.” There is no weighing of pros and cons. Huck simply 
does what he believes to be wrong, because he ‘warn’t man enough’. Huck’s 
perception of things is correctly represented by Bennett; but does that make 
his construal of the situation right? I think not. Huck was raised in a certain 
environment, with a certain morality; he has internalized its principles, and 
knows wrong from right according to this morality. When he does 
something wrong, he feels bad; in his own interpretation, his conscience 
stirs. But should we simply adopt this specific conception of conscience in 
our own conceptual scheme, as Bennett does? Should we accept what Huck 
identifies as his conscience as a fully adequate concept of conscience? I see 
no reason why we should, and several reasons why we should not. Bennett 
opposes feelings and conscience, or feelings and moral judgements, warning 
us not to confuse feelings of sympathy with moral judgements. But as 
Bennett shows in his description of sympathy, we always sympathize with 
                                                 
29 Bennett in fact follows the traditional line of interpretation, starting with Twain 
himself, but adopted by many commentators; ten years before Bennett, Levy (1964), 
383, points out that the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is traditionally interpreted in 
terms of a struggle between conscience (as a force of conventional society) and 
sympathy (or the heart, as a force of ‘nature’). Levy, like me, disputes this kind of 
interpretation. 
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someone because of something; because someone is in pain, or because 
someone might be harmed by one’s actions. So these are not ‘mere’ feelings; 
there is a cognitive content, an intentionality to them as well. Sympathy 
implies some kind of judgement, for instance that someone deserves caring 
attention and consideration; that there is a reason to sympathize with him or her. 
When sympathy leads Huck to help Jim escape, can we not also say that this 
sympathy implies a moral judgement, though an unarticulated one, and one 
that does not correspond with the morality he was taught?30 On some level, 
he feels that he ought to help Jim. His physical reactions are not just that, 
they are the physical manifestation of an unconscious prehension of value. 
Huck ‘felt sick’ when Jim reminded him of his promise. Why? Why would 
his body react like this, if not because the moral meaning of Jim’s words was 
on some level understood – a meaning that conflicted with what Huck knew 
as his morality? 
 The important role of empathy and sympathy in moral development 
is now quite generally acknowledged.31 The development of conscience 
depends for a large part on someone’s ability to imaginatively take another’s 
place. To act, like Huck did, from sympathy may be the proper moral 
response to the situation. When we see conscience as a mode of 
consciousness, as a way of being aware of a situation – not necessarily an 
intellectual, rational way, but also an affective, even bodily way, we can see 
that Huck’s response to the situation is not only a moral response, but a 
response issuing from conscience. This is the ultimate possibility of 
conscience: to break with conventional morality if it is too narrow, to 
transcend perverse moral principles – indeed, this possibility is one of the 
first things that spring to mind on hearing the word ‘conscience’. An 
                                                 
30 Clea Rees prefers to speak of ‘Empathy’ in Huck’s case, rather than sympathy, 
because unlike Himmler Huck identifies himself with Jim, and experiences the 
emotions proper to Jim’s situation. Her general analysis supports my own, however. 
She writes, for instance, that “emotions and feelings can be reasons for believing or 
doubting a moral claim”; Huck, she says, has “an emotional awareness of the most 
fundamental reason slavery is wrong – namely, that it pretends that slaves are not 
human beings or persons, in order to deny them equal moral status” (Rees [2006], 
sections 3 and 4). Cf. Levy (1964), 389: “It is sometimes said that Huck acts out of 
simple affection for Jim; but affection does not determine a moral attitude. It is 
more reasonable to say that Huck defies ‘conscience’ on the basis of an 
unformulated but very real sense of responsibility – to the notion that it is wrong, 
for example, to contribute to the enslavement of another human being. And this is a 
matter of conscience, too, to which we may assume Huck’s experiences with Jim 
have contributed in a fundamental way.” 
31 Not least due to the work of Carol Gilligan (author of In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
MA, 1982) and Martin L. Hoffman (for instance: Empathy and Moral Development: 
Implications for caring and justice, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000). 
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adequate concept of conscience confines it neither to its everyday 
manifestations whenever we (are about to) break or consider breaking some 
moral rule, nor to its seemingly loftier variant, the conscience of the martyr. 
Huckleberry Finn is in a nasty situation. He has lost his moral integrity. 
Conscience has split in two; Huck now has to deal with two alternately 
dominant manifestations of concerned awareness. The one is articulate, and 
derives its standard from conventional morality; the other is mute, and has 
no articulable standard to go by – none that Huck can articulate, because all 
of his moral vocabulary is in service of the first.32 This is the reason why ‘on 
the side of feeling’ Huck has no reasons, no deliberations, no words; it is not 
because on this side, there are only feelings, but because these feelings do 
not have Huck’s moral vocabulary at their disposal. Huck simply cannot think 
of his action as right, because the word has already been taken; it is not 
available for what he does.33 
Huckleberry Finn exemplifies the ability of conscience – or of 
people, through conscience – to transcend conventional morality.34 But he 
exemplifies only one particular way in which this might happen. To 
transcend the norms of one’s society is not necessarily a matter of feeling 
versus socially conditioned thinking. It may very well be the other way 
around: that critical thinking is necessary to transcend one’s socially 
conditioned emotions and feelings. But either way, where one’s own 
character and actions are concerned, it is essential that there is a true concern 
                                                 
32 Cf. Rees (2006): “Although Huck fails to recognise them as such, he is, 
nonetheless, aware of crucial moral reasons to reject slavery”, and “Huck has 
perfectly good ethical reasons to doubt the moral acceptability of slavery, but lacks 
the ability to recognise them as such.” Rees emphasizes Huck’s complete lack of 
critical abilities; “[n]ot only does he lack the skills to [reflect upon and improve upon 
his abhorrent beliefs about slavery], he lacks a conception of morality which even 
allows this as a possibility”. She rightly points out that for Huck, morality is not 
systematized, but merely a possibly incoherent and inconsistent set of rules to be 
memorized and followed. 
33 In Himmler’s case, there is indeed a conflict between morality and sympathy, as 
Bennett asserts, but there is perhaps more to it than that. The conflict is between a 
specific morality, meaning a specific set of moral principles, rules, and so on, on the 
one hand, and moral feelings on the other. These feelings are moral in a broader sense 
than Himmler’s principles. The ‘nervous and physical disabilities’ Himmler suffered, 
which included ‘nausea and stomach-convulsions’ (Bennett [1994], 300) might not 
merely be the result of an inner conflict between morality and (non-moral) 
sympathy; Himmler’s battle, we might speculate, is not against feelings that fail to 
make the proper distinctions (between worthy and unworthy people, good blood 
and bad blood), but rather against feelings that demand a certain measure of 
consistency in the treatment of human beings who do not differ from Germans in 
any morally significant way. 
34 Cf. Jacobs (2001), 90: “Someone with a conscience is someone who can see that 
customary practices or rationales are not adequate.” 
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for the moral quality of one’s own contribution to the process of reality. This 
is the precondition for transcendence of the kind under discussion here. 
One’s concern is not for the moral rules society has impressed upon one, nor 
for one’s own feelings in themselves, but for something that lies beyond 
specific moral codes, and to which those feelings at best point. This is just 
another way of saying that conscience involves ultimate concern. This 
includes the demand or the goal of transcendence within itself. To be able to 
live up to this demand requires sensitivity to value – to something of which 
existing moral codes are only the petrified witnesses. 
 
 
8.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIENCE AS AN EDUCATION TOWARDS 
 OPENNESS 
The previous section included some considerations relating to the 
development of conscience, a topic that up to now I had left undiscussed. It 
cannot remain so, however, for the concept of conscience that I propound is 
a concept of a mature conscience. No one is born with it, and most people do 
not fully attain to it, or only occasionally. The respect that anyone’s 
conscience deserves derives not just from the attained level of maturity 
(insofar as that can be established), but also simply from being situated on 
the path towards a fully realized conscience. The latter must always be 
understood to be the aim to which any conscience aspires, just as a creature 
at any stage of its development must be understood as aiming towards its 
full-grown form; it is its telos. The logic of its development is inherent in it 
from the beginning. 
 The verb ‘to educate’ comes from the Latin ‘educare’, meaning 
either ‘to raise’ or ‘to bring forth’ or ‘(make) grow’. It is related to ‘educere’, 
which means (among other things) ‘to lead out’, ‘to lead away’, and ‘to draw 
out’. The English ‘to educe’ preserves the latter meaning, especially in its 
figurative sense. Education, then, can also be seen as a process of ‘drawing 
out’ of what is potentially present in others, particularly children. 
Suppression of what might obstruct the realization of valued potentialities 
will be more often required in the early stages of the process than in the later 
stages. There is a spectrum that runs from suppression on the one side, via 
correction, instruction, and guidance, to stimulation and inspiration on the 
other side. During the process of education, the emphasis moves towards the 
latter. Yet the spectrum does not represent a chronological order. Instruction 
and correction are appropriate in the same stage, and the former may never 
cease. Stimulation and inspiration are (one hopes) present from the 
beginning, in which stage of the process education is primarily a matter of 
drawing out emotional responses that contribute to the happiness of the 
child and that of the parents. Communication, in the primary stage (before 
the child is old enough to receive education in the sense of instruction), 
occurs solely on the level of emotions and feelings. 
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 For the development of conscience, this means that it also starts out 
with the cultivation of certain emotional capacities and, in their wake, moral 
feelings. Martin Hoffman and others have described a progressive 
development of empathy through a number of stages, beginning with the 
child’s ability to distinguish between himself and other persons. At the age of 
two, some children will empathize with others to the extent that they will try 
to comfort them if they are distressed. Often, their skills in this area have not 
developed so far that they will realize what will have the most comforting 
effect on the person in distress; hence, for example, they bring the distressed 
the teddy bear that would comfort themselves. This is also an example of 
sympathy, which normally develops alongside empathy, but also constitutes a 
further stage when it operates independently from empathy.35 This occurs 
when we sympathize with someone, and wish to alleviate his or her distress, 
without being able fully to empathize with this person’s feelings. 
 Empathy and sympathy retain an important role with regard to the 
conscience of adults. It is often by empathy or sympathy that we are thrown 
into conscience. From their own experience, most people will know the 
effect of seeing starving babies on television. We know it goes on all the 
time, but only when we are confronted with it do we experience ‘pangs’ of 
conscience, and do we feel that we ought to do something. Of course, the 
feeling wears off again, and our resolve trickles away. Repetitive exposure to 
such images on television blunts our sensitivity to them; we may not be 
thrown into conscience anymore, or if we are, its intensity will be weaker, 
and it will not last very long. Obviously, there is also a huge difference 
between the effect of what we see on television and what we see in real life. 
The intensity of conscience depends, with most of us at any rate, on the 
force with which a possible trigger of conscience confronts us. An 
immediate confrontation has much greater effect than a mediate(d) one. 
Proximity is another factor of importance. We tend to empathize and 
sympathize more easily with those who are in some way close to us; either a 
close relative, or a close friend, or simply someone who lives close to us. For 
Adam Smith, the development of conscience was primarily concerned with 
correcting this partiality. One of the great problems for morality is to 
maintain an intimate awareness of distant suffering. And this awareness has 
to be awakened first. 
 Theorists of moral development have differed greatly over the 
question whether moral development is primarily a matter of increasing 
rationality and thereby of overcoming partiality, or rather of the cultivation 
                                                 
35 From a different perspective, we might say that empathy is harder to realize than 
sympathy, as the former requires that we do not imagine what we ourselves would 
feel in another person’s situation, but what the other person herself feels. Empathy 
requires that we abstract to a high degree from our own thoughts and feelings; it 
cannot involve pity or compassion. See Rees (2006), section 3.1. 
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of moral feelings and sensitivity – feelings that are bound to be partial, even 
if in theory our sensitivity can be widened to include distant others. The 
greatest exponent of the first category is Lawrence Kohlberg; the ‘mother’ of 
the second is Kohlberg’s critic Carol Gilligan.36 Interestingly, both can be 
seen as defending a particular notion of openness as the end towards which 
moral education attains. 
 Inspired by Piaget’s theory of the cognitive development of children 
and (like Piaget) by Kantian ethics, Kohlberg devised his famous account of 
moral development as a progression through six stages, two on a Pre-
Conventional, two on a Conventional, and two on a Post-Conventional 
level.37 The Pre-Conventional Level is fairly egoistic, the Conventional Level 
is social or moral, and the Post-Conventional could be called ‘ethical’ – it 
ends in moral behaviour guided by universal ethical principles. It is 
noteworthy that Kohlberg dubbed his fourth stage ‘The Stage of Social 
System and Conscience Maintenance’. Conscience, in Kohlberg’s view, plays 
a passing role in morality, because he sees conscience as ‘closed’. He is 
concerned with openness, as he believes that people should be able to 
transcend the defined morality of their society. Up to a point, I agree with 
Kohlberg. Only, I would say that conscience, too, can and should leave the 
Conventional Level behind. I disagree with Kohlberg’s identification of the 
universal principles of the final stage with principles of justice. Gilligan 
famously criticized Kohlberg on this point, proposing an alternative to his 
ethics of justice, namely an ethics of care. In a sense, what Gilligan proposes is 
a kind of openness that can be explained in terms of responsivity to the 
situation at hand; it is an openness towards the layout of reality.38 However, 
the difficulty of an ethics of care is that it is virtually impossible to care 
equally for different persons. While many philosophers today recognize that 
a certain partiality towards loved ones cannot be called unreasonable, this 
partiality must remain within acceptable bounds. If not, the openness of the 
ethics of care is lost. Kohlberg and, in his wake, Habermas, favours the 
universalistic approach exactly to avoid the closedness of (unreasonable) 
partiality. 
 To posit openness as an important element in moral maturity, then, 
and to say that it is, if not the end, then at least one important end of moral 
                                                 
36 For a critical discussion of Kohlberg’s theory, see Crittenden (1999). According to 
Carr and Steutel “there can be no doubt that the Piaget (1932) inspired work of 
Kohlberg (1981) and his cognitive developmental followers has occupied the centre 
stage of theorising about moral education for most of the post-war period”; Carr 
and Steutel (1999), 242-243. 
37 Later versions of the system include one or more added stages. 
38 Cf. Dreyfus, “What is Moral Maturity? A Phenomenological Account of the 
Development of Ethical Expertise”, 12-14. John McDowell speaks of ‘openness to 
the layout of reality’ in McDowell (1998), 26. The point is taken up by Sabina 
Lovibond in Lovibond (2002), 19. 
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development and education, is nothing new. A third approach, besides those 
of Kohlberg and Gilligan, affirms this observation.39 The virtue approach to 
moral education, which receives an increasing amount of attention today, 
holds practical wisdom (‘phronesis’) to be an important goal of moral 
development, to be encouraged by moral education. ‘Phronesis’, too, entails 
the openness of responsivity to the (value-dimension of the) situation at 
hand. The ‘phronimos’ acknowledges value pluralism and therefore does not, 
for example, favour justice over care, but lets it depend on the situation 
which value should prevail. 
 I distinguish between two kinds of openness, both of which belong 
to the ‘mature’ conscience. First of all, as conscience relates to an ultimate 
concern, it is characterized by the openness that comes with the notion of 
ultimacy. A proper understanding of ultimate concern entails an awareness 
of the danger of absolutizing our symbolizations of the ultimate and the 
concrete contents we give to our ultimate concern (i.c. a specific moral-
religious standard); this awareness should lead to openness, to the refusal to 
accept any moral-religious standard as definitive. The notion of ultimacy, 
then, should preclude closure. A second kind of openness is equally 
characteristic of what I consider to be the mature conscience: openness 
towards the layout of reality.40 The ‘objectivist’ element in my definition of 
conscience, expressed in the words ‘awareness of’, is meant to draw attention 
to this responsivity to the situation at hand.41 The idea of awareness of the 
moral quality of our own contribution to the process of reality entails the 
                                                 
39 I should note that at present in moral psychology (in the work of August Blasi and 
others) moral maturity is defined in terms of the gap between moral judgements and 
actions (the smaller the gap, the more morally mature the person), and in terms of 
the degree to which morality is an integrated part of the self, or, in other words, the 
degree to which a person identifies with (his or her) morality. I do not dispute that 
these are important aspects of moral maturity, but I can imagine someone who is 
morally mature in all these senses, but lacks both kinds of openness that I postulate 
as the ends of moral development and the development of conscience. 
40 Cf. Childress (1979), 329: “[I]f our observations about ‘consulting one’s 
conscience’ and ‘conscientiousness’ are accurate, a person of conscience can never 
view the case as irrevocably closed. He or she must be willing to reopen it in the 
light of new evidence.” In this view of openness, elements of both kinds of 
openness I distinguish between are present. 
41 Cf. Arendt (1971), 418, where she speaks of ‘reality’ as “the claim on our thinking 
attention which all events and facts arouse by virtue of their existence”. I said earlier 
that to be in conscience all the time is a recipe for madness; similarly, Arendt writes 
that “[i]f we were responsive to this claim [of reality] all the time, we would soon be 
exhausted; the difference in Eichmann was only that he clearly knew of no such 
claim at all.” Eichmann was closed towards important aspects of moral reality; he 
lacked sensitivity to value. 
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idea that ‘value’ can be ingredient in our experience.42 At the same time, we 
must recognize that openness entails an opening, and that this is of necessity 
an opening in something particular, towards something particular. In other 
words: openness is grounded in a particular perspective, which allows 
openness towards some things, maybe many things, but not everything – the 
same way a small hole in a wall will offer only a limited field of view. This 
does not vitiate the value of openness; the alternative is a blank wall. 
 We may be born with a limited openness towards the layout of 
reality, but we are certainly not born tolerant, which is what we should 
become if we attain the openness, in both of its senses, which characterizes 
the fully realized conscience. The development of conscience cannot, 
however, start out as a development of openness. Many authors have 
recognized this.43 In Kohlberg’s developmental scheme, a Conventional 
Level necessarily precedes the ultimate Post-Conventional Level, which 
means that people will first have to learn moral rules, before they can 
proceed to the level of ethical principles. The virtue approach acknowledges 
that people, as long as they are not ‘phronimoi’, will have to rely on prima 
facie rules, on rules of thumb.44 In Dreyfus’ phenomenology of skill 
acquisition, which fits in very well with a virtue approach to moral education, 
a level of competence, entailing ‘detached planning’ and ‘analytical rule-
guided choice of action’, precedes the levels of proficiency and expertise, in 
which conscious reflection and planning recede into the background and 
finally disappear altogether.45 Authors in the philosophy of education 
recently emphasized the same point.46 This conclusion is particularly relevant 
                                                 
42 ‘Ingredient’ is a Whiteheadian term, signifying something’s being an element in the 
concrescence of an actual occasion – that is, in the formation process of an 
experience that constitutes a subject at a given moment. 
43 Erich Fromm, whose distinction between the authoritarian and the humanistic 
conscience I mentioned, knew that “the difference between humanistic and 
authoritarian conscience is not that the latter is molded by the cultural tradition, 
while the former develops independently” (Fromm [1967], 175). Later authors have 
often neglected this cautionary remark. 
44 See Nussbaum (1992), 68. 
45 This does not necessarily mean that the expert has acquired the characteristic of 
openness. Someone who his extremely skilled in a certain practice may not 
(immediately) be able to go about what he does in a completely different way. A 
European ping-pong player, for instance, may not be able to play as well using the 
Chinese way of holding the bat. It is likely that a more skilled player will acquire such 
a skill more easily, though. 
46 William Galston (2003), 421-422, writes that “[o]ne might (…) argue that 
instructing children within a particular tradition, far from undermining intellectual or 
religious freedom, may in fact promote it. Knowing what it means to live within a 
coherent framework of value and belief may well contribute to an informed adult 
choice between one’s tradition of origin and those encountered later in life.” Paul 
Standish quotes Emerson: “I have my own stern claims and perfect circle. It denies 
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in view of a presently popular idea, which might be called the Myth of 
Secular Openness. 
 What we know about conscience and its development suggests that 
people are not born tolerant or open-minded. Neither does a spontaneous 
generation of these qualities occur in a person’s development. The ‘secular’ 
assumption, however, is that to be raised in a clearly delineated perspective 
on the world and our place in it, a perspective entailing some hierarchy of 
values, a religious perspective, leads to fundamentalism, a lack of openness, 
and intolerance.47 The truth is that openness requires the previous acquisition 
of such a perspective. Only by development through such a perspective can 
anyone attain to openness, which consists in the careful opening up of the 
perspective to other values, other priorities. Those who never acquire such a 
perspective, will never know what it is to have one, and hence will not be 
able to place themselves in another’s perspective in a substantial sense. The 
misunderstanding of and distrust towards religious people today stems from 
this inability of the ‘non-religious’ to even begin to understand the 
importance certain values have for the religious.48 
 Conscience, to sum up, presupposes an ultimate concern; openness 
of conscience presupposes the recognition of the ultimacy of that concern. It 
also depends on the cultivation of a sensitivity to value and its obstruction or 
destruction. This does not mean that a complete objectivity can be reached, 
or that someone with a mature conscience will be able to discern what is 
objectively right. Objectivity is merely a standpoint taken by a subject, who 
attempts to interfere as little as possible with the way in which the world 
presents itself to him or her.49 Much of our experience is mediated by 
                                                                                                               
the name of duty to many offices that are called duties. But if I can discharge its 
debts it enables me to dispense with the popular code.” He comments on it: “Yet 
the popular code is not dispensable in any simple iconoclasm, still less in a kind of 
freedom ab initio. It is only on the strength of, and out of, initiation into the criteria 
that constitute the world in which I am brought up that I can rise to the demands of 
this sterner regime.” (Standish [2003], 229. He quotes from R. Emerson, Selected 
Essays, Penguin, New York and London, 1982, 193.) 
47 Naturally, I do not mean to say that all secular people think this way. I am merely 
drawing attention to a view of religion that has becoming an enduring, and 
occasionally dominant, presence in the present day climate of opinion in the 
Netherlands and some other Western-European countries. 
48 The misunderstanding belongs also to the secular self-understanding. People may 
think they are ‘free’ in their thought, but they have grown up in a certain perspective 
as much as any Muslim or Christian. Only, this perspective is much less clearly 
delineated. Western people are confronted with an enormous variety of ideas, 
practices and images. In response to this, people’s outlook on life tends to lack unity 
and articulation. Nevertheless, they are equally incapable of questioning their own 
way of life, of openness to criticism, as the average orthodox Christian or Muslim. 
49 Iris Murdoch (1974) explains this in terms of minimizing the influence of ‘self’, 
and developing an openness towards reality through ‘looking’ and ‘loving attention’. 
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concepts, and the subjective form of experience that is conscience is 
determined by the subjective aim, that is, by the unity at which the subject is 
oriented.50 Nevertheless, the subject is not closed to the world, but 
participates in it; an open conscience is a valuable and at least partially 
attainable ideal. What the problem of ultimacy (which entails openness) and 
the concrete embodiment it begets (which has a tensional relationship with 
that openness) means in the context of conscientious objection will be 
discussed in chapter 14: “Aspects of Conscientious Objection (2)”. Now, it is 
time to look more closely at the notion of ultimate concern. 
 
 
8.4. ULTIMATE CONCERN 
Paul Tillich defined faith as “the state of being ultimately concerned”.51 He 
speaks of religion in a narrow (conventional) sense, and in a broad sense; in 
the latter case, he uses the same definition he uses for faith. For both, he 
speaks of “being grasped by an ultimate concern”.52 A concern that becomes 
ultimate in man’s life, that claims ultimacy, “demands the total surrender of 
him who accepts this claim, and it promises total fulfillment even if all other 
claims have to be subjected to it or rejected in its name”.53 What Tillich tries 
to express by means of the term ‘ultimate concern’ – but he is the first to 
admit that the term has its shortcomings, for which reason he also speaks of 
‘infinite passion’ (after Kierkegaard) and is willing to consider infinite 
concern, ultimate seriousness, and other terms, each with their own 
shortcomings – is man’s ability to be grasped by a concern that transcends all 
our normal, daily concerns, as well as our long-term ambitions. Human 
beings, some more (often) than others, experience this, which cannot 
adequately be put into words, but only expressed symbolically, which many 
people do by means of the symbol ‘God’.54 There are usually many other 
                                                                                                               
With respect to the first, see Murdoch (1974b), 66ff; Murdoch (1974c), 90-93, 95, 97, 
99-104. I have referred to the other concepts before. 
50 See the general introduction, i.2.2. Again, I am using the Whiteheadian 
terminology, designed for actual occasions, on the level of persons. 
51 Tillich (1957), 1. 
52 Brown (1965), 4: “If religion is defined as a state of ‘being grasped by an ultimate 
concern’ – which is also my definition of faith – then we must distinguish this as a 
universal or large concept from our usual smaller concept of religion which supposes 
an organized group with its clergy, scriptures, and dogma, by which a set of symbols 
for the ultimate concern is accepted and cultivated in life and thought. This is 
religion in the narrower sense of the word, while religion defined as ‘ultimate 
concern’ is religion in the larger sense of the word.” 
53 Tillich (1957), 1. 
54 Tillich (1957), 2-3, gives the example of Deuteronomy 6: 5: “You shall love the 
Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might”. 
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symbols, of course; in the case of Christianity, there are, for instance: Christ, 
the cross, the trinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and so on. 
Tillich conceptualizes that which people can only express symbolically in 
terms of ‘ultimate concern’. 
 Ultimate concern gives meaning and direction to a person’s life.55 It 
is that which ultimately makes sense. When Gandhi, whose conception of 
religion in many respects closely resembled Tillich’s, said that “Truth is 
God”, he expressed that what is ultimately meaningful in life is Truth; better, 
that Truth is what makes life meaningful.56 Though this is not what 
necessarily distinguishes ultimate from non-ultimate concern, ultimate 
concern may be worth dying for. There are striking examples from Nazi 
Germany of people who rather died than betray their ultimate concern and 
thereby themselves. They died in order to live; the alternative was to live and 
be dead.57 In conversations with students, Tillich also made clear that 
ultimate concern was not a matter of life or death in the ordinary sense, but 
                                                                                                               
“This,” Tillich says, “is what ultimate concern means and from these words the term 
‘ultimate concern’ is derived.” 
55 I have been asked (and I do not doubt that Tillich himself was often asked the 
same question) whether it is really true, as Tillich maintains, that everybody, or 
virtually everyone, has (an) ultimate concern. Would it not be possible for someone 
to have a set of different concerns, without one of them being ultimate? My answer 
is that this question implies a misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘ultimate 
concern’. The term does not point towards a hierarchy of concerns in which ultimate 
concern itself takes up the highest position. Rather, it indicates something that lies 
‘beyond’ all specific or concrete concerns. It does not coincide with any concrete 
concern, but it is the denial of the absoluteness of all concrete concerns. When 
someone has a number of different concerns, none of which he would wish to call 
‘ultimate’, this might in fact be an excellent illustration of what ‘ultimate concern’ 
means. (S)he expresses that none of his or her concrete concerns should be 
absolutized, but also that the balance between them matters – that something 
ultimately matters. This person’s rejection of a hierarchy of concerns in which one 
concrete concern is ultimate is (likely to be) a moral rejection, which shows that in the 
end it is not indifferent how one ranks or balances one’s concerns. Besides, (s)he 
would perhaps be willing to give up one of his or her concerns, perhaps two, but 
certainly not all of them. (S)he will find it important to have such concerns, and 
behind this (admirable) attitude lies ultimate concern. See Brown (1965), 20, and 
especially 26-27. 
56 Parekh (2001), 35. Parekh notes that while Gandhi first preferred notions like 
‘eternal principle’, ‘supreme consciousness or intelligence’, ‘cosmic power’, ‘energy’, 
‘spirit’, or ‘shakti’, to speak of God, “[l]ater in life he preferred to speak of satya 
(ultimate reality or Truth), and regarded this as the ‘only correct and fully significant’ 
description of God”. Gandhi here makes the mistake of absolutizing a specific 
symbolization of the divine. 
57 See Gollwitzer, Kuhn, and Schneider (eds.) (1958); Philippa Foot refers to this 
book in Foot (2003), 95. 
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rather one of ‘to be or not to be’.58 This possibility, of preserving being by 
dying, was also more clinically expressed by Luhmann when he explained 
that the personal system may choose the death of the organic system, 
freedom of conscience being a ‘Freiheit zum Tode’. 
 The example from Nazi Germany brings us to the heart of this 
book. With these people, ultimate concern manifests itself as conscience. We 
feel that there is Truth, that there is Goodness, that there is Beauty, even 
though neither Truth, nor Goodness, nor Beauty lies ultimately within our 
grasp. When someone says that he knows the full truth about anything, we 
know this is not true. Ultimate concern often grasps a person in one of these 
forms: Truth, Beauty, or Goodness. In the example above, we are dealing 
with ultimate concern in its aspect of the Good. But, even though each of 
these terms knows its own ultimacy (the Good never being synonymous with 
a good), they are already limitations of the Ultimate. For there is more than 
Goodness in the world, and someone who surrenders himself fully to 
Goodness may become blind to Beauty or Truth. On the other hand, one 
may wonder whether the good that is contrary to Truth and Beauty is really 
still good – one may wonder, that is, whether they do not all interpenetrate 
each other, offering different aspects of the ultimate, without completely 
obscuring the other aspects. 
 “Faith as ultimate concern is an act of the total personality. It 
happens in the center of the personal life and includes all its elements. (…) It 
is not a movement of a special section or a special function of man’s total 
being. They are all united in the act of faith.”59 Yet the whole is more than 
the sum of the parts. With respect to conscience, this entails a denial of the 
faculty view. In conscience, the whole person is involved; for, in 
Whiteheadian terms, a subject at any given time is the concrescent experience 
at that time, and the subjective form of this experience is conscience. It is 
how we experience what we experience, and as we are made up of that 
experience, it is how we are at that time – it is who we are then.60 The 
distinction between subject and object, though impossible to avoid in 
analysis, is in the end artificial. Hence Tillich writes that “[t]he term ‘ultimate 
concern’ unites the subjective and the objective side of the act of faith – the 
fides qua creditur (the faith through which one believes) and the fides quae 
                                                 
58 Brown (1965), 20-21. 
59 Tillich (1957), 4. 
60 Whitehead’s term ‘subject-superject’ is also appropriate here, which expresses that 
the subject, guided by its subjective aim (which gives to the whole of the experience 
the subjective form of purpose), projects itself into the future; similarly, part of 
conscience is the aim at a future self. Cf. McCready (1996), 97: “By anticipating a 
future self, conscience guides the present one.” McCready goes on to elaborate on 
this in a way reminiscent of Luhmann: “The conscience thus produces coherence of 
the self over time. It brings cognizance of oneself as a temporal being and holds the 
parts of the self together diachronically and synchronically.” 
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creditur (the faith which is believed). The first is the classical term for the 
centered act of the personality, the ultimate concern. The second is the 
classical term for that toward which this act is directed, the ultimate itself, 
expressed in symbols of the divine. This distinction is very important, but 
not ultimately so, for the one side cannot be without the other.”61 “In terms 
like ultimate, unconditional, infinite, absolute, the difference between 
subjectivity and objectivity is overcome.” The word ‘ultimate’ in ‘ultimate 
concern’ applies both to the ‘object’ of the concern and to the subjective side 
of the concern, that is: to someone’s being not simply concerned, but 
ultimately concerned. 
 “This character of faith,” Tillich says, “gives an additional criterion 
for distinguishing true and false ultimacy. The finite which claims infinity 
without having it (as, e.g. a nation or success) is not able to transcend the 
subject-object scheme. It remains an object which the believer looks at as a 
subject.”62 This is not a matter of yes or no, black or white: there are “many 
degrees in the endless realm of false ultimacies”. But any false ultimacy 
reveals itself as such in the end, Tillich asserts: “The inescapable 
consequence of idolatrous faith is ‘existential disappointment’, “a 
disappointment which penetrates into the very existence of man”.63 This 
problem of distinguishing ‘true’ from ‘idolatrous’ faith, ultimate concern 
from false ultimacies, is pressing for many readers of Tillich’s work. The 
students in the dialogues with Tillich published by Brown repeatedly ask for 
clarification. Brown phrases what he perceives as their problem with the 
concept of ultimate concern as follows: “I think the question that hangs all 
over this is: Are there any characteristics of ultimate concern in itself which 
will enable us to distinguish between genuine religion, which functions in the 
ultimate sense, and ‘religion’ associated with distorted secular movements? 
When we speak of ultimate concern, is it in any way a discriminating term? 
Does it help us to identify and distinguish one faith from another?”64 Tillich 
answers: “There is a criterion, namely, the word ‘ultimacy’; and ultimacy 
means nothing finite. Nothing which by its very nature is finite can rightly 
become a matter of ultimate concern.”65 He then gives an example, saying 
that “many boys are ruined because they make their mother their ‘ultimate 
concern’”, the consequences of which “are always destructive”. “The 
consequence is always destructive, because this finite then destroys other 
finites.” A boy who deifies his mother, for instance, will not be able to have 
normal relationships with other women. Another example is Nazi Germany, 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 10. 
62 Ibid., 11. 
63 Ibid., 12. 
64 Brown (1965), 24. 
65 Idem. 
 370 
in which nation and race were seen as ultimate, the destructive consequences 
of which are well-known.66 
 As soon as a symbolization of the ultimate, or any concrete 
embodiment of ultimate concern, comes to replace the ultimate, it becomes 
idolatrous, or, as Tillich also calls it, demonic. This means that ultimate 
concern includes within itself a critical principle – a warning to remain open 
to the ultimate, and not to absolutize one’s finite expressions of it. It also 
means that there is always a tension between the element of ultimacy and the 
concrete shape it is given.67 There are dangers on two opposite sides: on the 
one hand there is the danger of profanization (or secularization), which 
means that a (quasi-)religion loses its original substance, becoming empty – 
the ultimate concern fades; on the other hand there is the danger of 
demonization, which happens when particular symbolizations are 
absolutized, and all others repressed. In both cases, a fundamental openness 
is lost. In the first case, openness has given way to apathy or lethargy; there is 
no longer any feeling for the ultimate. In Heideggerian terms: people are so 
much lost in the They that they do not hear the Call – and yet it may still 
happen. The possibility for someone to be grasped by ultimate concern is 
never lost. In the second case, openness has given way to closedness; there is 
no openness because people see no need for it anymore: do they not already 
have what they were looking for? 
 Some symbolizations and embodiments of the ultimate are more 
likely to lose their transparency than others. The Jewish faith forbids any 
visible image to be made of God; moreover, God’s name is not to be spoken 
or written (in full). This way, it contains within itself a principle to prevent 
demonization. In Tillich’s interpretation of the Christian symbol of the 
crucifixion, Christianity has a similar principle: God has become incarnate, 
but the crucifixion symbolizes the inadequacy of any embodiment or 
incarnation of the divine. The protestant conscience (if it is not itself 
demonically perverted) functions as a similar critical principle; it embodies 
openness, it is a window that can always be opened. Nationalism, 
communism, liberalism, and other ‘quasi-religions’, as Tillich calls them, do 
not contain such a principle within themselves. Hence, the likelihood that 
they lose their transparency is even greater. But there are no guarantees in 
this area, either way. Neither is there an ultimate criterion to distinguish ‘true’ 
from ‘false’ religion (in the broad sense). All we have is the criterion of 
ultimacy, and the visible consequences of idolatry. To want more is to desire 
to make an object out of ultimate concern, which is by definition impossible. 
If there were precisely definable criteria in this matter, it would not be 
ultimate. For many – for me, too – this inescapable vagueness will be hard to 
bear. We want certainty, not just with respect to the ultimate, but with 
                                                 
66 The examples are Tillich’s. 
67 See chapter 14, “Aspects of Conscientious Objection (2)”. 
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respect to our symbolization of the ultimate as well; we want it to be a 
correct representation of the ultimate. This is caused by our application to 
the infinite of criteria that belong to the finite. We will have to live with the 
uncertainty and the tension. 
 Voegelin writes of the meditative origin of the philosophy of order. 
Our thought on the present matter, too, has a meditative origin. We are 
thrown back on our own experience of the ultimate, on our own religious 
experience (religious in the broad sense), if we wish to make sense of the 
concept of ultimate concern. Speaking for myself, I can say that it is often a 
negative experience, in the sense that it is an experience of the failure of 
words, rather than one that is readily articulated in words; an experience of 
not-something, rather than something. And yet one experiences something. 
However unsatisfactory such reflections may be, “[w]e must,” as Tillich says, 
“be able logically to distinguish the concept of ultimate concern and the content 
of ultimate concern”. He points out that Kant did so, too, when he 
distinguished the unconditional character of the Categorical Imperative from 
its variable contents.68 Similarly, we must be able to see the symbol of 
conscience as an expression of ultimate concern, and understand conscience 
conceptually as a mode of consciousness in which we experience things in 
light of an ultimate concern, without claiming anything with respect to the 
‘contents’ of conscience. 
 The above problematic goes to the heart of the philosophy of 
religion. It is the problem of the possibility of immediate (in the sense of not 
conceptually mediated) experience. Central to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s 
philosophy of religion (which Tillich’s resembles in certain respects) is an 
immediate experience of God, which he famously called the ‘feeling of 
absolute dependence’ (‘Gefühl schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit’).69 In Religious 
Experience, Wayne Proudfoot attacks the notion of immediate experience, and 
Schleiermacher’s notion of it in particular. According to Proudfoot, there can 
be no feeling ‘of’ anything that is not mediated by concepts. We cannot call 
an experience a ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ if it was not mediated by 
                                                 
68 Brown (1965), 21-22. 
69 On Schleiermacher, see Tillich (1972), 73-93; with regard to the ‘feeling of 
absolute dependence’ esp. 77-83. Tillich (ibid., 7-8) emphasizes that by ‘Gefühl’ 
Schleiermacher did not mean a merely subjective feeling, although it would be 
interpreted as such by many later thinkers: “Der beste Beweis dafür, daß 
Schleiermacher unter ‘Gefühl’ keine subjektive Empfindung verstand, ist die 
Tatsache, daß er in seiner Systematik, der ‘Glaubenslehre’, den Ausdruck ‘das Gefühl 
schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit gebraucht. In dem Augenblick, in dem er Gefühl mit 
schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit verband, transzendierte er das Psychologische, denn 
jede Art von Gefühl im psychologischen Sinn ist bedingt; es ist ein in dauernder 
Veränderung begriffener Strom von Empfindungen, Gedanken, Willensregungen 
und Erfahrungen. Die Erfahrung des Unbedingten ist etwas von diesem subjektiven 
Gefühl völlig verschiedenes.” 
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these concepts; therefore, Schleiermacher does not give a definition of 
religion in general, for not every religious person has the concept of ‘absolute 
dependence’.70 I agree with Proudfoot to a certain extent; to describe an 
experience as a feeling of absolute dependence gives it a definiteness that it 
did not have; in that sense, the description is not fully adequate. But as I 
maintain (see the general introduction) that language lags behind experience, 
this is where my agreement with Proudfoot ends. Someone who has never 
learned a language and does not know the (linguistic) concept of fear can still 
experience fear. Similarly, the possibility of experiencing the ultimate does 
not depend on someone’s having the concept (or a concept) of the ultimate. 
 Perhaps the most adequate way to describe (or evoke the sense of) 
religious experience of this sort (i.e. immediate experience), is by saying in 
Buber’s terms (although Buber would avoid the term ‘experience’ itself) that 
this type of experience ‘discloses’ without ‘revealing’.71 Nothing concrete is 
experienced, and yet something is prehended. In the case of conscience, no 
concrete moral truths are apprehended, but nevertheless there is disclosure 
of such a kind that the reality of value, of significance, cannot (or no longer) 
be denied, and that we are stimulated and inspired to pursue realized (and 
the realization of) value. 
 
 
8.5. CONSCIENCE, LUMINOSITY, AND INTENTIONALITY 
I have repeatedly spoken of the ‘contents’ of conscience, thereby suggesting 
that conscience has the form of intentionality. If we take ‘intentionality’ in its 
Voegelinian sense, this is not necessarily the case. Just as consciousness may 
have the structure of intentionality or luminosity, so conscience can have 
either structure. Like consciousness, conscience can also become the object 
of reflection, which means that the consciousness of this consciousness or 
conscience has the form of reflective distance. Finally, often enough, people 
have tried to turn conscience into an object for the intentional conscience. 
The way Voegelin understands ‘intentionality’, this is impossible, for 
conscience does not belong to ‘thing-reality’. In a less restrictive sense of 
‘intentionality’, where what is intended need not be an object belonging to 
‘thing-reality’, it is possible for conscience to be the intentional object of 
consciousness – but then Voegelin would speak of reflective distance. 
 It is in reflective distance that we are able to discover the structures 
of consciousness Voegelin calls ‘intentionality’ and ‘luminosity’. As 
conscience is a mode of consciousness, these are also structures of 
conscience. In the previous chapter I have pointed out as a flaw of many 
recent concepts of conscience that they forget the intentionality of 
conscience; I also stress the importance of the intentionality of conscience in 
                                                 
70 Proudfoot (1985). 
71 Buber (2004), 75. 
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part III. It is a good thing to remember that conscience is about something; 
but I would say it is not necessarily about existent objects, although the 
intentional consciousness is prone to regard its object as such.72 That means 
I have used (and will use) the term ‘intentionality’ in a broader sense than 
Voegelin does, except of course where I explicitly speak of Voegelin’s 
concept. With my use of the term ‘intentionality’, I link up with cognitive 
emotion theory, which stresses the intentionality of conscience, by which is 
meant the fact that an emotion is not merely something happening in the 
body (nor the perception of bodily changes), but also relates to something 
else.73 Fear is fear of something, even if this is something imaginary. The 
emotions in our dreams have intentional objects, too. Now, a monster in a 
dream could still be said to belong to thing-reality, but things get more 
complicated when we are dealing with something like ‘respect’, which is not 
a basic emotion. About what ‘thing’ is respect? It is not just about the person 
whom one respects. The same goes for conscience. It is an awareness (a 
concerned awareness) of ‘the moral quality of our own contribution to the 
process of reality’ – and this is not an object belonging to thing-reality. The 
way I use the term ‘intentionality’, then, it does not refer purely to the 
subject apprehending an object, but it takes up within itself elements that 
transcend the subject-object distinction, elements of value, elements of 
which one cannot become aware if luminosity did not also play its part. So 
my use of ‘intentionality’ when I speak of the ‘intentionality of conscience’ 
includes within itself elements of what Voegelin calls intentionality and 
luminosity; what I mean by the ‘intentionality of conscience’ is that 
conscience is not self-enclosed, but participates in reality, which means that 
reality has ‘importance’ in conscience. This means that another danger, 
besides forgetting the intentionality of conscience altogether, is that one 
forgets the element of luminosity, thinking that conscience is only intentional 
in Voegelin’s sense – that it perceives existent objects outside itself. 
 The Voegelinian distinction between intentionality and luminosity is 
still highly important and useful, even if I include both elements in what I 
call the ‘intentionality of conscience’, because it draws attention to the 
possibility that the balance between the two might be upset; historically, the 
                                                 
72 See Voegelin (1984) (Collected Works edition), 391: “[A]n aura of externality 
clings to the object of consciousness”. 
73 I am thinking of the work of Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum, and others; a 
partly similar (but also importantly different) approach is that of social-
constructionists like James Averill. Elements of both types of approach come 
together in Lauritzen’s definition of emotion: “I suggest that an emotion be defined 
as a culturally mediated experiential complex that consists of such diverse elements 
as pronounced physiological activity, expressive bodily responses, feelings, desires, 
beliefs, and evaluative judgments. Further, I suggests that we treat the cognitive 
components of the complex, i.e., beliefs and judgments, as the linchpin holding 
these various elements together.” (Lauritzen [1988], 316.) 
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danger has been that luminosity was forgotten and moved into the 
background. Intentionality tends to gain dominance over luminosity. When I 
speak of the ‘intentionality of conscience’, I assume a proper balance 
between the two; when the element of luminosity fades into the background, 
conscience is no longer ‘about something’ in the right way anymore. 
In thinking about conscience, rather than within conscience itself, 
what Voegelin calls ‘intentionality’ has also become dominant, which has led 
to a deformed view (and a rejection) of conscience. The previous seven 
chapters have dealt with that point. Unlike in the case of intentionality, it is 
impossible (or meaningless) to distinguish between the luminosity of 
conscience and a luminosity of consciousness in which we become aware of 
conscience. They are one and the same thing. That means that the process by 
which conscience increasingly came to be regarded indicatively, as an existent 
object, was a process in which an important element of experiences of 
conscience was lost sight of – that element that is always less conspicuous, 
because it lacks the clarity and distinctness of the objects of the intentional 
consciousness. 
 
 
8.6. THE MORAL QUALITY OF OUR OWN CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROCESS 
 OF REALITY 
Conscience is about something, but about what? Well, about “the moral 
quality of our own contribution to the process of reality, including our own 
being”. But what, first of all, do I mean by ‘moral quality’? 
I use the term ‘moral’ in a much broader sense than its meaning of 
that which corresponds to the mores of a particular community. The notion 
of morality I have in mind is (roughly) Whiteheadian. Whitehead 
distinguishes morality from what he usually calls ‘morals’ (though sometimes, 
confusingly, also ‘morality’); the latter is morality in its narrow sense, 
something which Whitehead almost despises, as is clear from the following 
remark: 
 
“[T]he defence of morals is the battle-cry which best rallies stupidity against 
change. Perhaps countless ages ago respectable amoebae refused to migrate 
from ocean to dry land – refusing in defence of morals.”74 
 
Morality in the broad (Whiteheadian) sense of the term “consists in the 
control of process so as to maximize importance”.75 It “is always the aim at 
that union of harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the 
                                                 
74 Whitehead (1964), 268. Paul Arthur Schilpp has collected a small number of 
quotations from Whitehead’s work to the same effect, in Schilpp (1991) note 1, 563-
564. See also Whitehead (1968), 76: “[W]e must remember that morals constitute 
only one aspect of the good, an aspect often overstressed.” 
75 Whitehead (1968), 13-14. 
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perfection of importance for that occasion”.76 Whitehead is most of the time 
not so much concerned with separate moral judgements or moral actions, 
nor with specific moral purposes, but with morality as a factor in the process 
of reality. Every person participates in process, and through participation 
modifying it and him- or herself. When Whitehead explains that moral 
responsibility is made possible by the fact of the final self-realization of 
actual entities, he is clearly thinking on the level of persons as well as actual 
occasions or entities.77 Beyond moral responsibility, there is duty, which 
“arises from our potential control over the course of events”.78 Our control 
is limited, of course; hence “our action is moral if we have thereby safe-
guarded the importance of experience so far as it depends on that concrete 
instance in the world’s history”.79 
 What all this comes down to, I believe, is the following: as 
participants in process, we are more or less directly connected to every other 
element in process. We can imagine this as a global, even globe-transcending, 
network in which we all have our place. To make it more concrete: imagine 
you are connected to everyone else in the world by means of threads of 
varying length, thickness and strength. We can also include the importance 
of the social, of groups and institutions, in this image, by imagining 
recognizable patterns with a relative stability over time in this network; also, 
we can imagine various ways in which to accommodate for the importance 
of structural factors, but we need not go into this here. With every move we 
make, we exert some influence on the network, via the threads by which we 
are connected to it. The network has a certain flexibility of course, and it is 
not difficult to see where our influence will generally be greatest. We can also 
see how patterns may emerge by which due to the collective activity of 
groups of people in one part of the word, the network may become severely 
distorted on some other part of the globe. When we distort the network, this 
has consequences for the experience of other people (or creatures, generally). 
We inhibit the movement (in either a literal or a figurative sense) of others, 
and this constitutes a form of evil: “The nature of evil is that the characters 
of things are mutually obstructive.”80 ‘Mutually’, Whitehead says, because he 
focuses on the harmony or discord between the elements that go into the 
concrescence of an actual occasion. His view of good and evil is thoroughly 
aesthetic: “the feeling of evil in the most general sense, namely physical pain 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 14. 
77 Whitehead (1985), 255: “[T]he actual entity (…) determines its own ultimate 
definiteness.” 
78 Whitehead (1962), 23. 
79 Whitehead (1968), 15. 
80 Whitehead (1985), 340. 
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or mental evil, such as sorrow, horror, dislike” is the ‘type of inhibition’ he 
calls ‘aesthetic destruction’.81 This is the opposite of importance. 
 Ethics (or morality) and aesthetics are not fully separable in 
Whitehead’s thought, not least because aesthetics is a very broad notion in 
his work, staying close to its original meaning. On the other hand, ‘beauty’, 
often seen as the subject of aesthetics, is also a much-encompassing notion 
for Whitehead, so that aesthetics is still very much concerned with beauty. 
Beauty and goodness are not the same thing, though it is hard to point out 
where they go apart.82 An important difference between the two (in 
Whitehead’s work) seems to be that beauty is concerned with the present, 
with experience now, whereas moral value implies a concern for the future, 
for future importance. Moral value also seems to imply a wider concern: 
“Morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook.”83 
Both the spatial and the temporal reach of moral concern are greater than 
that of the concern for the value of beauty. The distinction becomes blurred, 
however, when we are dealing with ultimate concern in its guise of 
inspiration. On hearing the word ‘inspiration’ the example of an aesthetic 
lifestyle naturally comes to mind. Although the good and the beautiful are 
characterized by different kinds of obligation, by their own ‘(I) must’, in the 
way people are struck by them, this difference fades when ultimate concern 
takes the form of inspiration, which always contains an element of beauty 
within itself. Ugliness and injustice ‘appeal’ to us to be redressed in very 
different ways; yet each asks to be set right.84 
 So far, I have left out an important aspect of ‘importance’, and 
thereby of morality. Importance combines two elements within itself: 
finiteness and infinity, the one and the many. Within the finite world of fact, 
which is characterized by multiplicity and diversity, value is realized. Value 
depends on limitation by realization in matter of fact; nevertheless, it points 
beyond matter of fact, to the ideal. Ethics is made possible by the inclusion 
by the actual of “‘not-being’ as a positive factor in its own achievement”.85 
                                                 
81 Whitehead (1964), 255-256. 
82 Iris Murdoch also struggles with this question. She points out (referring to Plato) 
that, whereas it seems possible to experience the transcendence of the Beautiful, this 
does not seem to be the case with the Good (Murdoch [1974b]). 
83 Whitehead (1985), 15; he continues: “The antithesis between the general good and 
the individual interest can be abolished only when the individual is such that its 
interest is the general good, thus exemplifying the loss of the minor intensities in 
order to find them again in a wider sweep of interest.” 
84 The difference cannot be said to lie in that the good is required, while the beautiful 
is in a sense gratuitous; the good is not exhausted by what is morally required – nor, 
I think, would we still say that beauty is merely gratuitous if the world were all of a 
sudden devoid of it. On the other hand, it might be suggested that beauty only 
becomes mixed with goodness when the latter goes beyond the morally required. 
85 Whitehead (1985), 189; before that in Whitehead (1938), 206. 
 377 
Importance depends on the extent to which the past contributes to the 
present and the future, as well as on the extent to which the ideal in the form 
of concrete possibilities for value is realized. This involves the factors of 
harmony, intensity, and vividness referred to before. Morality, then, is 
concerned with the influx of value in the world of fact; its aim, we might say, 
is to ‘let be’ as much as possible – in my network metaphor: to slacken the 
threads with which we are connected to others, in order not to inhibit the 
realization of value; or it may require more positive action: to adjust the 
pattern in order to maximize the possibilities for the realization of value.86 
 My concept of conscience as “a concerned awareness of the moral 
quality of our own contribution to the process of reality, including our own 
being” refers to a concerned awareness of the place we occupy in our 
perspective of the world and the possibilities for the realization of value 
(good or bad) that come with that station. The term ‘contribution’ was 
deliberately chosen to include the idea of ‘importance’. Ordinarily, of course, 
we do not entertain such grand views of ourselves in relation to the rest of 
the world. We tend to feel guilty when we have broken a moral rule (‘moral’ 
in its narrow sense) or betrayed one of our moral principles. But these point 
beyond themselves to a wider perspective of value (which is why Tillich 
speaks of a ‘transmoral’ conscience); they do so in practice only when 
conscience attains the necessary openness.87 That ‘morality’, in its narrow 
sense, points beyond itself is also the reason why conscience cannot be 
defined as a purely ‘moral’ (again in the narrow sense) phenomenon; it 
relates to ultimate concern, and therefore it is by definition religious, whether 
it is so in a more traditional sense or not.88 
 This requires some further explanation. Conscience can be said to be 
a moral phenomenon in different ways. It can be a moral phenomenon in 
the sense that it is concerned with moral value, or in the sense that its 
concern is with ‘the control of process so as to maximize importance’, in 
which case the business of conscience is exactly that of morality in the 
Whiteheadian sense, only specified to one person. The first possibility can be 
analyzed further into two ways in which conscience may be concerned with 
moral value. Conscience may be concerned with the application of moral 
rules out of concern with those rules, this particular morality, themselves. 
Alternatively, its concern may be directed at moral value as realized in the 
                                                 
86 Cf. Williams (1963), 190: “Moral obligation is the claim of possible good upon the 
free decision of any creature who is able to consider the effect of his action in 
relation to that good.” 
87 See Tillich (1969), chapter 4: “The Transmoral Conscience”. 
88 As a final remark concerning ethics and aesthetics, we can perhaps say that, so 
long as we are dealing with morality in the narrow sense of the word, the difference 
between the morally good and the beautiful (understood narrowly, as a quality of 
appearance) remains clear, while as soon as we move beyond this level towards that 
of ‘value’, the distinction starts to evaporate. 
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world, as when the injustice of a particular situation is perceived. As I see it, 
the first should at most be a passing stage in the development of conscience. 
But the fully realized conscience is concerned both with moral value in the 
second sense, and with non-moral value. This, too, can be understood in two 
ways. The first was already mentioned: a concern for the moral quality of our 
own contribution to the process of morality can be seen as a concern for the 
manner and degree in which that contribution influences process so as to 
maximize importance. The business of conscience is then that of morality. 
Alternatively, we might construe conscience’s concern with non-moral value 
as an awareness of the limitations of the moral. A fully mature conscience is 
coloured by the awareness that there are other types of value besides the 
moral, in other words: by a perspective on the moral and on itself. 
The mature conscience, at any rate, transcends concern with moral 
value alone, but its openness to non-moral value nourishes its sensitivity to 
moral value. When conscience is concerned with non-moral value, it is still 
‘moral’, though its object is not; this allows people to transcend the 
limitations of particular moral codes, and it enhances the sensitivity to moral 
value as realized in the world, while at the same time exposing this as one 
type of value among others, between which a delicate balance must be 
struck. 
 
 
8.7. CONSCIENCE AND EXPERIENCE 
 
8.7.1. Experiences of conscience 
Luhmann wrote: “Das Gewissen ist ein erlebbares Phänomen (…).”89 That is 
to say: conscience can be experienced. I speak of ‘experiences of conscience’ 
throughout this book. But how must the relation between conscience and 
experience be understood? 
 ‘Conscience can be experienced’ is not a statement of the same 
category as ‘trees can be seen’, or ‘the temperature of the water can be felt’. 
That we would not normally speak of ‘experiencing’ water temperature (nor, 
in German, of ‘erleben’) is significant in this respect. To experience, let alone 
‘erleben’, is something that involves the whole subject in a way that 
perception by particular senses does not. ‘To experience’ is but a feeble 
translation of ‘erleben’, which is to live through something, but without the 
negative connotations of this phrase – it is to ‘relive’, without the ‘re’. But 
people may speak of ‘experiencing’ Disneyland Paris or The Phantom of the 
Opera, and this is still not the same sense of ‘experiencing’ as when we say 
that conscience can be experienced. The reason is that conscience is not there, 
waiting to be experienced the way Disneyland Paris is, or a musical that 
awaits its audience at a particular date, time, and venue. 
                                                 
89 Luhmann (1973), 223. 
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 A better analogy would be with joy, or sorrow, or anger. ‘Anger can 
be experienced’; ‘Zorn ist ein erlebbares Phänomen’; both sound fine to me. 
Anger is not something out there, like Disneyland Paris, waiting for someone 
to (pay a lot of money and) experience it. In a sense, it is the experience. 
When we say that anger can be experienced, we speak of it as a potentiality 
of experience, as a possible subjective form an experience might take. We 
have abstracted ‘anger’ from all those experiences we call ‘angry’; in other 
words, there is a certain class of experiences we recognize as a particular 
class, and we use the word ‘anger’ to denote the defining characteristic of 
this class. Similarly, we use the concept of conscience to refer to what we 
take to be the defining characteristic of a specific class of experiences – 
namely, the experiences we have in that mode of consciousness we also 
speak of as conscience. This immediately points to a difference between 
conscience and anger (or joy, or sorrow, or some other emotion or feeling), 
for I would not as readily speak of anger as a mode of consciousness. Anger 
is a subjective form of experience; it is a mode of feeling, perhaps.90 But 
conscience is a more complex kind of subjective form. Not in virtue of its 
intentionality (in my broad sense of the word), for anger can be intentional as 
well, but because it involves an awareness of morally salient characteristics of 
the situation, reference to a moral standard, a complex of feelings, and 
possibly many other (cognitive) elements, that it integrates into itself.91 
 When I speak of conscience as a ‘concerned awareness (etc.)’, I leave 
open whether this awareness is predominantly cognitive in nature or not; 
usually, it is not. Freud held that the activity of the super-ego and of the 
conscience largely takes place in the ‘unconscious’; without (fully) accepting 
his views regarding the formation of the super-ego and the conscience, I 
agree with the view that much of conscience passes beyond the field of 
vision of the mind’s eye, so to speak. Conscience does not necessarily 
involve the articulation into verbal thoughts of that of which it is an 
awareness. 
 
8.7.2. Experiences of conscience and the definition of conscience 
Kittsteiner, when he is more than halfway through his book, writes: “Am 
Ende des Durchgangs durch die Begriffsgeschichte des Gewissens zwischen 
Reformation und Aufklärung steht eine Frage: was soll es eigentlich heißen, 
wenn man sagt: Das Gewissen bei Luther, das Gewissen bei Balduin, (…) 
bein Thomasius oder bei Kant? Die Redewendung ‘das Gewissen bei…’ 
unterstellt immer so etwas wie eine anthropologische Substanz, die ‘bei’ den 
                                                 
90 Whitehead sometimes speaks of the subjective form as the ‘affective tone’ of 
experience (see Hughes [1991], 278). Perhaps this allows us to make a distinction 
between different types of subjective form, conscience being a mode of 
consciousness, and joy, anger, et cetera being affective tones. 
91 See 8.2.1. 
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verschiedenen Denkern nur verschieden ausgelegt worden ist.”92 He shows 
himself an historian pur sang when he says: “Diachrone Begriffsgeschichte 
täuscht eine Kontinuität vor, die sich in dem Augenblick auflöst, wo nach 
den kulturellen Bezügen eines Begriffs gefragt wird. (…) Der Begriff 
‘Gewissen’ ist nur der Inbegriff aller Erfahrungen, die je mit ihm gemacht 
worden sind.”93 
 I agree with the centrality afforded to experiences here, but 
otherwise disagree with Kittsteiner’s suggestion. Leaving aside that he seems 
to deny the possibility of the misidentification of experiences as experiences 
of conscience, I would say that he exaggerates the difference between the 
experiences of conscience in different historical settings – differences, I 
might add, that are probably smaller than those between certain 
philosophical concepts of conscience, with their tendency to absolutize one 
particular aspect of the phenomenon.94 Against Kittsteiner, I have 
emphasized the equivalence of experiences of conscience. I have put forward 
the symbol of conscience as a framework with a large stability over time, 
which can accommodate the varying symbolic expressions of experiences of 
conscience. Moreover, I have indeed suggested (in chapter 2) that conscience 
is a human possibility, rather than a culturally specific one, that is realized as 
soon as certain social conditions are met. For this reason, it also makes sense 
to put forward a single concept of conscience that is intended to render 
intelligible the experiences of conscience of people now and two thousand 
years ago. My fluid concept of conscience is intended to be able to 
accommodate for diversity in experiences of conscience. The ‘concerned 
awareness of the moral quality (etc.)’ can take on different forms in different 
times, but within limits. We are still very much able to recognize Socrates’ 
experience (as has been passed on to us by Plato) as an experience of 
conscience – despite the enormous temporal gap. 
 Of course, the difference between Kittsteiner’s approach and my 
own is partly a difference in emphasis. While Kittsteiner emphasizes 
difference and diversity, I try to accommodate these within a fundamental 
unity. It is up to the reader to decide whether this attempt has been 
successful or not. 
                                                 
92 Kittsteiner (1995), 289. 
93 Ibid., 289-290. 
94 Kittsteiner also recognizes a certain unity, though; he speaks of the ‘bipolar 
ground-structure’ of conscience, by which he refers to the two aspects of the 
knowledge of a norm and the accompanying emotions (18-19, 289). Besides, if there 
were no more continuity than that on the level of the use of the term ‘conscience’, I 
doubt whether it would have made an interesting book; the interest lies in the fact 
that diverse conceptions of conscience are bound together by more than the use of 
the term. 
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Transition to part II: Freedom of conscience 
 
 
“In various periods in European history, freedom of conscience is most 
fervently advocated by those to whom it is denied, for as long as this is so. 
As soon as freedom of conscience is granted to them, they tend to lose 
interest in the principle.” I could start this part on freedom of conscience 
with a remark like this – in fact, I have. But the point is that I could have 
started it with a completely different statement, with just as much (or little, 
depending on the reader’s preference in describing a half-truth) truth in it as 
this one. Every exercise in the history of ideas, whatever the particular idea it 
is concerned with, will lead one into more and more complex networks of 
meaning that are full of paradoxes, unexpected shifts, improbable 
interconnections and co-occurrences of contrary developments. So I am not 
saying that the history of ‘the idea of’ – I will have to put it like this at the 
moment, for want of a better term – freedom of conscience is unique in this 
respect. What I can say is that the complexity of the subject-matter is still 
often underestimated. Therefore, what I will try to do is point out the most 
important issues and emphasize a number of aspects of the phenomena 
joined under the heading of ‘freedom of conscience’ that have not received 
the attention they deserve. This is done against the background of my 
approach of conscience as explicated in part I, and with a view to current 
developments in the juridical use of the term and the theorizing in this field. 
 Many different meanings of ‘freedom of conscience’ can be 
discerned in different periods, as well as in the present. In one (not the) 
sixteenth and seventeenth century context ‘freedom of conscience’ was 
virtually equivalent to ‘freedom of religion’. But this came in different shapes 
and sizes. It could mean: (1) the immunity of the forum internum, that is, a 
prohibition of inquisition. A more extended version of freedom of 
conscience (2) allowed the domestic exercise of one’s religion. In the most 
lenient interpretation, freedom of conscience entailed not only (1) and (2) 
but also the right to public religious practice.1 Besides this tripartite example 
of freedom of conscience as religious freedom, one could mention a more 
contemporary notion of freedom of conscience as the right of the individual 
to act according to his conscience in a societal context. This is what Niklas 
Luhmann calls ‘Gewissensfreiheit im landläufigen Sinne’ [‘freedom of 
conscience as it is commonly understood’].2 He offers as an alternative the 
‘Freiheit des Gewissens’ understood as a ‘Freiheit zum Tode’; central to 
Luhmann’s understanding of freedom of conscience is the idea that it does 
not allow people to act according to their conscience, but instead saves them 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Vermeulen (1989), 66; Mock (1983), 115-117. 
2 Luhmann (1965), 270. 
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from having to do so.3 I will not go on introducing more and more different 
conceptions of freedom of conscience. What I wish to point out here is that 
all conceptions of freedom of conscience mentioned so far are political-
juridical in nature (whatever their inspiration), and that they are to be 
distinguished from religious conceptions (whatever political and juridical 
influence they may exert). I believe this is the most basic distinction to make 
with regard to conceptions of freedom of conscience; it is closely bound up 
with the distinction between the public and the private, although the terms 
do not coincide.4 These notions of a political-juridical conception of 
freedom of conscience and a religious one are to be taken as ideal-types, as 
the extremes of a spectrum somewhere in between which most conceptions 
of freedom of conscience can be located.5 The best example of a religious 
conception of freedom of conscience is afforded by Martin Luther (1483-
1546), who coined the German term ‘Gewissensfreiheit’. For him, ‘freedom 
of conscience’ signifies the state of one’s conscience being liberated by God 
through faith – the Christian conscience is free from the law and free from 
works, “nicht daß keine geschehen, sondern daß man auf keine sich 
verlasse”.6 Now, the conscience being liberated also from the law (‘das 
Gesetz’) may sound political enough, but it would be a misunderstanding to 
read it that way.7 Luther explicitly states that Christian freedom (of 
                                                 
3 Luhmann’s concept of ‘freedom of conscience’ will be explained further on in this 
chapter. 
4 The distinction I make between religious and political-juridical conceptions of 
freedom of conscience is not a distinction between different kinds of motivation for 
supporting freedom of conscience, but a distinction between different meanings of 
‘freedom of conscience’. Thus, it is not to be confused with the kind of distinction 
John Plamenatz makes when he says that “[p]eople can believe in persecution or 
toleration for two quite different kinds of reason: political and religious”; see 
Plamenatz (1963), 67 (in ch. 2: ‘Liberty of Conscience’). Plamenatz goes on to 
distinguish a third kind of reason, which he calls ‘philosophical’. He claims that 
philosophical arguments, which put forward liberty of conscience as a natural right, 
form the basis of our present understanding of liberty of conscience. (I will use the 
terms ‘liberty of conscience’ and ‘freedom of conscience’ interchangeably.) 
5 Historically, religious conceptions of freedom of conscience tend to give way to 
political-juridical conceptions. See Lecler (1977), 369, where he says that Bullinger 
(successor of Zwingli) and Theodor von Beza “waren sich mehr oder weniger klar 
bewußt, daß zwischen der ‘Gewissensfreiheit’ der ersten Reformatoren und der 
scheinbar identischen Maxime, die aus den religiösen Kämpfen hervorgegangen war, 
der ganze Unterschied zweier verschiedener Epochen lag.” The first notion of 
freedom of conscience stressed the liberation of conscience and defended an 
objective divine truth; the second notion of freedom of conscience arose in the 
context of a plurality of sects and continuing conflict, and stressed the inviolable and 
sacred character of subjective convictions – to paraphrase Lecler. 
6 Luther (1983a), 124. [“not that none are done, but that one relies upon none”]. 
7 Which did not prevent contemporaries of Luther to interpret it politically. 
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conscience) is not a political freedom: “Denn Christus hat uns nicht in 
politischer hinsicht frei gemacht, nicht im Blick auf den äußeren Menschen, 
sondern theologisch oder in geistlicher Weise”.8 
 The example of Martin Luther also illustrates how conceptions of 
freedom of conscience are connected with concepts of conscience. His 
concept of conscience is thoroughly religious, focusing on people’s personal 
relation to God. Hobbes’ (1588-1679) idea of conscience, to take another 
example, leads him to reject freedom of conscience in the societal state. 
Again, there is a clear relation between a view of conscience on the one 
hand, and a standpoint with regard to freedom of conscience on the other. 
However, it is just as true that ‘freedom of conscience’ was often, and 
increasingly so, a notion relatively independent of concepts of conscience. I 
will devote chapter 9 to this problem of the relation between notions of 
conscience and conceptions of freedom of conscience. 
 It would be a mistake to discuss the ideas of different theologians 
and philosophers in different periods of time on the matter of freedom of 
conscience and then leave it at that. The history of freedom of conscience is 
soaked with pragmatics, with the influence of time and circumstance. As 
Richard Dees has shown, it would be incorrect to say that toleration (a 
concept with which that of freedom of conscience is strongly linked) is 
simply the “rational response to the intractable conflicts that the religious 
wars represent”.9 This is not meant to deny the influence of the enduring 
conflicts in the development towards the legal establishment of freedom of 
conscience, but to dampen the enthusiasm of those who “think that the 
widespread acceptance of toleration is one of the triumphs of rationality in 
the modern era”.10 Nevertheless, this chapter is, inescapably, much 
concerned with intellectual history. To a certain extent I regret this and wish 
that I would have been more competent; competent enough, at any rate, to 
weave intellectual history and “actual historical situations and specific 
events” into one cloth.11 I have occasionally tried to do so, however. I do not 
think that the regret should extend too far. Intellectual history is still part of 
history, or, better put, philosophical reflection does not occur in a spatio-
temporal vacuum. It provides one possible trail to follow in an attempt to 
understand historical developments. The question as to the relation between 
ideas and the course of history remains unanswerable; or, it will always 
require new answers. Hegel said that Minerva’s Owl flies out at dusk. While 
                                                 
8 Luther (1994), 21 (Luther [1883], Vol. 40 II, 3f.) [“for Christ has not liberated us in 
political respect, not with a view to the outward Man, but theologically or in a 
spiritual way”]. 
9 Dees (1998), 82. 
10 Idem. 
11 Oberman (1996), 17, wishes to “replace a timeless, immutable and therefore a-
historical principle of rationality with actual historical situations and specific events”. 
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preparing this part of the book, it often seemed to me that philosophical 
reflection provides the justification for what has already happened. Less 
negatively formulated: it attempts to understand what has happened, and the 
articulation of this understanding often becomes a factor in the development 
of what it was an understanding of. The history of toleration and freedom of 
conscience, to conclude, even provides examples of cases in which 
philosophical reflection was definitely ahead of its time – the owl (by 
mistake, perhaps) flying out at dawn. In such a case, when the owl is spotted, 
philosophy becomes an active, modifying force in history. 
 Chapter 10, then, will deal with the relation between lofty ideals, 
pragmatic considerations and historical circumstances, through a discussion 
of the main problem inherent in the notion (and the practice) of freedom of 
conscience, namely the problem of order. Chapter 11 embodies the extremes of 
pragmatism and idealism. It shows how both the practice and the concept of 
toleration changed in the course of time; how toleration turned from a 
negative into a positive, phrased in terms of conscience and its freedom; and 
finally, how ‘freedom of conscience’ (despite its pragmatic history) became a 
powerful symbol. Chapter 12 discusses the twentieth-century solutions 
proposed to the problem of order, solutions that stem mainly from a 
juridical theoretical discourse. The chapter closes with some remarks on the 
philosophical basis underlying freedom of conscience – or, more accurately 
put, I will suggest an interpretation of freedom of conscience that I believe is 
more viable than some current interpretations of the principle, and that is in 
line with my own concept of conscience. 
 Why devote so much time to the notion of liberty of conscience and 
its history? Can we not, once we know what to mean by ‘conscience’, go on 
to discuss conscientious objection? Part of the question pertains to the whole 
of this book, and concerns the importance of (the study of) history. I have 
dealt with this question in the introduction to this book; therefore I will say 
only this: freedom of conscience is, historically, the mother of conscientious 
objection. Otherwise put: conscientious objection is the most 
institutionalized and therefore the most tangible embodiment of the 
principle of freedom of conscience in our time. The notion of freedom of 
conscience is not exhausted by its interpretation as conscientious objection, 
but the current practice of conscientious objection cannot properly be 
understood without some grasp of its genesis in the notion and practice of 
freedom of conscience. It is in the emergence of the latter notion that the 
basic problems adhering to conscientious objection (on the political level) 
stand out most distinctly.12 It is because freedom of conscience is such a 
                                                 
12 Cf. Plamenatz (1963), 46: “[O]ne of the best – and sometimes even the best – 
method of getting a firm grip on a moral idea is by seeing how it arose and by 
contrasting it with the other ideas closely related to it.” I agree, which is why I also 
devote substantial attention to the notion of toleration. 
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powerful symbol in the Western world that the right of conscientious 
objection cannot be denied there without inconsistency. 
 
 389 
9. Conscience and freedom of conscience 
 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
When people speak of freedom or liberty of conscience, it is not at all self-
evident what ‘conscience’ means – even less so than when they simply speak 
of conscience. It might be just another name for ‘freedom of religion’, or it 
can be used to cover the freedom of thought, of expression, and of 
conscience (more narrowly understood) itself.1 Where freedom of 
conscience does indeed mean freedom of conscience, instead of something else, 
the meaning of the notion still depends on the meaning of ‘conscience’. 
Finally, the notion as a whole had a wholly different meaning for the 
Reformers than for sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century 
philosophers. For this reason, I have included this chapter, which explores 
the conceptual relations between ‘conscience’ and ‘freedom of conscience’. 
Particular attention goes to the dynamic of these relations, insofar as this 
pertains to the rise of the notion of freedom of conscience. 
 A priori, it seems at least plausible that particular conceptions of 
liberty of conscience depend on particular conceptions of conscience, and I 
will show this to be true in some cases. It is equally true, however, that in 
time the notions of conscience and freedom of conscience parted company. 
Section 9.2 below deals with the general connections between the notions of 
conscience and freedom of conscience; 9.3 shows how they drifted apart. 
 I have not given a definition of ‘freedom of conscience’ in the 
transition to part II, and I will not do so here, simply because we are dealing 
with the genesis and history of the notions, which means that we will 
encounter different ‘definitions’ as we go. I will come to defining ‘freedom 
of conscience’ in chapter 12, when it ought to be possible to construct a 
definition that is both relevant in our time, and informed by history. 
 
 
9.2. HOW CONSCIENCE AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE WERE RELATED 
 
9.2.1. The role of conceptions of conscience in the genesis of notions 
 of freedom of conscience 
In part I, I have presented the history of expressions of and reflection on 
conscience as the manifestation of a gradual shift from a symbolic to an 
indicative understanding of conscience – some important qualifications 
notwithstanding. What I wish to claim here, with some caution, is that this 
shift was a necessary prerequisite for any notion of freedom of conscience to 
arise. 
                                                 
1 Cf. Plamenatz (1963), 66-67, where he appears to speak of ‘intellectual freedom’ 
and of ‘freedom of though and expression’ as enveloped by ‘liberty of conscience’. 
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 It is easy to say too much at this point; to overstate my case. Is any 
notion of freedom of conscience logically unthinkable, completely unthinkable, 
in a situation in which conscience is not yet understood indicatively in the 
(early) modern way? That is perhaps not true. It is extremely hard to say 
whether such an indicative understanding of conscience is indeed a logical 
presupposition of any notion of freedom of conscience, or whether it was in 
fact an historically contingent prerequisite. Historically, the notion 
crystallized as a product of the discourse of ‘forcing the conscience’, and to 
speak of conscience in that way does seem to presuppose a more or less 
indicative understanding of conscience, or, at minimum, that conscience is a 
familiar and as it were unremarkable word, rather than a more rare and 
mysterious symbolic expression of a particular kind of experience.2 In other 
words: as long as ‘conscience’ functions as a symbolic expression, rather than 
(also) as an indicative term, it is highly implausible that people would come 
to speak of ‘freedom of conscience’. It would be somewhat comparable to 
the notion of ‘freedom of God’ (if we take ‘God’ to be the core religious 
symbol) – an incomprehensible notion, unlike that of freedom of religion, 
which implies a certain (reflective) distance to religious experience and its 
expression. With the gradual conceptualization and solidification of 
conscience, the likelihood of the occurrence of a notion of freedom of 
conscience increases. 
 If some such development, by which conscience came to be 
understood indicatively, and came to solidify into a faculty each individual 
possesses, was a necessary prerequisite for the genesis of any notion of 
liberty of conscience, must we then say that, from this perspective at least, it 
was a positive development? Or was freedom of conscience the fortunate 
by-product of a negative development, or a reaction to such a development? 
I have made it abundantly clear, I think, that I believe something is lost in 
the indicative understanding of conscience – something of crucial 
importance. I also believe that the development ‘from symbol to doctrine’ 
was a critical factor in that process which led to the rejection of conscience 
by certain parties on the one hand, and a plurality of incompatible definitions 
on the other. But if we consider our current principle of freedom of 
conscience a valuable asset, does this not urge for a revaluation of that 
development of which it seems to have been, in some way, a product? It 
certainly calls for an assessment of the connection between that development 
and the rise of a notion of freedom of conscience. 
 Where, under what circumstances, does a call for freedom of 
conscience arise? Surely not where freedom of conscience is a matter of 
course (if there is, or ever has been, such a place); nor where there is no 
                                                 
2 This holds especially for the ‘secular’ or political-juridical notion of freedom of 
conscience, and only to a much lesser degree for the Reformers’ conception of 
freedom of conscience. 
 391 
significant diversity of belief and practice.3 Freedom of conscience is 
necessary and makes sense only in a situation of diversity. The principle and 
practice of toleration was the precursor of freedom of conscience; therefore, 
it is helpful to take note of what Catriona McKinnon calls the ‘circumstances 
of toleration’.4 They are fourfold: 1) “Difference: what is tolerated differs from 
the tolerator’s conception of what should be done, valued, or believed.”; 2) 
“Importance: what is tolerated by the tolerator is not trivial to her.”; 3) 
“Opposition: the tolerator disapproves of and/or dislikes what she tolerates, 
and is ipso facto disposed to act so as to alter or suppress what she opposes.”; 
4) “Power: the tolerator believes herself to have the power to alter or suppress 
what is tolerated.”5 McKinnon distinguishes two other ‘structural features of 
toleration’: 5) “Non-rejection: the tolerator does not exercise this power.”; 6) 
“Requirement: toleration is right and/or expedient, and the tolerator is 
virtuous, and/or just, and/or prudent.”6 
 What role did (conceptions of) conscience play in (the coming about 
of) the circumstances of toleration and, in its wake, freedom of conscience? 
What is a matter of conscience to people is a matter of ultimate concern; 
clearly, then, it is a matter of importance. The processes of doctrinalization 
that took place during the Middle Ages and in early modern times entailed 
that people absolutized the ‘contents’ of their consciences. They came to 
insist on the literal truth of what was merely an imperfect symbolization of 
the ultimate. This attitude, which was one product of the transition to an 
indicative understanding of conscience, implied that other beliefs were seen 
as ‘deviant’, and that ‘deviant’ beliefs were opposed. It was a matter of 
importance to people that other people should hold the same beliefs, and if 
they did not, the former opposed (the beliefs of) the latter. The reality of 
conscience, then, shaped by a misunderstanding of the original nature of 
conscience, played an important role in bringing about the circumstances of 
toleration; more specifically, in bringing about the unfreedom that was the 
opposite of freedom of conscience. That the circumstances of toleration are 
there does not make the practice of toleration a given. The doctrinal 
understanding of conscience in itself constituted a force against toleration; 
but paradoxically, by doing so, and due to the importance attached to 
conscience, it became a factor in the genesis of freedom of conscience, both 
in theory and in practice. Theologians tended to defend conscience; ‘secular’ 
(excuse the anachronism) philosophers were the strongest advocates of 
                                                 
3 We might see that the notion arises only where, in practice, it is not there and this 
absence is no longer self-evident – it is now experienced as an absence. 
4 Chapter 11 deals with the difference and the relations between the principles of 
toleration and freedom of conscience in more detail. 
5 McKinnon (2006), 14. I am not sure whether ‘difference’ still needs to be 
mentioned if ‘opposition’ already figures in the list. The latter seems to incorporate 
the former. 
6 Idem. 
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freedom of conscience as a natural right.7 But the support that the latter 
notion received depended in part on the sanctity of conscience in traditional 
views, and on the importance of conscience for influential religious 
minorities. Finally, conscience could play a role insofar as toleration and 
freedom of conscience were advocated on moral grounds; not merely 
because it was prudent, but because it was right and just. 
 
9.2.2. A double inversion of meaning 
I have emphasized the historical shift from a symbolic to an indicative 
understanding of conscience. From a more strictly conceptual point of view, 
however, there are still many ways to describe the transformation of 
conceptions (to speak of concepts of conscience in pre-scholastic times would 
be an overstatement) of conscience that took place during the Middle Ages 
and in early modern times. One way of looking at it is presented in the 
following figure: 
 
‘syneidesis’ 
‘conscientia’ 
early use of ‘conscience’ 
later use of ‘conscience’ 
concrete: ‘knowing-with (others)’ 
 of a concrete act 
 
 
abstract: conscience as ‘moral sense’;
 moral consciousness in 
general; not attached to a 
concrete act 
abstract: ‘conscientia’, like 
‘scientia’ is something in 
which one can participate; 
something that admits of 
degrees 
 
concrete: private conscience: “my 
 conscience”, “your 
conscience”, conscience as 
a ‘thing’ 
 
Figure 1: inversion of meaning in use of the term ‘conscience’ and 
its predecessors 
 
This figure shows how conceptions of conscience turned upside down, as it 
were, with regard to their abstractness and concreteness. ‘Conscience’ 
literally refers to a form of knowing, a ‘knowing-with’ (someone). In the case 
of ‘syneidesis’, ‘conscientia’ in its early use, and even ‘conscience’ in its early 
use, this ‘knowing-with’ entails knowledge of a concrete act; in this sense 
they are concrete notions. On this (epistemological) level, the (early) modern 
notion of conscience is abstract. ‘Conscience’ does not so much stand for 
concrete knowledge concerning a concrete act, but rather for a moral faculty 
or a moral sense; a general power rather than an awareness tied to a concrete 
act. Older notions of conscience are also, in another sense, abstract. They 
                                                 
7 Cf. Plamenatz, 77-88. 
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referred to something (i.e. knowledge) one participated in, more or less in a 
Platonic sense. In this respect – we might say: from the point of view of the 
‘solidity’ of conscience – the (early) modern notion of conscience is concrete: it 
is not knowledge one participates in, but knowledge one has. From the late 
Middle Ages on, people start speaking of ‘my conscience’ and ‘your 
conscience’. Every individual person comes to possess his or her own 
conscience.8 
 The point of introducing this rather general (and inescapably 
simplified) scheme of the development of conceptions of conscience is that 
this double inversion, by which conscience became abstract in that respect in 
which it had been concrete and concrete in that respect in which it had been 
abstract, has been crucial for the development of both religious and political-
juridical notions of ‘freedom of conscience’. This should not be taken to 
mean that the inversion had to occur first, before any idea of freedom of 
conscience could arise. The inversion is indicative of a process which also 
gave rise to the different notions of freedom of conscience. Negatively put: 
freedom of conscience is conceptually unthinkable when conscience is 
thought of as something abstract one can participate in, and as something 
tied to a concrete act.9 Conscience, as it is understood in any interpretation 
of ‘freedom of conscience’, is something quite general, possessed by every 
individual. One has to ‘possess’ a conscience before it can be coerced; one 
has to have a conscience for one’s conscience to be able to be free. Both 
sides of the double inversion of meaning tend towards such a solidification 
of conscience into each individual’s private and sacred possession. Thus, we 
see once again that earlier conceptions of conscience were closer to the 
symbolic understanding of conscience than later indicative use. 
 
 
9.3. WHERE CONSCIENCE AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE PART 
In the previous subsection, I attended to a very general link between any 
interpretation of freedom of conscience and (early) modern concepts of 
conscience. In the transition to part II, I pointed out that particular notions 
of or attitudes towards freedom of conscience and particular concept(ion)s 
of conscience are often closely linked. Hobbes is a case in point.10 Luther is 
                                                 
8 This double inversion of meaning can be distilled from the history of expressions 
of and thought on conscience as I have presented it, but also from the available 
literature on conscience and its conceptual predecessors. Lewis (1991) is particularly 
helpful. 
9 There have been individualizing tendencies in Greek Antiquity, and especially in 
the New Testament use of ‘syneidesis’; these will be discussed in chapter 10. 
10 Although there is an ambiguity in his remarks on conscience, as I have shown in 
chapter 4, it is safe to say that his prevailing view of conscience was that it was 
nothing more than “a man’s settled judgement and opinion”, which led him to 
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another example. But more interesting than this rather unsurprising fact that 
interpretations of and attitudes towards freedom of conscience are often 
linked to a particular definition of conscience is the fact that conscience and 
freedom of conscience also tend to part, conceptually. This is more so with 
some authors than with others, and more often the case with later authors 
than with earlier ones. Before I move to illustrations of conscience and 
freedom of conscience diverging conceptually, however, I will say something 
about the relation between the two in Calvin’s thought. This example is 
particularly interesting, because in Calvin’s thought conscience and freedom 
of conscience appear, at first sight, to diverge, which on closer inspection 
they do not, and secondly, because the third element of what Calvin calls 
‘Christian freedom’ does contain the germ of divergence. 
 John Calvin (1509-1564) never systematically developed a concept of 
conscience, but he said quite a lot about it, covering many aspects of the 
phenomenon. As David Bosco demonstrates, Calvin uses judicial metaphors 
to draw attention to the cognitive aspect of conscience and metaphors of 
violence when addressing the emotive element.11 Conscience is what brings 
us before God’s throne, and is thus related to judgement, but it is also 
described as a worm, harassing the sinner. In one place, it is defined by 
Calvin as follows: 
 
“[J]ust as through the mind and understanding men grasp a knowledge of 
things, and from this are said ‘to know’, this is the source of the word 
‘knowledge’, so also when they have a sense of divine judgment, as a 
witness joined to them, which does not allow them to hide their sins from 
being accused before the Judge’s tribunal, this sense is called ‘conscience.’ 
For it is a certain mean between God and man, because it does not allow 
man to suppress within himself what he knows, but pursues him to the 
point of convicting him.”12 
 
The emphasis in this definition lies on the ‘being-judged-upon’. One thing 
that is interesting about this definition is that it distinguishes between 
conscience as ‘a sense of divine judgment’, as a concrete awareness at a 
particular moment in time, and conscience as a more general term, analogous 
to ‘knowledge’. I would say that the idea of conscience as a ‘moral sense’ or 
as a power, or a faculty of judgement, derives from the experience of a 
certain stability in experiences of conscience. It is because the same person 
tends to react to similar situations in a similar way, because every time he 
                                                                                                               
dismiss the idea that people living in society ought to be allowed to follow their own 
conscience. The same ambiguity can be found in Locke’s thought. 
11 Bosco (1986). 
12 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, John T. McNeill (ed.), Ford Lewis 
Battles (transl.), The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1960, III.19.15, quoted in: 
Bosco (1986), 336-337. 
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does something ‘wrong’, a certain kind of awareness arises in him of the 
quality of this act of his, that people have come to think of conscience (as of 
consciousness in general) as an enduring, stable presence.13 This is what we 
noted above, in slightly different terms, as a necessary requirement for 
people to be able to think of freedom of conscience. 
 According to Lecler, for Calvin, freedom of conscience meant the 
freedom to decide in ‘indifferent things’.14 These ‘adiaphora’, as they were 
called, were things, certain church rites for instance, that were not regarded 
as essential to faith, as they were neither forbidden nor commanded by 
God.15 According to Lecler, freedom of conscience, in Calvin’s 
interpretation, is a freedom to decide in certain matters, a freedom to judge for 
oneself. If this were true, more precisely: if this were the whole truth, 
conscience and freedom of conscience would diverge here. Calvin’s notion 
of freedom of conscience would link up with only one aspect of his 
conception of conscience, and in such a way that the subtlety of his 
definition of conscience quoted above would be lost. It is true that Calvin 
also speaks of conscience as the “innate power to judge between good and 
evil”, but a closer inspection of the many places where Calvin links 
conscience and judgement reveals that “[c]onscience derives its authority not 
from being the judge, but from being the convener of the court of the Judge 
for each person. It functions as the delivery service for judgment.”16 But like 
I said, this subtlety would be lost in Calvin’s interpretation of freedom of 
conscience, if Lecler gave us the whole truth about Calvin’s interpretation of 
this notion. 
 In fact, he did not. Calvin’s interpretation of freedom of conscience 
is a good example of an interpretation that is closely related to a particular 
conception of conscience. He says: 
 
“Christian freedom, in my opinion, consists of three parts. The first: that 
the consciences of believers, in seeking assurance of their justification 
before God, should rise above and advance beyond the law, forgetting all 
law righteousness. (…) The second part, dependent on the first, is that 
                                                 
13 See chapter 8. 
14 Lecler (1977), 352. 
15 Adiaphora, ‘indifferent things’ were matters of conscience for some, but not for 
others – they were of concern to some, and indifferent to others. One wonders 
whether in the long run the case of those desiring freedom of conscience is helped 
by recognition of it with regard to ‘indifferent things’. They are things that one 
regards as of ultimate importance, but that others regard as indifferent, without 
significance. This means that the freedom of conscience that is granted has its base 
in a complete lack of understanding. It seems to me that a more meaningful freedom 
of conscience would be one that is granted to you by others on the basis of a 
recognition by those others of the importance that certain matters have to you. 
16 Bosco (1986), 335-336. 
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consciences observe the law, not as if constrained by the necessity of the 
law, but that freed from the law’s yoke they willingly obey God’s will. (…) 
The third part of Christian freedom lies in this: regarding outward things 
that are themselves ‘indifferent’, we are not bound before God by any 
religious obligation preventing us from sometimes using them and other 
times not using them, indifferently.”17 
 
The first part of Christian freedom relates more to what Bosco called the 
cognitive element of conscience, the element of justification before God, of 
divine judgement. The second and third parts of Christian freedom are more 
concerned with the emotive aspect of conscience. These parts of freedom of 
conscience entail the conscience being relieved from excessive worry, that is 
only a hindrance in (‘joyous’) obedience to God.18 So, different aspects of 
Calvin’s conception of conscience are reflected in different parts of Christian 
freedom. 
 In the third part of this freedom, however, lies the beginning of a 
separate career for the notion of freedom of conscience. Later discussions of 
freedom of conscience often centered round the problem of ‘adiaphora’. 
John Locke, for instance, (who was a latitudinarian), took up the matter of 
‘adiaphora’ in his Two Tracts on Government (1660) to demonstrate the 
authority of the civil government in religious matters.19 Freedom of 
conscience comes to mean: the freedom to act according to one’s conscience 
in religious matters.20 When Hobbes stated “that no human law is intended 
to oblige the conscience of a man, but the actions only”, he meant “to take 
away this scruple of conscience concerning obedience to human laws, 
amongst those that interpret to themselves the word of God in the Holy 
Scriptures”, those being the people “continually demanding liberty of 
conscience”.21 In Hobbes’ view, freedom of conscience could not be a 
problem, because conscience had to do with one’s inner life, not with 
outward actions. In fact, in his idea of freedom of conscience, he follows 
Luther’s line of thought. In Hobbes’ use of the term, conscience has nothing 
to do with outward actions, and freedom of conscience can therefore hardly 
                                                 
17 Calvin (1961), III.19.2, III.19.4 and III.19.7. 
18 All three elements can also be found in Luther’s works, though not enumerated as 
clearly as in Calvin’s Institutes. This goes for the third part of Christian freedom as 
well, which I did not mention earlier: “In den Dingen aber ist er [der Mensch] frei, 
die Gott nicht geboten hat, wie z. B. in äußerlichen Werken.” Luther (1994), 21 
(Luther [1883], Vol. 42, 512). 
19 Creppell (1996). Latitudinarians held that only a small number of basic beliefs 
were essential to faith, and that all the rest (other beliefs, rituals, ceremonies) was a 
matter of personal choice, irrelevant to salvation. 
20 Many varieties were possible: it could be a freedom for the individual, or for 
religious groups; it could vary in degree of publicity. 
21 Hobbes (1969), 145 (II.6.2/3). 
 397 
be a problem. The way the term is used by those claiming freedom of 
conscience for themselves, referring to a certain kind of freedom of action, 
renders the term meaningless – that, at least, is Hobbes’ view. But Hobbes 
pictures conscience as a separate entity, demanding satisfaction. He pretends 
that it is isolated in its own internal sphere, whereas in fact it concerns 
(among other things) one’s own actions. Conscience is by definition not 
confined to one’s inner life. The separation between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
Hobbes makes is artificial, and rests on a misunderstanding of conscience. 
 Hobbes points out (not entirely correctly) that the problem of 
whether to follow God’s commands or those of man is not “of very great 
antiquity in the world”.22 It was not a problem for the Jews, because their 
civil law and their divine law were both the law of Moses; it was not a 
problem in Antiquity, because then both ‘righteousness and virtue’ and 
religious matters were ordered by civil law. The point of interest for us is that 
it becomes clear that freedom of conscience becomes a problem only when 
religion and the state are already separated to a certain degree. It is not simply 
the case, as one may be led to believe by reading the literature on the subject, 
that the separation of church and state was the next step, after the conception 
of the idea of freedom of conscience, in attaining freedom of conscience. 
The idea of freedom of conscience, in the guise of freedom of religion, arose 
when church and state were already drifting apart.23 
 Returning to the subject of this section: conscience and freedom of 
conscience parted conceptually when freedom of conscience came to be 
understood almost exclusively as freedom of religion, where this, moreover, 
was taken to be a certain kind of freedom of action. When freedom of 
conscience acquires such a meaning, or this becomes its dominant meaning, 
only certain specific aspects of conscience retain their relevance in this 
general context.24 Which aspects these are depends on the more specific 
context. Freedom of conscience can be requested for the purpose of 
relieving someone’s private suffering. This occurs when someone asks to be 
exempted from obedience in a case where this would cause great guilt, 
remorse et cetera. This is the kind of freedom of conscience Luhmann is 
most interested in, as we shall see. The elements of ultimate concern and 
intimacy expressed in the symbol of conscience are uppermost here. In 
another context, a demand for freedom of conscience may entail a demand 
to decide for oneself in certain (religious) matters. Here, the element of 
intimacy might be most prominent, or that of ultimate concern in the form 
of inspiration. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 145 (II.6.2). 
23 See chapters 10 and 11. 
24 This is not surprising, because in ‘freedom of conscience’ it is freedom that is the 
dominant element; conscience recedes in the background. 
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 The ‘conscience’ in ‘freedom of conscience’, we can say in 
conclusion, loses the richness of the symbol of conscience and detaches itself 
from concepts of conscience when ‘freedom of conscience’ itself gains in 
significance. That the notion of freedom of conscience gained a relative 
independence from concepts of conscience, requiring the support of only 
some aspects of conscience, is only one half of the story, however. It is just 
as true that concepts of conscience were modified under the influence of the 
notion of freedom of conscience, with its increasingly impressive political 
and juridical career. This influence, which to a certain extent brought 
conscience and freedom of conscience back together again, lay mainly in a 
formalization of concepts of conscience. Yet, on the other hand, a certain 
degree of formalism was necessary for any notion of freedom of conscience 
to arise in the first place. I will return to this in chapters 10 and 12. 
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10. The problem of order 
 
“The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it 
possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible 
right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for 
his religious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever 
they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been 
practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to 
have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the 
scale.” 
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty (1859), introduction. 
 
 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the core problem attached to the concept and the 
practice of freedom of conscience. It is what I will call the problem of order. It 
has two dimensions: 1) political order, and 2) order in the minds of men. The 
notion of freedom of conscience has a problematic relationship to both 
kinds of order. The nature of this relationship, and of the relation between 
the two dimensions, varies in time and depends on the perspective taken. 
For religious parties in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, to allow 
people to practice religion according to their own conscience was the same 
as allowing the minds of men to become disordered, and their souls to be 
lost. Order in the minds of men was a separate concern for them, apart from 
a concern for political order, even if both could be related in a number of 
ways. From the perspective of early-modern states, and in seventeenth-
century philosophy, the second dimension of the problem of order is only a 
problem because of its relation to the first dimension. Political order is 
endangered by disorder in people’s minds. The second dimension of the 
problem of order can also be phrased as the problem of subjectivity: is it 
sustainable for a state to allow freedom of conscience, if conscience is purely 
subjective? It is the danger of subjectivity that, in Hobbes’ view, necessitates 
the repression of conscience in the political sphere. With Locke, the 
emphasis moves in the direction of education as a solution to the problem of 
subjectivity. 
 The problem of order arose when the medieval unity of faith could 
no longer be sustained, even by force. The organization of society had been 
bound up with the unity of the church. In the later Middle Ages, when 
church and state were in some respects already beginning to disentangle, 
worldly rulers and ecclesiastical rulers nevertheless found each other as 
‘supporters of the hierarchical principle’.1 Even though, as Southern writes, 
“papal government (…) had lost most of its teeth”, “the ecclesiastical 
                                                 
1 Southern (1990), 52. 
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hierarchy could not be seriously attacked without a threat to the whole social 
order”.2 Hence, when an ineradicable plurality of faith had come into being, 
this presented the state with an enormous problem. This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that both parties claimed to constitute the true 
church, and therefore laid claim to the state’s allegiance. Political order was 
also endangered by the conflict between the (initially) two parties itself. Two 
general solutions offered themselves at first, depending on which dimension 
of the problem of order was taken as the point of departure. Departing from 
the first dimension, one could decide to repress conscience; departing from 
the second, one could attempt to discipline and educate conscience, with a 
view to attaining political stability.3 Only for religious parties was the 
problem of subjectivity a problem in its own right, and was the disordered 
mind a concern in itself. For the state, the problem of subjectivity was always 
only a problem because of its effect on political order; moreover, whereas at 
first a relation may have been perceived between the ‘right’ order in people’s 
minds and political stability, the problem of subjectivity soon turned into a 
coordination problem: as long as all subjects adhered to the same faith, there 
was no threat to political order. Later, this idea gave way to the idea that 
political order was best served by separating it from ‘order in the minds of 
men’, from religion and conscience, altogether. In other words: the solution 
known as the separation of church and state presented itself. As we have 
seen in part I, the education of conscience was also engaged in; thus, the 
problem was attacked on both fronts. 
 The religious concern for people’s souls; that is, their concern with 
the problem of subjectivity as a problem in its own right, gradually 
diminished. The two dimensions of the problem of order merged into one. 
When this happened, separate solutions to the problem of subjectivity were 
no longer sought. As we will see in chapter 12, twentieth century solutions to 
the problem of order are meant to be solutions to the problem of order in its 
first dimension alone.4 The same problematic that haunts the principle of 
freedom of conscience clings to the theory and practice of conscientious 
objection, which, where legal provisions have been made for it, is the most 
conspicuous modern embodiment of the principle of freedom of conscience. 
In fact, institutionalization of conscientious objection is itself a way of 
dealing with the problem of order, by keeping it within controlled bounds. It 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 50. 
3 In the early-modern context, ‘conscience’ is a broad notion; freedom of conscience 
and freedom of religion were intertwined. To ‘repress conscience’ can mean 
anything from repressing actions according to conscience to inquisition and 
indoctrination. 
4 Although in Luhmann’s case another variant of the problem of subjectivity can be 
seen to arise. 
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is because the problematic of conscientious objection is au fond that of 
freedom of conscience that this part of the book is so important. 
 I hope to show that history, apart from pushing in the direction of 
these problems, has also brought to the surface some ways of dealing with 
them. The solutions suggested in the twentieth century are the conclusions 
drawn from centuries of historical development. The rise and development 
of concepts of freedom of conscience has a curious dynamic. The rise of a 
situation of enduring religious plurality weakened the basis for claims to 
objectivity; it brought with it the existence of separate inter-subjective truths. 
This necessitated a more formal approach to conscience. Once conscience is 
conceptualized in a formalistic manner, the problem of subjectivity steps into 
the theoretical foreground – a problem that undermines the concept of 
freedom of conscience. Both subjectivity and formalism are prerequisite for 
the rise of the ‘secular’ notion of freedom of conscience; at the same time, 
they undermine it. This shows ‘freedom of conscience’ to be a tensional 
concept. While it has been recognized as a good, it has always been feared 
that an evil lurks behind it. To allow freedom of conscience is to relinquish 
control in a certain area; the challenge has been to do so in a controlled 
manner. 
 Through the present part of the book we make the transition from 
conscience to the practice of conscientious objection, and with that the 
emphasis shifts from the experienced reality of the individual to social and 
political reality. For this reason, I deal with conceptions of freedom of 
conscience primarily from a conceptual point of view; as part of a certain 
political philosophical discourse, ‘freedom of conscience’ is first of all a 
concept. Nevertheless, there is a symbolic aspect to the notion too, and the 
concept of freedom of conscience does lean on that, and does to a certain 
extent depend on it for its support. As a symbol, then, ‘freedom of 
conscience’ is also an important part of political reality, which is why 11.3 
deals with the question how ‘freedom of conscience’ became a powerful 
symbol. Until that chapter, it is important to bear in mind that there is this 
symbolic aspect to the notion of freedom of conscience. 
 I will start by showing that and how the notion of freedom of 
conscience was bound up with the problem of how to sustain social, and 
especially political, order. 10.3 discusses the second dimension of the 
problem of order: the problem of subjectivity. It shows that the very same 
subjectivity that (theoretically, at least) undermined the notion of freedom of 
conscience, helped give rise to it. 10.4 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
 
10.2. THE FIRST DIMENSION: POLITICAL ORDER 
The macro-dimension, we might say, of the problem of order is that of 
political order. By ‘political’ I mean the social as seen from the aspect of 
questions of power and the ordering of power-relations: how is the tensional 
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living-together of people in a limited geographic area structured, so as to 
allow this living-together to sustain itself? The political is that aspect of the 
social about which we speak in terms of power, conflict, (dis)order, 
(in)stability, interests, and so on.5 We will see that such terms pervade this 
section. Now that this problem of definition is out of the way, let us see how 
freedom of conscience relates to this dimension of the problem of order. 
 In his essay on freedom of conscience, Montaigne (1533-1592) says: 
 
“[E]n quoy cela est digne de consideration, que l’Empereur Julian se sert, 
pour attiser le trouble de la dissention civile, de cette mesme recepte de 
liberté de conscience que nos Roys viennent d’employer pour l’estaindre.”6 
 
Freedom of conscience can be used as a recipe for both order and disorder, 
depending on the situation. Montaigne mentions two possible situations: one 
in which freedom of conscience is allowed with the purpose of heightening 
disorder, and one in which it is used to create order. Another possible 
position is taken by Hobbes and the early Locke, who dismiss freedom of 
conscience for the sake of stability and order.7 Though I cannot think of a 
concrete example at the moment, I do not doubt that there has been 
someone in some situation who opposed freedom of conscience because he 
desired disorder – which is the fourth possible combination. 
 In Montaigne’s days, kings made use of freedom of conscience to 
fight disorder. Not much later, Hobbes defends the opposite view that 
freedom of conscience must not be allowed if one desires order. So, both 
these views were held in more or less the same period. Baruch de Spinoza 
(1632-1677) gave his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus the subtitle “containing a 
number of dissertations, wherein it is shown that freedom to philosophise 
can not only be granted without injury to Piety and the Peace of the 
Commonwealth, but that the Peace of the Commonwealth and Piety are 
endangered by the suppression of this freedom”. In the final chapters of this 
work, Spinoza explains that “it is impossible to deprive men of the freedom 
to say what they think”, and that “this freedom can be granted to everyone 
without infringing the right and authority of the sovereign” – a right and 
                                                 
5 Cf. Wolin (2004), chapter 1. For Eric Voegelin, ‘representation’ would be a key 
term as well, referring not merely to the representation of the ruled by the ruler(s), 
but also to the political order as a representation of cosmic order. 
6 Montaigne (1962), 654 (Essays, Book II, Chapter 19). [“Wherein this is very worthy 
of consideration, that the Emperor Julian made use of the same receipt of liberty of 
conscience to inflame the civil dissensions that our kings do to extinguish them.” 
Translation from Michel de Montaigne (1877). 
7 I should note that Hobbes did argue that, where toleration would seem to be more 
conducive to social peace than enforced uniformity, he advocated the former; he 
also rejected laws against heresy. See: Hobbes (2000), introduction: xl-xli. 
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authority that pertain also to religious matters.8 In the first half of the 
fourteenth century, Marsiglio of Padua already held the view that religious 
diversity should be tolerated (within limits), and he defended this on 
‘communal functionalist’ grounds – that is, on the basis of an argument 
concerning the proper functioning of the community as a whole, consisting 
of interdependent parts.9 I present these examples here to illustrate the fact 
that the issue of freedom of conscience (or earlier: that of toleration) is 
bound up with the problem of political order. The argument from the 
importance of order and stability is a stable element in discussions 
concerning toleration or freedom of conscience from the late Middle Ages 
up to the seventeenth century. Yet in this period an important transition 
took place. The position that defended freedom of conscience on the ground 
that this would be beneficial for the stability of society would become the 
dominant position in time, for an important part with the aid of an economic 
argument. I will point out some key moments in the transition, starting with 
the importance of the Reformation. 
 It is regularly claimed, in varying terms, that the Reformation 
‘caused’ the breakdown of the supposed ‘medieval unity of faith’.10 Michael 
Baylor states: “In Luther’s theology is seen a principle of freedom which (…) 
shattered the unity of the medieval church…”11 B.P. Vermeulen, to take 
another example, writes of the ‘diversity of faith’ ‘brought about by’ or 
‘caused by’ the Reformation.12 These are rather unfortunate phrasings, 
suggesting too simple an idea of causation. The Reformation did not cause, 
but was the breaking up of the old unity – even if Reformers never intended 
it to be that. By the time of the waning of the Middle Ages, the medieval 
unity of faith, in so far as it existed, had increasingly to be upheld by force. 
But this was a process that took place from the earliest beginnings of 
Christianity. Countless sects were condemned as heresies and persecuted.13 
The Reformation can legitimately be described as a breakthrough, but it did 
not turn up out of the blue; the possibility of religious diversity, and of 
toleration of religious diversity, had already been suggested by Marsiglio of 
Padua (1270-1342), for example.14 
                                                 
8 Spinoza (1989), 47 and chapters 19 and 20. 
9 Nederman (1994). 
10 I say ‘supposed’, because much of it was only appearance. Since 1054, for 
example, there were two churches: the Catholic church and the Greek Orthodox 
church of the Byzantine empire. See: Zagorin (2003), 46. 
11 Baylor (1977), 4. 
12 Vermeulen (1989), 42 and 45. 
13 See, for example, Zagorin (2003), chapter 2: “The Christian Theory of 
Persecution”, and Guggisberg (1984), chapter 1: “Frühes Christentum, Mittelalter, 
christlicher Humanismus”. 
14 Webb (1984), 100. 
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 As to the matter of the unity of faith being upheld by force, it must 
be said that it was not just church authorities that used force. There is ample 
evidence that heretics were also confronted by popular violence. R.W. 
Southern states that “on the whole the holders of ecclesiastical authority 
were less prone to violence, even against unbelievers, than the people whom 
they ruled.”15 Bernard Hamilton claims that heretics “aroused intense 
feelings of fear among the mass of the people” and that the Inquisition 
“substituted the rule of law for mob violence in the persecution of heresy”.16 
It must also be taken into account that heresy was not exclusively a religious 
phenomenon. A heretic was not necessarily someone with a different 
opinion as to the interpretation of Bible-passages, or with a different view on 
the role of the church – heretics often reacted to the concrete social situation 
they found themselves in, signalling what they judged were social ills, as 
Austin P. Evans says.17 He quotes Guiraud: “Heresy in the Middle Ages 
nearly always connected itself with some anti-social system. In a period when 
the human mind habitually expressed itself in theological form, socialism, 
communism, and anarchy appeared under the forms of heresy.”18 The charge 
of heresy occurred, sometimes at least, in certain towns’ struggle for urban 
freedom, and in conflicts concerning economic issues.19 
 Any society is ordered in multiple ways; that is, there are many 
aspects to any societal order: political, economic, religious, military, 
                                                 
15 R.W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1970, 19, quoted in Moore (1984), 43. 
16 Bernard Hamilton, The Medieval Inquisition, London, 1981, 25 and 57, quoted in: 
Moore (1984), 43. 
17 Evans (1931), 93. 
18 J. Guiraud, Questions d’histoire et d’archéologie chrétienne, Paris, 1906, 44, in: Evans 
(1931), 93 (translation by Evans). 
19 Evans (1931), 115-116. Luther’s opposition to the Catholic Church also had an 
important economic element in it: on religious grounds, he criticized the system of 
indulgences. An indulgence was money payed by a sinner to buy off some of (in the 
case of a rich man perhaps even all of) his time in purgatory. This ‘system of high 
spiritual finance’, as Erikson calls it, became increasingly perverse (Erikson [1958], 
220). The money collected by special friars was used to finance the building of St. 
Peter’s Church in Rome, or to pay for the personal debts of bishops. Luther’s 
criticism was especially directed against the Dominican monk Tetzel, who even went 
so far as to sell indulgences for sins not yet committed, but only contemplated. 
Tetzel also advised people to go to the confessor of their choice, so that they could 
avoid the less lenient. (Ibid., 220-221; for Luther’s views on indulgences see also 
Wicks [1967]; with respect to Tetzel especially 482.) Luther’s criticism of such 
practices was a threat to the church, not just for religious reasons, but also because it 
was directed at what had become an important part of the economy the church 
relied upon. (Protests against the materialistic orientation of the church were not 
new. In several countries, monasteries became the victim of public rage, caused by 
the exorbitant accumulation of wealth in these ‘spiritual’ institutions.) 
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psychological, and so on. These are abstractions, of course. In reality they are 
interwoven – and yet they seem to individuate themselves to such an extent 
that we are forced to recognize them as relatively independent.20 Any society 
has multiple aspects in this sense, but at the same time its particular order is 
characterized by the pattern they make, in which some aspects or dimensions 
of order are dominant over the others. In this sense, it is surely true that the 
medieval societal order was a thoroughly religious order, both on a popular 
level and on the level of worldly and spiritual authorities. Religion put its 
stamp on all other aspects of society, in a way that it could not be said the 
economy or the political aspect of order did. Given the dominance of the 
religious dimension of medieval society, the Reformation, which confronted 
both worldly and spiritual authorities with the reality of a religious plurality 
that could no longer – although they tried for some time – be repressed, 
presented a huge problem. If the unity of faith is the unity of state and 
society, then what will happen to the latter when an uncontrollable diversity 
of faith comes into existence? 
 It took a long time before people could see the possibility of a stable 
society and a powerful state without a unity of faith. The rise of the nation-
state and of free cities enabled (if not necessitated) another solution: cuius 
regio eius religio; the religion of the ruler would be that of the ruled.21 Different 
territorial regions would have different religions, but in each region only one 
religion would be allowed. It was a compromise between Lutherans and 
Catholics; the former had managed to create a space within the Holy Roman 
Empire in which they were safe from persecution, protected by a worldly 
ruler.22 But it is important to see that this had nothing to do with religious 
toleration, except in the sense that each party had to tolerate that the other’s 
faith was dominant in other states. So this was just as much about the 
sovereignty of states as it was about religion. People had to accept that what 
religion was officially adhered to in another state was not their business, so 
to speak. The Peace of Augsburg also represented an important stage in the 
dynamic of church-state relationships. Formally, at least, the worldly ruler 
decided which religion his people were to have. Theoretically, then, the state 
gained predominance over religion. But it was religious pressure that brought 
                                                 
20 As I take it, the term ‘aspect’ belongs neither to the fully subjective, nor to the 
purely objective side of experience. On the one hand, an aspect of something is that 
‘thing’ looked at from a certain angle; on the other hand, aspects force itself upon 
our experience, as it were – perhaps because of the way we are, but that does not 
detract from the fact that the notion of aspects defies arbitrariness. Aspects are 
relational ‘entities’. I will also speak of ‘dimensions’ of societal order, to emphasize 
the more objective element of ‘aspects’ of order. 
21 The principle (which was by no means new) was laid down in the treaty of the 
Peace of Augsburg (1555). Under the treaty people were allowed, within a certain 
period of time, to move freely to a region of their own religion. 
22 This was not the case for other varieties of Protestantism. 
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this situation about. Early modern states were closely linked to specific 
religious denominations. Even though, in retrospect, we can see that a 
separation of interests had long been under way, “early modern European 
states were financially, administratively and militarily not strong enough to 
sustain themselves without the aura of religious, dynastic and juridical 
symbols”.23 
 For Luther and Calvin the connection between church and state was 
still a matter of course. I have said before that Luther explicitly distinguishes 
between the spiritual and the worldly realm, between a religious freedom of 
conscience and a political interpretation of the principle. Both Luther and 
Calvin emphasized the necessity and importance of obedience to the worldly 
government. In Book IV, Chapter 20 of his Institutes, Calvin makes it clear 
that even tyrants must be obeyed. Ordinary people would be presumptuous 
if they thought they had the ability to judge the ruler, and the right to 
overthrow the government. The office of the king is divinely instituted, and 
therefore the king can only be set aside by those near to him in office.24 It is 
nevertheless significant that Calvin allows for this possibility. It shows up a 
difference between his thought and Luther’s. While Luther merely wanted 
the state to secure the possibility of religious life; that is, while he “wanted 
worldly discipline for the sake of spiritual freedom”, Calvin in fact desired to 
subordinate the state to the church. He declared their independence from 
each other, yet wished to “ensure that the State shall support the true 
Church”.25 Which part of his thought he emphasized depended on the 
situation. Where the (true) church was dominant over the state, he preached 
obedience; where the true faith was suppressed, he stressed the right of 
resistance.26 Plamenatz shows that Calvin still relies on medieval theories of 
resistance and the relation between church and state. Stuurman makes the 
same point and writes: “A continuous thread runs from medieval political 
theory to early modern critics of absolutism. Contrary to a persistent 
historical myth Lutherans and Calvinists did not put forward a new theory of 
resistance.”27 But while Calvin may have advocated a right of resistance, and 
while both Luther and Calvin held that God was to be obeyed before men, 
the model of the state they envisaged was fairly absolutist. No less than 
Hobbes in the seventeenth century did they emphasize the basic need for 
order. Calvin also insisted that the state should support the ‘true’ faith. In 
                                                 
23 Stuurman (1995), 49 (my translation). 
24 Calvin (1961), IV.20. 
25 Plamenatz (1963), 57-58. 
26 Ibid., 59. 
27 Stuurman (1995), 99. 
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this respect, he was as absolutist in his thought as Hobbes, and perhaps more 
so.28 
 Koselleck points out how absolutism had its background in the 
religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and how 
absolutism in turn formed the background for the Enlightenment, at the 
heart of which lay the growing into independence of the moral realm (in 
separation from the political), from which absolutism could be criticized. 
The secret space in which the moral realm could develop came into existence 
when Hobbes separated ‘inner’ and ‘outer’, private and public. The sovereign 
controlled the latter sphere, but not the inner conscience. He took all 
political responsibility away from the people, so that he had sovereign power 
and full responsibility. He could not share political power with others, for in 
that case he could not hold up his end of the bargain, the social contract. 
Only if he alone had political power, could he have full political 
responsibility. The citizen, politically powerless and bare of responsibility, 
Koselleck maintains, discovered himself as moral. He claims that in Locke’s 
thought, we see how morality becomes social, rather than private, and that 
moral judgement is extended to the value of actions. A separation of the 
moral and the political is underway; society separates itself from the state and 
gradually comes to oppose it. For Turgot (1727-1781), Koselleck writes, 
“[d]as Gewissen dem politischen Gebot unterwerfen heißt (…) nicht mehr 
wie für Hobbes, den Bürgerkrieg verhindern, sondern genau umgekehrt: es 
heißt ihn gerade aufbeschwören: ‘S’opposer à la voix de la conscience, c’est 
toujours être injuste, c’est toujours justifier la révolte, et par conséquent 
toujours donner lieu aux plus grands troubles.’”29 Conscience is here a social 
force; we can easily imagine how ‘the voice of conscience’ became ‘the voice 
of the people’. There are several other elements in Koselleck’s analysis, 
which I can only briefly touch upon. The moral critique of political power 
was enforced by an economic factor: the rise of a wealthy middle-class and a 
new upper-class, related to a thriving commerce and supported by a moral-
economic ethos, meant that a new source of funds arose for the sovereign, 
who took their hard-earned money in great quantities.30 This debt was at the 
same time a moral capital for society, especially because political power 
rested with the debtor. “In diesem Wechselverhältnis zwischen dem 
finanziellen Kapital, das in den Händen der Gesellschaft zugleich ein 
moralisches Guthaben war, und der finanziellen Verschuldung des Staates, 
                                                 
28 In Leviathan, Hobbes maintained that the sovereign should decide what the 
religion of the commonwealth should be; he was also to decide on the form of 
public worship. Only in the secret, internal space of conscience were people free 
from the sovereign’s authority. See: Hobbes (2000), introduction: xxxviii-xliii. 
Insofar as Calvin wanted the state to meddle in that inner space Hobbes kept free 
from state interference, he pushed his absolutism further than Hobbes. 
29 Koselleck (1973), 43; 130. 
30 Koselleck focuses on the French situation here. 
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der aus politischer Machtvollkommenheit, aber ganz unmoralisch, die 
Schulden verdeckte oder ausstrich, liegt einer der stärksten sozialen Impulse 
für die Dialektik von Moral und Politik.”31 A final important factor, 
intertwined with the economic factor, is the rise of a new philosophical 
conception of history, in which European history came to be seen as a 
history of progress in all aspects of life – progress, I might add, of which the 
economy was seen as an important, if not the, motor. But progress was also, 
as Koselleck says, the modus vivendi of critique.32 Changing moral views were 
the surest sign of progress.33 
 Even if we agree with Koselleck that morality and politics diverged, 
and that philosophical arguments for freedom of conscience sprang from the 
dialectic between them, we must keep in mind that Enlightenment thinkers 
were not by definition those partisans for liberty of conscience they are often 
made out to be. “For the leading thinkers of the Enlightenment,” Andrew 
notes, “freedom of conscience was Hobbesian Erastianism, not Miltonian or 
Lockean separation of church and state.”34 Enlightenment thinkers primarily 
resisted authority; religious groups proclaimed the sanctity of conscience.35 
Religious minorities, suppressed by absolutist rulers, expressed a religious 
critique of absolutism, the influence of which was no less than that of the 
moral critique uttered by philosophers and intellectuals. 
 The latter, however, was more in step with socio-economic 
developments. The diverse dimensions of societal order gradually 
disentangled themselves: a separation of interests occurred – and conscience 
and religion became one of those interests. Absolutist states were 
confessional states, based on the principle of cuius regio, eius religio; 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ‘secular’ critique of this regime entailed 
the idea that political order and religious order ought to be disconnected, in 
the best interest of both. The religious wars testify to the fact that religion 
had ceased to provide unity and stability to state and society.36 Absolutism 
was a temporary solution, but its theoretical separation of inner and outer – 
which was by itself unacceptable to adherents to other confessions than the 
state religion – did not translate itself into a practice of toleration; in fact, 
                                                 
31 Koselleck (1973), 51. 
32 Ibid., 91. 
33 Ibid., 48. 
34 Andrew (2001), 117. 
35 See chapter 11. 
36 Wolin (2004), 337, notes that before Locke, most people saw conscience (but in 
this context we may also read: religion) as a unifying force. Exceptions are 
Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Hobbes. Locke follows Hobbes in looking upon 
conscience as a divisive force. This is not merely a new perspective on the same 
phenomenon – for what on earth would have brought about this change of 
perspective if conscience had remained completely the same? Conscience and 
religious conviction had indeed become a (but certainly not the) divisive force. 
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religious persecution was a distinctive characteristic of absolutist states. 
Thus, these states undermined their own stability. The reaction to this 
situation was an urge towards a disconnection of state and church – a 
disconnection that had in fact long been underway. Marsiglio of Padua’s 
arguments for toleration are informative in this regard. His ‘communal 
functionalist’ argument for toleration of dissenters was a socio-economic 
argument. Nederman writes: “According to the Defensor Pacis, the best and 
highest temporal aim to which good regimes can aspire is the provision of a 
sufficient or materially adequate existence. (…) [T]he structure of the 
Marsiglian community is determined by the wide-ranging socioeconomic 
functions that human beings are able to perform.”37 Marsiglio argues, in 
Nederman’s words, that “the emergence of the community is stimulated by 
the growth of social complexity”.38 A network of economic interdependence 
is created, which makes it imprudent, self-destructive even, for a community 
to exclude dissenters in all respects. Marsiglio agrees that heretics ought to be 
shunned, but “[t]his is to be understood in regard to belief and the 
observance of the rituals of the faith, rather than in regard to other domestic 
or civil intercourse”.39 Marsiglio moves towards a secular public sphere. 
Nederman: “[B]y denying intercommunication of a purely secular nature 
between the orthodox and nonbelievers of all sorts, it is the faithful 
themselves who will be harmed: they will not be able to take advantage of 
those material benefits which constitute the very foundation of communal 
life.”40 This is a strong, socio-economic argument for toleration of dissenters. 
Socio-economic relations, not faith, are taken to be the foundation of the 
community. This went hand in hand with a separation of church and state, 
for Marsiglio denied that the church had any authority in civil matters, or 
                                                 
37 Nederman (1994), 905. 
38 Idem. 
39 Marsiglio of Padua, Writings on the Empire: Defensor Minor and De Translatione Imperii, 
C.J. Nederman (transl.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, chapter 10.5, 
quoted in: Nederman (1994), 911. Compare Locke (1968), 79: “[N]o church is 
bound in the name of toleration to cherish in her bosom a man who, after 
admonition, continues obstinately to offend against the laws established in that 
society. For if they can be broken with impunity, the society will come to an end, 
since they are both the conditions of communion, and also the sole bond that holds 
the society together. Nevertheless, care must be taken that the sentence of 
excommunication carry with it no insulting words or rough treatment, whereby the 
ejected person may be injured in any way, in body or estate. For all force, as I have 
said, belongs to the magistrate (…). Excommunication neither does nor can deprive 
the excommunicated person of any of his civil goods or private possessions.” 
40 Nederman (1994), 912. 
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that they could take measures against heretics that would have an effect on a 
person’s ‘civil comforts’.41 
 In Leviathan, Hobbes writes: 
 
“The office of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth 
in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the 
procuration of the safety of the people (…). But be Safety here, is not meant a 
bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every man 
by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall 
acquire to himselfe.”42 
 
But while Hobbes followed this statement up with the assertion that the 
sovereign should provide public instruction, ‘both of doctrine, and example’, 
later authors tended to fence off an increasingly large area of the social from 
interference by the state. Whatever people did with their time, as long is it 
was not harmful to state or society, it was none of the state’s business. 
 Conscience and freedom of conscience became an interest among 
others.43 Wolin, taking Locke as an example, points out that the notions of 
conscience and (personal) interest ‘coalesced’, once the former was no longer 
necessary in defence of toleration: 
 
“It is too often forgotten that Locke’s case for toleration marked a decisive 
shift in the notion of conscience. The ‘Puritan Conscience’ had been 
conceived by its defenders as a disciplined mode of judgment, one 
controlled by the ‘objective’ standard of Scripture and steeped in religious 
instruction. One of the main reasons that the sects of the seventeenth 
century championed toleration was the possibility that a dissenting 
conscience might in fact be testifying to what was true. In contrast, what 
was controlling in Locke’s argument was that conscience stood for a form 
of conviction rather than a way of knowing. Thus conscience meant the 
                                                 
41 Marsiglio of Padua, Writings on the Empire: Defensor Minor and De Translatione Imperii, 
C.J. Nederman (transl.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, chapter 15.6. 
Shame and disgrace were not taken to be civil discomforts. Cf. Southern (1990), 45: 
“Marsilius of Padua was the first impressive spokesman for secular rulers (…).” 
42 Hobbes (2000), 231 (chapter XXX). 
43 ‘Interest’ gradually came to be seen as ‘a force that governed the world’, and as the 
best indicator and predictor of the future behaviour of individuals and groups. A 
seventeenth-century writer names conscience, interest, and sense of obligation as the 
three ‘only safe rules amongst men to judge of future events’; of these, interest was 
the most reliable. Religious minorities were held to pursue each their own interest; 
this was what divided them, and – if freedom of conscience was granted – what 
would guarantee social and political order. These things are discussed and explained 
in Gunn (1968), especially 559 and 562. 
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subjective beliefs held by an individual, and from this definition flowed the 
same characteristics which were later attached to interest.”44 
 
Wolin finds these characteristics of interest “– its individualistic character, 
the subjectivity of a judgment about it, and the impossibility of imposing it –
” in the work of Bentham and Mill, and notes they “were a faithful 
reproduction of those attributes assigned to conscience by Locke in his 
classic Letter Concerning Toleration”.45 Edward G. Andrew points out that in his 
First Treatise of Government, Locke referred to reason, not to conscience, as the 
voice of God, where reason is a rather narrow principle, close to a 
calculation of interest: “For the desire, strong desire of Preserving his Life 
and Being having been Planted in him, as a Principle of Action by God 
himself, Reason, which was the Voice of God in him, could not but teach him and 
assure him, that pursuing his natural Inclination he had to preserve his Being, 
he followed the Will of his Maker.”46 Andrew then quotes Michael Rabieh, 
who says that “by reinterpreting God as supporting his rational law of 
nature, Locke has left him in our conscience, but it is a conscience which 
sees little tension between self-interest and morality”.47 In Hobbesian 
philosophy, and in Locke’s thought after him, an image of man as a primarily 
self-interested creature is created, a homo economicus that only lives with others 
‘peacefully’ because it is in his best interest. (Economic) conflict and a theory 
of scarcity become the foundation of societal and political order.48 In the 
same period, Bernard de Mandeville wrote his famous The Fable of the Bees, 
the sub-title of which (Private Vices, Public Benefits) refers to the idea that it is 
in the best interest of society if people egoistically pursue their own interests 
without consideration for others.49 In Spinoza’s thought, too, the human 
urge towards self-preservation (which is an animal urge) was definitive for 
both ethics and politics. The social contract was based in this drive, and the 
state was driven by a similar principle. In the interest of order; that is, in its 
own interest, the state had to take human nature into account. This meant 
that it could not stop people from thinking, from philosophizing, for this 
was an ineradicable part of human nature. For Spinoza, the right to 
                                                 
44 Wolin (2004), 339-340. Some of the issues introduced here – that of the formalism 
and subjectivism of conscience – will be taken up in later subsections. 
45 Ibid., 339. 
46 Locke (1999), 205 (I.IX.86) quoted from the 1988 edition in: Andrew (2001), 85-
86. 
47 Michael S. Rabieh, “The Reasonableness of Locke, or the Questionableness of 
Christianity”, in: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, 1991, quoted in: Andrew (2001), 86. 
48 See Achterhuis (2003). 
49 This line of thinking was continued most obviously in the Scottish Enlightenment, 
in the work of Adam Smith – though it must immediately be said that he did not 
share the moral scepticism of the aforementioned authors at all. 
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philosophize was in fact the natural necessity to do so. Natural rights are 
what people naturally have the power and ineradicable urge to do.50 
 In the seventeenth and particularly the eighteenth century, it became 
common to think of conscience and religion in terms of interest. Part of the 
defence of religion against its critics was that it was profitable both to the 
individual and to society as a whole. Locke excluded atheists from 
considerations of toleration, because they could not be trusted. In society, 
religion provided the essential binding element of trust: 
 
“[T]hose who deny the existence of God are not to be tolerated at all. 
Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can 
have no hold upon or sanctity for an atheist; for the taking away of God, 
even only in thought, dissolves all.”51 
 
An anonymous eighteenth century manuscript sums up the common 
thoughts and sentiments on the subject quite succinctly: 
 
“It is an old saying, that every man is the artificer of his own fortune in the 
world. It is certain, that the world seldom turns wholly against a man, 
unless through his own fault. Religion is; in General; profitable unto 
allthings. Virtue, diligence, and industry, joined with a good temper and 
prudence, has ever been found the surest road to prosperity; and where 
men fail of attaining it, their want of success is far oftener owing to their 
having deviated from that road than to their having encountered 
insuperable bars in it.”52 
 
Pierre Bayle had a remarkably deviant view, holding that religion was without 
consequence for society. In religion, people strive for a truth they will never 
know exactly; their orientation to truth is provided by the instinct of 
conscience.53 But this is largely a spiritual and internal matter. According to 
                                                 
50 Plamenatz (1963), 79-80; Dreitzel (1995), 22-29. 
51 Locke (1968), 135. Locke also denied toleration to religious groups that by 
entering their church “ipso facto pass into the allegiance and service of another 
prince” (Catholics), and groups that consider themselves to have certain prerogatives 
others do not have, as for instance the prerogative to depose a king that is not to 
their liking. Locke himself did recognize a right of resistance, however; see Locke 
(1999), 404-405 (II.XVIII.209). 
52 Anonymous eighteenth century manuscript (in my possession), probably 
American; it appears to be an address to a certain company of people. 
53 Gianluca Mori (1997), 47, explains that ‘invincible ignorance’ necessitates the 
reliance on instincts like conscience, and that Bayle’s belief that no certain truth 
could be attained in these matters underlay his defence of toleration. He also points 
out that too much has often been made of Bayle’s stance for toleration. He did not 
so much advocate the rights of conscience, but rather a pragmatic regime of 
toleration in the interest of political stability. 
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Bayle, people seldom act from religious or moral principles; God has 
provided other principles that cause human action: the desire for 
approbation and fear of disapprobation, temperament, punishment and 
reward by governments – these, Bayle says, have a decisive influence on the 
human heart. He even asserted that, while a society of atheists was viable and 
sustainable, a society of true Christians would soon perish in its hostile 
environment. Dreitzel summarizes: “Die Freiheit jeder Art von ‘religiöser’ 
Überzeugung ist also individuelles Recht als Folge der Pflicht zur 
Wahrhaftigkeit, sie ist anthropologisch eine Folge der Verschiedenartigkeit 
der Menschen, sie ist politisch und sozial möglich, weil Religiosität im 
Grunde genommen sozial folgenlos ist – Gesellschaft und Staat werden von 
Gesetzen der Bedürfnisse und der Interessen, von Gewohnheiten und 
traditionalen Institutionen zusammengehalten.”54 Those who thought of 
religion as profitable to the individual and society carried out the conflation 
of conscience and interest; Bayle in effect turned it into a private interest, 
being the most consistent with regard to the separation of state or societal 
interests on the one hand, and private religious interests on the other.55 
 In accordance with this line of thinking, freedom of conscience 
came to be seen as an interest like freedom of trade and the freedom to 
organize.56 Marsiglio was early with his arguments in this direction. He was 
followed in the seventeenth century by people like Henry Parker, Henry 
Robinson and Sir William Temple. The first thought that the government 
should make sure there was freedom of religion, because this was of 
fundamental importance for free trade. Robinson, in his Liberty of Conscience, 
wrote that the worldly government had nothing to do with religious matters 
and claimed that any limitation of people’s freedom of religion would harm 
the prosperity of the nation. His great example was the tolerant and 
economically thriving Dutch Republic. Sir William Temple made use of the 
same argument.57 Wolin points out that Locke based “his plea for toleration, 
at least in part, upon the example of economic activity”.58 Religious 
                                                 
54 Dreitzel (1995), 21. 
55 Spinoza also privatized religion; Dreitzel (1995), 27, writes: “Die völlige 
Privatisierung der Religion kommt auch darin zum Ausdruck, daß bei Eiden nicht 
mehr Gott angerufen werden soll, sondern das ‘Wohl des Vaterlandes und die 
Freiheit’.” 
56 In this relation, the following remark by Benjamin (1990), 15, is interesting: 
“Those seeking compromise solutions to conflicts that appear to involve matters of 
principle often can reach a resolution if they recast such conflicts as conflicts of 
interests.” 
57 Guggisberg (1977), 474-475. 
58 Wolin (2004), 340. In contrast, it is illustrative to look at what Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274) says in his discussion of the question whether heretics should be 
tolerated: “[I]t is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul 
than to forge money, which supports temporal life.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
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associations were seen as voluntary societies on a par with commercial 
societies. “Zunehmend wurde (…) die religiöse Spontaneität auch mit der 
unaufhebbaren Spontaneität des Denkens und des praktischen Urteils 
verbunden. Die ‘libertas conscientiae’ verband sich mit der ‘libertas 
philosophiae’, mit der Freiheit des ‘respublica literaria’, mit der ‘Freiheit des 
Handels’, mit der ‘Freiheit des Eigentums’, sie unterstützten sich 
wechselseitig oder wurden als Einheit gesehen. (…) Die Freiheit der 
Religionsgemeinschaften als Grundrecht verband sich mit der Forderung 
nach ‘Vereinigungsfreiheit’.”59 Roy Porter writes: “Voltaire extolled the 
virtues of civil and religious liberty, English style, by picturing in his Lettres 
Philosophiques (1733) the scene at the London Stock Exchange. There 
Anglicans, Dissenters and Catholics, Jews and Mohammedans were all 
permitted to trade on equal terms. Freedom of trade went with freedom of 
religion, bringing peace and prosperity.”60 And Wolin remarks that “[t]hat  
interest and conscience had coalesced was not lost upon the men of the 
eighteenth century”, quoting Morellet, who depicted the new era as one of 
‘freedom of conscience in trade’.61 Marx and Engels’ cynical remark that 
“[d]ie Ideen der Gewissens- und Religionsfreiheit sprachen nur die 
Herrschaft der freien Konkurrenz auf dem Gebiet des Wissens aus”, does 
not seem to be very far-fetched.62 
 In retrospect, then, we can say that it took a long period of strife, of 
religious wars and persecution, before a solution for the problem of order 
crystallized in the minds of men – a not at all perfect solution, but one to 
which historical circumstances gave rise. This was the separation of church 
and state. The state’s interest had gradually separated itself from what came 
to be the private interest of religion.63 While religion retreated into a sphere 
of its own, the unity of the state and political stability were safeguarded by 
economic activity and prosperity, and more concretely by people’s freedom 
to pursue their own interests – a freedom limited by their power, of course. 
When toleration of dissenters was at the beginning of its career, the private 
sphere was that of religious dissidents only. Now, all of religion retreated 
                                                                                                               
Theologica, Thomas Baker, London, 1917, II-II, Question 11, Art. 3, included in 
Edward Peters (ed.) (1980), 182-183, i.c. 182. Concern for the soul slipped into the 
background in the seventeenth century, its place in the focal point of attention being 
taken by more mundane matters. 
59 Dreitzel (1995), 9-10. 
60 Porter (1990), 28-29. Cf. Stuurman (1995), 64. 
61 Wolin (2004), 340.  
62 Marx and Engels (1972), 480. In the original 1848 edition it read ‘Gewissens’ 
instead of ‘Wissens’. 
63 See Southern (1990), 34-37, where he explains how around 1100 separate secular 
and religious spheres began to emerge, and the secular ruler was ‘demoted from his 
position of quasi-sacerdotal splendour’, because “[t]he old sacred kingship had no 
place in the new world of business”. 
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into the private sphere. In a sense, all religious people were thereby on their 
way to become dissidents.64 Freedom of conscience was largely the result of 
these changes, of a societal transition from a predominantly religious order 
(that, of course, had an economic and political dimension as well) to a 
society in which socio-economic interests provided the predominant 
principle of order.65 
                                                 
64 The Edict of Amboise (1563) allowed domestic exercise of their religion to 
dissenters among the nobility; the Edict of Nantes (1598) – which was revoked in 
1685 – granted the same freedom to all Huguenots (French Protestants). I will not 
repeat the history of all such edicts, as it would merely be a repetition of what can be 
found in the works of Lecler, Guggisberg and many others. 
65 Thus, expediency played an important part in bringing about liberty of conscience. 
See chapter 11 for more on this point. 
 416 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The economic language of conscience: an eighteenth-century 
example 
 
An eighteenth-century popular text illustrates the infiltration of economic 
vernacular in the terminology of conscience; An Analysis of the Principal 
Duties of Social Life: Written in Imitation of Rochefoucault: In a Series of 
Letters to a Young Gentleman, on his Entrance to the World begins letter 
V, “On the Sense of Equity, and the Light of Conscience”, as follows: 
 
YOU will find in your inward feelings, 
if duly attended to, a fund of rules 
for your conduct, that will never lead you 
astray. 
 
THE world is an immense community; 
for the welfare of which, its numberless 
constituents are, by a tacit compact, uni- 
versally united to each other. 
 
HUMAN society may be likened to a co- 
partnership in trade; every member of 
which is intitled to an interest adequate to 
the capital which he puts into the common 
stock. 
 
Further on, it says: 
 
IN order to direct our judgement in this 
necessary settlement of the reciprocal 
claims of society, Nature has given us 
the sense of equity; which, like an exact 
and faithful accountant, assigns to every 
one his proper share. 
 
(…) 
 
EQUITY is that unerring balance 
wherein conscience weighs the worth and 
demerit, the righteous claims and wrong 
pretensions of all; and where self is thrown 
into the common scale, without predilec- 
tion. 
 
John Andrew, An Analysis of the Principle Duties of Social Life, Richardson and 
Urquhart, London, 1783, 49, 51 and 55 (from Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online, published by Thomson Gale) 
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10.3. THE SECOND DIMENSION: THE ORDERED MIND 
“To the conscientious persecutor,” Plamenatz writes, “the argument that, 
where thought is free, the truth must in the end prevail, seems paltry and 
sentimental; an argument attractive only to men lacking courage to exert 
themselves in defence of truth.”66 If you allow people to think for 
themselves, they will think different things. They will think differently about 
moral and religious matters, too. These differences result partly from 
differences of perspective and context, but partly from the peculiar 
characteristics of the individuals concerned. Subjectivity, in other words, is 
inevitable. In epistemology, Whitehead defines ‘subjectivism’ as “the belief 
that the nature of our immediate experience is the outcome of the perceptive 
peculiarities of the subject enjoying the experience”.67 In the present context, 
where we are concerned with the subjectivity of conscience, we might define 
this as the situation that the dictates of a person’s conscience are the 
outcome of the peculiarities (whether perceptive, inventive, or otherwise) of 
the individual in question. In other words: what this person’s conscience 
‘says’ is not so much the result of the operation of objective reality on his or 
her mind, but rather of the activity of this mind itself. As I see it, an 
experience is always a unity of subject and object. Nevertheless, where the 
experience of ‘external reality’ is concerned, there can be differences in the 
contribution of the subjective and the objective element. The subject is part 
of reality, but an individuated part, and as such, it plays a more or less active 
role in ‘processing’ the reality that makes up its experience. Pure passivity, 
however, is an illusion – but so, probably, is its opposite, where subjectivity 
is all there is. 
 In late medieval thought, however, conscience was basically seen as 
a transmitter of values broadcast by God. That is, if it was a well-ordered 
conscience. How, then, did they deal with the problem of subjectivity? This 
is the subject of 10.3.1. The next subsection will deal with an attempted 
solution to the problem of subjectivity: the education of conscience. 
Subsection 10.3.3 discusses the dynamic between the subjectivity of 
conscience and formalism in the conceptualization of conscience, in relation 
to notions of freedom of conscience. 
 Before I enter into these matters I should answer one important 
question: what exactly is the problem of subjectivity? The answer depends on 
the context. ‘The’ problem of subjectivity continually changes shape. In 
scholastic times, the problem was that people could feel bound to do what 
was ‘objectively’ wrong. Were they then really bound to do as their 
conscience told them, or not? And what did this mean for the erring person’s 
soul? The problem of subjectivity appeared in the form of such questions. 
                                                 
66 Plamenatz (1963), 70. 
67 Whitehead (1938), 107. 
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 With the Reformation, the problem of subjectivity took on a new 
form. A situation of enduring religious plurality had come into being, but all 
(or most) parties insisted on their adherence to the only true faith – they 
insisted, in other words, on their own objectivity. The problem of 
subjectivity, from the point of view of those religious parties that insisted on 
their own righteousness, was threefold: people who did not accept the true 
faith but indulged in their own fantasies forfeited their souls; the products of 
the subjective conscience threatened the community of true believers, who 
might be persuaded to deviate from the true faith; people with disordered 
minds constituted a threat to political stability, which was a precondition for 
the flourishing of the true church. 
 From the relatively disinterested perspective of ‘secular’ 
philosophers, it was clear that there was no objective criterion for truth in 
religious matters. Which convictions someone held could not but depend on 
contingent factors, on factors peculiar to the subject in question, on his or 
her upbringing, social environment, et cetera. The assumption of objectivity 
had to be replaced by the recognition of a plurality of centres of 
intersubjectivity, with each religious denomination constituting such a centre. 
If conscience is not objective and can lay no claim to truth, why would the 
state tolerate being confronted by beliefs it finds absurd or even dangerous? 
What authority does conscience have, if it can no longer claim to transmit 
God’s word? These are theoretical problems pertaining to the subjectivity of 
conscience – problems that receive their poignancy from the increased 
likelihood that the state will be confronted by the subjective conscience. 
Conflict between religious parties necessitated liberty of conscience, but the 
subjectivity of conscience seemed to undermine it. How could social and 
political order be maintained in view of the increasing assertiveness of the 
‘subjective’ conscience? And why should anyone care what another’s 
conscience says? Such questions are still pertinent today. They pertain to the 
grounds of liberty of conscience, and therefore of conscientious objection. 
 
10.3.1. The objectively erring, yet subjectively binding conscience: a 
 prelude to freedom of conscience? 
Every work that pays more than minimal attention to the history of (freedom 
of) conscience says something about the medieval discussions of ‘contra 
conscientiam agere’. It appears at first sight that the idea, prominent in these 
discussions, of the objectively erring yet subjectively binding conscience 
constitutes an important step on the road to freedom of conscience. The 
relation between the two is not that straightforward, however. 
 The usual starting point in the treatment of this subject is Peter 
Abelard (1079-1142). According to Abelard, we know what God commands, 
that is: we know what is right, through revelation and natural law. Abelard 
gives priority to the latter and thereby to conscience. For Abelard, Romans 
14:23: “omne, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est”, becomes the idea that 
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everything that is not in accordance with conscience is sin.68 This must be 
understood to mean that acting against what one holds to be right and 
believes to be God’s will is to be condemned. A strong subjective element is 
introduced here, for the criterion of sin is no longer merely whether one’s 
action violates objectively ascertainable laws, but whether it goes against 
one’s own subjective idea of what is right. It may still be possible to punish 
someone who followed his supposedly erroneous conscience, given that he 
violates a divine command. For Abelard, however, this person would not 
have sinned, as “non est peccatum nisi contra conscientiam” [there is no sin 
except against the conscience].69 But even in the case of other scholastics 
who may have thought it possible to sin while following one’s conscience, it 
is still true that sin and lawfulness have come to diverge. Going against one’s 
conscience is sin, irrespective of whether the conscience is in accordance with 
divine law or not. That to act against one’s conscience becomes the 
definition of sin in Abelard’s thought is indicative of a shift of attention from 
the outward action to the actor’s intention. And surely, of a man who 
knowingly and willingly acts against what he holds to be God’s will on the 
one hand, and a man who does wrong, thinking that he complies and 
intending to comply with God’s will on the other, the former is the more 
morally perverted of the two – that, at least, would be the scholastic train of 
thought. The reason why Thomas Aquinas held the objectively erring 
conscience to be binding for the subject was indeed that the subject held the 
dictates of his conscience to be God’s will.70 The authority conscience gained 
on this basis was a negative one: it was thought to be wrong to act against 
one’s conscience, but that did not mean that it was always right to follow it. 
 In chapter 3, I argued that the insoluble problem of the objectively 
erring but subjectively binding conscience was the result of the increasing 
strictness with which conscience was defined. I claimed that “because 
conscience was taken to be an existent entity, not separate from, yet a 
definable part of a certain faculty [either the will or reason], it became an 
additional factor to be reckoned with in moral reasoning”. Doing the right 
thing and following one’s conscience made two; they were often not 
coincident. What interests us here is not so much (the solution of) the 
problem itself, but its relation to the later notion of freedom of conscience. 
It seems to me that the fact that these discussions occurred and that the 
focus of attention came to lie more with the intention of the individual is 
                                                 
68 Mock (1983), 31-32. 
69 Stelzenberger (1963b), 101. 
70 Aquinas (1981), Vol. II, 674-675 (First part of the second part, Q. 19, Art. 5). The 
objectively erring conscience was held to be only conditionally binding, for one 
could set it aside without sin, and, as Augustine of Ancona said, one was obliged to set 
one’s erroneous conscience aside at the command of one’s superiors (the pope, for 
instance). Augustine of Ancona (2001), 481. 
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indicative of a process, a change in mentality, that led also to the idea of 
freedom of conscience. On the other hand, these discussions make it very 
clear that the thirteenth century knew no such notion. It is evident that the 
idea of an objectively knowable universal truth was still uppermost in 
thirteenth-century thought. This made it hard for scholastic thinkers to deal 
with the growing awareness of man’s subjectivity. The idea of the objectively 
erring but subjectively binding conscience is a signal of the occurrence of 
processes of divergence, but itself also an expression of a thoroughly 
objectivist and anti-relativist mentality. 
 Thomas Aquinas found a way of dealing with the problem of the 
conscientia erronea that left the divine nature of conscience unscathed. 
Conscience, as I have explained in chapter 3, was conceptualized in terms of 
‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia’. The ‘synderesis’ (as a habitus) constituted the 
divine, infallible part of conscience; ‘conscientia’ was the application of the 
principles conveyed by ‘synderesis’ to particular circumstances. Now, in the 
application things could easily go wrong, mostly because people had an 
inadequate knowledge of the situation, or because they were mistaken in 
which principle to apply. Some ignorance was culpable, some was not; there 
were things one could have known and things one should have known. So the 
subjectivity of conscience, the possibility of divergence between the 
individual’s conscience and what was held to be the objective truth, was seen 
from a thoroughly objectivist perspective and also framed by this 
perspective. By this I mean that the ‘erroneous’ conscience was treated as a 
case of ignorance (if not malevolence), and not as an expression of another 
view or opinion. The possibility of a more positive view of subjectivity was 
overshadowed by the idea of ‘recta ratio’. Conscience was primarily seen as, 
ideally, a transparent medium of truth, which in practice suffered from a 
certain opaqueness, but only in the sense that it did not transmit or convey 
the truth properly, not in the sense that it had its own creative contribution 
as a source or locus of truth in its own right. When someone’s conscience 
erred, it was because something went wrong with the message while it was 
on its way, not because it created its own message or as a whole went its own 
way. This perspective was completely different from that of those 
Protestants who would proclaim the sanctity of the individual conscience, or 
that of skeptical Enlightenment defenders of freedom of conscience. 
 
10.3.2. The education of conscience 
I noted in the transition to part II that Luther’s explicit enjoinder that the 
Christian’s freedom of conscience was not a political freedom did not prevent 
some people from interpreting it that way.71 The fact that Luther stated this 
                                                 
71 See Plamenatz (1963), 56: “[T]here were soon people willing to carry his principles 
much further than he had done. (…) These people (…) were called Anabaptists (…). 
Most of them were harmless, though some were aggressive and violent. Their 
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so explicitly indicates his concern about the anomic or even antinomian 
potential inherent in the concept (or at least in the formulation of the 
concept) of Christian freedom.72 Calvin was aware of this threat even more 
than Luther.73 Therefore, he placed much stress on the importance – or, 
better put: the obligation – of obedience to worldly authorities. In other 
words: he recognized the relation between the second and the first 
dimension of the problem of order. Like Luther, Calvin distinguished sharply 
between secular (or ‘temporal’) power and spiritual power. As Wolin says, 
the difference between them was not a difference in kind, but lay in “their 
range of objects or jurisdiction”.74 Against radical sectarians who gave an 
anomic or anarchist twist to the concept of Christian liberty “Calvin asserted 
the value of the civil order for all men and its right to command Christians in 
particular”; against ‘flatterers of princes’ “he affirmed the independent power 
of the church and its claim to a distinctive jurisdiction”.75 So Calvin was by 
no means against power and discipline in general, but only against misplaced 
employment of them. An example of the latter was provided by the papacy, 
against whom Calvin defended, in Wolin’s words, ‘the sanctity of the 
individual conscience’.76 Wolin then remarks: “Having demolished the 
Roman case, Calvin could only salvage the same power for his own church 
by modifying the dogma of conscience. For this purpose the proper starting 
point was not conscience but order.”77 The end to be achieved was the well-
ordered conscience, Balduin’s ‘recta conscientia’. Calvin had to overcome the 
anarchic forces of ‘diversity in the manners of men’, the ‘variety in their 
minds’ and the ‘repugnance in their judgments and dispositions’.78 The 
legislative power of the church was needed to remove the threat of anarchy. 
The principal power of the church, however, was jurisdiction. Wolin: “Its 
                                                                                                               
theories were denounced as subversive, and Luther was anxious to dissociate himself 
from them.” According to Plamenatz, “Luther saw the danger of allowing anyone, 
no matter how ignorant or fanatical, to preach what doctrines he pleased. Yet, 
lacking a true conception of liberty of conscience, he did not know how to reconcile 
the claims of faith with the need for order.” 
72 Andrew points out that “[t]he antinomian call of conscience came to prominence 
in seventeenth-century Britain”, among the radical puritan followers of Calvin. 
Andrew (2001), 32-33. The ambiguity in Reformation thought about conscience and 
its freedom is most clearly present, so J.C. Davis maintains, in the thought of 
William Ames; see Davis (2005). 
73 He fed it as well; in 1538, Calvin wrote to someone in Geneva: “If you entertain 
some doubts about [my calling] it is enough for me that it is quite clear to my own 
satisfaction.” As Walzer (1965), 64, says: “the conscience was set free”. Cf. 
Plamenatz (1963), 57: “Calvin was even less inclined to liberty than Luther.” 
74 Wolin (2004), 172. 
75 Idem. 
76 Ibid., 173. 
77 Idem. 
78 Ibid., 174. 
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pre-eminence came from the fact that it dealt with the most fundamental 
problem of order, namely, the discipline of the members.”79 The ‘well-
ordered conscience’ was both an end in itself, a means towards order within 
the church, and a means to attain a well-ordered society. 
 Here lies the second dimension of the problem of order and its 
attempted solution: the imposition of order on the minds of men through 
discipline; that is, through the controlled formation of conscience. Calvin 
was not just concerned with external control, but just as much, if not more, 
with internal control. This started from birth: 
 
“There is no other way of entrance into life, unless we are conceived by 
[the church], born of her, nourished at her breast, and continually 
preserved under her care and government until we are divested of this 
mortal flesh and ‘become like the angels’ (…) we must continue under her 
instruction and discipline to the end of our lives…”80 
 
Calvin was not merely interested in repressing private opinions, but in 
preventing them from arising. Hence his opposition to the Lutheran idea 
that everyone ought to be allowed to interpret the Bible for himself.81 His 
concern was with education: “[T]here is a twofold government in man: one 
aspect is spiritual, whereby the conscience is instructed in piety and in 
reverencing God; the second is political, whereby man is educated for the 
duties of humanity and citizenship that must be maintained among men.”82 
Luther, too, was aware of the importance of the proper education of 
conscience and of the danger of the wrong education, as is clear from his 
complaint about priests who “in der Kirche heute kein anderes Amt führen, 
als daß sie die Gewissen verwirren, zugrunderichten und umstricken”.83 
 The concern with education was not limited to the Reformers. 
‘Secular’ philosophers, too, saw the need for it; in their case, however, order 
in people’s minds was not an end in itself but a prerequisite of social and 
political order, and, in the case of Enlightenment philosophers, an 
instrument of progress. Hobbes urged the sovereign to instruct his people. 
He did not speak of the instruction of conscience in this context, because he 
had already relegated conscience to the realm of private opinion; the term 
bore the stench of subjectivity. Locke shared Hobbes’ distrust of conscience, 
but placed more emphasis on the importance (for better or worse) of 
socialization in the formation of conscience: “…it may come to pass, that 
                                                 
79 Idem. 
80 John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, John Allen (transl.), Westminster 
Press, Philadelphia, n.d., quoted in: Wolin (2004), 175. 
81 Wolin (2004), 173. 
82 Calvin (1961), II.19.15. 
83 Luther (1983a), 12 (Aus der Auslegung von Psalm 13 [14], 1), [“in church fulfil no 
other function, than that they confuse, destroy and snare people’s consciences”]. 
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doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the 
superstition of a nurse, or the authority of an old woman, may, by length of 
time and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of principles in 
religion or morality.”84 In chapter 4, I referred to Wolin’s remark that the 
“growing distrust of conscience stimulated the search for a new kind of 
conscience, social rather than individual, one that would be an internalized 
expression of external rules rather than the externalized expression of 
internal convictions.”85 He also points out that the charge often brought to 
bear against liberalism, “of seeking to dissolve the solidarities of social ties 
and relationships and to replace them by the unfettered, independent 
individual, the masterless man”, is “almost without foundation and 
completely misses the liberal addiction towards social conformity” – an 
addiction Wolin goes on to trace through the works of Locke and especially 
Adam Smith.86 What I have said in chapters 4 and 5 about Locke’s, Smith’s 
and Kant’s philosophy of education corroborates Wolin’s view. I might just 
add one remark: the notion of self-command, crucial in eighteenth-century 
philosophy of education, can be interpreted in two (opposite) directions. 
Self-command can be the ability to control one’s passions and inclinations so 
as to keep them within the bounds of the socially agreeable; this may be 
compatible with heteronomy. Someone who has learned, taught by the 
masters of fear and shame, to control that in himself which others 
disapprove of, has self-command in this sense. But self-command can also 
be interpreted to mean, quite literally, the ability to command oneself. To 
have self-command is then to be autonomous, and thereby relatively 
independent from the opinions of others. In times of social unrest, thinkers 
tend to emphasize the former kind of self-control, where social discipline is 
never really transcended. Jeremy Bentham is a case in point. 
 With the growing emphasis on the ‘education’ of conscience, which 
in some circles would definitely take the form of indoctrination, it seems that 
what was given with the one hand was taken away again with the other. The 
freedom that was gained on a societal level was compensated by compulsion 
on the psychological level. Internal checks took the place of external control. 
In a time of distrust of the individual conscience, the felt need for proper 
education increased. The distrust of conscience had some of its roots in an 
                                                 
84 Locke (1979), 81 (Book I, ch. III, § 22). 
85 Wolin (2004), 338. Hobbes’ and Locke’s distrust of conscience must be seen in the 
context of the radical puritanism in England in their time. The ‘Saints’, as these 
puritans were called, embodied the antinomian threat of the concept of Christian 
(i.e. Protestant) freedom. 
86 Ibid., 343-345. Cf. Thomas L. Dumm (1985), who argues that “it is not natural 
law, but the liberal doctrine of toleration that has generated the policies that 
contribute to the advancement of (…) conformitarianism in the United States” 
(388). He shows how the Quaker experiment in Pennsylvania anticipated modern 
liberal society with respect to social control, conformity, and the penal system. 
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awareness of the subjectivity of conscience and the influence of socialization 
on the development of conscience. At the same time, the distrust of 
conscience led to an increased emphasis on the need for instruction and the 
necessity of discipline. All in all, it seems that there are two possible answers 
to the same problem (the problem of order in relation to conscience), a 
combination of which has been in effect in European history: the first 
solution is to leave conscience be in its own separate sphere and reduce its 
importance in the public sphere as much as possible; the second solution is 
to shape the individual’s conscience in such a way that wherever it manifests 
itself, it can do no harm.87 With regard to freedom of conscience, the ‘gain’ 
of the early modern period was that the distinction between an inner and an 
outer realm meant that the state did not interfere with people’s interior. The 
downside was that every external expression was subject to the will of the 
sovereign. The gain of the Enlightenment was that the artificial distinction 
between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ was abolished, which created room for a 
substantial notion of freedom of conscience. The downside (or at least the 
danger) here was that society (and, under its pressure, the state) increasingly 
interfered with people’s conscience through discipline. With a more 
substantial freedom of conscience, the danger of an equally substantial 
unfreedom (in another sense) of conscience arose. 
 The increasing emphasis on the education of conscience, then, was a 
concomitant of the rise of notions of freedom of conscience; they are 
parallel developments, and this is no coincidence – even if, in the case of 
Christian freedom, the increased (felt) need for the education of conscience 
was the result of a misinterpretation by the people of what the Reformers 
meant by ‘freedom of conscience’. A possible objection to this view is that 
the interiorization of moral principles started much earlier, namely in the 
confessional. I will have to deal with this objection before I move on to a 
discussion of the problem of subjectivity and the necessity for a more formal 
concept of conscience. 
Confessions were part of Christian practice from the beginning. As a 
catholic institution, it is part of the sacrament of penance. At first 
confessions were made publicly, later they became private and secret. Aron 
Gurevich notes that auricular confession (confession by whispering in the 
ear of the father-confessor, or simply private confession) was followed up by 
public punishment of sinners until as late as the thirteenth century.88 
Gurevich states that “[t]he confessional was designed as a place of self-
analysis under the guidance of the priest” and that the parish priest “had the 
task of directing the religious life of his flock. It would have been very 
difficult to control successfully their private and public behaviour without 
                                                 
87 With regard to the first solution, see Koselleck (1973), chapter 1. 
88 Gurevich (1997), 24. 
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confession and that useful tool that helped to organize it, the penitential.”89 
It is significant that Gurevich speaks of private and public behaviour, not of 
conviction. Nevertheless, the term ‘self-analysis’ seems to indicate an 
important degree of interiority. I will not deny the truth of this, yet it must 
not be overstated. In practice, confession could easily become (by repetition 
alone – did not Oscar Wilde say that “all repetition is anti-spiritual”?) an 
almost meaningless ritual, a standard procedure to cleanse oneself, and 
especially to fulfil one’s religious obligations. The role of ‘self’ in the self-
analysis Gurevich mentions was quite limited. The confessional was designed 
in such a way that control stays mainly external and does not achieve the 
character of self-control. This becomes quite clear when one attends to the 
element of the witness we identified in chapter 1 as a core element of the 
symbol of conscience. The sinner uses the priest, the father-confessor, as his 
witness, not himself or his own conscience. In the context of the confessional 
conscience retains its original meaning of a knowing-with-others. This means 
that the sinner had to be aware of which part of his behaviour fell under the 
heading of sin, but this could be a fairly disinterested awareness – 
disinterested, except perhaps to the extent that he would be worried about 
the consequences of his actions for himself. Simply put, the sinner would 
need consciousness of sin, not conscience. The story Kittsteiner tells as an 
introduction to his book on the origins of the modern conscience is 
illustrative in this context: 
 
“In the evening of the twelfth of May 1787 Karl Philipp Moritz writes an 
entry in the diary of his journey through Italy. In Fondi a young man has 
been killed, that was apparently caught up in some quarrel. In town they say 
about him that he, instead of dealing with his business himself, would have 
done better to turn to a ‘huomo di Conscienza’, a Man of Conscience, for 
advice, that is to a clergyman or at least to a man that isn’t poor, that 
doesn’t come from the rabble.”90 
 
So, even late in the eighteenth century, conscience was not much interiorized 
with people in rural villages in Catholic Italy – much to the astonishment, 
indignation even, of the enlightened traveller. Without claiming that the 
situation would have been completely different in small villages in Protestant 
countries, it seems safe to say that the confessional did not greatly stimulate 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 24 and 79. A penitential was a sort of ecclesiastical rule manual which 
prescribed by which punishment different sins were to be corrected. Sometimes, 
penitentials contained questionnaires that the father-confessor could use in 
questioning the person confessing to him, so as to help him establish the nature and 
gravity of the transgression and judge it. Penitentials, unofficial books that had 
originated from the needs of local clergymen, were officially forbidden in the ninth 
century (25), but continued to be in use. 
90 Kittsteiner (1995), 13 (my translation). 
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an inward turn; the conscience of Catholics was not transformed by the 
confessional into ‘in internalized expression of external rules’. 
 That moral education in general was still in its infancy is also 
testified to by the clerical use of penitentials. Not only lay people were quite 
ignorant of religious morality; priests too needed a reminder now and then. 
The penitentials were of use to priests who were uncertain about what 
behaviour could be tolerated and what could not. Even among the clergy, 
religious morality was not very much internalized. 
 The privatization and interiorization that carefully set in during the 
Middle Ages, in the practice of confession, received a strong impulse from 
Protestantism. The anomic threat inherent in the notion of Christian 
freedom was countered by an emphasis on discipline and the shaping of 
conscience. Calvin’s ‘metaphors of violence’, as Bosco called them, certainly 
had a function in this respect. Internalization of rules often proceeded, as 
Adam Smith also noticed, through fear. Thus arose the disciplined character 
of the individual that obeyed the Divine Voice in himself – the character that 
was, in Max Weber’s eyes, indispensable to the development of capitalism; 
that was demythologized by Marx, looked upon with contempt by Nietzsche, 
and psychologically explained by Freud.91 
 
10.3.3. The problem of subjectivity and the necessity of formalism 
In the previous chapter, I explained what kind of concept of conscience was 
a prerequisite for any notion of freedom of conscience. The inversion of 
meaning I described there had two parts: a move from the concrete to the 
abstract and one from the abstract to the concrete. The first was a move 
from conscience as knowledge of a concrete act to conscience as a moral 
faculty or moral sense, or as moral consciousness in general. I have described 
the second as a move from conscience as something (a certain kind of 
knowledge) in which you participate to something (some ‘thing’) everyone 
individually owns. The former of the two relates most clearly to the second 
half of the title of this subsection, ‘the necessity of formalism’; the latter is 
more directly related to the problem of subjectivity – though the issues of 
formalism and the subjectivity of conscience are closely connected. 
 ‘Formalism’, in this context, refers to the characteristic of a concept 
of conscience that it focuses not on the content of conscience, but on more 
formal features; these may include the function of conscience, but also its 
origin (as a natural given, or as divine) and its nature, formalistically defined 
(as, for instance, the meeting-place of God and man). I have explained what 
I mean by subjectivity in this context earlier in this chapter. The subjectivity 
of conscience (more precisely: the existence of a plurality of centers of inter-
subjectivity) posed practical and theoretical problems. Problems on the 
practical level were conflict, disorder, and threats to social and political 
                                                 
91 See Hammond (1993), chapter 2. 
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stability. These necessitated a separation of church and state and a practice, 
at minimum, of toleration, and preferably of freedom of conscience. As the 
personal importance of conscience had not lessened but rather increased, 
conscience had to be accommodated to some extent with a view to political 
stability alone. Defenders of freedom of conscience needed to provide a 
foundation for the importance of conscience. Because of the diversity of 
consciences, this required a new approach to conscience. While once the 
right to follow one’s conscience was based in its authority and that authority 
in the objective (God-given) truth of its dictates, this idea had lost much of 
its acceptability in the seventeenth century. With objectivity, the authority of 
conscience was also in danger of disappearing – and thereby its possible right 
to resist the authority of the state. Either the authority had to be given new 
support, or the right to follow one’s conscience had to be based in 
something other than the authority of conscience. Both solutions were 
proposed. The authority of conscience remained based in its relation to God, 
but no longer in the sense that God informed the conscience; it was now 
seen as a more formal relation, which nevertheless endowed conscience with 
an aura of sanctity. But liberty of conscience also came to be seen as a 
natural right regardless of the matter of its authority. Many kinds of 
arguments were produced. Locke advanced fairly traditional arguments, 
saying, for instance, that each individual was best placed to care for his or 
her own soul, and that it was irrational to try to impose a religion.92 He also 
offered some newer arguments, related to the authority of the worldly 
government, the limits of which were set by the nature of the ends for which 
it existed.93 Liberty of conscience, in brief, could become a natural right 
because the right of others to interfere with anyone’s conscience was denied. 
This view was supported by a separation of law and morality: as long as 
people kept to the law, what they did was nobody’s business. This line of 
argument reached its apex in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.94 
 The principle of freedom of conscience only arose when the 
objectivity of conscience could no longer reasonably be upheld. Historically, 
the ‘problem’ of subjectivity was an important factor in the genesis of the 
secular notion of freedom of conscience. But it did necessitate another, more 
formal, approach to conscience; and this, too, was a prerequisite for the rise 
of the notion of freedom of conscience. Substantial definitions of conscience 
had become inadequate in face of the plurality of beliefs and the 
concomitant loss of the possibility to claim objectivity; the reality of 
conscience was still there; plurality and conflict necessitated liberty of 
conscience; a new concept of conscience was necessary to accommodate the 
                                                 
92 See McKinnon (2006), 7-10; Plamenatz (1963), 77-88. 
93 Plamenatz (1963), 83. 
94 See Mill (1992), 1-110, especially 15; McKinnon (2006), 10-13. 
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second and third point – this had to be a more formal approach to 
conscience. Let us look at this in more detail. 
A certain degree of formalism was a necessary requirement for any 
notion of freedom of conscience. The Christian notion of freedom of 
conscience as developed by Luther and Calvin, however, does not depend on 
a formalistic concept of conscience in exactly the same way the ‘secular’ 
notion of freedom of conscience does.95 For the latter notion of freedom of 
conscience – the one that would become the most influential and with which 
we are, in the end, concerned in this chapter – the idea that it is ultimately 
undecidable whose conscience ‘is right’ is fundamental. For Luther and 
Calvin, this was not an issue. So the secular notion of freedom of conscience 
claims this freedom for (in principle) any conscience, regardless of its content. 
The secular notion of freedom of conscience is not that of a freedom merely 
for those with a Christian (read: Protestant) conscience, but for everyone 
with a conscience – that is, for every human being.96 
 It is no coincidence that what we will find were two main 
inspirations for the secular notion of freedom of conscience at the same time 
inspired a more formalistic concept of conscience.97 Mysticism and 
humanism stimulated the development of a concept of conscience that 
focused not on the content of conscience, but on its formal or unspecified 
relation to God. The Thomistic concept of conscience entails a more 
substantial view of the relation between man’s conscience and God. The 
general principles conveyed by the ‘synderesis’ are of divine origin. 
Conscience, on this view, derives its authority from a more substantial 
relation to God. The substantial element in this relation, however, must not 
be overstated. The principles of ‘synderesis’ are of a highly general nature; 
they are of the kind ‘do good and avoid evil’. Much of the objectivism that 
humanists and mystics at least partially let go of lay not in the Thomistic 
concept of conscience itself, but outside it, in the conviction that with the 
help of the two revelations of the Book and of Nature it was possible to 
ascertain without doubt whether someone’s conscience was in error or not. 
                                                 
95 By ‘secular’, I do not mean to suggest that this political-juridical notion has 
nothing to do with a religious conscience; it is merely meant to distinguish this 
notion of freedom of conscience from that of Christian freedom. 
96 Of course there were all kinds of discussions about who were human beings and 
who were not, and about distinctions between superior and inferior human beings. 
Undoubtedly, there were many ‘enlightened’ men in Europe who thought that 
negroes did not have a conscience, in the sense that they did not even have that 
spark in them ‘that was not even extinguished in the breast of Cain’. From another 
point of view, from which conscience is seen as a culturally specific product of a 
unique historical development, these men may have been right. But the point is that 
the secular notion of freedom of conscience did not, in principle, restrict this 
freedom to a certain privileged group of people. 
97 See the subsection on toleration in chapter 11. 
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 A number of related shifts were of great importance in the 
development of the notion of freedom of conscience.98 In fourteenth-
century thought, the positions of God and man in relation to each other 
changed significantly. From the eleventh century onward, religious 
experience became more emotional in nature. Also, and connected with 
these changes, a stronger appreciation of and attention for the ‘this-worldly’ 
developed. In Passage to Modernity, Louis Dupré explains how God became a 
more removed figure, of less relevance (eventually) to the world. He lays 
most responsibility for this with nominalist philosophers who, by claiming 
that the order of things is principally beyond man’s capacity to understand, 
helped create a division between the natural and the supernatural.99 Now, if 
God is seen as belonging to the separate and unintelligible realm of the 
supernatural, the only way to reach God is through mystic experience. 
 Mysticism was not a new phenomenon, but it gained in importance 
in the second half of the Middle Ages. The important scholastic Bonaventure 
had affinities with mysticism. Somewhat surprisingly, he was less lenient with 
regard to the erroneous conscience than Aquinas.100 In general, however, the 
influence of mysticism was towards tolerance and toleration. A central 
formula in humanist-mystic thought and a precursor of ‘freedom of 
conscience’, as we will see further on, was that of ‘not forcing the 
conscience’. An important influence of mysticism on the notion of 
conscience lay in an emphasis on spiritual purity instead of conformity to 
external (religious) laws, as found in the work of Sebastian Franck.101 As I 
explained in chapter 3 (subsection 3.3.2), mysticism, a more intense religious 
experience (including the experience of conscience), and the rise of cities and 
urban life, created a dynamic towards a plurality of beliefs, towards dissent. 
For this reason, too, mysticism was an important factor in the development 
of the notion of freedom of conscience. 
 The greatest ‘necessitator’ of a formalism of conscience was the 
existence, since the Reformation, of a religious plurality that was there to 
stay. That is, it was necessary if one had no wish to fight this plurality and at 
the same time wanted to uphold the authority of conscience. This authority 
had always depended on its relation to God, and continued to do so, but in a 
different way. In the mystic tradition, a shift of emphasis occurred from 
contemplation to love. According to Dupré, contemplation came to be 
identified with love. The relation to God become more emotional, as well as 
                                                 
98 From now on this will exclude the Lutheran notion of Christian freedom, unless 
otherwise stated. 
99 Dupré (1993). Interestingly, the voluntaristic view of God that underlies this 
worldview receives a secularized form in Hobbes’ Leviathan (immortalized in Carl 
Schmitt’s phrase: “auctoritas, non veritas facit legem”). See Bloch (1977), 61. 
100 See Bonaventure (2001). 
101 Vermeulen (1989), 48. 
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more ‘earthly’, as is visible in the new devotion of Christ, concentrating on 
his humanity and suffering. In his presentation of Bonaventure’s views, 
Dupré writes: “In the contemplative love of Christ (…) the mind assimilates 
the forms in a way that surpasses the truth of abstract knowledge. True 
cognition consists in uniting a created image with its personal archetype, 
Christ, the synthesis of all ideas. If the essence of all ideas resides in an 
individual, the weight of knowledge shifts from the abstract universal to the 
singular.”102 The shift in mysticism towards man’s inner life and towards 
individuality in general had its counterpart in the nominalism of John Duns 
Scotus (ca. 1266-1308) and William of Ockham (ca. 1285-1347). The former 
introduced the notion of a forma individualis, by which individuality was 
emancipated from the realm of contingency. The latter abandoned the idea 
of knowledge as participation in universal forms. For him, in Dupré’s words, 
the “only access to the real consists in an intuition normally conveyed 
through the senses. (…) God may directly infuse an intuition without sense 
impression.”103 With this view, Ockham was quite close to the original 
meaning of ‘syneidesis’, as a more intuitive kind of knowledge than 
‘conscientia’; it would also become a persistent element in thought about 
conscience throughout the modern period. In ethical theory in the twentieth 
century conscience would be associated primarily with ethical intuitionism. 
 In more formalistic views of conscience, it was seen as the meeting-
place of God and man, but in this meeting no objectively ascertainable 
universal truths were conveyed. Furthermore, it was less a matter of reason 
than of emotion. Yet, the authority of conscience remained, due to its 
relation to God. Humanist thought, of which the central notion is that of the 
dignity of man, supported the authority of the private conscience; the dignity 
of man is the dignity of conscience, in a sense. Man gradually came to be 
regarded as a source of value in itself. I said earlier that a formalism of 
conscience was necessitated by the existence of religious plurality. 
Analogously, a somewhat pragmatic foundation for the humanist idea of the 
dignity of man can be pointed out. The notion of the dignity of man was 
bound up with the ‘rise of the individual’. Kerrigan and Braden show how 
the latter is related to the recognition of the fact that people hold different 
opinions. For the humanist philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), there 
was one truth, but, in Kerrigan and Braden’s words, “we know that our 
obvious space-time uniqueness translates into significant metaphysical and 
religious uniqueness because we have intellectual and temperamental 
differences. We do not see eye to eye, therefore we are…” They quote 
Ficino: “For at the same time, some affirm and others deny the same thing; 
some want it, others do not.”104 
                                                 
102 Dupré (1993), 38. 
103 Ibid., 39. 
104 Kerrigan and Braden (1989), 112. 
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 A formalism of conscience was made possible by an element of 
Christian thought that had been present from the beginning (being a result 
of the encounter of Judaeo-Christian and Greek thought), and that was part 
of ‘mainstream’ thought, not merely of undercurrents. I am referring to the 
important idea of natural law, which provided access to secularity from within 
Christian thought.105 Natural law theory was important throughout the 
Middle Ages, and a particular kind of natural law theory also became 
influential after the Reformation, not least in the context of the development 
of the secular notion of freedom of conscience. Schockenhoff remarks, with 
regard to the situation of conflict of the sixteenth and seventeenth century: 
“Weil die Religion selbst zur Ursache kriegerischer Auseinandersetzungen 
wurde, konnten Einheit, Freiheit und innerstaatlicher Friede nicht mehr 
religiös, sondern nur mehr durch den Rückgriff auf ein allgemeines 
Naturrecht und die in ihm verankerten bürgerlichen Freiheitsrechte 
begründet werden.”106 Natural law theory and the new importance assigned 
to the individual combined to engender the idea of natural rights, of which 
the right to freedom of conscience would become one, perhaps even the 
most important.107 This was the natural law tradition of Althusius (ca. 1563-
1638), Hugo de Groot (Grotius) (1583-1645), Pufendorf, Thomasius (1655-
1728), and Wolff (1679-1754), and in the Anglo-Saxon tradition that of 
Hobbes and Locke. There is no contradiction in saying that the grounding of 
freedom of conscience in a natural right has its source in a natural law 
tradition that includes one of the strongest opponents of freedom of 
conscience, Thomas Hobbes. The attitude taken towards freedom of 
conscience depended, in this tradition, on the fundamental view of human 
nature that lay at the foundation of one’s natural law theory. Those with a 
pessimistic view of human nature, like Hobbes, tended to distrust conscience 
and restrict its influence. Thomasius’ ideas show how natural law theory both 
provided a foundation for freedom of conscience and helped undermine it, 
by referring conscience to a completely subjective sphere. Thomasius 
distinguished sharply between natural law and positive law. For instance, 
according to Thomasius, polygamy was only prohibited by positive law, not 
by natural law. Positive law was just, in Bloch’s words, “the ordering of the 
external relations of individuals”. It became separated from morality, which 
meant, on the subjective side, an ‘emancipation of conviction’. Bloch notes: 
                                                 
105 This was pointed out by Gerrit Steunebrink on a symposium on religious 
tolerance, held in Nijmegen on 23-06-2004. 
106 Schockenhoff (2003), 20. [“While religion itself became the cause of bellicose 
disputes, unity, freedom and state-internal peace could no longer be religiously 
grounded but only by recourse to a general natural law and the civil rights of 
freedom anchored in it.”] 
107 Cf. Plamenatz (1963), 77-88. On the development of the idea of a right to 
freedom of conscience and its juridical embodiment, see: Vermeulen (1989), 58-62, 
or Scholler (1958), 34 and further. 
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“Moral wurde so zum Synonym für eine zunächst inwendige Gruppe 
subjektiver Rechte, für das Recht zur Befolgung der Gewissenspflicht, als 
einer äußerlich unerzwingbaren, folglich auch äußerlich unverbietbaren. (…) 
Moral ist bei Thomasius ein Asyl der Gewissensfreiheit, ein Naturrecht der 
Toleranz.”108 His theory also exhibits the self-undermining tendency that is 
typical of all ideological grounding of freedom of conscience, as we will see 
further on. 
While freedom of conscience came to be seen as a natural right, 
conscience came to be looked upon as a natural endowment of man, as I 
have shown in chapter 6. It came to be seen, in the late Middle Ages and 
early modernity, as a ‘natural instinct’. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, conscience acquired a place (and sometimes it took pride of place) 
in descriptions of the organisation of human nature. In chapter 5, I 
mentioned the seed-metaphor for conscience, which became popular in the 
sixteenth century, and was much used by Calvin. One spoke of seeds planted 
by God to signify the core of conscience that lies in man. Thomas Reid 
adopted the metaphor, speaking of conscience (or moral judgement) as 
something that “grows to maturity from an imperceptible seed, planted by 
our Creator”.109 In “Observations concerning Conscience”, Reid writes: 
 
“The seeds, as it were, of moral discernment are planted in the mind by 
him that made us. (…) Their progress depends very much upon their being 
duly cultivated and properly exercised. (…) We must not therefore think, 
because man has the natural power of discerning what is right and what is 
wrong, that he has no need of instruction; that his power has no need of 
cultivation and improvement; that he may safely rely upon the suggestions 
of his mind, or upon opinions he has got, he knows not how.”110 
 
This brings us to the problem of the subjectivity of conscience. We 
have seen that conscience is still looked upon as connected to God, from 
which connection it derives it dignity and authority – a dignity and authority 
necessary to support also what I have called the secular notion of freedom of 
conscience.111 The connection with God lies not in the content of 
                                                 
108 Bloch, 59-67, in particular 67. [“Morality thus became a synonym for an in the 
first instance internally directed group of subjective rights, for the right to obey the 
duty of conscience, as something externally incoercible, and therefore also externally 
unprohibitable. (…) With Thomasius, morality is an asylum of freedom of 
conscience, a natural right of toleration.”] 
109 Reid (1999), essay V: “Of Morals”, chapter 1: “Of the First Principles of Morals” 
(640). 
110 Reid (1999), essay III, chapter VIII (595). 
111 Perhaps one could say that this dignity and authority were a necessary support 
especially for the secular notion of freedom of conscience. The Lutheran and 
Calvinian notion of conscience underlying Christian freedom was a substantial 
notion; it was supported by its content. Moreover, their notion of freedom of 
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conscience, but in the fact that it is implanted in us by God. There is a 
growing awareness that socialization plays a role in the formation of 
conscience; that is: an awareness that the conscience has to be formed.112 
This awareness is expressed in the metaphor of the seeds of conscience. It 
entails also an awareness of the vulnerability of conscience. The authority of 
conscience eventually became truly a matter of faith, as is clear from the 
following passage from Thomas Reid: 
 
“The faculties which nature hath given us, are the only engines we can use 
to find out the truth. We cannot indeed prove that those faculties are not 
fallacious, unless God should give us new faculties to sit in judgment upon 
the old. But we are born under a necessity of trusting them.”113 
 
We have to trust conscience, although we do not know whether it conveys 
truth or not, because it is all we have. This is a common sense argument, but 
it points to the essential change that occurred in the preceding centuries, by 
which conscience turned from something with a basis in God-given 
knowledge and capable of apprehending objective truth to a private and 
ultimately subjective principle. Of course, when conscience came to be seen 
as private, as a moral sense every individual possesses, it was not immediately 
seen as subjective. It is very well possible to uphold a view of conscience as 
private and particular, but not subjective in the sense in which I defined 
subjectivity at the outset of this subsection. Nevertheless, the dynamics of 
thought were such that conscience gradually came to be seen by its critics as 
purely subjective. In combination with other factors (particularly the 
common indicative understanding of conscience, which was very much at 
odds with the subjectivity perceived by critics), this led to the expression of 
severe criticism of the notion and its authority. The first wave of criticism 
occurred in the seventeenth century; the second in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, leading to the virtual abandonment of the notion in both 
philosophy and psychology. 
 A self-undermining dynamic is at work in the process through which 
the notion of freedom of conscience arose. An increasing plurality of beliefs, 
entailing a decrease in inter-subjectivity (or an increase in centres of inter-
subjectivity) and an increase in subjectivity, necessitated a more formal 
approach to conscience. A certain degree of formalism (a shift of emphasis 
away from the content of conscience) – and, as we will see, a certain degree 
                                                                                                               
conscience did not need a similar support as the secular notion, because it was 
primarily a ‘freedom from’ (guilt, the law), not a ‘freedom to’ (follow the dictates of 
one’s conscience). 
112 See chapters 4 and 5 and the previous subsection. 
113 Reid (1999), essay III, chapter VI (591). Butler’s insistence that conscience 
“carries its own authority with it” was not a viable solution to the problem of the 
authority of conscience. 
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of skepticism or truth-relativism, a degree of individualism in the 
conceptualization of conscience – was a necessary precondition for the 
notion of freedom of conscience to arise and for it to gain juridical 
significance. At the same time this formalism, the skepticism, and the 
relativism undermined conscience and its authority, for why would anyone 
respect the dictates of another’s conscience, when these can lay no claim to 
truth whatsoever?114 Conscience became emotionalized, which is reflected on 
the level of theory in a revival of the mystic symbolism of the ‘spark of 
conscience’ and the ‘candle of the Lord’, and at the same time in the 
depreciatory way in which someone like John Locke spoke of conscience in 
his philosophical works. Andrew writes: “Locke’s Essay [concerning Human 
Understanding] championed rational autonomy and deprecated conscience as 
irrational.”115 Locke shared Hobbes’ distrust of conscience and of people 
using the term ‘conscience’ very easily, as a slogan by which they clothe their 
opinions with a dignity they do not deserve and shield them from 
criticism.116 In an earlier section, I quoted Wolin, who pointed out that 
“what was controlling in Locke’s argument was that conscience stood for a 
form of conviction rather than a way of knowing. Thus conscience meant 
the subjective beliefs held by an individual…” As I explained earlier in this 
subsection, the attitude Hobbes and the early Locke took with regard to 
freedom of conscience is the attitude of one variant of the new natural law 
tradition. The subjectivity that makes them distrust the private conscience, 
however, also adheres to conscience as perceived by the champions of 
freedom of conscience in the natural law tradition, as is clear from what 
Bloch said about Thomasius. Though one can, rather roughly, distinguish 
between an Anglo-Saxon tradition and a German tradition, in the latter of 
which conscience was not emotionalized the way it was in Anglo-Saxon 
thought, conscience does not escape subjectivity in this tradition. Samuel 
von Pufendorf (1632-1694), for example, adopts of the medieval 
conceptualization of conscience only the ‘conscientia’, and drops the innate, 
primordial ‘synderesis’. He understands conscience as a judgement of the 
intellect, and sees ‘leges naturales’ (natural laws) not as inscribed in man’s 
heart, but as to be discovered by intellect from study of the human 
condition.117 In this German tradition of thought, of which Kant can also be 
said to be an exponent, the subjectivity of conscience can only be held at bay 
by insisting on the universality of reason – something, obviously, that people 
would not remain prepared to do. 
                                                 
114 Some answers to this question have been given; Luhmann in fact gives quite a 
good answer to it. Generally, however, skepticism with regard to conscience, its 
value and its dignity, came to prevail. 
115 Andrew (2001), 83. 
116 See Andrew (2001), 86. 
117 Mock (1983), 39. 
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 I will leave it at this, as I have explained in chapter 6 how, in the 
German tradition, traditional and rationalistic concepts of conscience were 
criticized by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud, and how the Anglo-Saxon 
conceptualization of conscience led to Darwin’s relativistic view of 
conscience. I believe it has become clear enough that and how plurality and 
subjectivity necessitated formalism. This formalism may have been both 
historically and conceptually necessary for the notion of freedom of 
conscience to arise, but it could hardly mask the subjectivity of conscience 
that lurked in the background as a potential threat to social and political 
order. The formalism of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century concepts of 
conscience did not entail a complete acknowledgement of the subjectivity of 
conscience; these concepts were based on the assumption of the universality 
of reason.118 They were not informed by a consideration of the consequences 
of allowing complete liberty of conscience. We will see in chapter 12 that 
Luhmann, in answer to the problem of subjectivity, devised a more (though 
not fully) adequate formalist concept of conscience. 
The challenge that needs to be met, as Luhmann tries to do, is this: 
how do we retain what we consider to be the supremely valuable principle of 
freedom of conscience (as embodied also in legal provisions for 
conscientious objection), in face of the subjectivity of conscience? This 
means that the problem of the subjectivity of conscience needs to be 
answered. A more formal approach to conscience seems to be required; we 
will see in chapter 12 that Luhmann recognizes this, but we have seen that 
this was also the historical answer to the problem – if not yet an adequate 
answer. 
 
 
                                                 
118 In this respect the ideas of the Socinians (a Protestant sect) were superior. 
Plamenatz (1963), 73, summarizes them as follows: “Where every man judges for 
himself, they said, there must be diversity of opinion; and this diversity, since it is 
inevitable, must be accepted with a good grace.” Interestingly enough, Socinus 
(1539-1604) came up with a rather pragmatic defence of conscientious objection to 
military service by members of the Polish Brethren Church. He wrote that “when we 
say that it is not lawful for a Christian to wage war or fight, we are speaking of a 
private person and not of the king, prince or magistrate”. Moreover, “[n]ot all those 
things which the Christian is forbidden to do are wrong in themselves and to be 
condemned”. He thus anticipated a Hobbesian separation of a private and a public 
sphere – the latter being the one to which the use of violence properly belongs – by 
approaching the topic from the other side; in fact, he went further than Hobbes did, 
for he saw Christians as belonging to the private sphere alone, whereas for Hobbes 
everyone’s actions belonged to the public sphere. Socinus’ pragmatism lay also in his 
view that it was unproblematic to pay war taxes, or, if unavoidable, to take up arms 
without using them to kill or wound anyone. See Brock (1992), 679 (note 21) and 
678-687. 
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10.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter dealt with the main problem that beset(s) the theory and 
practice of freedom of conscience, namely the problem of order in its two 
dimensions: political order, and order in people’s minds. The latter I have 
also called the problem of subjectivity. Reviewing this chapter, we may note 
that both the ethical question of whether freedom of conscience is a good 
that we should try to realize, and the prudential question of whether it is wise 
in a practical sense, or expedient, to realize it, cannot be answered without 
reference to the problem of order. If we want to answer either of these 
questions, we will have to deal with the problem of order. Is it good that 
people are at liberty to ‘care for their own soul’, whether they seem to make 
a mess of it or not, or would it be better to ‘educate’ them, or to repress all 
outward expressions of the way they ‘care for their soul’? And which of these 
alternatives serves the goal of social and political stability best? If liberty of 
conscience is, as Plamenatz claims, “the right to hold and profess what 
principles we choose, and to live in accordance with them”; if, as Bloch 
claims, liberty of conscience became, in Thomasius work, the subjective right 
to follow one’s conscience; this means that the conscience of the individual 
may clash with the authority of the state.119 This is also implied in what 
Koselleck describes as the separation of morality and politics. Morality, 
whether as a social force or in the form of the individual conscience, 
constitutes a potentially critical force over against the state. From the 
perspective of the state, then – or from the perspective of social and political 
order – it stands to reason that freedom of conscience must have its limits. It 
must be compatible with the demands of social and political order; 
moreover, it must be compatible with other rights. No right is absolute; all 
rights all limited by each other.120 
 Answers to the question how the balance must be struck will occupy 
our attention in chapter 12. For the most part, that chapter will deal with 
(more or less) contemporary theories of freedom of conscience, mostly from 
the field of the philosophy of law. The question there will be how legally to 
accommodate for the valuable (or at least greatly valued) principle of freedom 
of conscience in a way that is compatible with the demands of order. Before 
that, I will show in chapter 11 how the positive principle of freedom of 
conscience arose from the initially negative concept of toleration, and how 
‘freedom of conscience’ became a powerful symbol – a development which 
has immediate bearing on the value attached to the principle of freedom of 
conscience today. 
                                                 
119 Plamenatz (1963), 49. 
120 Idem. 
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11. Between idealism and pragmatism 
 
“It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those three 
unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, 
and the prudence never to practice either.” 
MARK TWAIN, Following the Equator, ch. 20: “Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New 
Calendar” (1897) 
 
 
11.1. INTRODUCTION 
I noted in the previous chapter that in this part of the book the emphasis 
shifts to social and political reality. This is particularly true for section 11.2. 
Having dealt in the previous chapter with the problem of order in its two 
dimensions, I will here turn to the dynamics of order; that is, to the dynamic 
interplay between practices of persecution and toleration on the one hand, 
and concepts of heresy, toleration, and freedom of conscience on the other; 
between historical circumstances, and skeptical thought, relativism, and 
arguments from expediency. What I call ‘Zagorin’s question’, a question 
anticipated in 10.2, will be explicitly discussed in 11.2.2: were skepticism and 
expediency enough to bring about a lasting regime of religious toleration? 
Zagorin answers this question in the negative, and places great emphasis on 
the importance of ideas. He writes an intellectual history of religious 
toleration.1 I attempt to arrive at a more nuanced conclusion. 
In the transition to part II, I distinguished between a religious notion 
of freedom of conscience and a political-juridical one. The first is the 
Lutheran/Calvinian notion of Christian freedom; the second is the ‘secular’ 
notion of freedom of conscience that is not in principle (though often in 
practice) reserved for one particular religious group. It is from the latter 
notion of freedom of conscience – the one that arose from the dynamic 
discussed in 11.2 – that our present notion derives most directly (assuming 
that ‘we’ have only one such notion). Freedom of conscience is something 
quite different from religious toleration. The latter, however, developed from 
a pragmatic policy into a valued principle, and hence underlies the principle 
of freedom of conscience. From the seventeenth century on, the notion of 
freedom of conscience became clothed in the terminology of (human) rights. 
This is how we speak of it today. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion”. Not only in Western countries is this declaration seen as of 
fundamental value. Western countries, however, see the human rights 
discourse as the product of their Enlightenment; it is something they take 
pride in. Freedom of conscience, in conjunction with freedom of thought 
and religion and freedom of speech and expression, is gladly taken as a 
                                                 
1 Zagorin (2003). 
 438 
symbol (perhaps the symbol) of Western (European and American) 
civilization. The question of 11.3 is: how did freedom of conscience become 
such a powerful, suasive symbol? 
 
 
11.2. DYNAMICS OF ORDER: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND PRAGMATISM 
Having dealt, in the previous chapter, on a rather abstract theoretical level 
with what I take to be the fundamental issue with regard to freedom of 
conscience, namely the problem of order in its two dimensions, I will 
continue here with a discussion of more concrete matters – what I will call 
the dynamics of order. I will still be concerned with conceptual matters – 
when does the concept of toleration arise and how does it develop? how 
does it relate to the concept of heresy? how did toleration develop into 
liberty of conscience? – but these will be discussed in close relation to 
historical practices (of toleration, of persecution) and circumstances. The 
idea behind this is that the best way to come to understand arguments is to 
see them in action. I will pay ample attention to the question of what, 
historically, provided the necessary support for the secular principle of 
freedom of conscience. Candidates for this function are also still candidates 
for providing the best theoretical support for toleration, as is shown by 
McKinnon, who provides a very insightful and much more thorough 
systematic discussion of the concept of toleration than I can provide here 
(and than I have chosen to provide, giving precedence to a historical-
systematic approach, rather than to a purely systematic one). 
 
11.2.1. Toleration, heresy, and persecution 
Although it will not surprise people to find a lot of talk about toleration in a 
text on freedom of conscience, few authors today would agree with 
Reverend Murray, who spoke of “the problem of toleration, which is the 
problem of conscience”.2 Toleration is not the same as allowing freedom of 
conscience (in whatever sense of the term), although in practice it may turn 
out the same.3 One can tolerate (or not tolerate) behaviour that has no 
particular grounds in anybody’s conscience. People who are the object of 
toleration may not appeal to conscience. Finally, there is a kind of freedom 
of conscience that hardly requires any toleration, except a refraining from 
inquisition – freedom of conscience is then understood as a completely 
internal matter; a freedom of thought, not action. That the problem of 
toleration is not identical with that of conscience does not mean that they are 
not related. Both in practice and thought, the latter is more or less an 
extension of the former. In some periods more than in others, the 
                                                 
2 Murray (1929), 59. 
3 Plamenatz (1963) repeatedly insists on the difference, though also on their intimate 
relatedness; see, for instance, 52, 66 and 77. 
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terminologies of the debates intermingle. It is partly because of the 
increasing emphasis on the sanctity of the individual conscience that 
toleration develops from a negative notion referring to a limited practice into 
a valued principle the ‘possession’ of which tickles the vanity of Western 
nations. There is enough reason, then, to devote some time to a discussion 
of the concept and the practice of toleration. 
 The notion of toleration has been defined in many ways. A useful 
definition is provided by Johannes Kühn, and quoted by Guggisberg: 
“Toleranz ist Ertragen und – positiver ausgedrückt – Geltenlassen des 
Anderen.”4 In keeping with the etymology of the term, the negative notion 
of toleration is primary. William Huseman wrote an enlightening article in 
this connection. Using five French sixteenth century polemical treatises as 
his sources, he demonstrates that those in favour of toleration tended to 
avoid the term ‘toleration’ and other terms belonging to the same ‘family’, 
and use terms like ‘permettre’ instead. Opponents of toleration on the other 
hand, made ample use of the term and its negative connotations. ‘Tolérer’ 
referred to a passive attitude of the government, allowing the evil to spread. 
‘Permettre’ signified a more positive, active attitude; it was also, in contrast 
with ‘tolérer’, a legalistic term, which for this reason was favoured by “those 
living in illegality”.5 The big question is: how did ‘toleration’ turn from a 
“temporary measure based on expediency” into a positive general principle?6 
If I may venture a guess, I would suggest that, given the fact that ‘tolérer’ 
indicated a passive stance of the government, perhaps the term became more 
in use among advocates of a separation of church and state; that is, of the 
state not interfering in religious matters.7 This way, the more recent and 
more positive meaning of ‘toleration’ would link up with the older, pejorative 
notion. The advent of the positive notion of toleration does indeed coincide 
with a gradual separation of church and state. Nevertheless, this remains a 
speculation, as yet unsupported by the appropriate research. 
 Toleration in its most idealistic form, on a par with principles like 
freedom of conscience and freedom of speech, may be a relative novelty in 
                                                 
4 Johannes Kühn, “Das Geschichtsproblem der Toleranz”, in: Autour de Michel Servet 
et de Sébastien Castellion, Recueil publié sous la direction de B. Becker, Haarlem, 1953, 
3, quoted in Guggisberg (1984), 9. [“Toleration is to endure (the presence of) others 
and – more positively put – to let them assert themselves.”] The English word 
‘tolerance’ seems closer to the German ‘Toleranz’, but ‘toleration’ is the narrower 
term, more specifically focused on this context. 
5 Huseman (1984). 
6 Ibid., 309-310. 
7 The negative notion of toleration indicates a passivity of the state towards 
something very evil. For this passivity to become looked upon as something 
commendable, the perception of this evil would also have to change. Dees’ article 
“Trust and the Rationality of Toleration” – I have referred to it before – suggests 
how this may have happened, but I will come back to that later. 
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history, but the practice of toleration in a more limited sense certainly is not. 
Early Christians – a convenient, not a necessary point of departure – had to 
struggle to be tolerated. Three centuries later, Christians were themselves in a 
position to tolerate – and chose not to. Some passages of importance 
throughout the history of toleration debates can be found in the New 
Testament. In Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, he speaks of Christians with 
weak and with strong consciences.8 Those with a weak conscience are the 
just-converted, who still have scruples about eating meat that was offered to 
the Gods, even though they know those Gods do not exist. For the sake of 
their weak brothers, those with a stronger conscience should, when they dine 
together, also refrain from eating the meat offered to the Gods – for 
conscience sake; not their own, but that of the weaker brothers.9 This 
tolerant – even more than tolerant – attitude is not uniformly expressed 
throughout the New Testament. Also in Corinthians, Paul says to the 
Christians there: “when ye come together in church, I hear that there be 
divisions [schismata] among you” and further on: “there must also be heresies 
[haireseis] among you”.10 Perez Zagorin points out some other places in the 
New Testament where there is talk of ‘(damnable) heresies’ and ‘divisions’. 
These terms are often associated, which shows the importance that was 
attached to the unity of the early church. Choice, which is the literal meaning 
of ‘hairesis’, was not an option for early Christians.11 
 “Imperial Rome,” Zagorin notes, “was tolerant in practice in 
permitting the existence of many diverse religious cults, provided their 
votaries also complied with the worship of the divine emperor as part of the 
state religion.”12 Again, we see how the attitude towards religious pluralism 
depends on whether it is seen as a threat to political order. With respect to 
the Roman demand of participation in the imperial cult, Christians 
responded with a nolle prosequi. Hence, in the first three and a half centuries, 
Christians were persecuted with different degrees of intensity.13 While they 
tried to subdue heresies amidst their own ranks, they also tried to gain 
recognition of their freedom of religion. Zagorin points out that the 
Christian theologian Tertullian (living in the later second and early third 
century) held the opinion that heretics could not be Christians, and at the 
                                                 
8 See chapter 2. 
9 1 Corinthians 10:27. See, for example, Lecler (1977), 333. 
10 1 Corinthians 11:18-19, quoted in: Zagorin (2003), 18. 
11 Zagorin (2003), 18-19. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 The Jews also refrained from participation in the empirial cult, but according to 
Zagorin their religion was respected because of its age, and seen as less hostile 
towards Roman religion. Jewish priests, moreover, offered prayers for the emperor 
in the Temple at Jerusalem (Zagorin [2003], 5). 
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same time, while insisting on the truth of Christianity, opposed compulsion 
in religion and spoke out for ‘libertas religionis’.14 
 In 311, the Roman emperor Constantine became by his conversion 
the first Christian emperor. In 313, the Edict of Milan granted the freedom to 
choose one’s religion. The Christian hold on the empire increased gradually. 
In 356, the death penalty was proscribed against those worshipping idols. In 
380, Christianity officially became the sole state religion under Theodosius. A 
prohibition against honouring household gods was issued in 392, followed in 
395 by a prohibition against walking around pagan temples. In 435 it was 
ordered, on pain of death, that pagan temples still standing were to be 
demolished.15 This inversion of the state of affairs, by which Christians 
turned from persecuted into persecutors, coincided with a change of attitude 
in the work of St. Augustine (354-430). Himself at first a Manichaean, he 
experienced a conversion and was baptized in 387. Since then he wrote 
against Manichaeism, Pelagianism and Donatism. The Donatists, Zagorin 
says, “formed a schismatic and rival church with its own clergy”.16 Augustine 
kept trying to refute heretical doctrines and to persuade their adherents to 
(re)join the Catholic Church. In letters addressed to Donatists, Augustine 
emphasizes the voluntariness with which the true faith was to be accepted. 
Around the turn of the century, Augustine changed his mind and began to 
write in favour of coercion.17 He kept insisting on the voluntary acceptance 
of faith, but thought it desirable in some cases to bring people in the right 
position for this voluntary acceptance of faith. This could entail the use of 
force. If fear could help reduce the influence of false doctrines, then 
intimidation was a legitimate means of getting people to change their minds. 
It would be too easy to attribute Augustine’s change of heart entirely 
to the changed position of the church. Augustine’s concern lay with the 
salvation of individual souls.18 If violent means were necessary to accomplish 
this salvation, then so be it. Augustine himself said that he changed his 
position because he had seen Donatists “converted to Catholic unity by the 
fear of imperial laws”, who were now grateful for their violent conversion.19 
He supported his position with references to the Bible, in particular to the 
parable of the feast in Luke 14:21-23, (where a man who had organized a 
feast, on finding that none of the people he had invited shows up, orders his 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 21. 
15 Poulat (1989), 76-77. 
16 Zagorin (2003), 26. 
17 Cf. Plamenatz (1963), 76, on the post-Reformation period: “It is (…) important to 
notice that the attitudes of the different Churches to toleration and liberty of 
conscience depended almost entirely on their relative sizes and hopes of 
predominance.” 
18 Cf. Plamenatz (1963), 70, on the conscientious persecutor. 
19 St. Augustine, Letters, 5 vols., Fathers of the Church, New York, 1951, Vol. 2, 73-
74 (letter 93 to Vincent), quoted in: Zagorin (2003), 27-28. 
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servants to go out and bring back all the poor, the blind and the lame they 
can find and “compel them to come in”), and the parable of the wheat and 
the tares in Matthew 13:24-30, of which Augustine gives a somewhat curious 
interpretation, that would later be repeated by Thomas Aquinas. The wheat 
in the parable is equated with good Christians; the tares, naturally, are 
heretics. The question is whether the tares should be uprooted before the 
harvest, that is: before the Last Judgement. The point of the parable appears 
to be that one should not uproot the tares, because one might harm the grain 
in doing it, and leave the judgement to God. Augustine reverses the parable’s 
meaning and states that it means that one can uproot the tares if one is able 
to recognize them, and if there is no risk of uprooting the wheat with them.20 
 Christian authors occupied themselves with the problem of heresy 
from the beginning. It is important to note, however, that not every 
divergence from Christian doctrine counted as such. Heresy was defined in 
the thirteenth century by Robert Grosseteste as “an opinion chosen by 
human faculties, contrary to Holy Scripture, openly taught and pertinaciously 
defended”.21 Jews and Muslims (dangerous as they were) were not regarded 
as heretics, because they were born as Jews or Muslims; they had not chosen 
to stray from the true faith, like heretics. Heretics had been baptized, but 
chose to turn away from the church. As such, they were a much greater 
threat to the unity and stability of the religious community, which accounts 
for the (even) greater degree of intolerance suffered by heretics in 
comparison to Jews and Muslims. The definition offered by Grosseteste can 
also serve to explain why all kinds of pagan beliefs and practices survived 
throughout the Middle Ages. They did not have the articulate character of 
opinions, and were not usually ‘openly taught and pertinaciously defended’; 
they were simply part of everyday life and therefore openly but not conspicuously 
present. These pagan beliefs generally did not assert themselves aggressively, 
nor did they turn against the Christian faith, offering themselves as an 
alternative. The church (in the form of local priests) often responded to the 
old pagan traditions with mild attempts to subdue them, but more 
importantly with a policy of transformation and integration. Elements of 
pagan beliefs and practices that could not be eradicated were given a new, 
Christian meaning.22 Parish priests had to allow that “[t]he churchyard was 
the place for games and sports; even such holidays as contained considerable 
                                                 
20 Zagorin (2003), 28-29. The ‘compelle intrare’ of Luke 14 would also become a 
returning element in toleration debates. 
21 Ibid., 40. 
22 See, for instance, Wessels (1994). Wessels points out that there were two attitudes 
towards existing religions, one represented by the missionary Bonifatius, who 
wanted to eradicate everything that was not Christian, the other by Pope Gregory I 
the Great, who favoured a policy of saving anything that was not directly contrary to 
Christian faith. See also Künzel (1986), and Van Deursen (1986). 
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pagan elements were celebrated here…”23 Finally, there was a considerable 
interest in magic – not just the natural magic of herbs – among both worldly 
and spiritual dignitaries. Thomas à Becket, for instance, regularly consulted 
soothsayers.24 
 Heresy was considered to be much worse than the mere 
continuation of pagan tradition (in a Christian guise or not) by the 
uneducated. The old heresies Augustine faced had been subdued in the early 
Middle Ages; the problem returned in (roughly) the twelfth century, with the 
emergence of a new spirituality. St. Francis, for example, trying to model his 
way of life after that of Christ and the apostles, represented an anti-
materialist religious movement (a devotional movement, as they are often 
called) with strong mystic overtones. He came close to being condemned as 
a heretic. The greatest threat for the church, at least in its own perception, 
came in the form of the ‘new Manichaeism’ of the ‘Great Heresy’ of the 
Cathars, a movement that was especially strong in France, where they were 
also known as ‘Bulgares’, ‘bogri’, ‘bugres’ and ‘bougres’ – the latter term 
becoming an equivalent of ‘heretics’.25 Cathars, ‘the pure’, challenged 
Catholic religious doctrines. As Stoyanov says, they “shared with reformist 
sectarians [like St. Francis, AS] the pursuit of apostolic life, piety and 
asceticism coupled with opposition to the church hierarchy, which was 
deemed to have abandoned the apostolic traditions”.26 What the Cathars did 
not share with other reformists was the dualism to which they owed their 
reputation as ‘new Manichaeans’. With their view of the universe as a 
battleground for the opposed forces of Good and Evil (whether given 
Christian names or not), the Cathars reminded the established church of its 
old enemy, Manichaeism. To counter the threat posed by the Great Heresy, 
the church ‘founded’ (this term is an overstatement, as Zagorin points out27) 
the Inquisition, which would become an increasingly powerful instrument 
and also an increasingly autonomous institution. Members of the Inquisition 
had the power and the mandate to question people using all conceivable 
methods of interrogation. If found guilty, a victim of the Inquisition that 
would not confess to the error of his or her ways was handed over to the 
worldly authorities to be executed. The Inquisition could force unwilling 
government officials to cooperate by threatening them with 
excommunication. The later Middle Ages were a time of increasing 
theoretical dogmaticism and practical intolerance, and it is worth noticing, as 
                                                 
23 Gurevich (1997), 79. 
24 Hattinga van ’t Sant (1988), 159-160. 
25 Stoyanov (1994), xvii. The terms ‘Bulgares’, ‘bougres’, et cetera, refer to the mainly 
Bulgarian origin of Bogimilism, a form of ‘new Manichaeism’ which by the 
thirteenth century had spread to Western Europe, and which resembled and 
influenced Catharism. 
26 Ibid., 1. The Dutch word for ‘heretics’, ‘ketters’, derives from ‘Cathars’. 
27 Zagorin (2003), 41. 
 444 
Zagorin does, that the hatred of Catholics towards heretics was returned 
(though unbacked by power) by those heretics, who saw themselves as 
‘sheep in the midst of wolves’. As Zagorin says, “[t]here is no reason to think 
that heretics were more tolerant than their persecutors”.28 
 The issue of toleration came to its full poignancy when the church 
was confronted with the reality of an ineradicable religious pluralism.29 To 
bring about a situation of religious pluralism, however, was never the 
intention of Luther and other reformers. The word ‘Reformation’ itself 
shows what the movement intended.30 Luther hoped that the church would 
mend its ways and return to a pre-corrupted state. Things turned out rather 
differently. The church faced a new division (after the schism of 1054 that 
was also, conveniently perhaps, a territorial schism): there were now Catholic 
churches and Protestant churches. Catholics and Protestants were equally 
intolerant towards each other; they did not agree to differ, but they agreed on 
one thing: that the other party was wrong. Lecler notes that in 1525 Luther 
denominated the conscience of the capitulars of Altenburg, who appealed to 
their conscience to retain the right to celebrate mass, as “erdichtetes 
Gewissen”: fictional or fictitious conscience. Luther would recognize only 
one argument, which was a justification of their conscience by appeal to the 
Bible.31 This is an important thing to notice, because it shows the 
preoccupation with certainty that was typical of the period. Luther wanted 
their arguments to have a solid and certain foundation: the Bible. Moreover, 
he thought that everyone who would take the trouble to read the Bible 
carefully would come to the same conclusions. The doctrinalization that 
occurred in the scholastic period had been indicative of an attempt to 
pinpoint the meaning of things and words. In the same period, the meanings 
of ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ reading were transformed and a great emphasis 
came to lie on the ‘literal’ meaning of texts in its new sense (the modern 
sense) of the word. The late Middle Ages also saw the beginnings of modern 
natural science. All these developments are indicative of a climate of thought 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 36. 
29 On a more academic level, pluralism had already replaced a metaphysical 
‘community of assumptions’, as Gordon Leff points out. The breakdown of this 
community of assumptions occurred in the fourteenth century, though it was 
prepared in the thirteenth. Leff also remarks, interestingly, that “the so-called Latin 
Averroists in the 1260s and 1270s, before their condemnation in 1277, was a more 
direct challenge to a Christian outlook than anything in the fourteenth century. The 
Latin Averroists, however, represented the negation of a Christian framework at all, 
hence their suppression. The re-orientation that came with the fourteenth century on 
the other hand was precisely through redefining that framework above all in its 
foundations of being, knowledge, and belief.” (Leff [1976], 9.) 
30 ‘Reformation’ is a sixteenth century label for the movement, though not a label 
devised in advance, of course. 
31 Lecler (1977), 346. 
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that must be characterized as increasingly rigid and preoccupied with a new 
kind of certainty; not the certainty of faith that persisted despite the human 
inability to understand what was divine, but a certainty of human 
understanding.32 On a political level, this climate of thought appeared in the 
form of more and more desperate attempts to retain control, including a 
control over the minds of men, for which the Inquisition was called into 
existence. 
 Luther was not a tolerant man, nor did he ask for tolerance; he 
wanted to reform. The freedom of conscience he promised to true Christians 
may remind us of its Stoic precursor. The Stoics thought that one should 
follow conscience (to say ‘one’s conscience’ would be an anachronism), but 
this had no political or juridical implications. Their concern lay with man’s 
interior, with spiritual freedom, undisturbed by external circumstances.33 
Similarly, Luther’s Christian freedom was also primarily a freedom despite the 
circumstances. The first arguments for toleration, therefore, did not come 
from the side of the reformers, but from humanist scholars. Nicholas of 
Cusa (1401-1464), whose thought also contains mystic elements, is an early 
example. He suggested in De Pace Fidei that all religions in essence come 
down to the same thing, which is clearly a basis for tolerance. Other mystics 
or humanists that pleaded for tolerance include Sebastian Franck (1499-
1542) and Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert (1522-1590). Perhaps the best known 
advocate of toleration – Zagorin calls him ‘the first champion of religious 
toleration’ – is Sebastian Castellio (1515-1563), author of De Haereticis, an sint 
Persequendi.34 In the arguments for toleration of these last three authors (as 
well as in many anonymous pamphlets and writings of lesser known authors 
from the same period), the phrase ‘forcing the conscience’ (‘forcer les 
                                                 
32 See Nelson (1969), 12: “Different and even contradictory as they were in many of 
their views and motivations, there is one critical sense in which the pioneers of the 
Reformation and the pioneers of the scientific revolution were at one. All – Luther, 
Calvin, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal – attacked the late medieval casuistry of 
conscience and probabilism of opinion at their very roots. Moreover, their attacks 
against every shade and grade of conjecturalism, fictionalism, and probabilism were 
put forward in the name of subjective certitude and objective certainty.” About the 
rejection of probabilism, see also Rose (1975), chapter 6, especially 72-73. Of course, 
this is only one aspect of the new science, which could also be approached from the 
perspective of adventurousness. In a sense, Reformers and scientists shared a certain 
boldness as well, and both had great confidence in their own ability to know the 
truth for themselves. As Nelson points out, subjective certitude and (a claim to) 
objective certainty went hand in hand. Reformers and scientists both threw off a 
certain kind of humility and a reverence for authority and tradition. 
33 See chapter 2. 
34 De Haereticis (Concerning Heretics, and whether They Should be Persecuted) was published 
in 1554. See Zagorin (2003), chapter 4. 
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consciences’ / ‘das Gewissen zwingen’) plays an important role.35 It is 
repeatedly said that ‘the conscience should not be forced with the sword’. 
Coornhert says: “Die ware leeraren en ghebruycken (…) gheen sichtbare 
wapenen (…) gheen menschen, maar Godes wapenen. T’is gheen 
vleeschelijck, maar een gheestelijck swaart.”36 There is a strange paradox in 
the way this argument is put forward in different places. Sometimes it is said 
that the conscience should not be forced; sometimes, on the other hand, it is 
said that the nature of conscience is such that it cannot be forced.37 These are 
very different statements, and the ambiguity that comes to light in their co-
occurrence seems to be indicative of a transformation of the concept of 
conscience that lay behind them. To say that the conscience cannot be forced, 
indicates that one sees conscience as something purely spiritual, untouched 
by external circumstances, but also without relevance to them. The other 
argument implies that conscience could be forced, and therefore either that its 
being extends beyond the boundaries of the individual’s mind, or that the 
mind can be manipulated from the outside. The latter notion of conscience 
is the one that lies at the basis of political-juridical notions of freedom of 
conscience; the former is implied in the Lutheran and Calvinian notion of 
freedom of conscience.38 
 The present subsection started with toleration. With the above 
considerations we have ended up at notions of freedom of conscience. That 
means that toleration turned from a negative into a positive principle. How 
was this principle supported, and how could it be sustained in practice? That 
is the subject of the following subsection. 
 
11.2.2. Zagorin’s question 
Authors on toleration disagree about whom or what to thank for (or to 
blame for, if you wish) the modern Western regime of tolerance (supposing 
that this does indeed exist). It is not very fashionable at the moment to give 
all the credit to the Protestant Reformation. More emphasis is laid on less 
idealistic factors, though the hardcore pragmatists are also already under fire. 
This debate is also a debate about method. Heiko Oberman criticizes Joseph 
                                                 
35 Lecler (1977), 348-351; Vermeulen (1989), 48-49. 
36 Vermeulen (1989), 49. [The true teachers do not use (…) visible weapons (…) not 
human, but divine weapons. It is not a bodily, but a spiritual sword.] 
37 Michel de L’Hospital claims this, for instance. See Lecler (1977), 350. 
38 It is possible that the argument that conscience cannot be forced was at least 
sometimes intended to make a conceptual point: force is irreconcilable with the 
nature of conscience. Insofar as it was an empirical statement, it lacks a certain 
realism. There are many things one can do to manipulate another’s conscience, and 
there are also many ways to manipulate one’s own (either consciously or 
unconsciously). On the other hand, history furnishes us with a number of examples 
of people who were so strong that their conscience could indeed not be forced, nor 
their will broken. In such cases, force may affect the body, but not the mind. 
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Lecler and his followers for writing too much of an intellectual history, for 
focusing on “tracts and treatises, on publishers and printers”.39 Herbert 
Butterfield quotes W. K. Jordan, who wrote as early as 1940: “The historian 
of ideas (…) must ever realise that a dozen works written in the heat of the 
controversy, or a score of pamphlets indited by sectaries gripped by a 
blinding fear, may not, despite their blinding intensity, be so significant as 
indices of the nature of cultural change as the cold verdict of a judge on 
assize, the casual quip of a Pepys, or the blunt observation of the squire to 
his lady.”40 Oberman replaces an intellectual by a social history of ideas, 
using as a heuristic axiom “that the limits of tolerance can best be measured 
on the margins of society”.41 The real idealists in this debate (or these 
debates) are found among the writers of intellectual history, but we cannot 
turn this around: writers of intellectual history are not always idealists. Lecler 
and Guggisberg, for instance, lean towards the pragmatic side. One of the 
most recent works on the subject is Perez Zagorin’s How the Idea of Religious 
Toleration Came to the West – which title already betrays something of where 
Zagorin stands. He wishes to defend the importance of ideas against that of 
more material factors in explanations of the origin of enduring religious 
toleration. Political expediency may bring about “a regime of coexistence 
between Catholics and Protestants”, but without the backing of “religious, 
philosophical, moral and humanitarian arguments” supporting and justifying 
toleration, the coexistence will not last. “In the absence of convincing 
reasons showing why toleration is right and desirable, the institutional 
accommodation and the change in individual and social values needed to 
establish it could hardly occur.”42 
 The previous subsection ended with a discussion of arguments 
concerning the ‘forcing’ of conscience. But the argument against the forcing 
of conscience is only one among several principled arguments for toleration. 
Vermeulen distinguishes two other arguments. The first is the old argument 
that faith can only be accepted voluntarily. The second centres round the 
idea of the value and dignity of the private conscience – this argument, 
Vermeulen says, is at the basis of the formulation of freedom of conscience 
as a human right.43 It has to be joined by a certain amount of truth-relativism, 
however, to become effective. For Castellio, Coornhert, Locke and Bayle 
(1647-1706), it is clear that no human being can authoritatively lay claim to 
                                                 
39 Oberman (1996), 13. 
40 W. K. Jordan, The Development of Toleration in England, 1640-1660, Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1940, II, 469, quoted in Butterfield (1977), 582. 
41 Oberman (1996), 29. 
42 Zagorin (2003), 12-13. 
43 We have seen that Plamenatz identifies other grounds for the idea of liberty of 
conscience as a natural right. 
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an absolute truth.44 Sebastian Franck thought that the ideas of heretics were 
always one-sidedly presented; even heretics must have held part of the 
truth.45 I will come back to the issue of relativism later; at this moment, it is 
enough to know that it was there, for now we can turn to the question 
Zagorin answered in the negative: were skepticism and expediency enough to 
bring about a lasting regime of religious toleration? I will not repeat the 
arguments from expediency here, since they have been discussed in 10.1; I 
have not said anything about skepticism, however, so I will shortly look into 
that. Undoubtedly the most famous skeptic after the Classical period is 
Michel de Montaigne. His skepticism with regard to conscience is evident 
from various passages. In his essay “Of Repentance”, he says: 
 
“Be pleased here to excuse what I often repeat, that I very rarely repent, 
and that my conscience is satisfied with itself, not as the conscience of an 
angel, or that of a horse, but as the conscience of a man, always adding this 
clause, not one of ceremony, but a true and real submission, that I speak 
inquiring and doubting, purely and simply referring myself to the common 
and accepted beliefs for the resolution.”46 
 
A bit further on, he states: 
 
“We, who live private lives, not exposed to any other view than our own, 
ought chiefly to have settled a pattern within ourselves by which to try our 
actions; and according to that, sometimes to encourage and sometimes to 
correct ourselves. I have my laws and my judicature to judge of myself, and 
apply myself more to these than to any other rules: I do, indeed, restrain my 
actions according to others; but extend them not by any other rule than my 
own.”47 
 
The most telling passage, however, is this one: 
 
“The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, 
proceed from custom; every one, having an inward veneration for the 
opinions and manners approved and received amongst his own people, 
                                                 
44 Vermeulen (1989), 52. Such arguments have a long history. Even in a work like 
the Summa on Ecclesiastical Power by Augustine of Ancona, of which the general 
tendency is to underscore the inviolable power and authority of the pope, some 
room is left for a situation in which the pope might be deposed. Furthermore, 
Augustine of Ancona (1270/1273-1328) agrees to the thought that “to judge 
consciences is not permitted to the pope or any man whatever in the present life” – 
he replies, however, by saying that the pope does not judge inner consciences, but 
outer deeds. See Augustine of Ancona (2001), 469 and 471. 
45 Guggisberg (1977), 85. 
46 Montaigne (1877), Book III, chapter II: “Of Repentance”. 
47 Idem. 
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cannot, without very great reluctance, depart from them, nor apply himself 
to them without applause.”48 
 
Montaigne is skeptical of an objectivistic view of conscience. He rejects the 
idea that conscience is a (divine) medium of truth. Instead, he sees 
conscience as private and subjective, and dependent on socialization and 
custom.49 Hobbes and Locke share this view of conscience.50 From the 
fifteenth century on, (moral) skepticism became an important element of the 
intellectual climate, due to people like Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), 
Michel de Montaigne, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Moral skepticism 
followed primarily from a recognition of man’s partiality towards himself 
(and those near and dear to him) and the role of the emotions in moral 
behaviour and judgement – a recognition that is most explicit in the works of 
David Hume (1711-1776).51 Perhaps the most succinct expression of moral 
skepticism or moral relativism is Locke’s remark that “everyone is orthodox 
to himself”.52 
 Though relativism and skepticism are not the same thing, they 
certainly belonged to the same climate of thought, and to the same aspect of 
that climate. If skepticism does not take its most radical form, and instead of 
denying that there is such a thing as truth halts at the stage of doubt about 
ever finding the truth, it may come down to a certain form of relativism – a 
form that says that everyone tries, in his own way, to get at the truth, and 
that none of us is in a position to judge, ultimately, whose quest is successful 
and whose in vain. A radical form of relativism may entail the thought that 
‘everyone has is own truth’ and that there is no truth beyond that – such a 
relativism comes down to more than a mild form of skepticism. So I will not 
distinguish between the two here, and treat moral relativism and moral 
skepticism at a par – they fulfil the same function in the advent of toleration 
and freedom of conscience. 
 Before we are in a position to answer ‘Zagorin’s question’, we 
should take a look at Richard Dees’ article “Trust and the Rationality of 
Toleration”. He shows that toleration was not simply a (or the) rational 
response to centuries of religious conflict. Dees argues that at the height of 
these conflicts, toleration was not rationally required at all. In fact, it was 
                                                 
48 Ibid., Book I, chapter XXII: “”Of Custom”. 
49 Which means that private consciences will tend to have more in common, the 
more they are formed in the same environment. 
50 Though Hobbes on occasion pines for the old conception of conscience as 
knowledge shared with others and seems to see this as the real meaning of 
‘conscience’, and Locke exhibits a much less skeptical view of conscience in his 
more popular works. See chapter 4. 
51 On the recognition of man’s partiality in Hobbes and especially Locke, see Dunn 
(1991), 176-177. 
52 Locke (1968), 59. 
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rational for both Catholics and Protestants to distrust each other. Because 
toleration makes us vulnerable to others, it requires at least a minimum of 
trust. “Trust, however, is rational only if we can reasonably expect to gain 
something from it – or at least, if we do not have to sacrifice too much for 
it.”53 In sixteenth-century France, it was rational for Huguenots not to trust 
Catholics, and the other way around, because it was very likely that the other 
party would betray that trust. Advocates of the ‘rationality-thesis’ (to give a 
name to the idea that toleration was the rational response to a long period of 
religious strife and violence) might say that intolerance was irrational, given 
the costs of it: all the suffering that the wars caused. But Dees points out that 
for both parties, eternal salvation was at stake; they were fighting for their 
souls, as well as for those of others. Dees concludes: “[I]f we take their 
religious beliefs and values seriously and if we recognize that they believed 
that salvation itself was at issue, their willingness to endure war does not 
seem irrational at all.” 54 Another reason why Catholics were not irrational to 
reject toleration of Huguenots is that they saw salvation as a collective good, 
and the church as providing the social bond of the community. There could 
not, in their view, be more than one religion in a state. Given the goals of 
both parties, distrust and intolerance were rational responses to the situation. 
What was needed to establish a minimum of trust and, on that basis, 
toleration, was a moral conversion. Dees speaks of a ‘conversion’ “to emphasize 
the essential role played by non-rational and merely causal factors”; “it is not 
the result of what people do, but of what happens to them.”55 Dees argues that 
battle fatigue “changed the dynamics for trust”.56 The incessant conflicts 
changed people’s evaluation of the benefits of intolerance, and of the 
importance of fighting for eternal salvation. The circumstances led to a 
revaluation of principles and beliefs. Perhaps eternal salvation came to 
appear as a rather distant prospect to endure so much for on this earth. In 
any case, the scales of the costs and benefits of trust and distrust turned. The 
government enabled the beginning of toleration by stepping back from 
religion, thereby assigning to itself and to religion separate spheres. The state 
found a way of securing its own power without the unifying element of a 
state religion – the separation of church and state was a separation of 
interests. 
 ‘Zagorin’s question’ is the name I gave to the question of whether 
skepticism and expediency (either alone or together) were enough to bring 
about a stable regime of coexistence between different religious groups. 
Zagorin’s answer was a clear no; he states that toleration may arise from 
expediency, but to last stands in need of principled support – the support of 
                                                 
53 Dees (1998), 83. 
54 Ibid., 85. 
55 Ibid., 91. 
56 Ibid., 92. 
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the ideas of Castellio, Locke and others. Zagorin, therefore, focuses on ideas 
in his work on religious toleration; he stands in the tradition of intellectual 
history. It seems to me that, though Zagorin’s argument is not incorrect, it 
would be better, instead of emphasizing the importance of one factor at the 
cost of another, to point out the interwovenness of the different factors at 
work. Zagorin provides two examples to demonstrate that expediency 
without the support of the proper ideas (or ideals) could not bring about a 
lasting peaceful coexistence: the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Edict of 
Nantes (1598). The failure of the first attempt is evident from the Thirty 
Years War, starting in 1618; the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 
testifies to the failure of the second attempt at peaceful coexistence. In fact, 
these examples can also be used to prove where Zagorin is wrong. They are 
examples of situations in which ideas (religious beliefs) still outweighed 
expediency, as well as arguments from expediency. More positively put, one 
might say that concern for the soul was still more important than economic 
and political interest, but this is again a half-truth, as concern for the soul 
and more worldly interest were not separate issues. So Zagorin’s examples 
cannot serve to show that expediency was not enough; in fact, they 
demonstrate that there was not enough of the ‘expediency-element’ present 
to bring about lasting peaceful coexistence and toleration. As to skepticism – 
or, as Zagorin calls it: “the growth of religious indifference and unbelief” – 
we can say that Zagorin is right in noting that a skeptical attitude may also 
lead to indifference with regard to toleration.57 In fact, however, skepticism 
played an important part in bringing about religious toleration. A certain 
degree of skepticism was a necessary element of the foundation of those 
idealistic arguments for toleration Zagorin attaches so much importance to. 
Many defenders of toleration out of principle held that no man could 
ultimately judge the truth of religious beliefs and that therefore no one could 
ever be justified in taking up arms against people adhering to different 
beliefs. A certain degree of skepticism, of truth-relativism, is at the basis of 
this defence of toleration. It is a crucial element in Locke’s defence of 
toleration. Locke’s idealistic argument that the state was not to interfere with 
the individual’s religious worship also implies a certain relativism, because for 
Locke the care for the soul had become an exclusively private business. 
Every individual was to care for his or her soul in his or her own way, 
because no one could do this better for you.58 No one, in Locke’s view, had 
any authority with regard to what would be the best way to care for one’s 
soul. Zagorin is right in emphasizing the importance of ideas, but we must 
                                                 
57 Another argument Zagorin advances against the idea that skepticism brought 
about peaceful coexistence is that its impact was “largely limited to intellectual elites 
and the educated” (Zagorin [2003], 9). It seems to me that this begs the question 
with regard to the elitist character of idealist defences of toleration. 
58 Recall Wolin’s remarks on conscience and interest. 
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take the trouble to look carefully at what the ideas were that helped create a 
regime of tolerance. In fact, many of the important ideas, of the influential 
arguments, were arguments from expediency. I have already pointed out the 
importance of the economic argument. Henry Kamen spoke of religious 
liberty “as a concomitant of free trade” and stated that “toleration tended to 
increase in proportion to the decrease of dogmatic belief”.59 Though they are 
somewhat cynically put, there is much truth in these remarks. The 
circumstances of the time go a long way in rendering intelligible why 
toleration came about, yet they were not uninterpreted circumstances. 
Political and economic expediency played a role also through arguments 
from expediency. Idealistic arguments are other indicators of the climate of 
thought and feeling in which toleration came to be regarded first as a 
necessary and temporary solution to pressing problems, and later as a 
valuable principle – they also show the influence of a new (or revived) 
element in thought: skepticism and relativism. Finally, it is important to see 
that the influence of arguments from expediency do not demonstrate that 
people all of a sudden saw the benefits and therefore the rationality of 
toleration, but instead indicate an important change in the beliefs and 
attitudes of individuals as well as governments. For the latter, a new 
perspective opened that provided religion with its own sphere; the former 
came to attach more importance to the things of this world – the shift 
expressed by Wolin as one from conscience to interest. 
 
 
11.3. HOW ‘FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE’ BECAME A POWERFUL SYMBOL 
The ‘secular’ notion of freedom of conscience arose at a time when 
‘toleration’ was starting to lose its negative connotations, and as a follow-up 
to the phrase of ‘not forcing the conscience’, which was used in pleas for 
toleration instead of that term itself. Though on the one hand it is true that 
‘toleration’ has also become a valued principle, the term is still shunned by 
some. For some people it has always retained an ambiguous, if not foul, 
taste. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in Was ist Aufklärung, stated that his age 
was not yet an enlightened age, but an age of enlightenment; it was also the 
age of king Frederick, “Ein Fürst, der es seiner nicht unwürdig findet, zu 
sagen: daß er es für Pflicht halte, in Religionsdingen den Menschen nichts 
vorzuschreiben, sondern ihnen darin volle Freiheit zu lassen, der also selbst 
den hochmütigen Namen der Toleranz von sich ablehnt: ist selbst 
aufgeklärt, und verdient von der dankbaren Welt und Nachwelt als derjenige 
gepriesen zu werden, der zuerst das menschliche Geschlecht der 
Unmündigkeit, wenigstens von Seiten der Regierung, entschlug, und jedem 
frei ließ, sich in allem, was Gewissensangelegenheit ist, seiner eigenen 
                                                 
59 Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967, 240 and 55, 
quoted in: Oberman (1996), 13-14. 
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Vernunft zu bedienen.”60 Kant preferred freedom to toleration. Similarly, 
Goethe stated: “Toleranz soll nur eine vorübergehende Gesinnung sein; sie 
muß zur Anerkennung führen. Dulden heißt beleidigen.”61 For the 
Netherlands, toleration has become an identity-defining characteristic. The 
Dutch are considered to be tolerant by people all over the world, and they 
(or most of them) like to think of themselves as tolerant.62 For Western 
countries in general, however, freedom of conscience is the more evocative 
term. 
 Paradoxically, our present secular notion of freedom of conscience, 
though historically more directly linked to the ‘secular’ notion of freedom of 
conscience that arose in the seventeenth century, in the wake of the 
toleration debates, owes an important part of its evocative power as a symbol 
to the radical religious conscience of English Puritans, and in the end, 
therefore, to the Lutheran and Calvinian notion of Christian freedom. In one 
phrase, the power of the symbol of freedom of conscience has its ground in 
a change from the idea that ‘conscience makes cowards of us all’ to the idea 
that ‘conscience makes heroes of us all’.63 The conscience of the Saints did 
not make cowards of them (however much talk of the worm or the fire of 
conscience and of hell there may have been), but it empowered them. In 
seventeenth-century England, the Lutheran conscience became a 
revolutionary conscience. Andrew quotes from several authors to 
demonstrate the antinomian tendency of Puritan thought; John Reeve, for 
instance, stated: “Whosoever hath the divine light of faith in him, that man 
hath no need of man’s law to be his rule, but he is a law unto himself, and 
lives above all laws of mortal men, and yet obedient to all laws.”64 Andrew 
summarizes the views of Laurence Clarkson: “swearing, drunkenness, 
                                                 
60 Kant (1968), 40. [“A prince who does not find it unworthy of himself to say that 
he holds it to be his duty to prescribe nothing to men in religious matters but to give 
them complete freedom while renouncing the haughty name of tolerance, is himself 
enlightened and deserves to be esteemed by the grateful world and posterity as the 
first, at least from the side of government , who divested the human race of its 
tutelage and left each man free to make use of his reason in matters of conscience.”] 
(Bold type in original. Translation from the Modern History Sourcebook, at 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/kant-whatis.html.) 
61 [“Toleration should be merely a passing disposition; it must lead to recognition. 
To tolerate means to insult.”] Both the quotation from Kant and that from Goethe 
were mentioned by Frans Jacobs, on the aforementioned symposium on religious 
tolerance that was held in Nijmegen. Jacobs shares their view, and holds that ‘the 
language of toleration/tolerance’ should make way for the ‘language of respect’. 
62 Arguably, both factual tolerance and the extent to which the Dutch like to see 
themselves as tolerant have decreased somewhat in recent years. 
63 These are the titles of chapters 2 and 3 respectively, of Andrew (2001). 
64 Quoted by Andrew (2001), 31, from Christopher Hill, Liberty against the Law: Some 
Seventeenth-Century Controversies, Allen Lane, London, 1996, 219. 
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adultery, and theft were no more sinful than prayer and praise if the inner 
light informed the soul.” Clarkson wrote: “No matter what Scripture, Saints, 
or Churches say, if that within thee do not condemn thee, thou shall not be 
condemned.”65 What these puritans claimed, was a freedom for their 
conscience. Andrew notes: “Enlightenment thinkers did not want freedom 
for conscience; that is, they did not favour the emancipation of intolerant 
certitude, religious zeal, and revolutionary intransigence. For them, freedom 
of conscience tended to mean sceptical tolerance, not an immunity or 
sanctity for conscience.”66 In fact, it has been (and perhaps still is) crucial for 
the secular idea of freedom of conscience that conscience retains an aura of 
sanctity; the power of freedom of conscience as a symbol has part of its basis 
in a Protestant concept of conscience. Even if secular thinkers now attempt 
to replace this basis by the humanist idea of the dignity of man, one has to 
bear in mind that this itself has religious origins. 
 Of the Puritan champions of the rights of conscience, John Milton 
(1608-1674) receives the most attention in Andrew’s book. Perez Zagorin 
almost seems to portray Milton, with his advocacy of freedom of printing, 
freedom of speech, and (limited) freedom of conscience, as an enlightened 
thinker that is only hampered from realizing the Enlightenment ideals to the 
full by his Protestantism. Zagorin writes: “[H]is refusal to extend freedom to 
Catholicism, an oppressed religion in England, is explained by his Puritan 
background and the legacy of religious hatreds left by the Reformation 
conflict from which he was unable to emancipate his mind.”67 Implicit in this 
remark, especially in the last part, seems to be the idea that freedom of 
conscience, in the end, is a product of Enlightenment thought. What 
Zagorin, unlike Andrew, fails to appreciate to the full is that Milton’s 
freedom of conscience is a Protestant (Puritan) notion of freedom of 
conscience, and that Milton’s pleas for toleration stem from his Puritan 
beliefs. Andrew notes that “for Milton, liberty of conscience means that ‘no 
true Protestant can persecute, or not tolerate his fellow Protestant, though 
dissenting from him in some opinions’.”68 To Zagorin’s question (from an 
earlier text on Milton) why Milton did not assign the same freedom to the 
Catholic as to the Protestant conscience, Andrew suggests that “Milton 
perhaps would have replied that just as thought is a condition of freedom of 
thought, so the exercise of conscience is a condition of its liberty”. For 
Milton, “the rights of conscience correspond to its duties”, and on the latter 
                                                 
65 Andrew (2001), 31. He quotes Clarkson from Laurence Clarkson, A Single Eye, 
London, 1650, Thomason Tract E614, pp. A2, 9, 12. 
66 Andrew (2001), 179. 
67 Perez Zagorin (2003), 224. 
68 Andrew (2001), 61. He quotes from John Milton, Complete Prose Works, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1953-82, Vol. 7, 420-421. Milton advocated freedom 
of conscience in indifferent things, and toleration of those who agreed with his faith 
in essential matters. This excluded the Catholics. 
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level, the Catholics have failed. Milton thought the conscience of Catholics 
poorly developed; Catholics lacked character and “the self-command he 
thought essential to Christian liberty”.69 Here, we encounter that same 
notion of self-command that figured so prominently in Smith’s Theory of the 
Moral Sentiments. It is not merely seen as a necessity and as a prerequisite for 
freedom of conscience – recall chapter 10, on the education of conscience as 
a solution to the problem of order – but it is also something both Milton and 
Smith take pride in. In Milton’s work, we see that freedom of conscience is 
bound up with a proud notion of conscience, which is both an achievement 
and the mark of a free agent. The religious idea of the sanctity of conscience 
was coloured, transformed even, by an activism that is the second element of 
Milton’s thought that stimulated the growth of freedom of conscience into a 
powerful symbol. Andrew speaks of Milton’s conscience as a ‘martial banner’ 
and states that “[t]he individualism of Milton’s championship of the rights of 
conscience became, through intolerant anti-popery, partisan collectivism. 
Individual conscience became partisan class consciousness.”70 Milton makes 
use of the idea that underlies the humanist idea of the dignity of man when 
he says that “no man who knows ought, can be so stupid as to deny that all 
men naturally were born free, being the image and resemblance of God 
himself”.71 Andrew concludes: 
 
“In Milton’s writings we see how conscience has become heroic or 
revolutionary. (…) The voice of conscience replaced both custom and 
traditional authority; individual interpretation of Scripture empowered the 
weak to challenge their superiors in the social hierarchy. The dictates of 
conscience engendered zeal, discipline, and the duty to overthrow popery 
and prelacy. Liberty of conscience meant political as well as religious liberty 
(…). Conscience dictated the violent overthrow and repression of those 
who would deny freedom of conscience. Milton’s antinomian and partisan 
conscience was the banner of revolutionary republicanism.”72 
 
 Milton’s influence may have lain in Britain, on the Continent, too, it 
were not Enlightenment philosophers who most furthered the cause of 
freedom of conscience. Andrew points out, as I have noted before, that ‘the 
leading thinkers of the Enlightenment’ thought of freedom of conscience as 
‘Hobbesian Erastianism’ rather than ‘Miltonian or Lockean separation of 
church and state’.73 He goes on to point out that Voltaire, who “taught that 
the first law of nature was toleration”, combined this view with the idea that 
                                                 
69 Idem. 
70 Idem. 
71 Milton, Vol. 3, 198, in Andrew (2001), 61. 
72 Andrew (2001), 62. The paragraph is not free from overstatement, but it captures 
the general tendency of Milton’s thought and influence. 
73 Ibid., 117. 
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the prince should have full authority in ecclesiastical matters. Diderot, 
similarly, thought that the state should control religion in all its aspects.74 The 
French revolution, especially in so far as it became a popular movement, 
with its battle cry of ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’, was much more inspired 
by the thought of Rousseau than by that of clear-cut Enlightenment 
philosophers.75 Robespierre and Saint-Just, members of the Committee of 
Public Safety in France after 1792, were, in Hampson’s words, ‘devotees of 
Rousseau’. Rousseau stressed the importance of an ‘Inner Voice’, a voice of 
nature that everyone has: “Whatever I feel to be right is right. Whatever I 
feel to be wrong is wrong. The conscience is the best of all casuists… 
Reason deceives us only too often and we have acquired the right to reject it 
only too well, but conscience never deceives.”76 The voice of conscience was 
the voice of nature, a voice that people should learn to listen to even in their 
corrupted societal situation. This would lead them to understand how they 
should live together. In this ideal community, every individual would 
surrender himself and his private judgement to the collective, to the ‘volonté 
générale’. It was such a community that Robespierre and Saint-Just hoped to 
establish in France. The revolutionary potential as well as the popularity of 
Rousseau’s thought lay for an important part in its egalitarianism – an 
egalitarianism that was implicit in all natural law theory; everyone, peasant or 
nobleman, had access to the inner light and was able to judge not just 
himself but society as well, a society in which inequality was growing, and 
with it the call for revolution.77 
 The French revolutionaries were concerned with freedom of 
conscience, particularly in the sense that they radically opposed its corruption 
by the economic, political and religious establishment. Robespierre speaks of 
                                                 
74 Idem. 
75 Hampson (1968), 131, writes: “It may be argued with equal plausibility that 
Rousseau was either one of the greatest writers of the Enlightenment or its most 
eloquent and effective opponent.” As to the American Revolution, this was also 
inspired not just by Enlightenment thought, but by Protestant ideas as well. Andrew 
pays particular attention to the thought of the Quaker Thomas Paine, whose work 
Common Sense, Andrew says, “is an odd mixture of enlightened reason and Protestant 
conscience” (Andrew [2001], 136). 
76 Hampson (1968), 195. See chapter 5.4. 
77 The ‘inner light’ is a very broad symbolization of conscience, in which conscience 
is not restricted to the individual’s judgement of himself. Andrew rightly notes that 
the ‘moral sense’ of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, among others, also has this 
character of a social, rather than an individual conscience. Andrew (2001), 116. 
Koselleck would phrase things somewhat differently; he would emphasize that 
conscience had become a social force – that through the secret conscience society 
came to oppose politics (the state). Growing inequality was a source of moral 
criticism, because it was a symptom of the failure of politics. See Koselleck (1973), 
chapter 2. 
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“intriguers who purchase the consciences of the delegates of the people”.78 
In the Parisian Petitions to dethrone the King (August 3, 1792), “priests” are 
mentioned, “as agitators, abusing their power over timid consciences”, and 
the law of June 10, 1794, speaks of “those who have sought to mislead 
opinion and to prevent the instruction of the people, to deprave morals and 
to corrupt the public conscience, to impair the energy and the purity of 
revolutionary and republican principles…”79 Conscience gains new power 
from its association with patriotism: “the rule of judgments is the conscience 
of the jurors, enlightened by love of the Patrie”. 
 In seventeenth-century England and Scotland, and perhaps even 
more in eighteenth-century France, liberty of conscience becomes the battle 
cry of a new era – in France subsumed under the triad of liberty, equality and 
fraternity. Conscience offered the opportunity of resistance against political, 
economic and religious rulers. Compared to ‘Enlightenment reason’, 
conscience (both the Protestant and the Romantic) had an egalitarian 
character, which explains much of its popularity.80 Both Protestant, 
Enlightenment and Romantic thought valued individuality, each in its own 
way. Revolutionary puritan thought reveals just as strong a confidence in the 
power and abilities of man as an individual agent as the optimists among 
Enlightenment philosophers. The dynamics of history were such, however, 
that the Protestant background of the sanctity of conscience that served so 
importantly as a foundation for freedom of conscience, has been all but 
forgotten – freedom of conscience having become, in the secular minds of 
the majority of us, an accomplishment of Enlightenment reason.81 It came to 
be associated foremost with the secularized human rights discourse. The 
equality implied in the revolutionary conscience of Milton and Rousseau 
found an alternative in the equality before the law. This had been made 
possible by a separation of law and morality, but the very same separation 
implied that this equality did not extend to the socio-economic realm.82 
Nevertheless, it is part of the democratic order Western countries take so 
much pride in, and of which freedom of conscience is (to a large extent due 
to forgotten influences) one of the most powerful symbols.
                                                 
78 Robespierre (1997). 
79 “Parisian Petitions to Dethrone the King”; “The Law of 22 Prairial Year II”. 
80 Andrew (2001), 187. Another ‘equalizer’, as we have seen, was the separation of 
law and morality. Compare the association of conscience and equity in eighteenth-
century Britain, for example in the work of Adam Smith, but also in a popular text 
like that adduced in chapter 10 as an example of the economic language of 
conscience. 
81 It is only the Protestant background that is forgotten; the sanctity lingers, even 
after nineteenth- and twentieth-century (scientific) criticism. Andrew (2001), 33: 
“Yet the sanctity of conscience persisted, and may even have been enhanced, despite 
the questioning of its supernatural source.” 
82 Bloch (1977), chapter 22. I will take up this subject in 7.4.1. 
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12. Solutions to the problem of order 
 
 
12.1. INTRODUCTION 
Up to now, I have spoken much about freedom of conscience but little 
about its codification. This will be remedied in the present chapter, in which 
I will also turn towards the twentieth century. By the time freedom of 
conscience came to be seen as a natural right, it was no longer theoretically 
restricted to the field of religion, though in practice this was still the case and 
would remain so for quite some time. In the twentieth century, we see that 
practice begins to conform to theory, and that the connection between 
conscience and religion is loosened; better put: the restriction of conscience 
to religious convictions and practices is gradually undone.1 People are 
granted the freedom to act according to conscience in the civil domain, 
within the boundaries set by the law – or, in other words: the state 
recognizes that they cannot deny people the right to do so. An area of 
conflict remains, however, namely that area in which the conscience of 
individuals clashes with the requirements of law. Such clashes are partly 
regulated by the existence of legal provisions for conscientious objection. 
This is the clearest embodiment of the principle of liberty of conscience at 
present, and much theorizing concerning liberty of conscience is written with 
a view to the practice of conscientious objection and its regulation. In the 
form of provisions for conscientious objection, the state incorporates the 
problem of order within itself. By doing so, it also solves the problem to a 
certain extent. Disorder is ordered in advance. I have briefly mentioned 
Turgot in the previous chapter. In his thought, Koselleck explains, “[d]ie 
staatliche Ordnungsgewalt bleibt zwar in den Händen des Fürsten, aber nicht 
der Fürst, sondern ‘man’ entscheidet, was rechtens ist und was nicht. Mag 
der König immer entscheiden; man entscheidet, wann er nicht zu 
entscheiden hat. Das Gewissen bestimmt den Ausnahmefall.”2 In the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, as a result of increasing state power, 
conscience becomes the exception, and the state determines when and where 
an exception will be made for it.3 
 Montaigne showed that freedom of conscience can be a recipe for 
both order and disorder. The question is how to guarantee that it will be the 
former. This chapter discusses some relatively recent answers to this 
question. Niklas Luhmann’s answer will take centre stage. I will start with a 
                                                 
1 Note that in the twentieth century, this connection mainly entailed that 
conscientious objection was allowed if the objector belonged to a recognized ‘peace 
church’ or at least a recognized religious denomination. 
2 Koselleck (1973), 124. 
3 More about the relation between conscientious objection and state power will 
follow in chapter 14. 
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section on the redefinition of freedom of conscience in the twentieth century 
and two ‘pre-Luhmannian’ conceptions of freedom of conscience – if not 
pre-Luhmannian chronologically, then in spirit. 10.3 will discuss Luhmann’s 
thought and its adaptation in a fourth approach. I will end with a section on 
how to understand ‘freedom of conscience’. 
 Before I proceed with the above, I should answer some questions 
before they arise – questions that are bound to arise. I will confine myself to 
a discussion of German theories of freedom of conscience. Therefore, the 
question is bound to arise why I do not also attend to contributions from the 
Anglo-Saxon language area? Also, as I make ample use of Vermeulen’s 
presentation of other positions than his own, it could be asked why I do not 
also discuss his own views on freedom of conscience. To start with the latter: 
Vermeulen is mainly interested in the manageability of the legal principle of 
freedom of conscience and not so much in the philosophical foundation of 
the principle, which is my interest. As to the former question: it was not so 
much a matter of confining myself to German theorizing, as one of 
attending to what was available. There just happens to be much more 
German reflection (or output of it, anyway) on the meaning and foundation 
of freedom of conscience than there is in the Anglo-Saxon language area. 
‘But what about Rawls?’, one might ask. Rawls, indeed, writes about liberty 
of conscience and sees it as an integral part of his system of political 
liberalism – he even claims that “were justice as fairness to make an 
overlapping consensus possible it would complete and extend the movement 
of thought that began three centuries ago with the gradual acceptance of the 
principle of toleration and led to the nonconfessional state and equal liberty 
of conscience”.4 Andrew Murphy convincingly demonstrates, however, that 
“Rawls’s ‘completion and extension’ of liberty of conscience represents, 
instead, a retreat from the philosophical and political foundations of that 
movement”.5 Murphy explains that “[t]he possible role for any nonliberal, 
nonrational comprehensive doctrine progressively shrinks as a reader 
proceeds through Political Liberalism and Rawls repeatedly expands the scope 
of public reason”; Rawls even goes so far as to claim that, in Murphy’s 
words, “voting on the basis of one’s comprehensive doctrine is illegitimate”.6 
At best, then, Murphy concludes, “Rawls’s liberalism is (…) a belief-action 
split that has historically worked against liberty of conscience”.7 
 The fact that Rawls’ liberalism entails a belief-action split deprives an 
observation of his that could have been of interest here of much of its value, 
as it has become an isolated remark, contradicted by the tenor of the rest of 
                                                 
4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, 154, 
quoted in Murphy (1998). 
5 Murphy (1998). 
6 Idem. 
7 Idem. 
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Political Liberalism. Murphy presents this observation as follows: “At a (…) 
philosophical level, liberty of conscience serves as a necessary prerequisite 
for individuals to exercise their moral powers, to develop, revise, and pursue 
their conceptions of the good over the course of a lifetime.”8 This is a rather 
general remark, entailing a broad view of liberty of conscience – most of the 
time, people can exercise and develop their moral powers without ever 
needing to take recourse to an appeal to conscience; that is, without ever 
requiring the support of the legal principle of freedom of conscience. A 
common distinction in the literature is that between freedom of conscience 
as a metajuridical principle and as a principle of positive law. Luhmann’s 
notion of freedom of conscience, as will become clear, is metajuridical; it 
grounds and interprets the legal principle of freedom of conscience. Several 
other German theorists also express the first sense of freedom of 
conscience.9 Rawls’ conception of liberty of conscience ‘at a philosophical 
level’ is even broader. However, the interest Rawls’ observation might have 
had for my purposes is greatly diminished by the fact that Rawls does not 
develop its meaning; instead, he negates it. A last remark with regard to 
Anglo-Saxon reflection on freedom of conscience is that at least in the 
United States, by my knowledge, all development of the legal principle of 
freedom of conscience occurred by way of jurisdiction and responses (by 
judges) to jurisdiction; in other words, the meaning of the principle is 
constantly redefined in and by practice.10 
 
 
12.2. BEFORE LUHMANN 
Now that we must move towards a legal-philosophical discourse, it seems 
appropriate to say something about the legal career of the notion of freedom 
of conscience. Vermeulen states that freedom of conscience as a general 
human right was recorded for the first time in the Unie van Utrecht (1579). 
The term ‘freedom of conscience’ (in old Dutch: ‘vrijheid van conscientie’) 
was not used in that document itself, though. In later legislation, however, 
the thirteenth article of the document is interpreted and confirmed as 
‘freedom of conscience’.11 Vermeulen points out the importance of the new 
scientific ‘analytic-synthetic’ method for political theory. Applied to the state, 
it means that the state is analysed into its basic elements, which are taken to 
be individual (atomic) persons in a pre-societal state of nature. The synthesis 
of these elements proceeds through a postulated contract or covenant, as we 
find it explained by Hobbes and others. Due to such an interpretation of the 
state and its relation to individuals, natural rights accrue to these individuals. 
                                                 
8 Idem. 
9 See: Mock (1983), 69; Eckertz (1986), 257 ff. about Bäumlin, Stein and Mock. 
10 Galston (2002). 
11 Vermeulen (1989), 57. 
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Freedom of conscience comes to be seen as a natural and inalienable right of 
every individual.12 I have already referred to the importance of the separation 
of law and morality in this respect. This, Bloch explains, has two sides: the 
first is the separation of law from morality, the second the separation of 
morality from law. The first ‘freed the subjective rights’. “Der vom 
objektiven Recht freie Raum ist größer als der von Moral freie, der juristische 
Pflichtraum daher kleiner als der moralische. In diesem Unterschied 
meldeten sich die subjektiven als Freiheitsrechte, denen sehr viel weniger 
Pflichten gegenüberstehen oder gar eingeschrieben sind als den 
Freiheitsrechten in der Moral. Sie sind Naturrecht und haben sich genau 
jenen Teil Freiheit zurückbehalten, der zum Zweck der äußeren Sicherheit 
nicht abgegeben werden mußte.”13 The separation of morality from law 
relates to the external incoercibility of moral commandments, which is ‘used’ 
to turn these commandments into rights: “ist beispielsweise 
Gewissensfreiheit äußerlich unerzwingbar, so ist sie auch, wo sie auftritt und 
das Ihre fordert, äußerlich unverbietbar.”14 “Nach Seite Ihrer Pflicht 
(Gewissenspflicht),” Bloch continues, “gehört sie zur Moral, als dem Gebiet 
hoher Anforderungen, autonomer Normen; nach Seite ihrer 
Unverbietbarkeit gehört die Gewissensfreiheit zum subjektiven Recht und 
wurde so das Modell der Menschenrechte.”15 
 Vermeulen points out that the reach of the principle of freedom of 
conscience as it was laid down in the edicts, treatises, acts and proclamations 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth century was fairly limited. As I said in the 
introduction, in its most lenient form the principle prohibited inquisition and 
allowed not only domestic but also public religious worship – public 
meaning: in a church. The English Toleration Act of 1689 that followed the 
Glorious Revolution of the year before, Zagorin reports, “granted dissenters 
who believed in the Trinity (which was nearly all of them) freedom of public 
worship, preaching, and teaching. It did not, however, remove any of their 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 59-60. 
13 Bloch (1977), 261. [“The freedom allowed by objective (positive) law is greater 
than that allowed by morality, the juridical space of duty therefore smaller than the 
moral. In this distinction, the subjective rights presented themselves as rights of 
freedom, that had far less duties as their counterparts then rights of freedom in 
morality. They are natural law and have retained exactly that part of freedom that did 
not have to be surrendered for the purpose of external security.”] 
14 Ibid., 262. [“is, for instance, freedom of conscience externally incoercible, so it is, 
where it asserts itself and claims its own, externally unprohibitable.”] 
15 Idem. [“To the side of its duty (conscientious duty) it belongs to morality, as the 
sphere of high demands, autonomous norms; to the side of its unprohibitability 
freedom of conscience belongs to subjective law and thus became the model of 
human rights.”] In chapter 11, we saw Milton defending the idea that the legal rights 
of conscience correspond to its moral duties; evidently, he did not differentiate 
between law and morality. 
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civil disabilities, such as their inclusion from public office, and Catholicism 
remained a prohibited religion.”16 Things did not proceed smoothly in 
France either, with the withdrawal in 1685 of the Edict of Nantes (1598). 
Nevertheless, in the course of the eighteenth, and especially the nineteenth 
and twentieth century, freedom of conscience (in the sense of freedom of 
religion) came to be recognized as a fundamental individual human right in 
all western European countries, as well as in the United States. All these 
countries saw a separation of church and state, and came to recognize the 
equality before the law of different religions.17 
 In his presentation of the development of the right to freedom of 
conscience in French legislation, Vermeulen quotes from the first article of 
the Loi relative à la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat (1905): “La République 
assure la liberté de conscience. Elle garantit le libre exercise des cultes…”.18 
But, Vermeulen notes, this ‘liberty of conscience’ has acquired a different 
meaning from the old one of a minimum of religious freedom for minority 
groups, as it “now functions as a summarizing denominator for the secular 
state, characterized by the separation of church and state and by religious 
freedom for all”.19 In effect, ‘freedom of conscience’ had become a 
redundant formula in the legislation of the now secular states of Western 
Europe. Freedom of conscience had always meant religious freedom of 
some kind. In secular states, in which state and church are separated and 
individuals, irrespective of their religion, are equal before the law, there is no 
use for a separate right to freedom of conscience in its ‘traditional’ sense of 
religious freedom.20 
 In the twentieth century freedom of conscience does not disappear 
from legislation, but it is redefined along lines that were set out much earlier 
in theory but never effectuated in practice. The redundancy the principle had 
due to its interpretation as religious freedom did not mean the end of it. In 
fact I would say that in the twentieth century, ‘freedom of conscience’ and 
‘conscience’ moved closer towards each other again – or at least they had 
that opportunity. Freedom of conscience in its sense of religious freedom 
negated a large part of the meaning of ‘conscience’. Now, it could and had to 
open up again towards this part, in order to retain its juridical significance. 
 In the twentieth century, freedom of conscience is no longer 
restricted to the domain of religious action, but becomes the right to act in 
accordance with one’s conscience in the civil domain.21 This is where 
                                                 
16 Zagorin (2003), 267. 
17 Vermeulen (1989), 67. 
18 Ibid., 68. Vermeulen quotes from Z. Giacometti, Quellen zur Geschichte der Trennung 
von Staat und Kirche, Tübingen, 1926, 272. [“The Republic assures liberty of 
conscience. She guarantees the free exercise of cults…”] 
19 Vermeulen (1989), 68. 
20 Ibid., 71. 
21 Ibid., 73. 
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freedom of conscience becomes juridically problematic: “It was this conjunction 
with a narrowly delineated religious frame of action that made freedom of conscience a 
juridically manageable right.”22 At first, the problem was manageable, because 
conscience was still religiously defined – which meant, in practice, that 
conscientious objection was only recognized as such if it had a basis in a 
recognized religion. Secularization and increasing plurality put an end to this. 
In the course of the twentieth century, freedom of conscience could no 
longer be restricted to any specific domain. Also, it became increasingly clear 
that no substantial or material criterion could be used any longer as a test of 
conscientious action or objection. Instead, formal criteria had to be devised 
and used. That meant, for instance, that instead of judging a person’s 
conscience with regard to its truth-value, it became the task of judges to 
ascertain the seriousness of a person’s convictions – to ascertain, more 
accurately, whether the matter at hand was really a matter of conscience to 
the person in question. In short: the problem of order in its first dimension 
became pressing again when conscience burst through its traditional religious 
bounds; in its second dimension, as the problem of subjectivity, it urged 
towards a formalistic conception of conscience. 
 It took some time before theorists in general accepted the necessity 
of formalism (with regard to both conscience and freedom of conscience) – 
a formalism (in response to a necessity of formalism) that had been implicit 
in the notion of freedom of conscience from the beginning, though only to a 
certain extent.23 Vermeulen (partly following Mock) distinguishes four 
strands in German legal theory that tried to make freedom of conscience 
legally manageable – that tried, in other words, to deal with the problem of 
order – of which the first two fall under the heading of the present section.24 
Of the third, Niklas Luhmann is the main representative; the fourth is an 
adaptation of Luhmann’s theory. These will be attended to in the following 
section. 
The first strand is that of the ‘value objectivists’, who stick to a 
substantial definition of conscience. Vermeulen mentions K. Brinkmann as 
its most explicit representative. Conscience, in his view, is a “Wissen um das 
Gerechte (Recht, objektiv Gute), und Ungerechte (Unrecht, objektive 
Böse)”.25 This means that freedom of conscience is the freedom to act in 
                                                 
22 Idem. 
23 As must be clear from chapters 1 and 8, I reject a full-blown formalism of 
conscience. What this means for my view on freedom of conscience will become 
clear in 12.4. 
24 It appears that there has been much more reflection (or at least: output of 
reflection) on the subject in Germany than elsewhere. 
25 K. Brinkmann, Grundrecht und Gewissen im Grundgesetz, Bonn, 1965, 61ff., in: 
Vermeulen (1989), 163. [“knowledge concerning the just (right, objectively good), 
and unjust (wrong, objectively evil)”] 
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accordance with the objectively right view.26 Vermeulen further mentions W. 
Hamel and F. W. Witte as adherents to a ‘value objectivist’ view. 
The second strand of thought entails a ‘sphere-theory’, which 
attempts to delimit freedom of conscience by assigning to the individual a 
sphere in which conscientious action is allowed and outside of which it is 
not. Such a territorial limitation is suggested by Heinrich Scholler, according 
to whom freedom of conscience protects a certain ‘Geheimsphäre’ [‘secret 
sphere’], which is a part of the private sphere that is not accessible to others 
offhand. That does not mean that freedom of conscience functions to 
protect the privacy of individuals. The primary goal of the principle is to 
enable the individual to live according to the moral norms that compel him 
with the least possible added burdens.27 Scholler’s approach has the great 
disadvantage that it is, as Vermeulen notes and Scholler himself admits, 
impossible to tell where the ‘Geheimsphäre’ ends and the public sphere 
begins. Scholler’s criterion to determine whether a person’s ‘Geheimsphäre’ 
has been violated, is to see whether this person has been touched in the core 
of his being (‘Tiefenperson’, ‘Persongeheimnis’, ‘Kern der Persönlichkeit’) – 
a criterion, obviously, that does not eliminate the vagueness of the concept 
of a ‘Geheimsphäre’. Ekkehart Stein gives a different twist to the territorial 
approach. For him, there can only be one real limit to freedom of conscience, 
namely the freedom of conscience of others.28 Everyone, in Stein’s view, is 
free to act in accordance with the dictates of his conscience in his own 
sphere (‘Eigensphäre’), which must be defined by law. In relation to the 
state, a person’s ‘Eigensphäre’ is the sphere outside the ‘den Staat 
ausmachenden Wirkungszusammenhangs’ [‘functional whole that is the 
state’].29 This seems to suggest, but does not mean, that positive law always 
prevails over the subjective right to freedom of conscience. According to 
Stein, a violation of the sphere of another or of the state is only possible 
through action; from this follows, for Stein, that conscientious inaction is 
protected by law. Vermeulen rightly concludes that this view is unacceptable. 
It is impossible to separate each individual’s sphere from that of all others. 
Furthermore, the distinction between action and inaction does not hold; 
there are many situations in which inaction means culpable neglect.30 
Vermeulen notes several other problems of Stein’s view; I will not mention 
them here, but note one point of criticism Vermeulen does not come up 
with. What I find remarkable about the ‘territorial approach’, that attempts 
to confine freedom of conscience to a particular sphere, is that it seems to 
ignore the nature of conscience – and I can say this without presupposing 
                                                 
26 Brinkmann, 99, as interpreted by Vermeulen (1989), 163. 
27 Vermeulen (1989), 165. 
28 Stein (1971), 57. 
29 Vermeulen (1989), 166; Stein (1971), 58-59. 
30 Vermeulen (1989), 167. 
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my own view of conscience. Stein took the trouble to study the history of 
thought on conscience, but even that did not prevent him from suggesting 
the limitation of freedom of conscience to the ‘Eigensphäre’ of individuals. 
The point both Scholler and Stein seem to miss, is that conscience, in 
principle at least, knows no limits to its area of application.31 Just as we take 
morality to hold in any context (even though every practice also has its own 
rules and changes the hierarchy of urgency of moral rules), and because it does 
so, conscience cannot be confined to any particular sphere. If one met a 
person claiming to act according to his conscience in his ‘own sphere’, but 
only in accordance with external norms in the public sphere, one would 
certainly raise a brow. Such behaviour is rightly frowned upon; we expect 
people to act conscientiously in all situations. This does not mean that one 
ought to go to any length at all times to do the most conscientious thing; we 
do many things routinely, without much thought, and this is just as well. But 
when we run into a problem – let’s say that we are a civil servant and 
encounter a gross unfairness in a procedure, which only on very rare 
occasions will come to light, but is nevertheless much to the disadvantage of 
the very few individuals involved – we ought to act conscientiously (however 
one would want to fill that in in this particular instance), instead of blindly 
following procedures.32 
 To assign conscience to a sphere of its own is not a satisfactory 
solution to the problem of order; it runs counter to the nature of conscience, 
and thereby runs the risk of provoking disorder. That conscience, and 
therefore also freedom of conscience, cannot be limited to a particular 
sphere, does not mean that there can be no limits to freedom of conscience. 
Freedom of conscience is of necessity a limited principle – only, it cannot be 
limited to a particular sphere. The principle of freedom of conscience may 
apply in any context, but whether it does in fact apply, and whether, if it 
applies, it must prevail over other principles, remains to be decided. 
Luhmann attempts to provide criteria to help judges decide in these matters. 
                                                 
31 Luhmann: “[D]as Gewissen erfaßt alles Verhalten ohne Ausnahme.”; “Das 
Gewissen und mithin die Gewissensfreiheit beziehen sich auf alle Themenbereiche, 
mit denen ein Mensch sich in seinem Verhalten identifizieren kann…” – Luhmann 
(1965), 275 and 280. 
32 In his “Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency”, (in Philosophy, Vol. 
74, Issue 3, 1999, 311-329), Alasdair MacIntyre stresses the importance of such 
practice-transcending questions – questions that cannot be dealt with within the 
normative framework internal to the practice we participate in – that (he assumes) 
we must all face and one time or another (see Musschenga [2004], chapter 6). 
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12.3. LUHMANN AND AFTER 
 
12.3.1. Luhmann’s concept of freedom of conscience 
Social scientific approaches to conscience are sometimes presented as if they 
entailed a superior insight that finally, after centuries of vain toiling and 
moiling by clouded minds, broke through like a beam of sunlight. Ekkehart 
Stein states that “[d]ie kritische Sichtung philosophischer Aussagen über das 
Gewissen hat ergeben, daß bisher alle Versuche, als Bezugspunkt des 
Gewissens eine transzendente Realität (ein absolutes Sittengesetz oder eine 
objektive Wertordnung) nachzuweisen, gescheitert sind”.33 This is why, in his 
view, legal philosophers should turn to psychology for instruction. But he 
misses the point. The conceptual history of conscience exhibits a great 
variety of concepts, and this is neither surprising nor much revealing with 
regard to the value of those concepts. This conceptual history is not the 
story of a search for an adequate conceptualization of conscience that for 
many centuries resulted in nothing more than a growing pile of inadequate 
concepts, only to succeed in the second half of the twentieth century in 
finding an adequate, because non-transcendent, concept. A much closer 
approximation of the truth would be to say that every period in history 
generates its own symbolization and conceptualization. ‘The’ scholastic 
concept of conscience – the unity despite variety is what is relevant here – 
has not been falsified by later concepts; not even by formalistic concepts. It 
fitted the experience of that time, its worldview and its anthropology. This is 
not to say that it was representative of the experience of the ‘common 
people’. It was a highly artificial construct – but as such, it was typical of its 
age. Historically, few expressions and concepts may have been able to lay 
claim to the status of being a symbolization or conceptualization of the 
generalized experience of all; some belonged to a smaller segment of society. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual history of conscience shows definite 
tendencies; the concept evolving with the experience of the age. The 
different concepts that were constructed in the course of time were 
representative of the way people at each historical juncture came to terms 
with their world, which is all that the functionalist view could ever claim for 
itself.34 Luhmann, as we have seen in 7.3.2, did not miss this point. He 
understands his concept of conscience as the kind required by socio-
                                                 
33 Stein (1971), 43. [“critical study of philosophical statements about conscience has 
shown that so far, all attempts to point out a transcendental reality (an absolute 
moral law or an objective moral order) as a point of contact for the conscience have 
failed”] 
34 On the one hand, this holds true for my own concept of conscience as well; on 
the other hand, as it is meant to be a ‘meta-concept’, it does not merely depart from 
my own present experience of conscience, but attempts to do justice to past 
experiences of conscience, too. 
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historical circumstances, and intends it to be a solution to the problem of 
order in relation to freedom of conscience as it appears in his time. 
 I have called the previous section “Before Luhmann”, and this one 
“Luhmann and after”, suggesting a chronological sequence more perfect 
than it in fact is. Stein, for example, wrote his Gewissensfreiheit in der Demokratie 
in 1971, six years after Luhmann published his article “Die Gewissensfreiheit 
und das Gewissen”. Nevertheless, this period saw a transition towards a 
formalistic or functionalist approach, a transition in which Luhmann is the 
major figure. Other functionalist views refer back to Luhmann’s 1965 article. 
I will first explain Luhmann’s views on freedom of conscience; next, I will 
look into Vermeulen’s presentation and critique of Luhmann’s thought (the 
third strand of thought in German legal theory Vermeulen distinguishes), 
and his remarks on the adaptation of Luhmann’s views that constitutes the 
fourth strand of thought on freedom of conscience. I will conclude this 
section with own critique of Luhmann’s position. 
 What I will say about Luhmann’s theory of freedom of conscience 
presupposes what I have said about Luhmann’s concept of conscience in 
7.3.1. Luhmann’s concept of conscience is an attempt 1) at clarification, 2) to 
free the concept from the restrictions imposed by religious or moral content, 
3) to establish criteria that enable us to distinguish (in juridical practice) 
‘dictates’ of conscience from other subjective impulses, and, finally, 4) to 
scientifically reconstruct the experience of conscience and the plausibility of 
religious and moral terminologies based on that experience.35 The concept of 
conscience needs clarifying, according to Luhmann, because existing 
(conflicting) theories are not able to explain whence the authority of 
conscience comes from, given that the truth of dictates of conscience cannot 
be ascertained, and because of the confusion concerning freedom of 
conscience and conscientious objection that exists in the juridical sphere. As 
we cannot verify dictates of conscience, and given the way conscience 
functions, we must let go of any remainders of substantialist accounts of 
conscience. This explains the need for the criteria mentioned in point 3. I 
take it to be an important merit of his view of freedom of conscience that it 
is so consistently based on his concept of conscience. 
 Luhmann’s view of conscience presupposes a relative independence 
of the personal from the physical system, and on this basis he comes to a 
rather unusual conception of freedom of conscience. He explicitly 
distinguishes the ‘Freiheit des Gewissens’ from ‘Gewissensfreiheit im 
landläufigen Sinne’. The freedom of conscience Luhmann’s concept of 
conscience implies is the ultimate freedom to choose one’s own death; it is a 
                                                 
35 See for the first goal: Luhmann (1965), 257-259, 263 and Luhmann (1973), 223; 
for the second: Luhmann (1965), 258-259, 270 and Luhmann (1973), 224, 241; for 
the third: Luhmann (1965), 260, 284-286; and for the fourth: Luhmann (1973), 223, 
237-243. 
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‘Freiheit zum Tode’ [‘freedom unto death’]. But this is not a very useful 
conception of freedom of conscience in the juridical sphere, and as 
Luhmann does not think much of what is commonly understood by 
‘freedom of conscience’, he develops his own concept of ‘Gewissensfreiheit’ 
pertaining to the juridical sphere, which is also to be distinguished from the 
‘Freiheit des Gewissens’ in the somewhat dramatic sense explained above. 
Normally, Luhmann says, people hold ‘freedom of conscience’ to mean the 
freedom to act according to one’s conscience. But looking at the latent 
functions of the institutionalization of conscience as a fundamental right, we 
will, according to Luhmann, have to come to a different conclusion: “Die 
Gewissensfreiheit soll die Orientierung des Handelns am individuellen 
Gewissen nicht ermöglichen, sondern ersparen.”36 What does this mean? 
 Luhmann propounds a functionalist view of conscience and 
freedom of conscience in the context of his systems theory. Point of 
departure of his analysis, Vermeulen explains, is the maintenance (or 
preservation) and stabilization of the social system.37 In other words: the first 
dimension of the problem of order returns in Luhmann’s theory in terms of 
the preservation and stability of the social system. Luhmann looks at conscience and 
freedom of conscience mainly from the aspect of conflict, both intra-
personal and between persons and the state. Conscience, though functioning 
as a stabilizer within the individual, is a potential threat to the stability of the 
social system. The consistency that is generally demanded and expected of 
individuals can become such a threat when the state demands behaviour of 
an individual that would be inconsistent with who that person has been in 
the past, who she is and who she desires to be. The crisis of conscience that 
may be the result may have disruptive consequences in the individual’s social 
and professional surroundings. The principle of freedom of conscience 
functions to resolve conflicts that may arise in the described manner, or to 
prevent them from arising: “Die Gewissensfreiheit hat nur den Sinn, die 
Einzelperson und ihre vielfältigen Rollenbeziehungen gegen Gewissenskrisen 
zu schützen.”38 Hence the observation: “Die Gewissensfreiheit soll die 
Orientierung des Handelns am individuellen Gewissen nicht ermöglichen, 
sondern ersparen.” This sounds a bit awkward, given that conscientious 
objection, even if it is recognized by the state and an acceptable alternative is 
offered by which the conflict is resolved, is still conscientious objection, but it is 
merely the result of Luhmann’s preoccupation with conflict. It is the 
‘Entlastungsfunktion’ of the state to prevent that an individual has to go 
                                                 
36 Luhmann (1965), 271. 
37 Vermeulen (1989), 168. 
38 Luhmann (1965), 281. [“Freedom of conscience is only meant to protect the 
individual and his manifold role relations against crises of conscience.”] 
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through with his conscientious objection to the perhaps bitter end.39 
Luhmann states as a general guideline: “Die Folgen des Konflikts muß 
derjenige tragen, der über Alternativen verfügt, der also dem Konflikt 
ausweichen könnte.”40 Luhmann mentions Podlech, who took this idea a bit 
further and saw it as an obligation of the state to provide alternatives – a 
position which is in line with Luhmann’s 1965 article. 
Given the function Luhmann ascribes to (or calls) conscience, 
namely: guarding the identity of its owner, and given the (theoretical) 
primacy for Luhmann of the stability of the social system, it is 
understandable that his focus is on conflicts of conscience, the kind of critical 
situation in which an individual’s whole personality is at stake. We have seen 
what key question Luhmann associates with conscience: ‘Can I do this and 
still be me?’ This question does not arise in connection with habitualized 
behaviour, whether it would be approved of by conscience, or not. 
Conscience stirs when an individual is inclined to or demanded to do 
something out of the ordinary. In such a situation a reflective decision has to 
be made. For example, when a young man, who is a pacifist, is called up for 
military service, he has to decide whether to give in (and go against his 
conscience) or to stand by his convictions. When he decides to do the latter, 
that is: to follow his conscience, this would entail a certain way of acting that 
would probably have disruptive consequences in certain areas of his life 
(private or public), if the state would stick to its demands. In western 
European countries (among others), however, allowances are made for 
conscientious objection, of which the case above is an example. This means 
that the conscientious objector is offered an alternative, a way out, so to 
speak, by which means disruption of his private and/or public life can be 
avoided. In a sense, as I said before, the objector does not have to see it 
through to the bitter end. That, I believe, is why Luhmann prefers to speak 
of the state sparing an individual’s conscience, instead of enabling persons to 
act according to their consciences. It depends largely on when one sees 
conscience as active. One could argue that the conscientious objector in our 
example acts according to his (active) conscience anyway, whether the state 
makes allowances for it, or not. On the other hand, clauses concerning 
freedom of conscience are not included in the law to enable action according 
                                                 
39 A second reason to formulate the meaning of freedom of conscience in the 
negative, like Luhmann does, might be that freedom of conscience as the freedom to 
act in accordance with one’s conscience would be too broad a principle. Vermeulen 
(1989), 213, mentions Geiger’s idea that freedom of conscience should not mean 
more than that people are not forced to go against what their conscience commands. 
The coerced failure to act in a way approved, but not commanded by conscience, cannot 
be a problem for the conscience. 
40 Luhmann (1970), 19. [“The consequences of the conflict should be born by that 
party, that has alternatives at its disposal, and hence could have avoided the 
conflict.”] 
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to conscience in general. As long as such action is not against the law, there is 
no need for such a clause. Freedom of conscience is secured by law to 
resolve conflicts between individuals and the state, by offering individuals a 
way out of conflicts of conscience resulting from these conflicts with the 
state. This is the aspect Luhmann draws attention to. 
 Luhmann stated as a guideline or criterion for evaluating conflicts 
between the state (or another demanding party) and conscientious objectors 
that the costs of the conflict should be borne by the party with alternatives at 
its disposal. Vermeulen criticizes this criterion, saying that it is insufficient, as 
there are situations in which neither the state nor the individual have 
alternatives at their disposal. Luhmann stated that in such a situation, the 
right of the individual should prevail.41 Does this open the door to disorder? 
Does it leave the state defenceless in face of the onslaught of the subjective 
conscience? For Luhmann, the problem of subjectivity was never a problem 
in itself, but only with a view to the problem of political order. Now, it turns 
out that, far from posing a danger to the state, the subjectivity of conscience 
is not a problem at all. What matters is not on what grounds anyone objects 
conscientiously, but whether the objection is indeed a conscientious objection, 
which in Luhmann’s view means that the identity of the individual is at 
stake.42 The view that the right of the individual should always prevail where 
there is no alternative available to either party is unacceptable to Vermeulen, 
which is understandable, but it is doubtful how often a situation will arise in 
which there is no alternative whatsoever. Luhmann, in any case, estimates 
that real crises of conscience occur very rarely.43 Vermeulen goes on to say 
that Luhmann’s criterion is incorrect, because its consistent application would 
lead to the conclusion that “conscientious objections to involuntarily 
accepted active duties always have to be conceded to”, as the conscientious 
objector has no alternative that he can accept in good conscience.44 I must 
say that Vermeulen’s argument eludes me. In practice, it occurs quite 
frequently that an alternative is found that is acceptable to the conscientious 
objector. Many conscientious objectors to military conscription accepted 
alternative service. Furthermore, it seems to me that, despite Luhmann’s 
suggestion in his 1970 article that in cases where there is no alternative for 
                                                 
41 Idem.  
42 Another variant of the problem of subjectivity might pertain exactly to that 
question: is someone’s objection a conscientious objection or not. The problem of 
subjectivity would then not be that the ‘dictates’ of an individual’s conscience may 
differ from those of any other person’s, but rather that each individual would have 
her own subjective view of what conscience is and what, therefore, a conscientious 
objection is. Luhmann’s functionalist approach to conscience answers this problem 
as well, by formulating as a general characteristic of all conscientious objections that 
they are grounded in convictions that are central to the objector’s identity. 
43 Luhmann (1970), 22. 
44 Vermeulen (1989), 169. 
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either party the right of the individual ought to prevail, the general tendency 
of his view on the subject points towards another conclusion. If the state 
were to have to concede to conscientious objection too often, this could 
either lead to modification of the law(s) involved (for example: it could mean 
the end of conscription), or, with the laws involved remaining the same, the 
interest of the stability of the social system as a whole would prevail over the 
interests of individuals. Conceding to too many conscientious objectors 
might have a stronger destabilizing effect than the combined crises of the 
consciences involved would have. Given that the stability of the social 
system has Luhmann’s primary attention, being the very basis underlying 
freedom of conscience in his view, it seems likely that if in a certain situation 
the stability of the social system would be furthered by a less yielding attitude 
of the state, Luhmann would approve of that attitude. In the present context, 
however, Luhmann takes the situation not to be so. 
 Vermeulen suggests that Luhmann in fact uses another criterion 
than the one he puts forward in his 1970 article. In 1965, Luhmann made 
clear that a conscientious actor who breaks the law with his action must be 
punished without hesitation – in such a case, Luhmann says, it was up to the 
individual to find an alternative for his action.45 The fact that Luhmann 
thinks the conscientious actor breaking the law is punishable leads 
Vermeulen to conclude that Luhmann cannot be using his ‘criterion of 
alternatives’: “the conscientious actor, after all, has no other option which he 
can justify to himself in good conscience, whereas the state does have the 
possibility of granting him dispensation”.46 It seems to me that this is 
incorrect; if someone perceives an injustice or some other wrong in society, 
and feels that action should be taken to redress this wrong, this does not 
mean that there is only one way to redress it.47 It is unlikely that breaking the 
law is the only option, even if, in some cases, it may be the most effective 
option – the likelihood of which I will not discuss here. One can draw public 
attention to what one sees as a wrong to be redressed, organize protest 
marches, et cetera. So Luhmann’s suggestion that it is up to the individual, in 
a case like this, to find alternative ways of action, does not seem 
unreasonable. Vermeulen, however, thinks that Luhmann’s actual criterion is 
                                                 
45 Luhmann (1965), 283. 
46 Vermeulen (1989), 169. 
47 The problem is similar to that which McKinnon identifies as the key problem with 
regard to toleration: how can we understand a person’s opposition to something as 
one based in commitments she genuinely takes to be justified through what 
McKinnon calls ‘responsible belief’, while at the same time accepting that “other-
regarding action in line with [those commitments] is not justified”? In other words: 
how do we avoid the paradox of toleration, which entails that we can only tolerate 
what we (justifiedly) evaluatively disapprove of, and that what we disapprove of in 
this manner should not be tolerated. (McKinnon [2006], 33; 26-27.) 
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that of the damage done to the public interest or individual rights, which 
weigh heavier than the ‘interest of conscience’.48 
 This brings Vermeulen to the fourth strand of thought, which is an 
adaptation of Luhmann’s position. According to Podlech and Mock, when 
individuals are faced with legal obligations they cannot in good conscience 
fulfil, the state must offer them alternatives, unless these are not available or 
would lay too heavy a burden on society.49 This brings us closer to the point, 
though not close enough, according to Vermeulen. The central issue, 
Vermeulen holds, is that of a weighing of ‘legal goods’, of the 
‘Gewissensposition’ against the rights of others and public interests, in which 
the availability of alternatives is only one of the factors to be taken into 
consideration.50 We have hereby reached the fourth position, which entails 
an advocacy of the method of ‘Güterabwägung’, the weighing of goods, a 
method advocated by many authors: Podlech, Bäumlin, Freihalter and 
others. Vermeulen argues convincingly against the method of 
‘Güterabwägung’: it is impractical, as there is no criterion to be used in the 
weighing of goods; it is often unclear what exactly has to be weighed against 
what; it does not provide a solution for the problem of the ‘boundlessness’ 
of conscience – all in all, it “does not provide us with useful criteria to 
determine the limits of freedom of conscience”.51 
 I agree with Vermeulen’s dismissal of the method of 
‘Güterabwägung’, but not with his idea that “this is what the system-
theoretical approach in the end amounts to”.52 The question of the damage 
resulting from different possible ways of resolving conflicts is of crucial 
importance to Luhmann, but not in the way Vermeulen suggests. The 
concern with (system) damage precedes and underlies Luhmann’s arguments 
concerning the way to evade or resolve particular conflicts. Legal provisions 
for conscientious objection are designed to prevent or minimize system 
damage; particular cases are not judged by the criterion of damage, but by 
that of the availability of alternatives. 
 
12.3.2. A critique of Luhmann’s position 
One of the merits of Luhmann’s view of freedom of conscience is that it 
provides criteria to judge appeals to conscience. It imposes limits on what 
the state can accept as such an appeal and what not. As I said before, 
Luhmann accepts the necessity of formalism – his functionalist theory 
continues the development towards formalism that is inherent in the idea of 
freedom of conscience – while trying to solve the problem of subjectivity. 
                                                 
48 Vermeulen (1989), 169. 
49 Idem. 
50 Idem. 
51 Ibid., 172. 
52 Ibid., 173. 
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Luhmann does not revert to objectivist criteria; he does not try to get rid of 
subjectivity. He accepts subjectivity as a given, and argues from a system-
theoretical perspective that a) to allow some form of freedom of conscience 
is necessary for the stability of the social system – here we see the 
conjunction of the two dimensions of the problem of order, and b) the 
criterion for conceding or not conceding to an appeal to conscience lies in 
the availability of alternative courses of action to either party. The 
conscientiousness of objections (i.e. whether something counts as an appeal 
to conscience) is judged by the criterion of damage to the personal system. If 
the individual’s personal system is endangered, this constitutes a threat to the 
stability of his social environment. This is the final ground for allowing 
freedom of conscience. 
 Dietrich Franke criticizes Luhmann for de facto taking psychological 
damage as the criterion for conscientiousness; he takes this criterion to be 
too restrictive: “Es wäre eine nicht gerechtfertigte Verengung des 
Persönlichkeitsschutzes, wenn man mit der älteren Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverwaltungsgerichts zur Kriegsdienstverweigerung den 
Gewissensschutz auf Persönlichkeiten beschränken wollte, die durch den 
Gewissenskonflikt zu ‘zerbrechen’ drohen.”53 He goes on to say, with more 
pathos: “Der grundrechtliche Gewissensschutz läßt sich nicht auf ein Recht 
verkürzen, vor staatlich zugefügten Neurosen geschützt zu werden.”54 
Franke thinks that “the respect on behalf of the state for the moral 
autonomy of the individual should commence earlier”, and maintains that 
freedom of conscience as Luhmann understands it “serves less the 
protection of conscience than the protection of the state against 
conscience”.55 Franke goes to far, I think, when he speaks of the 
Luhmannian conscience as “von allen gesellschaftlichen Geltungsansprüchen 
getrennt”, as “das blinde Kontrollzentrum eines zersplitterden Selbst” and 
later on as “ruhigzustellende irrationale Instanz (…) staatstheoretisch an den 
Rand der Irrelevanz”.56 But with his general criticism he makes an important 
point against Luhmann. Should we allow freedom of conscience; more 
specifically, should we accommodate conscientious objections, because by 
doing so we prevent psychological damage in personal systems? Is this the 
                                                 
53 Franke (1989), 15. [“It would be an unjustified narrowing of the protection of the 
personality if, (in agreement) with the older jurisdiction of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
(highest administrative tribunal) with respect to conscientious objection to military 
conscription, one wanted to limit the protection of conscience to personalities that 
are in danger of ‘falling apart’ due to the conflict of conscience.”] 
54 Idem. [“The constitutional protection of conscience cannot be reduced to a right 
to be protected against neuroses caused by the state.”] 
55 Idem. 
56 Ibid., 15-16. [“separated from all societal self-assertive claims”; “the blind control 
center of a splintered self”; “irrational instance to be soothed (…) from the 
perspective of state theory on the verge of irrelevance”] 
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basis of the importance of appeals to conscience? That does indeed seem to 
be a misconception. In one sense, the criterion is too restrictive, as Franke 
points out. In another sense, it is too broad: it is very well possible that not 
to recognize certain nonconscientious objections could also lead to serious 
damage to personal systems. So Luhmann mislocates the importance of 
appeals to conscience – a problem to which I will return in part III. 
 Franke may be right in his criticism, but the alternative he offers is 
not very appealing. From his criticism of Luhmann, and even more from the 
rest of the article, it is clear that Franke favours a much broader 
interpretation of freedom of conscience, in which the triad of conscience, 
responsibility and democracy figures most prominently. His talk of a 
‘dialogical conscience’ (among other things) reveals that Franke uses the term 
‘conscience’ very broadly, and also very vaguely. It may be closest to Locke’s 
description of conscience as “nothing else but our own opinion or judgment 
of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions”. The ‘conscience’ in 
Franke’s freedom of conscience, has little to do with conscience as 
experienced by the individual, nor with any psychological or philosophical 
use of the term. On the whole, Franke’s view of freedom of conscience 
renders it completely impractical. 
Luhmann, in fact, scores better on the points on which Franke fails. 
Yet, I am not satisfied with his theory. I have made some critical remarks 
about Luhmann’s concept of conscience in chapter 7, that I will not repeat 
here. I take it to be a merit of a theory of freedom of conscience if it is based 
on a plausible concept of conscience. Luhmann’s concept of conscience goes 
a long way, but is, in my opinion, inadequate in some important respects. 
Recall the example of the singer objecting to the interruption of his career; I 
would say that there is something amiss with a concept of conscience that 
allows for this to be called ‘conscientious objection’. What would be gained by 
accepting such a concept, except confusion? This evidently has a practical 
side as well: if the objection of the singer must be labelled ‘conscientious 
objection’, then freedom of conscience is meant for this kind of case as well. 
It seems to me that Luhmann’s idea of freedom of conscience loses much of 
its practicability as a legal principle here. Add to this Luhmann’s mislocation 
of the importance of appeals to conscience, which is due to his 
psychologization of such appeals, and it will be evident that, especially if we 
wish to understand conscientious objection, we need to go beyond 
Luhmann. 
 
 
12.4. HOW TO UNDERSTAND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 
We have seen how the legal principle of freedom of conscience arose and 
developed historically, with philosophical reflection on the notion sometimes 
in the vanguard, sometimes lingering behind. We have seen how, in its 
meaning of religious freedom, it became superfluous due to the (virtually) 
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complete separation of church and state. Freedom of conscience arose as a 
subjective right due to the separation of law and morality. That morality and 
law are separated means that they can clash. In the twentieth century, this 
often took the form of a conflict between an individual and the state. This, in 
turn, usually occurred in the form of conscientious objection, for instance 
against military conscription. At present this is still an issue in many 
countries, though not in the Netherlands, where the system of military 
conscription was suspended in 1997. There are, however, many other 
contexts in which conscientious objection occurs. People may 
conscientiously object to undergoing (or, from the other side: giving) certain 
medical treatments, or because they cannot agree with company policy; 
policemen may refuse to take action against participants in a certain protest 
march; a civil servant may conscientiously refuse to marry a gay couple. This 
is when people invoke the support of the principle of freedom of 
conscience. From the side of the judges, it is an absolute necessity to keep 
the principle manageable and applicable. With both conscience and freedom 
of conscience being formal principles, a solution has to be found for the 
problem of subjectivity. In view of the variant of the problem of subjectivity 
I commented on in footnote 42, it is clear that judges need to have criteria 
on the basis of which they can decide whether the case at hand is really a 
case of conscience or not – after which, of course, they still have to decide 
whether to concede to the appeal or not. 
 I have brought forward Luhmann’s approach to conscience and 
freedom of conscience as the most valuable approach available at this time. 
He understands freedom of conscience as a mechanism by which the social 
system alleviates pressure on itself, by means of alleviating (or entirely 
removing) the pressure on personal systems – a pressure which, would it rise 
too high, could inflict serious damage on the social system. In principle, 
leaving aside Luhmann’s view of conscience or assuming that we have 
corrected for what I take to be flaws in his conception of conscience, I 
believe this is a valid way of understanding freedom of conscience. 
 When I ask how we should understand freedom of conscience now, I 
am looking for an answer that goes beyond the mere recognition that it is a 
legal principle, or a subjective right – which are two sides of the same coin. 
Nor am I interested here in ‘freedom of conscience’ as a symbol. What I am 
looking for is a metajuridical understanding of the legal principle. Luhmann’s 
view certainly goes beyond the superficial level; his is a metajuridical, not a 
juridical understanding. His approach reveals a certain aspect of freedom of 
conscience, and therefore helps us understand it. By speaking of an ‘aspect’, I 
indicate that the question of this section allows of multiple answers. 
Luhmann provides us, so it seems, with a pragmatic understanding of freedom 
of conscience. I believe that a more principled understanding would be 
equally valid; before presenting such an understanding, however, I would like 
to nuance the pragmatism of Luhmann’s notion of freedom of conscience. 
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This seemingly pragmatic device, explained in the somewhat clinical terms of 
sociological systems theory, must have a non-pragmatic background. For 
Luhmann, freedom of conscience protects personal systems, and by doing so 
it protects the social system as well – which is why the social system contains 
a mechanism like that of freedom of conscience. The stability of the social 
system depends on the stability of personal systems, and personal systems 
depend, for their continued existence, on the continued existence of the 
social system. In itself, this seems to be a circular argument. The only way 
out of the circle, is to recognize that it presupposes a ‘primordial’ concern; 
neither the preservation of personal systems nor that of the social system can 
be important without there being a basic concern for this preservation. In 
fact, as Luhmann would undoubtedly admit, freedom of conscience 
presupposes concern of a much less basic nature too. What Luhmann 
provides is a bare bones understanding of freedom of conscience, which is 
precisely for that reason very illuminating – much like an x-ray is. 
 I have stressed that I see it as a merit of Luhmann’s conception of 
freedom of conscience that it has a strong basis in an articulate concept of 
conscience. To a certain extent, however, the weaknesses of Luhmann’s 
concept of conscience will also be those of his understanding of freedom of 
conscience. I say ‘to a certain extent’, because in its bare-bones form as 
presented above, Luhmann’s conception of freedom of conscience leaves 
room for modifications in his concept of conscience. Nevertheless, while 
recognizing Luhmann’s view of freedom of conscience as legitimate and 
illuminating to a certain extent, I would like to counter its one-sidedness by 
presenting my own interpretation, which is directly related to my own 
concept of conscience. Luhmann may be right in asserting, from his 
functionalist perspective, that freedom of conscience fulfils a negative rather 
than a positive function, but he mislocates the importance of appeals to 
conscience – this has to do with conscience itself, rather than with 
psychological damage that is contingent upon being forced to act according 
to conscience. 
 My own interpretation of freedom of conscience is twofold, as one 
can approach freedom of conscience from the perspective of the state or the 
law (a metajuridical perspective), or from the perspective of the individual.57 
From the latter perspective, given my definition of conscience as a 
concerned awareness of the moral quality of our own contribution to the 
process of reality, including our own being, freedom of conscience might be 
defined as the freedom to shape one’s life in accordance with this concerned 
awareness. Concern implies that one takes an active interest in things; 
freedom of conscience cannot therefore be limited to a freedom from 
                                                 
57 This twofold interpretation underlies the distinction, in chapters 13 and 14, 
between aspects of conscientious objection on the personal-experiential level and 
those on the public level. 
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inquisition. It is, however, limited by other principles and rights. My 
interpretation of freedom of conscience from the other perspective is not 
new, either; it was expressed by humanists and by Locke, among others. 
Richard Bäumlin expresses a similar view, though I do not accept the rest of 
his theory.58 Given my concept of conscience, the most consistent 
metajuridical interpretation of the legal principle of freedom of conscience 
would be that it is a recognition of the non-absolute character of positive law.59 
Another way of putting this is that by acknowledging freedom of conscience 
a system of law recognizes the element of contingency in its nature, a societal 
order recognizes its limits. At the same time these limits are recognized, they 
are revealed. For instance, a state that acknowledges freedom of conscience 
is a state that can only play a limited role in the moral education of its 
members – arguably something with a downside as well as an upside. 
 The non-absoluteness of positive law is not met by the absoluteness 
of conscience – except, perhaps, for a subjective absoluteness; and it need not 
be. Freedom of conscience does not imply a view of conscience as a source 
or medium of higher truth. For Luhmann and many others, it has nothing to 
do with truth. In my view, in line with my concept of conscience, freedom of 
conscience implies (and is by many taken to imply) the possibility of a truth-
relation between conscience and reality – the latter meaning: that part of 
process in which the individual in question is more immediately involved. 
Without this implication, there is no reason for attaching any special value 
(as most people, in fact, do) to conscience or freedom of conscience. It 
makes sense to speak of the dignity of an idea or principle; to speak of the 
dignity of a mechanism, however useful, would be to stretch the meaning of 
words beyond its limits. 
 
 
12.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The legal principle of freedom of conscience, and legal provisions for 
conscientious objection, arose at least in part in answer to the problem of 
order. Freedom of conscience serves political stability. The subjectivity of 
conscience has long been perceived as a threat to that stability, but with 
Luhmann we can safely conclude that it need not be a problem at all if adopt 
a more formalistic approach to conscience. What we must not adopt is his 
psychologizing approach to conscience and appeals to conscience. That 
freedom of conscience supports political stability does not mean that it is 
important for that reason alone, or even primarily; similarly, that the 
frustration of a person’s conscience can lead the personal system to become 
                                                 
58 Eckertz (1986), 257. 
59 And I believe this might be extended so as to include the dominant morality, 
which, in the end, determines whether appeals to conscience are judged to be 
reasonable or unreasonable. 
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unstable and break down, does not mean that legal provisions for 
conscientious objection derive their importance from the psychological 
damage they prevent. The aim of part III is to come to an understanding of 
conscientious objection that is informed by the present chapter and the 
foregoing chapters, but locates the importance of conscientious objections in 
the right place. Only by doing so will we be able to formulate a philosophical 
foundation of conscientious objection. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part III 
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Transition to part III: Conscientious objection 
 
 
A case of conscientious objection lay at the beginning of this study, which 
searches for a philosophical foundation for conscientious objection. It took a 
while, but we have now arrived at the part of the book that treats of 
conscientious objection. Parts I and II of the book come together in this 
part. One needs to know how to understand ‘conscience’, if one wishes to 
understand conscientious objection. Legal provisions for conscientious 
objection are an embodiment of freedom of conscience; a historical 
understanding of the main problem(s) adhering to the principle of freedom 
of conscience deepens one’s insight in conscientious objection, both as a 
legal principle and as a practice. Contemporary theories of conscientious 
objection are largely responses to the problem of order in its two 
dimensions: political order, and order in the minds of men. They have 
focused especially on the second dimension, which I have also called the 
problem of subjectivity. This is not surprising, since the institutionalization 
of conscientious objection that took place in Western countries in the course 
of the twentieth century itself constitutes a solution to, or at least a way of 
dealing with, the first dimension of the problem of order. 
 Niklas Luhmann’s work is a clear exception: his theory deals with 
both dimensions of the problem of order. The dimension of political order 
shows up in Luhmann’s theory in the form of the stability of the social 
system, to the preservation of which legal provisions for conscientious 
objection are a means. To accommodate conscientious objections means that 
one relieves the pressure on personal systems; this way, the pressure on the 
social system is also diminished. The stability of the social system depends 
on the stability of personal systems and their immediate social environments. 
The latter is at stake when someone faces a crisis of conscience; when this 
person is faced with a demand (or social duty) to do something that he or 
she cannot do without losing their identity – an identity that was formed in 
large part in response to a social demand for consistency. For the sake of 
both this person and the stability of the social system, it is best to allow him 
or her to be consistent; that is, to allow the person not to violate his or her 
conscience. What this conscience says is irrelevant to Luhmann; hence, I said 
in chapter 11, the problem of subjectivity is not a problem for Luhmann at 
all. What matters is whether an objection is conscientious or not, and no 
substantial criteria are needed to determine this. For Luhmann, conscience is 
not a certain set of principles, or a drive towards a defined good, but an 
identity-preserving function of the personality. The question of conscience is: 
‘Can I do this and still be me?’1 
                                                 
1 Older views of conscience tended to focus on the content of conscience, and 
conscientious objections were therefore seen as liable to evaluation on the basis of 
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But instead of saying that the problem of subjectivity is not a 
problem for Luhmann at all, there is also another way of looking at it. The 
problem of subjectivity is the problem of order in people’s minds. ‘Disorder’ 
in people’s minds poses, or can pose, a problem for the state. It is from this 
perspective that we have looked at this dimension of the problem of order 
up to now. Luhmann’s view invites a slight change of perspective; it is the 
confrontation with the state that may cause ‘disorder’ in the mind of a 
conscientious objector. This is another kind of disorder; it is not disorder as 
it would have been understood in the seventeenth century, where a 
disordered mind was a poorly informed, unreasonable, or obstinate mind. 
The disorder potentially caused in the mind of a conscientious objector by 
the confrontation with the state is a psychological ‘disorder’, not an 
epistemological one. This is why the stability of the personal system plays 
such an important role in Luhmann’s theory. The conscientious objector is 
under severe mental stress; the theoretical corollary is that the strain he or 
she is under becomes a measure of conscientiousness. This is an undesirable 
feature of many recent theories of conscience and conscientious objection, 
and I will comment on this psychologization of conscience in the coming 
chapters. 
 In the following, I will not engage in a debate with a host of theories 
of conscientious objection. Some will pass in review, of course, and 
Luhmann’s theory in particular informs my own approach, highly different 
though it is. Like Luhmann and others, I have recognized the need for a 
formalistic approach to conscience. The symbol of conscience is a rather 
formal framework, which accommodates a great plurality of concrete 
symbolizations of conscience. My fluid concept of conscience is also highly 
formal. But in my case, the formalism ends at a certain point. Conscience is a 
moral phenomenon, in the broadest sense of the word ‘moral’; it is 
characterized by a concern for ‘the good life’ and ‘being good’ that expresses 
ultimate concern. I have drawn (and will in the following chapters draw) 
attention to the intentionality of conscience because forgetting this easily 
leads to a mislocation of the importance of conscience. Its importance 
derives from ultimate concern; but concepts of conscience that forget the 
intentionality of conscience are apt to locate it in the level of stress with 
which someone would be faced if (s)he were forced to act against his or her 
conscience. With a view of conscience as expressing ultimate concern, my 
understanding of conscientious objection is necessarily different from 
Luhmann’s. Some objections that he would (have to) label ‘conscientious’ 
would not be recognized as such on the basis of my approach. But, as I will 
also argue in the following chapters, there is more to conscientious objection 
                                                                                                               
substantial, that is, content-regarding criteria. Hence Brodhurst (1899), 31: “[I]s the 
State to bow to the conscientious belief which it has good grounds for deeming 
erroneous, to the probable injury of some of its members?” 
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than being an objection on grounds of conscience. Conscientious objection 
can be viewed from different perspectives; it is a legal principle, but also a 
practice of conscientious objectors. From both perspectives, a number of 
aspects of the phenomenon are revealed. Chapter 13 discusses those aspects 
that are not only central to conscientious objection, but also central in 
identifying conscientious objection, and in distinguishing it from other kinds 
of objection. In chapter 14 I broaden the perspective to discuss no less 
important aspects that are, however, less directly relevant to identifying cases 
of conscientious objection; these concern the relations between 
conscientious objection, the state, and the law. 
 My goal, then, is not to arrive at a unified definition of conscientious 
objection, but to draw attention to a number of important aspects of 
conscientious objection as we understand it today – aspects that are also, and 
often more clearly, revealed in pre-modern cases of conscientious objection 
(as we may, somewhat anachronistically perhaps, call them). The multi-
dimensional understanding of conscientious objection thus gained will 
inform the two case studies discussed in chapter 15, but these will also 
provide some new insights, and deepen the understanding of conscientious 
objection gained so far. Finally, these three chapters (informed by the rest of 
the book) will provide the material on the basis of which a philosophical 
foundation for conscientious objection will be formulated in chapter 16, the 
concluding chapter of the book. 
 Just now, I suggested that to speak of pre-modern cases of 
conscientious objection might be an anachronism. The reason for this is that 
the term ‘conscientious objection’ was coined in a modern (late nineteenth-
century) context, to refer to people who, on grounds of conscience, refused 
to comply with a demand made on them by the state, expressed this 
objection in a certain way, and so on. (The identifying characteristics of 
conscientious objection are discussed in chapter 13.) According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, the first documented use of the term ‘conscientious 
objector’ stems from 1899.2 I have also been able to trace it back to that 
                                                 
2 The OED (1989) gives 1899 and refers to ‘objector’ for the reference; there, we are 
referred back to ‘conscientious 1b’. The OED (1978), however, does provide the 
reference under ‘objector’, namely to Whitaker’s Almanac 400/I: “A conscientious 
objector to vaccination can .. escape all penalties.” The word ‘conscientious’ 
originates in the early seventeenth century, and is derived from the French 
‘consciencieux’, which in turn comes from Latin ‘conscientiosus’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1989). ‘Conscientious objection’ understandably precedes ‘conscientious 
objector’ somewhat. Moskos and Chambers (1993), note 33 to page 12, remark that 
“Peter Brock has traced the term ‘conscientious objection’ to military service or war 
to 1846, when it was mentioned several times by pacifists, antimilitarists, and 
political radicals in their relatively short-lived campaign against compulsory militia 
service and recruitment for the British Army”. They refer to Peter Brock, Freedom 
from War: Nonsectarian Pacifism, 1814-1914, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
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year.3 The earliest references to ‘conscientious objectors’ I could find (with a 
reasonable effort) concern objectors against compulsory vaccination (of their 
children).4 The terms ‘conscientious objection’ and ‘conscientious objector’ 
become widespread during World War I. Since then, the association of 
conscientious objection with military conscription has become virtually 
automatic. Cain describes conscientious objection as ‘refusing (military 
service) for reasons of conscience’.5 Moskos and Chambers begin their 
introductory essay to The New Conscientious Objection thus: 
 
“If the citizen soldier can be traced back to the origins of the modern 
Western state, an equally durable social type is the conscientious objector to 
military service. Conscientious objection is at the core of the individual’s 
relationship to the state because it challenges what is generally seen as the 
most basic of civic obligations – the duty to defend one’s country.”6 
 
Had the hopeful reader expected to find all kinds of conscientious objection 
in The New Conscientious Objection, this hope immediately proved to be vain. 
Merriam Webster’s dictionary, to turn to another kind of source, defines 
conscientious objection as “objection on moral or religious grounds (as to 
service in the armed forces or to bearing arms)” and a conscientious objector 
as “a person who refuses to serve in the armed forces or bear arms on moral 
                                                                                                               
1991, 319, note 47. I have found a rather unusual use of the term in Bray (1869), 
411: “It is a cow’s conscience that makes it want to toss every dog it sees, from the 
inherited effect of dogs’ ill conduct towards the cow’s paternal ancestors in bull-
baiting, which so universally prevailed in England fifty years ago. A cow has a 
conscientious objection to dogs in general, and she tosses her head every time she sees 
one, very much as some young ladies do at fast young puppies of another race.” (My 
italics.) A use of the term that is in line with later and present-day use of the term 
can be found, for instance, in “The Uniformity of the Census of Australasia in 1891” 
(1890), 315, where it is said that in returning the census questionnaire people should 
be allowed to write ‘object’ where asked about their religious denomination, if they 
have a conscientious objection to state their religious belief. Another early use is 
Ritchie (1891), 141. (The OED [1989] does not trace ‘conscientious objection’ back 
very far; from the nineteenth century, it mentions ‘conscientious deliberations’, 
‘conscientious scruples’ and other similar terms. The first reference to ‘conscientious 
objection’ it presents is from 1916.) 
3 See Brodhurst (1899), 24. 
4 See Brodhurst (1899); the description of Paul (1903) in “Notes on Economical and 
Statistical Works” (1903), 399; Dudfield (1905), 13. It is clear from the latter that a 
‘conscientious objector’s clause’ existed in British law. Paul (1903) is described in the 
“Notes on Economical and Statistical Works” as “[a] pamphlet, written by a 
‘conscientious objector,’ setting forth the views of his party, and endeavouring to 
show the impracticability of compulsion.” That ‘conscientious objector’ is placed 
between parentheses testifies to the relative novelty of the term. 
5 Cain (1970), 275. 
6 Moskos and Chambers (1993), 3. 
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or religious grounds”.7 Although this automatic association of conscientious 
objection with compulsory military service is still rather persistent, it is now 
also widely recognized that the phenomenon cannot be narrowed down to 
this sphere alone, and that there are conscientious objectors in many other 
area’s – medicine being one of the most conspicuous.8 Whatever the context, 
however, the term ‘conscientious objection’ usually refers to a fairly common 
phenomenon in modern democratic societies. In that sense, to speak of 
Thomas More or Socrates as a conscientious objector is an anachronism. 
 In a broader sense of the term ‘conscientious objection’, however, 
both Socrates and More are paradigm examples of conscientious objectors. 
They objected to a ‘state’ demand on grounds of conscience, and expressed 
this objection in a characteristic way, with the behaviour that is typical of 
conscientious objectors. Their cases, as well as other historical examples, will 
be helpful in determining the prime characteristics of conscientious 
objection, some of which are somewhat obscured by the procedural manner 
in which conscientious objection is often dealt with in modern democratic 
societies. 
 Throughout this book, and in part III in particular, I have tried to 
emphasize the unity and commonality of the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ 
conscience, and hence of ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ conscientious objection. I 
recognize what is ‘new’ about conscientious objection today, but like Moskos 
and Chambers people tend to exaggerate the difference between ‘old’ or 
‘traditional’ and ‘new’ (‘secular’) conscientious objection. ‘Secular’ 
conscientious objection only poses a challenge to traditional concepts of 
conscience. It does not undermine the philosophical foundations of 
conscientious objection. These have to be found in a view of conscience that 
encompasses both ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ consciences. 
                                                 
7 The OED (1989) defines a conscientious objector as “one who refuses to conform 
to the requirements of a public enactment on the plea of conscientious scruple; esp. 
such an objector to military service”, thereby recognizing a narrow and broad use of 
the term. The C.O. to military service is also popularly called a ‘conchy’. (This 
definition of a conscientious objector first appeared in the supplementary volume to 
the 1978 edition.) 
8 For a conscious limitation of the concept to the military sphere (or a conscious 
adoption of its common narrow interpretation), see Harries-Jenkins (1993), 67. 
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13. Identifying conscientious objections 
 
“Waar ik op zit te wachten zijn gewetensbezwaren! Wat dat zijn? Ha ha! 
Wat ik zeggen ga klinkt hard. Máár: het slaat de spijker op zijn kop. 
Of u doden kunt of niet.”1 
SONG TEXT BY DON QUISHOCKING (1974) 
 
 
13.1. INTRODUCTION 
What is conscientious objection? How do we identify it; that is, how do we 
identify a certain case as a case of conscientious objection? These are indeed 
two different questions. To know how to identify something is not the same 
as knowing what it is in all its aspects. If one’s interest is with the 
identification of conscientious objection, certain aspects of the phenomenon 
will step into the foreground rather than others. Some things may be 
identifiable by something that is far from essential to them. In the case of 
conscientious objection, however, identification entails that one is able to tell 
the essential difference between conscientious objections and other kinds of 
objection.2 The difference lies not in superficialities. In this chapter, then, I 
approach the first question (what is conscientious objection?) through the 
second (how do we identify it?). My immediate interest is with the 
identification of conscientious objection. Against the background of my 
approach to conscience, certain identifying aspects of conscientious 
objection will light up. This is an unusual phrase: ‘identifying aspects’. Two 
reasons underlie my preference for it instead of, for instance, ‘identifying 
characteristics’: 1) it avoids the reifying tendency of phrases like the latter; 
conscientious objection is not a ‘thing’ with a number of characteristics; 2) it 
draws attention to the role of the subject, of perspective. Because my 
immediate interest in this chapter lies with the identification of conscientious 
objection, I will mainly be concerned with identifying identifying aspects – I 
will come to the problem of how to do this shortly. The identifying aspects 
found can then serve as criteria to determine whether a particular case is a 
case of conscientious objection or not. In practice, this will often come 
down to a verification or falsification of pre-existing intuitions. It is not 
generally the case that we have no clue whatsoever about whether something 
constitutes a conscientious objection or not, and therefore apply a set of 
criteria to determine what is the case. But there may be doubtful cases, in 
which the aspects discussed below may help. However, the identification of 
identifying aspects serves another purpose as well: it allows us to point out 
                                                 
1 “What I am waiting for is a conscientious objection! What that is? Ha ha! What I’m 
about to say sounds harsh. But: it hits the nail on the head. (It’s) Whether you can 
kill or not.” 
2 This, at any rate, is how I will understand ‘identification’. 
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the essential difference(s) between conscientious objections and other kinds 
of objection. This means that the present chapter is an important step in 
arriving at a philosophical foundation of conscientious objection. 
Things are often easier in theory than in practice. This surely holds 
true in the case of conscientious objection, which is far easier to contemplate 
than to put into practice. In a more specific sense of the word ‘theory’, 
however, the theory of conscientious objection has always been fraught with 
difficulties as well. This is reflected in the flaws theories of conscientious 
objection tend to have. Much of the theory of conscientious objection up to 
now has, for instance, overstressed the intellectual aspect of it, and in 
conjunction with that its rational (and eloquent) articulation. Hence Don 
Quishocking’s sarcastic representation of a member of the committee 
evaluating applications for conscientious objector status: “Didn’t you just say 
you’ve read Marx and Engels, but tell me honestly, do you understand all of 
what they say? Don’t you merely have secondary education?”3 
 Theorists of conscientious objection have often tried to arrive at a 
single definition of the phenomenon. Only on the face of it, however, is 
conscientious objection easy to define. In Dutch literature, one finds 
definitions like the following: 
 
“We speak of conscientious objection when someone feels compelled in 
conscience not to fulfil a legal obligation. Conscience then incites to 
inaction.”4 
 
“A conscientious objection [is] an objection (…) that an individual has 
against an action that is required of him, because he feels obliged in 
conscience to act otherwise in the concrete situation.”5 
 
The latter definition is immediately qualified in a most curious manner, by 
the statement that this is only one definition, an ‘agreement’, and that other 
agreements are also possible. I would agree that no definition captures all 
aspects of conscientious objection, yet there has to be more to a definition 
than its being agreed upon. 
                                                 
3 My (rough) translation of: “Zei u net niet dat u Marx en Engels hebt gelezen máár 
zeg eens eerlijk snapt u alles wat daar staat? U hebt toch enkel MULO?” 
4 Holland (1989), 23: “We spreken van gewetensbezwaren indien iemand zich in 
geweten gedwongen voelt een wettelijke verplichting niet na te leven. Het geweten 
roept dan op tot een niet-handelen.” (All translations are my own, unless otherwise 
stated.) 
5 Gewetensbezwaren vragen aandacht, 12: “een gewetensbezwaar [is] een bezwaar (…) dat 
een individu heeft tegen een van hem verlangde handeling, omdat hij zich in geweten 
verplicht voelt in de concrete situatie op een andere manier te handelen.” (Original 
in italics.) The CDA is the major Christian-democratic political party in the 
Netherlands. 
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 In British and American literature, one encounters similar definitions 
of conscientious objection: 
 
“To refuse (military service) for reasons of conscience.”6 
 
“[Conscientious objection] springs from a person’s refusal to do, or to 
abstain from doing, what he believes he ought not to do or to do, even 
though the law commands the contrary, and this because he believes his 
very integrity as a moral agent is involved in disobeying the law.”7 
 
This last definition goes beyond Cain’s definition, in that it avoids the 
circularity involved in defining conscientious objection as objection on 
grounds of conscience. Definitions like the above draw attention to two 
aspects of conscientious objection that are most clearly separated by Carl 
Cohen, who gives us two definitions of conscientious objection: 
 
“Conscientious objection may be viewed as a legal pressure valve, 
deliberately devised to relieve the tension between deeply held moral 
convictions and the demands of the law, when that tension becomes 
extreme.”8 
 
“[B]y conscientious objection we mean simply objection that is based truely 
and deeply upon moral convictions.”9 
 
The latter definition is more reminiscent of the first three definitions 
recorded above, although it does not refer to conscience, but to moral 
convictions instead. In fact, reading on, we find the following supposedly 
rhetoric question: “What is ‘conscience,’ after all, but our blanket name for 
the personal governing principles to which a man is ultimately committed?”10 
 The above definitions point to two aspects of conscientious 
objection. Conscientious objection is always defined by reference to 
                                                 
6 Cain (1970), 275. This definition of conscientious objection (or conscientious 
refusal, as John Rawls also calls it, which is the same thing) is abstracted from the 
following sentences: “Since the era when Christians became reluctant to march to 
the drums of Roman legions, governments have had to face the problem of citizens 
who refuse military service for reasons of conscience. In the eyes of many, the right 
to conscientious objection is as difficult to justify as the right to revolution.” Cain is 
one of many who narrow down conscientious objection to conscientious objection 
to military service. Unlike other authors, he does not express his awareness of doing 
so. An author who does not limit conscientious objection to conscientious objection 
to military service is James Childress. See Childress (1979). 
7 McCloskey (1980), 536. 
8 Cohen (1968), 269. This view is similar to that of Niklas Luhmann. 
9 Ibid., 276. 
10 Idem. 
 492 
conscience on the one hand, and the relational aspect constituted by the 
public objection (in a legal context) on the other hand.11 Both aspects have 
to be adequately dealt with, in order to come to an adequate understanding 
of conscientious objection. In relation to this, we might point out a 
distinction between conscientious objection as a private phenomenon, and 
conscientious objection as a political-juridical phenomenon. Vegetarianism can 
be an example of conscientious objection as a private phenomenon. A 
vegetarian may conscientiously object to eating meat, yet he may do so in 
private. Here, the stress lies on the conscientiousness of the objection, not on 
the form that objection takes. It could also be called conscientious objection 
as a moral phenomenon. However, as a political-juridical phenomenon, 
conscientious objection should also have a moral aspect. In fact, however, the 
institutionalization of conscientious objection has led to an increasing 
distance between the moral and the political-juridical aspect of conscientious 
objection. Hence, with conscientious objection as a political-juridical 
phenomenon, the emphasis lies more on the relational aspect of the public 
objection in a legal context, than on the experience of conscience underlying 
the objection. To correct this, while in this chapter the focus lies on 
conscientious objection of the public form, that is, on the political-juridical 
phenomenon of conscientious objection, and not on phenomena like 
vegetarianism (that constitute a form of conscientious objection in their own 
right), the moral reality of conscientious objection will not be lost sight of. In 
fact, the first thing to do when embarking on an analysis of conscientious 
objection is to make clear what one means by ‘conscience’. 
 Carl Cohen’s definition of conscience will not do. It may often be 
used as a blanket name for all sorts of things, but in the first part of this 
book I believe to have shown that conscience has always been something 
other and more than that. To see conscience as a blanket name for ‘personal 
governing principles to which one is ultimately committed’ is a sign of 
philosophical forgetfulness, the product of a history that has forgotten itself. 
It is also an example of reification, of the illegitimate indicative use of the 
word conscience. Furthermore, with its reference to ‘principles’ it is an 
example of an overly intellectual understanding of conscience. What Cohen 
did get right is the element of ultimate commitment, or, as I have called it, 
ultimate concern. As an alternative to views like Cohen’s, I have proposed 
that we see conscience first of all as a symbol, engendered by a certain class 
of experiences. I have identified three core elements of the symbol of 
conscience, these being: 1) the element of ultimate concern; 2) the element 
of the witness; and 3) the element of intimacy. The element of ultimate 
                                                 
11 Cf. also Harries-Jenkins (1993), 67: “In essence, conscientious objection is the 
articulation by an individual of a set of highly internalized attitudes in response to a 
particular stimulus.” He then goes on, however, to narrow the concept down to 
conscientious objection against military service. 
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concern typically comes in one of two guises: that of authority or that of 
inspiration – they are, however, not necessarily mutually exclusive. The 
element of intimacy also tends to manifest itself in one of two forms: secrecy 
and privacy.12 On this basis, I constructed my own (fluid) concept of 
conscience. I proposed to view conscience as a mode of consciousness.13 As 
a ‘definition’ of conscience, I suggested that conscience is a concerned awareness of 
the moral quality of our own contribution to the process of reality, including our own being. 
 That conscience first of all needs to be understood symbolically entails 
that we must also recognize the symbolic element in conscientious 
objection.14 An appeal to conscience in the form of conscientious objection 
must be seen as a symbolic expression of ultimate concern, of the experience 
of transcendent value in relation to the objector’s own concrete situation.15 
The dominant present-day understanding of conscience, however, is such 
that the symbolic character of appeals to conscience will often go unnoticed, 
both by the appellant and his audience. The procedural manner in which 
cases of conscientious objection are dealt with, especially in traditionally 
lenient countries, aggravates this effect.16 
 Herein lies a reason for looking at older examples of conscientious 
objection with a view to an analysis of the most important aspects of 
conscientious objection.17 As I said before, I will be primarily concerned with 
those aspects that stand out as identifying characteristics of conscientious 
objection. Once in this chapter, and in chapter 14 as a whole, I will look at 
                                                 
12 See chapter 1. 
13 See chapter 8. 
14 This is an uncommon approach, but I have found a precedent in Rabinowitz 
(1951), 364: “In only four states is there law requiring schools to make the course in 
military science compulsory. In the remaining states it is possible to establish a 
rational system for recognizing the claims of all those who assert they are 
conscientious objectors regardless of the symbol being invoked by the individual as a 
sanction for his behavior; there is no need to discriminate between the religious and 
non-religious conscientious objector.” (See also ibid., footnote 19, where Rabinowitz 
invokes psychological support for this view.) 
15 It is worth noting that in the U.S. vs. Seeger case the Supreme Court defended its 
liberal interpretation of the ‘Supreme Being’ clause of the 1948 Selective Service act 
by reference to Tillich’s work. On Tillich’s view of religion and faith, Seeger’s 
objections were religious in character in the sense that they related to an ultimate 
concern. See Cain (1970), 301; on the same, but without mention of Tillich, cf. Sherk 
(1968), 20-21. 
16 Traditionally lenient countries are The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
Scandinavian countries, and Great Britain. See Mellors and McKean (1982), and (for 
the reference to Britain) Cain (1970), 288: “[I]t is probably easier to challenge the 
authority of the state and get away with it in England than in any other European 
country.” 
17 By which I do not intend to say that contemporary cases are by definition less 
suitable for such an analysis. 
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aspects that are less immediately visible, though certainly not less central to 
the phenomenon. The main question in the present chapter is: how do we 
recognize or identify cases of conscientious objection?18 I will answer this 
question not by giving a precise definition of conscientious objection, but by 
discussing a number of central aspects of conscientious objection that 
(against the background of my approach to conscience) stand out clearly, and 
so can serve as identifiers of cases of conscientious objection. 
 These identifiers may lie (predominantly) on a personal-experiential 
level, or on a public level. There is no solid border between these levels, but 
in most cases it will be clear whether an aspect belongs to the public side of 
conscientious objection, or on the personal-experiential side. 
How do I come by these aspects? If I answer: from an analysis of 
cases of conscientious objection, the question begged is: “How can you 
identify these cases, before knowing what conscientious objection is?” It is a 
familiar problem in the history of philosophy. Heidegger struggled with the 
same problem in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.19 (‘Struggled’ is perhaps too 
much to say; he recognized the problem and dealt with it quite quickly and 
confidently.) Heidegger wished to know the origin of the work of art; that is, 
the source of its essential being. The question regarding the origin of the 
work of art, Heidegger explains, becomes the question as to the essence of 
art. How do we come to know the essence of art? By looking at works of art; 
by making a list of them and comparing them with a view to what they have 
in common. But how can we recognize works of art? Because we know what 
art is. There is no way out of this circle. 
 
“So müssen wir den Kreisgang vollziehen.”20 
 
Which means that he starts with what is commonly known: “Kunstwerke 
sind jedermann bekannt.”21 
 Though I acknowledge that there is a circularity here, as in the case 
of conscientious objection, the circularity as it is here presented is (as 
Heidegger would recognize) misconstrued. It is as wrong to suggest that we 
need an analysis of the comprehensive collection of all works of art to know 
what art is, as it is nonsensical to say that we need to be able to apply a fully 
articulated concept of art if we are to identify works of art. The mistake is in 
the level of articulacy that is supposedly required of our concept(ion) of art 
to be able to identify a work of art as a work of art. No one would demand 
that we come up with a fully articulated concept of cake, before allowing us 
                                                 
18 With the qualification made earlier still in force, that the focus is on conscientious 
objection as a political-juridical phenomenon (with its moral dimension). 
19 Heidegger (1977), 8. 
20 Ibid., 9. 
21 Idem. 
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to continue with our identification of something as a piece of cake. With 
such trivial matters, we assume that people know what cake is. Why would it 
be different with art? Heidegger does not seem to think there is a difference; 
we all know works of art. The problem arises when we engage in an attempt 
at defining a concept; that is, when the ideal of precision arises. It then seems 
that we need an articulate concept of something, before being able to identify 
an item as an instantiation of the concept. But this is a misconception. The 
mistaken idea is that articulacy can only originate in articulacy; precision only 
in precision. I suggest that we think of articulation as a process, starting out 
from inarticulacy, and aiming at as high a degree of articulacy as the subject 
allows. This means that we start (in Aristotelian fashion, Voegelin would say) 
with common intuitions regarding our subject matter. Individually, we start 
from our own preconceptions of, in Heidegger’s case, art. (Repeated) 
confrontation with items belonging to the same class (or ‘family’) results in 
the creation in the mind of a preconception of such items, that enables us to 
identify items as belonging to that class when confronted with them in the 
future. This preconception is inarticulate, but forms the basis for our 
articulate judgements. The learning process here is not one of gradually 
coming to know an eternal truth (what art is, for example) in full detail; 
rather, it is part of the process of acquiring a language and linguistic skills. 
‘Art’ is a word. As all words, it is applied in certain ways, in certain contexts, 
in a particular linguistic community. Learning a language, participating in this 
community, we form preconceptions of the meanings of words. Thus, we 
end up in the situation that ‘we all know works of art’. But this is not precise 
knowledge; it is merely the obvious and legitimate starting-point for 
analysis.22 
 So in setting out to analyze the phenomenon of conscientious 
objection, I inevitably start from my own preconception, leading me to 
examples of conscientious objection. Then there are the common intuitions 
and associations expressed by others; things like martyrdom and heroic 
stands, but also the image of peace-loving softies with beards and sandals. 
The term itself, furthermore, being built up out of two basic elements 
(‘conscience’ and ‘objection’), suggests certain obvious criteria for the 
identification of cases of conscientious objection. In fact, as we have seen, 
many definitions do not venture beyond the safety of these basic elements. 
All the things mentioned here (and more) coalesce to create an idea of 
conscientious objection, different aspects of which are analysed below. This 
                                                 
22 The reason I proceed in this manner in the case of conscientious objection, while 
having chosen a very different approach with respect to conscience, is that the 
former is regarded here primarily as a social (more precisely, a political-juridical) 
phenomenon, whereas conscience is regarded as primarily an experiential 
phenomenon, belonging to intrinsic, rather than social reality – which does not mean 
that conscience could not be regarded as part of the latter, as a meme, for instance. 
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analysis, without resulting in a clear-cut definition of conscience, will allow 
closure (though never permanent closure) of the no longer vicious circle by 
returning to common intuitions and common uses of the term ‘conscientious 
objection’, sharpening and possibly criticizing these. It may turn out that 
some of these intuitions or uses of the term were incoherent, and hence it 
may be that some cases thought to be examples of conscientious objection 
will have to be excluded from that category. I merely state this for the sake 
of completion, and as a theoretical possibility; I will not search for 
illustrations of this possibility. 
 My analysis, then, attempts to provide the best possible 
interpretation of what people mean when they speak of conscientious 
objection, either in their own appeal to conscience, or with regard to that of 
others. It is not simply descriptive, though. I am first of all concerned with 
what we can, coherently, mean by the term (which means that I allow for the 
possibility that people sometimes mean things by a term that are incoherent); 
but secondly, and this is a normative element, I am concerned with how we 
should use the term if we want to use it coherently, and with as great a 
richness of meaning as the term allows. I believe, however, that we can 
derive the norm of use from actual use and common intuitions, combined 
with what we know about conscience and, somewhat less interestingly 
perhaps, objections – the whole being set against the background of the 
earlier parts of this book, regarding conscience and freedom of conscience. 
My analysis (in this and the following chapter), in other words, should be 
taken as the result of a process of articulation of the various inarticulate 
elements mentioned earlier, guided by my analysis of conscience and the 
central problems of freedom of conscience. 
 
 
13.2. WHETHER ONLY CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION UNDERSTOOD AND 
 EXPRESSED AS SUCH CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS CONSCIENTIOUS 
 OBJECTION 
Someone might say that a conscientious objection is simply an objection that 
the objector sees and presents as conscientious. But this is incorrect for two 
reasons: firstly, not all objections understood to be conscientious by the 
objector and presented as such are in fact conscientious objections; secondly, 
some objections that are not thought of as conscientious may very well be 
that. Here, I will discuss only the second point, as I believe the former (the 
possibility of self-deception) to be self-evident. This discussion concerns 
both the question whether people must experience their objections as 
‘conscientious objections’, and the question whether objectors have to be 
label their objections as such for others to be able to speak of conscientious 
objection in their case. My focus will be on the latter, but people’s self-
understanding underlies the way they express themselves. 
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The first question to ask, then, with a view to the problem of 
recognizing or identifying cases of conscientious objection, is whether the 
objection in question needs to be couched in terms of conscience. To be 
able to identify a certain objection as conscientious, is it necessary that the 
objector explicitly refers to his or her objection as a conscientious objection? 
Must the objector verbally refer to conscience, or verbally stress the 
conscientiousness of the objection? My answer to this question can be 
derived from what I have said in the first chapter, on the symbol of 
conscience. Just as it is very well possible to express an experience of 
conscience without recourse to the term itself, or to terms traditionally 
associated with conscience; that is, just as it is unnecessary for a certain 
(symbolic) expression to contain the term ‘conscience’ or an equivalent term 
to be able to be recognized as an expression of conscience, it is also 
immaterial whether a conscientious objection is explicitly phrased as such. 
 The above only holds, however, as long as a case is dealt with 
outside of the juridical sphere. A hospitalized Jehovah’s Witness, for 
example, may conscientiously refuse a blood transfusion without explicitly 
bringing conscience into play. She may say that she cannot receive a blood 
transfusion, because of her being a Jehovah’s Witness. The hospital staff will 
probably interpret this as a conscientious objection, and discuss the case 
among themselves as such – but that is exactly the point: a conscientious 
objection can be recognized as such without the objector’s explicit 
notification that hers is a conscientious objection. 
A real-life example is provided by doctor Norman Heathcote, who 
visited St. Kilda, the extreme western part of the British Isles, in 1900.23 
“There is no need,” Heathcote wrote, “for them [the St. Kildans] to go 
through the form of saying that they are conscientious objectors. They 
simply refuse to allow their children to be operated on, and there is no more 
to be said.”24 A couple of interesting aspects of conscientious objection are 
enclosed in this small remark. First of all, its connection with people’s 
identity comes to the fore. I have spoken of conscience in terms of ultimate 
concern; here, conscientious objection is associated with such ultimacy in the 
form of a way of life. The conscientious objection of the St. Kildans flows 
from the fact that to allow the doctor to operate on their children would 
violate who they are. It is quite likely that ignorance, and a related fear, 
played a part as well, but it would be too easy to dismiss their refusal as 
stemming from ignorance alone. Another interesting point to note, is that 
                                                 
23 St. Kilda is a small archipelago in the Atlantic Ocean, 45 miles to the west of the 
nearest island (Uist) of the Outer Hebrides, which are situated off the Northwestern 
coast of Scotland. It was inhabited for at least 1000, possibly 2000 years, until the 
evacuation of its last 36 inhabitants in 1930. The St. Kildans lived a harsh and simple 
life, depending mostly on seabirds for their subsistence. 
24 Quoted in Steel (1981), 53, from Norman Heathcote, St. Kilda, 1900. 
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formalized or institutionalized conscientious objection only makes sense 
when the objector is part of the same community that deals with the 
objection, and shares this community’s way of life to a sufficient extent. In 
modern Western societies, this is usually (supposed to be) the case. Some 
groups, however, (Jehovah’s Witnesses for example), have received a special 
status that allows them an easy passage through or around the formalities of 
conscientious objection to certain matters – in the case of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and members of other peace churches, this was and is often the 
case in connection with compulsory military service. In 1974, the Dutch 
Government granted Jehovah’s Witnesses an unlimited delay of the duty to 
military service. The European Commission supports this provision with the 
following argumentation: “Members of Jehovah’s Witnesses adhere to a 
comprehensive set of rules of behaviour which cover many aspects of every 
day life. Compliance with these rules is the object of strict informal social 
control amongst the members of the community. One of these rules requires 
the rejection of military and substitute service. It follows that membership of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses constitutes strong evidence that the objections to 
compulsory service are based on genuine religious convictions.”25 The 
central argument here is the plausibility of the genuineness of conscientious 
objection by members of Jehovah’s Witnesses. In my view, it makes more 
sense to say that the legal provisions created by the Dutch government are 
evidence of a pragmatically grounded recognition that the way of life of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses is of such a nature, that it would be pointless to 
continue to demand of members of this group that they fulfil their military 
duties. 
 In practice, it will often be necessary for a conscientious objection to 
be expressed as such, in order to be eligible for legal recognition as a 
conscientious objection. In the case of conscientious objection to 
compulsory military service, a Dutch conscript had to formally apply for the 
status of conscientious objector. His application (both in writing and speech) 
was judged by a committee that advised the minister either to recognize or to 
reject it, and judged by its conformity with the legal requirements – the law 
speaks of ‘grave/serious conscientious objections’, which are taken to be 
“insurmountable conscientious objections against the personal fulfilment of 
military service in connection with the use of means of violence in which one 
can become involved through service in the Dutch army”.26 In the last years 
of conscription (that is, during the first half of the nineties), in a negative 
advice, the committee often referred to one or more of a standard list of 
three criteria the applicant might fail to meet: the objections 1) were to be 
conscientious; 2) were to be insurmountable; 3) were to relate to the use of 
                                                 
25 EurCom 11-10-1984, D&R 40, 207, quoted (in full, unlike above) in Vermeulen 
(1993), 89-90. 
26 Wet Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst, 1978, art. 2. 
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means of violence as referred to in the law. A standard letter was used, with 
all three criteria on it, of which those that applied could be marked with a 
cross or a circle around the number.27 This indicates the degree of 
formalization the process acquired in the course of time, partly under 
pressure of an increasing number of real and fake conscientious objectors.28 
 Because conscientious objection occurs more often in some 
contexts than others, it is hardly surprising that in contexts where 
conscientious objections are relatively often encountered, certain formal 
procedures have arisen that dictate how the conscientious objection should 
be made public. This goes both within organizations and in the case of 
conscientious objection against duties imposed by the state. Hence, some 
authors choose to employ a legalistic definition of conscientious objection. 
Rachel Barker, for instance, speaks of “the true nature of conscientious 
objection, that it is not a policy or a doctrine, but merely a status conferred 
upon an individual by the state while conscription is in force”.29 She refers to 
conscientious objection to compulsory military service only, as this is the 
subject of her book. A conscientious objector, in this view, is merely 
someone on whom this status has been conferred. This is not the view I 
wish to take. Procedures like those regarding conscientious objectors to 
military service make it relatively easy for objections to pass as conscientious 
that are in fact far removed from any real experience of conscience. At the 
same time, truly conscientious objections that do not fit the procedure might 
go unrecognized by the authorities. The rationale behind such procedures 
does not concern me at this point. What is important here is that they are 
irrelevant to the identification of conscientious objection in the sense in 
which I employ the term. Identification would be easy if one said that 
anything the state identifies as conscientious objection is conscientious 
objection, and anything not so recognized is not. I choose a more difficult, 
but also more sensible approach. Whether the state (or the smaller 
organization in question) recognizes a certain objection as conscientious or 
not is beside the point. Whether the objector speaks of ‘conscience’ or not is 
equally beside the point. The basic question is whether we are dealing with 
an objection grounded in conscience.30 On this point, therefore, what I have 
called conscientious objection as a political-juridical phenomenon does not 
differ from conscientious objection as a private phenomenon. 
                                                 
27 This can be seen in the remaining files of conscientious objectors in the Archives 
of the Ministry of Defence in Kerkrade (Archief van de Directie Dienstplichtzaken, 
from now on ADD). 
28 I will deal with conscientious objection to military conscription separately, in the 
next chapter. 
29 Barker (1982), 4. 
30 This is not all there is to conscientious objection, but, like I said, it is the most 
basic point.  
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 As a final note I might add that even someone who rejects the label 
‘conscientious objector’ for himself may still legitimately be recognized as 
one. Michael Walzer writes about Randolph Bourne, who “contemplates and 
then rejects the designation of himself as a ‘conscientious objector’. He 
doesn’t, indeed, want to fight, but it’s not the case that he ‘would be 
delighted to work up [his] blood lust for the business [of fighting], except 
that this unaccountable conscience, like a godly grandmother, absolutely 
forbids.’ What forbids his military service is ‘something that is woven into 
his whole modern philosophic feel for life.’ Bourne claims that his refusal is 
the act of a person, not of an ‘objective conscience’ suppressing the lower 
orders of the self. It is not his conscience that refuses but something deeper 
within, or more continually active across, or more pervasive throughout, his 
inner life.”31 Bourne does not want to be called a ‘conscientious objector’, 
because he rejects what he takes to be the meaning of the term ‘conscience’. 
This need not and should not stop us from identifying him as a 
conscientious objector, in the sense of the term explained in this chapter. 
 
 
13.3. CORE ELEMENTS OF THE SYMBOL OF CONSCIENCE AS INDICATORS 
 OF THE CONSCIENTIOUSNESS OF OBJECTIONS 
Now that I have stated what I, unlike some other authors, do not consider an 
identifying aspect of conscientious objection, (which means that I take it to 
be irrelevant in determining whether we are dealing with conscientious 
objection or not), I can continue with what I do take (arguably, at least) to be 
relevant criteria. These are of three kinds. The first kind is actually just one 
criterion, which is whether we are dealing with an objection or not. I will not 
discuss the concept of an objection here, but assume that we know what we 
mean by the term.32 The second kind of criterion relates to the personal-
experiential level; the third to the public level. 
The present section deals with the criteria on the personal-
experiential level. My suggestion here is that we take the presence of core 
elements of the symbol of conscience as indicators of the conscientiousness 
of an objection.33 In the evaluation of a person’s objections, the fluid 
                                                 
31 Walzer (1994), 92-93. 
32 The relational aspect of an objection will figure in my analysis, in section 13.4.1. 
33 What this means, in fact, is that we look for elements of the symbol of conscience 
on the level of expression or symbolization. These elements, when they really are 
symbolic expressions of experience, and not mere hollow phrases, are also elements 
of the experience of conscience. The (sometimes) difficult task is to ascertain 
whether the presence of core elements of the symbol of conscience is not merely a 
verbal presence, in which case no real symbolization took place. This task is made 
slightly easier by the ‘evidence’ of identifying aspects on the public level – for 
instance, acceptance of the consequences (see 13.4.1). I assume that experiences of 
conscience will always find expression in such a way that at least some of the core 
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concept of conscience I have formulated may serve as a rough guide. In 
many cases, it may be enough to determine whether an objection can be 
called conscientious or not. Especially where this is not immediately clear, 
however, an analysis in terms of the core elements of the symbol of 
conscience will be helpful. Though it certainly cannot be said that the 
absence of one or even more of these elements entails the non-
conscientiousness of an objection, I cannot think of an objection as 
conscientious when all three elements are absent in whatever form. 
Moreover, in my view, one cannot speak of conscience or conscientious 
objection where there is no ultimate concern. 
 
13.3.1. The element of ultimate concern 
We have seen in chapter 1 that the element of ultimate concern tends to 
appear in one of two guises: that of authority, or that of inspiration. The 
elements of authority and inspiration, then, represent two sides of the same 
coin. We have also seen that one way to describe the changes the 
symbolization of conscience underwent through time is in terms of a process 
of immanentization, a transition from transcendence (in a narrow sense of 
the term, as relating to the ‘supernatural’) to immanence. This transition 
roughly coincided with a shift of dominance from the element of authority 
to the element of inspiration.34 It must be kept in mind, however, that this 
did not entail a loss of transcendence in a broader sense of the term, the 
sense of relating to the ultimate or absolute.  
We see the shift from authority to inspiration reflected in the 
practice of conscientious objection. Whereas pre-modern and early modern 
conscientious objections were typically phrased in the language of authority, 
modern (especially twentieth-century) conscientious objections typically 
employ the language of inspiration. 
                                                                                                               
elements of the symbol of conscience can be identified; the (opposite) ‘danger’ that 
non-conscientious objections are mistaken for conscientious ones can never be 
completely removed. 
34 I say roughly, because the element of authority can occur in immanentized form as 
well. The Voice of Conscience, for instance, can exemplify the element of authority 
whether it is perceived as God’s Voice or not. Also, though particularly suited to 
express the element of authority, it can express the element of inspiration as well. 
Historically, we see that the element of authority persists for quite some time when 
immanentization has taken place, the authority then being attached to Reason. Also, 
the element of inspiration is dominant in the English Puritan movement, as well as 
in Romanticism. Hence, it must not be seen as belonging exclusively to 
immanentized or secular thought. Finally, the elements of authority and inspiration 
must not be taken to be mutually exclusive; they can exist alongside each other. In 
many cases, however, one of them tends to dominate at the cost of the other; 
Socrates is a clear exception to this rule. 
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Now, without looking into the details of the experience underlying a 
particular objection, we may simply note the presence of the element of 
authority, as when Socrates explains that “a thing divine and superhuman 
happens to me (…); I have had it ever since childhood, a certain voice which 
happens, and every time it happens it always turns me away from whatever I 
am about to do, but never turns me towards anything.”35 Similarly, Thomas 
More, refusing to consent to the divorce of king Henry VIII, and refusing to 
recognize Henry as head of the Church of England, appeals to his 
conscience as something that he must follow if he wishes to avoid 
displeasing God and damning his soul.36 Quaker Richard Seller, press-ganged 
into the British Navy in 1665, refused to take up arms. When the captain 
asked him why, “I told him, I was afraid to offend God, for my warfare was spiritual, 
therefore I durst not fight with carnal weapons.”37 
 A secular (immanentized) phrasing of the element of authority might 
refer to a categorical imperative, as Dennis Waters, conscientious objector in 
World War II, does: “I don’t wish to be a martyr at all, one doesn’t like doing 
this sort of thing, but there are times when one has this categorical 
imperative, ‘No, I won’t do that’.”38 This kind of expression, of not being 
able to do something, turns up regularly throughout history, with both 
religious and secular objectors.39 Martin Luther is said to have spoken the 
words: “Here I stand, I can do no other, so help me God.” Thomas More 
wrote: “I can no further go, but put all in the hands of him, for fear of whose 
displeasure for the safeguard of my soul stirred by mine own conscience (…) 
I suffer and endure this trouble.”40 He also explained: “I cannot in everything 
think the same way that some other men of more wisdom and deeper 
learning do; nor can find in mine heart otherwise to say than as mine own 
conscience giveth me.”41 In 1703, Quaker John Smith, in a similar situation 
to Richard Seller (mentioned above), stated: “And as I came to be acquainted 
with the discipline of the cross, and the divine light shining in my heart, 
about the 22d. year of my age, I was called to bear my testimony against wars 
and fightings, as being contrary to the doctrine of Christ, and the nature of 
his kingdom, and could not join with those that were for bearing armes for the 
defence of the country, against the French and Indian enemy…”42 In files of 
conscientious objectors from the Dutch Archives of the Ministry of 
                                                 
35 Plato (1997), 73. 
36 De Silva (ed.) (2000), 74 (for instance). 
37 An Account of the Sufferings of Richard Seller, of Keinsey, a Fisherman, Philadelphia, 1772, 
4, in Brock (ed.) (1993), 7. Italics in original. 
38 Goodall (1997), 203. 
39 ‘Religious’ must here be taken with its common meaning, not in Tillich’s sense. 
40 De Silva (2000), 65. 
41 Ibid., 55. 
42 John Smith, A Narrative of Some Sufferings, for his Christian Peacable Testimony, 
Benjamin & Jacob Johnson, Philadelphia, 1800, 5-6, in Brock (ed.) (1993), 33-34. 
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Defence, I found an abundance of phrases on the same line as the above, a 
few examples of which are: “I cannot hurt people”, “I cannot and will not kill 
or harm another person”, “If an action goes against my conscience, I will not 
be able to perform it”, “I will never be able to kill someone consciously, 
intentionally, by means of violence”, and “Finally, there is the aspect of just 
not being able to.”43 
The element of inspiration, like that of authority, is a key element; at 
least one of them will always be present in expressions of conscience. We 
have already seen this for Socrates, who stated that “doing nothing unjust or 
impious, that is my whole concern”.44 In Thomas More’s case, the element of 
authority predominates over the element of inspiration. Some of his 
expressions are probably best seen as expressions of ultimate concern sec, 
without categorizing them as expressing either the element of authority or 
that of inspiration. On the other hand, many of his letters certainly seem to 
be ‘inspired’, if reserved in style. That it is an ultimate concern that is at stake 
is evident throughout his letters. More repeatedly emphasizes that it is not a 
‘mere scruple’, or simple obstinacy, (as some people suspect), that prevents 
him from signing the oath Henry wants him to sign.45 That conscience is a 
matter of ultimate concern to More is further evidenced by two things: 
More’s avowal that to go against his conscience would be to jeopardize his 
soul, to risk eternal damnation, and secondly by More’s willingness to accept 
the consequences of his stand, even if this meant death. I will come back to 
the second point later, when I will discuss whether ‘willingness to accept the 
consequences’ can be seen as an identifying aspect of conscientious 
objection in its own right. “[U]nto the oath that there was offered me I could 
not swear it without the jeoparding of my soul to perpetual damnation”, 
More states.46 And also: “…I can no further go, but put all in the hands of 
him, for fear of whose displeasure for the safeguard of my soul stirred by 
mine own conscience (…) I suffer and endure this trouble.”47 To More, as 
would have been clear to his contemporaries (for whom the same held true 
or, by the standards of their time, should have held true), his soul was the 
most important thing in the world, because the soul was virtually the only 
thing in this world that was not of this world.48 With the aforementioned 
                                                 
43 ADD. For privacy reasons, I cannot give more precise references. The quoted 
statements are all from the 1990’s. 
44 See chapter 1. 
45 See for instance De Silva (2000), 59, 74. In the latter instance More is quoted by 
his daughter Margaret Roper in a letter to Alice Alington, daughter to More’s second 
wife. 
46 Ibid., 58. ‘Jeopard’ was a Middle English verb. 
47 Ibid., 65. 
48 See also De Silva (2000), 18-19. De Silva (22) also emphasizes: “When More wrote 
in these prison letters that he had ‘a respect to mine own soul,’ he was not 
exclusively considering the eternal destiny of what is called the human soul or spirit. 
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Quakers, as in More’s case, the element of authority predominates. However, 
the fact that conscience was a matter of ultimate concern to them appears 
most clearly from their willingness to die for the truth of it. In their conduct, 
they are certainly inspired. Seller, hearing people ‘speak several things against’ 
him, wanting to answer for himself, is said to have had the following 
experience: 
 
“[T]here came a motion within me, and bid me Be still, Be still, Be still, three 
times, which I obeyed, and was comforted; then I believed God would 
arise: and when they had done speaking, then God did arise, and I was 
filled with the power of God, and my spirit lifted up above all earthly 
things, and wonderful strength was given me to my limbs, and my heart full 
of the power and wisdom of God, and with glad tidings my mouth was 
opened to declare to the people the things that God had made manifest to 
me…”49 
 
In more contemporary cases, the ultimate nature of the concern in 
question is expressed in many ways, one of which is the categorical ‘cannot’ 
discussed above. Ultimacy is more often expressed in terms of self: 
‘protecting one’s sense of oneself’ and equivalent expressions.50 Sometimes 
the element of inspiration is clearly present. One of the Dutch conscientious 
objectors whose files I studied consistently expressed his conscience in terms 
of beliefs, striving, determination – his was an empowering conscience. 
Quite regularly, people seem to be in search of inspiration, expressing a 
sense of crisis. Horace Eaton, a conscientious objector in the Great War, 
remembers: “It was the greatest crisis in my life, and only those called upon 
to face a similar issue or problem can realize the terrible weight of 
responsibility one felt, and above all the anxiety to do that which was 
Right.”51 One conscientious objector to military conscription whose file I 
looked into stated that to go against his conscience would mean to ‘deny his 
existence’. Naturally, there are differences between secular and religious 
expressions, in the traditional sense of these terms. But I would like to 
emphasize once again that the significance of these differences must not be 
overstated. In religiously (in a narrow sense of the word) grounded 
conscientious objections, the element of authority continues to predominate. 
Yet it must be seen as the other side of the element of inspiration, and both 
terms must be taken to express ultimate concern. Finally, there are clear 
examples of religiously inspired conscientious objection in which the element 
of inspiration predominates. In 1941 Robert Marshall Putt, for instance, 
                                                                                                               
(…) More knew that if he had taken the oath against his conscience, he would have 
become, in that very moment, a lost man.” 
49 Brock (ed.) (1993), 16. 
50 See the phrases quoted by Childress (1979), 316-317. 
51 Goodall (1997), 15. 
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publicly proclaimed that he was a conscientious objector; he was inspired by 
the example of Jesus, as well as by the principles underlying the American 
Constitution.52 
 
 
An example of the religious imagery of ‘secular’ 
conscientious objections53 
 
13.3.2. Intermezzo: the certainty and uncertainty of conscience 
At this point it is worthwhile to look into certain matters more deeply. I 
leave the track of identification for a moment to consider, first of all, the 
meaning of the ‘cannot’ uttered by so many conscientious objectors, and 
secondly, a deeper (i.e. less easily visible, but no more or less central) aspect 
of conscientious objection on the personal-experiential level. 
 
                                                 
52 Putt (1941). 
53 Source: http://www.ppu.org.uk/learn/infodocs/cos/st_cos3s1_pict.html 
(accessed 10-2006). 
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13.3.2.1. The ‘cannot’ of conscience as explanation or justification 
With respect to the conscientious objector’s ‘cannot’ it is helpful to take a 
look at a distinction made by Gerald MacCallum, between conscience as an 
explanation of behaviour, and conscience as a justification of behaviour. 
MacCallum notes that 
 
“[t]here has been a recurring tension in the history of conscience between a 
view of conscience as something of which one is a helpless, or largely 
helpless, victim, and a contrary view of conscience as a guide leading one in 
a direction in which it is often very difficult to go. The distance between 
these views of a person’s relation to his conscience is roughly indicated by 
the apparent gap between Luther’s ‘I can do no other!’ (…) and the modern 
idea that one ‘ought to try to live up to’ one’s conscience, however difficult 
this may be to do. (…) [T]here are traces of each view throughout virtually 
the entire history of the concept, though the first view seems somewhat 
more prominent in the theological stages and the second somewhat more 
prominent in the secularized stages.”54 
 
It is immediately clear that, in one respect at least, MacCallum is wrong, for 
we have just seen that the ‘Lutheran’ phrase ‘I can do no other’ (or some 
equivalent of it) is still very much in vogue today. And yet, MacCallum draws 
attention to an interesting problem. When someone appeals to his or her 
conscience, is that to explain certain actions, or is it (also) to justify them? 
Does the so often expressed ‘cannot’ indicate a physical inability, or 
something else? Most authors on conscience would go for ‘something else’. 
For Niklas Luhmann, as we have seen, the question of conscience is: ‘Can I 
do this and still be me?’ A ‘cannot’ of the kind we are dealing with here, 
would then mean: ‘I cannot do this and still be me’ – which entails that ‘I 
cannot do this’ is a way of expressing that ‘doing this’ would disturb, even 
end, the continuous existence of the original ‘I’. Another way of looking at it, 
is to see it as a strong form of a ‘moral cannot’. We often say things like: 
‘You can’t do that’, when we mean, not that the person we are addressing 
cannot physically do a certain thing, but that it would be immoral to do so. 
But the best way to see how we must interpret the above ‘cannots’, is 
probably to look at the (verbal) context in which they are uttered. The 
person I quoted above, who stated that he would not be able to perform any 
action that went against his conscience, stated this in the following context: 
 
                                                 
54 MacCallum (1993), 183-184. MacCallum’s distinction is somewhat analogous to 
my own distinction between the element of authority and that of inspiration, but, for 
reasons that will become clear in the course of this subsection, I believe that he 
misjudged where the difference lies between more traditional religious expressions 
of conscience and modern secular expressions. 
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“The justification of my action flows from the operation of my conscience. 
If an action goes against my conscience, I will not be able to perform it. This 
may involve emotional difficulties/objections [bezwaren], like the feeling of 
oppression that violence brings about in me, as well as rational objections, 
like [those against] the way the army thinks about the way to solve 
conflicts.” 
 
This person explicitly refers to a justification of his action. Although the rest of 
the first sentence has a somewhat mechanical ring to it, the final sentence 
speaks of objections, not of physical inhibitions. This is the language of reason, 
not causation. Earlier in the same letter, however, the author comes up with 
a highly ambiguous paragraph: 
 
“To me, conscience is the whole of norms and values that indicate 
what I think is right or wrong, and according to which I wish to live 
and act. This influences my actions, on the one hand consciously, on 
the other hand unconsciously. With many things, I no longer 
wonder why I do them. My actions know/follow some sort of 
automatism; of itself one does things that are in accordance with 
one’s conscience.” 
 
And in the next paragraph, he states: 
 
“I have become more critical and with that the conscience that 
accompanies my actions has become more conscious. I no longer let 
myself be guided unconsciously by Christian norms and values.” 
 
How are we to reconcile, if at all possible, the ‘automatism’ with the critical 
attitude? It is easier than it seems. It is merely realistic to say that there are 
things one does automatically, without reflection. But this is post-reflective, 
not pre-reflective action. As the conscientious objector above says: ‘I no longer 
wonder…”, implying that he thought about this before and determined his 
position, after which certain courses of action were allowed to become 
habitualized. It is also realistic to say that there are unconscious influences on 
our actions. We can only try to make ourselves as much aware as possible of 
the factors determining our (re)actions. That one ‘of itself’ does things that 
are in accordance with one’s conscience, is also a way of expressing the link 
between conscience and identity. Both conscience and our actions flow from 
who we are; we do not constantly have to recall who we are; hence, we often 
act without further reflection on whether this is wrong or right. This does 
not makes us ‘powerless to resist the dictates of conscience’, or a ‘helpless 
victim’ of conscience.55 It would be just as odd to say that, as it would be to 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 184, 183. 
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say that we are helpless victims of our interests, our convictions, or our 
reasoning. 
 It seems to me, then, that what this conscientious objector tries to 
convey by saying that he will not be able to act against his conscience, is 
something of the force of the moral imperative with which he sees himself 
faced, and of the degree to which such action would be in discord with who 
he is – which are not two entirely different things, as the reader will have 
gathered. From the files of other conscientious objectors that expressed 
themselves in the ‘cannot’ form or an equivalent of that, it is also clear that 
we are not dealing with a ‘natural’ ‘cannot’. No natural (physical) inhibitions 
prevent the objectors from doing what they say they cannot do. They are not 
explaining their behaviour by pointing out certain processes of causation; 
they are justifying themselves by recourse to reasons and values, and by 
pointing out the compelling nature of the imperatives these entail. It is a 
justification from importance: only something of great importance, so they 
feel, will suffice to justify their objection. We may recall Randolph Bourne, 
quoted by Michael Walzer: Bourne, Walzer says, “contemplates and then 
rejects the designation of himself as a ‘conscientious objector’. He doesn’t, 
indeed, want to fight, but it’s not the case that he ‘would be delighted to 
work up [his] blood lust for the business [of fighting], except that this 
unaccountable conscience, like a godly grandmother, absolutely forbids.’ 
What forbids his military service is ‘something that is woven into his whole 
modern philosophic feel for life.’ Bourne claims that his refusal is the act of a 
person, not of an ‘objective conscience’ suppressing the lower orders of the 
self.”56 Bourne refuses the idea of a conscience forcing him to do something 
or even strongly influencing him. This refusal is related to his particular 
understanding of the term ‘conscience’. Though we need not (and I do not) 
share this understanding, it does in this case help point out an important fact: 
that the idea of conscience as a purely causal factor in a person’s behaviour 
unduly separates the conscience from the person. The fact that Bourne 
rejects a conscience understood in this way, makes him all the more eligible 
for conscientious objector status in my eyes. 
 A final question is whether the ‘cannot’ of pre-modern and early 
modern times was of a different nature; that is, whether this did serve as an 
explanation, rather than a justification. Thomas More speaks of his refusal to 
sign the oath, to which “the offering of the oath unto me of pure necessity 
constrained me”.57 But there are more extreme examples. In his article “The 
World’s Worst Worm”, Jonathan Wright shows how people in the sixteenth 
century struggled to distinguish those suffering from ‘natural melancholy’ 
from those afflicted by conscience. The symptoms were often the same, and 
could last for years. Sixteen-year-old Thomas Fitzherbert, being present at a 
                                                 
56 Walzer (1994), 92-93. See 8.2.1. 
57 De Silva (2000), 59. 
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Protestant service, felt so bad about this, that he was “seized with so violent 
a horror that I could not possibly remain there; I therefore rushed out”.58 
Francis Wodehouse, a non-conformist, “recalled that he had ‘decided, just 
once, to rig my conscience, and throw my scruples to the wind’ by attending 
an Anglican service, but ‘[i]mmediately I entered the church … my bowels 
began to torture me. A fire seemed to kindle in them, and in a few moments 
flared up. The torment was acute. The flame rose right into my chest and the 
region of my heart, so that I seemed to be steaming and boiling in some 
hellish furnace.’”59 It was physically impossible for these people to remain 
where they were. Thomas’ ‘could not’ is of a physical nature. But does that 
mean that in these two cases conscience, bodily manifesting itself in the 
manner described, can serve only as an explanation of their behaviour? I 
believe not. To answer this question in the affirmative is to forget the 
intentionality of conscience. Their bodies do not simply behave the way they 
do for no reason; instead, they respond to the situation in a way fitting to the 
strong convictions these people have. They do not simply leave the church 
service because of their physical condition, but their physical condition 
corresponds to their conviction that they should not be there and their desire 
not to be there. It is not unlike the situation of someone running away from 
an aggressive dog (for instance). Today, post-Jamesian theorists of emotion 
dare to point out the intentionality of emotions. Someone who runs away 
from an aggressive dog is not scared because he is running away (or because 
of bodily processes in general), as William James would have maintained; he 
is running away because he is scared of the dog. In conclusion: it is nowhere 
justified to see conscience as nothing more than an explanation of behaviour. 
There is always a reference to beliefs, convictions, et cetera. This conclusion 
will not come as a surprise, I suppose; it is in line with what was said earlier 
about the element of authority. The ‘cannots’ discussed here express this 
element, and may do so in the language of transcendence (narrowly 
conceived) or immanence, in secular or religious phraseology.60 
                                                 
58 Henry Foley, Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus, 7 vols., London, 
1875-1883, vol. 2, 210, quoted in Wright (1999), 123. 
59 Wright (1999), 124; he quotes from Philip Caraman (ed.), The Other Face: Catholic 
Life under Elizabeth I, Longmans, London, 1960, 59-60. 
60 The distinction I make here between the two ‘cannots’ is supported by the 
distinction made by Peter Bieri between the ‘zwanghafte’ and the ‘erzwungene 
Wille’. The first eludes insight and consideration, but the second does not; the first is 
involuntary like a tic, while in the second case one is forced to adopt a will one 
would rather not have. The first case is a case of internal compulsion, where ‘I can 
do no other’ is literally true. The second is a case of external compulsion, where ‘I 
can do no other’ is an expression of freedom. One regrets that the world is the way 
it is, and that one has to choose what one chooses, but ‘one can do no other’, ‘one 
has no choice’, for the world sometimes forces one to choose between two evils. 
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13.3.2.2. Certainty and doubt; risk and courage 
The ‘cannot’ of the conscientious objector sounds like an expression of 
extreme certainty. But how can (s)he be so sure? Is (s)he so sure? When we 
consider some similarities between the symbol of conscience and the symbol 
of God, we will see that conscientious objection unites within itself – but 
never without tension – elements of both certainty and uncertainty. 
 In Dynamics of Faith, Paul Tillich distinguishes between two elements 
in the notion of God: “the element of ultimacy, which is a matter of 
immediate experience and not symbolic in itself, and the element of 
concreteness, which is taken from our ordinary experience and symbolically 
applied to God.”61 The first element, the ultimate concern, Tillich says, “is in 
itself certain. The symbolic expression of this element varies endlessly 
through the whole history of mankind.”62 So the first element is 
characterized by certainty, whereas the variable second element, the symbol, 
is the opposite: 
 
“God as the ultimate in man’s ultimate concern is more certain than 
any other certainty, even that of oneself. God as symbolized in a 
divine figure is a matter of daring faith, of courage and risk.”63 
 
These two elements, of ultimacy and concreteness – or, in other words, of 
ultimate concern and the concrete shape this concern begets – can also be 
discerned in the symbol of conscience. More in line with Tillich’s phrasing 
would be to say: in the notion of conscience, of which the symbol is the 
concrete element. But this is immaterial. In (what I have called) the symbol 
of conscience, we find the element of ultimacy in what I have called the 
elements of authority and inspiration. In my chapter on the symbol of 
conscience, I was mainly concerned with the stable elements in the symbol 
of conscience. In the present context, the variable element is of equal 
importance. For besides an element of ultimacy, there is an element of 
concreteness in the symbol of conscience, which is the concrete symbolic 
expression that is the vehicle for the element of ultimacy.64 In other words: it 
is the concrete contents of conscience; the truth someone commits himself 
                                                                                                               
This means that the exercise of one’s freedom can be extremely hard, and 
occasionally requires great courage. See Bieri (2006), 110-122. 
61 Tillich (1957), 46. 
62 Ibid., 46-47. 
63 Ibid., 47. 
64 Cf. Madinier (1954), 6-7, where he speaks of conscience as “à la foi absolue et 
contingente (…) singulière et universelle, temporelle et éternelle” [“at the same time 
absolute and contingent (…) singular and universal, temporal and eternal”]; that 
conscience has this dual character is an “antinomie que toute théorie de la 
conscience morale doit résoudre” [“antinomy that every theory of conscience should 
resolve”]. 
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to. This is a matter of risk, of courage – a true auto-da-fé, one might say. The 
usual meaning of this term brings us close to our subject of conscientious 
objection, a common association of which is that of martyrdom. The fact 
that conscientious objection entails an act of faith in the above sense 
contains an easily forgotten reason for the admiration we tend to feel for 
martyrs, for ‘heroes of conscience’, people like Thomas More. Their stand 
requires courage in more ways than one: it takes courage to resist other 
people and to persist in the face of torture and death; but the first act of 
faith, to commit oneself to a particular truth, involves risk and hence requires 
courage as well.65 
 Tillich notes that “it would be meaningless to ask whether one or 
another of the figures in which an ultimate concern is symbolized does 
‘exist’. If ‘existence’ refers to something which can be found within the 
whole of reality, no divine being exists.”66 For this reason, I have spoken of 
conscience as belonging to ‘insistent reality’. The term ‘conscience’ itself is 
the first concrete expression of that particular species of ultimate concern 
with which we are concerned in this book. To invoke conscience, then, even 
without adding ‘contents’, is already a matter of risk. Is it an adequate symbol 
for expressing ultimate concern in its aspect of the Good?67 This depends for 
a large part on its power to point beyond itself, to the ultimate it is supposed 
to stand for. People may give themselves to symbols, or let themselves be 
carried away by symbols, that must be considered inadequate symbolizations 
of the ultimate. Now, in a certain sense, any symbolization is inadequate – a 
variable, historically contingent attempt to grasp what cannot ultimately be 
grasped. But some symbols must be considered inadequate in another sense, 
namely in their tendency to absolutize themselves, claiming intrinsic interest 
for themselves.68 Or, alternatively, but with the same effect, it may be that 
the certainty of the element of ultimacy becomes attached to the concrete 
experiences that serve as subsidiaries in the symbolic relation. Here, the 
contents of conscience come into view; that is, the translation of this kind of 
ultimate concern into concrete formulations of moral principles and norms – 
a translation that can be more, but also less fortunate. 
                                                 
65 Carl Cohen (1968), 271, acknowledges that conscientious objection requires 
courage, but recognizes only the social, not the religious courage. 
66 Idem. 
67 Tillich distinguishes between an ontological and a moral type of faith, in the latter 
of which the ‘holiness of what ought to be’ is central. (And within the moral type, he 
distinguishes between a juristic, a conventional and an ethical type.) I would be 
equally happy with a (very traditional) distinction of aspects (or, perhaps, types) of 
ultimate concern in terms of the Good, the True and the Beautiful. 
68 See Tillich (1957), 96-97 on the two criteria of the truth of faith, the first of which 
is the adequacy of its symbols in the sense of its effectiveness, its power to ‘carry you 
away’ (to use Polanyi’s phrase); the second of which is “that it expresses the ultimate 
which is really ultimate”. 
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 Faith and uncertainty, doubt and courage are closely bound up with 
each other in Tillich’s view: “Doubt is overcome not by repression but by 
courage. Courage does not deny that there is doubt, but it takes the doubt 
into itself as an expression of its own finitude and affirms the content of an 
ultimate concern. Courage does not need the safety of an unquestionable 
conviction. It includes the risk without which no creative life is possible.”69 
In Thomas More’s last letters, we encounter the tension between certainty 
and doubt in a very pronounced form: 
 
“My Lord of Canterbury taking hold upon that that I said, that I 
condemned not the conscience of them that sware, said unto me that it 
appeared well that I did not take it for a very sure thing and a certain, that I 
might not lawfully swear it, but rather as a thing uncertain and doubtful. 
‘But then,’ said my Lord, ‘you know for a certainty and a thing without 
doubt, that you be bounden to obey your sovereign lord your King. And 
therefore are ye bounden to leave off the doubt of your unsure conscience 
in refusing the oath, and take the sure way in obeying of your prince, and 
swear it.’ Now al[though] was it so that in mine own mind methought 
myself not concluded [not legally bound], yet this argument seemed me 
suddenly so subtle and namely [especially] with such authority coming out 
of so noble [notable] a prelate’s mouth, that I could again answer nothing 
thereto but only that in my conscience this was one of the cases in which I 
was bounden that I should not obey my prince, sith that whatsoever other 
folk thought in the matter (whose conscience and learning I would not 
condemn nor take upon me to judge) yet in my conscience the truth 
seemed on the other side. Wherein I had not informed my conscience 
neither suddenly nor slightly, but by long leisure and diligent search for the 
matter.”70 
 
More does not reply by stating that, on the contrary, his conscience is very 
certain. Instead, he repeats that he feels he can do no other, and that he will 
not judge another’s conscience. The Lord of Canterbury (Archbishop 
Thomas Cranmer) feels that there is an inconsistency in More’s position: if 
he is unwilling to condemn those who did what More himself refuses to do, 
why would he condemn himself for doing the same? Or, the other way 
around: if he is so sure that he should not sign the oath, why does he not 
extend this judgement to others who did sign? It seems that he cannot be so 
sure after all. In fact, the Archbishop confuses the certainty of the element of 
ultimacy and the uncertainty of the element of concreteness. Had More 
condemned others, who did sign, he would not so much have been 
consistent, but rather self-righteous. More consistently refuses to pervert his 
stance into one of self-righteousness; he leaves others to their own 
conscience. In line with this position, he remains open to any argument that 
                                                 
69 Tillich (1957), 101. 
70 De Silva (2000), 59-60. 
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might convince him to act otherwise than he does, even if he does not 
consider this very likely: “…if I might find those causes [the reasons why 
More refuses to sign the oath] by any man in such wise answered, as I might 
think mine own conscience satisfied, I would after that with all mine heart 
swear the principal oath too.”71 
 Open(ended)ness and doubt, then, do not weaken conscience or the 
case of a conscientious objector, but are an integral part of it, without which 
conscientiousness would turn into self-righteousness, and the possibility of 
self-criticism would be lost. This very openness is a factor that induces 
conscientious objectors to use the language of determination, phrasing their 
objections in terms of a ‘cannot’, a ‘not being able to’. It is not that their 
minds are closed to other options, that they are unwilling to survey other 
options, to change their minds – but they are saying that, the case being as it 
is, or as it appears to them at that moment, they can see no way around their 
conscientiously reached conclusion, provisional though it may be. The 
situation as they perceive it, allows them no other option than to 
conscientiously object. Hence, they ‘can do no other’, even though they are 
willing to revise their position come good reasons for doing so. 
 
13.3.3. The element of the witness 
The second core element of the symbol of conscience, and hence the second 
indicator of the conscientiousness of an objection, is that of the witness. In 
Socrates’ case, this element is only implicitly present, in the sense that his 
daimonion must be witness to Socrates’ actions and thoughts, if he is to speak 
out against some of them. The same applies to Thomas More, who saw 
conscience as, among other things, (keeper of) a record of his deeds, in 
particular those that were wrong. A clear conscience is a witness that has 
nothing to tell; nothing, but a tale of peace of mind. More spoke quite 
frequently about the clearness of his conscience, for instance when he says 
that “the clearness of my conscience hath made my heart hop for joy”.72 In 
an explanatory note, De Silva connects this phrase with a paragraph from 
Walter Hilton’s The Scale of Perfection, part of which reads: “[A]s the Apostle 
says: Gloria mea est testimonium conscientiae meae. That is, My joy is the testimony 
of my conscience, and that is when it bears witness to peace and accord, true 
love and friendship between Jesus and a soul, and when it is in this peace it is 
in highness of thought.”73 Quaker John Smith, too, speaks of “the sweet 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 59. 
72 De Silva (2000), 100. 
73 Walter Hilton, The Scale of Perfection, John P. Clark and Rosemary Dorward (eds.), 
Paulist Press, New York, 1991, 282, quoted in De Silva (2000), 182. With respect to 
other matters than that for which he is held prisoner, More says: “in mine own 
conscience (…) I find of mine own life, matters enough to think on”. (De Silva 
[2000], 95.) 
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peace and satisfaction of mind, that I enjoyed in this time of my suffering”.74 
This is all not very surprising, when we look at conscientious objectors that 
stand their ground. More explicit references to conscience as a witness are 
found when it is a bad conscience that is discussed, when people are warned 
not to stray from the right path, et cetera. Another thing to keep in mind is 
that with the gradual immanentization of conscience, the element of the 
witness also came to receive a different expression. From an external 
witness, conscience comes to be experienced as an internal witness. First as 
the impartial spectator, the man within; in more contemporary expressions 
of conscience, this internalized externalist language is also dropped. We find 
the element of the witness in expressions like “I could not live with myself” 
and “a man has to answer to himself first”, both adduced by James 
Childress, who has his own phrasing of the element of the witness: “[T]he 
appellant to conscience claims that he will not be able to forget the act in 
question if he performs it.” He also speaks of an ‘inner witness’.75 
 
13.3.4. The element of intimacy 
Then, finally, there is the element of intimacy. As explained in chapter 1, this 
comes in two guises: that of secrecy and that of privacy. The latter, often 
entailing the experience of conscience as being of a very personal, often 
emotional nature, is more regularly and more clearly present in modern 
symbolizations and other expressions of conscience than in pre-modern 
ones. It would be a mistake to read in ancient uses of the term ‘heart’ simply 
the same connotations of intimacy we now attach to the word – these were 
present, but certainly did not exhaust the meaning of the word. In ancient 
Egypt, the word had both cognitive and noncognitive connotations. In the 
Old Testament, the word often expressed a more emotional aspect of 
conscience. 
In pre-modern times, the element of intimacy turns up quite 
regularly in the form of secrecy. You may recall C.S. Lewis’ remark that 
‘consciring’ was often close to ‘conspiring’. We have also seen (in chapter 1) 
that Hobbes notes a metaphoric use of the term ‘conscience’ “for the 
knowledge of [one’s] own secret facts, and secret thoughts”. Thomas More 
articulates the element of intimacy in this form when he states: “Finally as 
touching the oath, the causes for which I refused it, no man wotteth [knows] 
what they be for they be secret in mine own conscience…”76 The element of 
intimacy also turns up in More’s letters in the form of privacy – which shows 
that the easily made association of this type with modernity is not exclusive. 
Time and again, More emphasizes that he only asks that others don’t meddle 
with his conscience, like he has never meddled with the conscience of 
                                                 
74 Smith, 14 in Brock (ed.) (1993), 42. 
75 Childress (1979), 317, 324. 
76 De Silva (2000), 94. 
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another, and will never do so.77 The emphasis here is not on the uniquely 
personal nature of conscience, but on its being ‘nobody’s business’ except 
one’s own. 
In chapter 12, we saw that Heinrich Scholler reduces freedom of 
conscience to the aspect of intimacy in the form of secrecy, stating that the 
principle of freedom of conscience serves to protect a ‘Geheimsphäre’, a 
secret sphere that is a part of the private sphere that is not accessible to 
others off-hand. According to Scholler, conscientious action (hence also 
conscientious objection) is allowed inside this sphere alone. 
 Randolph Bourne provides an excellent modern example of the 
element of intimacy. His conscience is not ‘like a godly grandmother’ that 
forbids him to fulfil his military service, but rather ‘something that is woven 
into his whole modern philosophic feel for life’ – something for which 
Bourne, as we have seen, does not want to use the term ‘conscience’, exactly 
because he feels that this suggests an external authority, in other words: 
because in his view of conscience the element of intimacy that is such a 
strong element of his experience is lacking. 
 
 
13.4. IDENTIFIERS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, ON THE PUBLIC LEVEL 
It is worth noting that of the core elements of the symbol of conscience, 
when they function as indicators of the conscientiousness of an objection, 
those are of primary importance, that are of a more public nature. Even 
though they must all be located on the personal-experiential level, some core 
elements will more often present themselves publicly. The strongly related 
elements of authority and inspiration are of this kind. These are the elements 
that primarily occasion someone to make a stand – which is by definition a 
public event. 
 There are, however, a number of identifying aspects of 
conscientious objection that are of a primarily (if not exclusively) public 
nature; aspects that are to be located, not on the personal-experiential, but 
on the public level. When I say that there are these aspects, I should 
immediately qualify this statement by saying that this is arguably so. It is even 
less clear here than in the previous paragraph that the absence of any or even 
all of these aspects (with the exception of the first) would necessarily vitiate 
any claim that some objection should be classified as a conscientious 
objection. 
 
13.4.1. The relational nature of conscientious objection 
This first aspect draws attention to the relational nature of conscientious 
objection; to the fact that it is always an objection to something (a practice, 
the performance of an action), and, moreover, an objection to another 
                                                 
77 See for instance De Silva (2000), 58, 60, 61, 90, 94. 
 516 
(authoritative) party’s demand.78 The latter is of most interest in the present 
context. There is always another party involved. Socrates conscientiously 
refuses to perform an action demanded of him by the polis. Thomas More 
conscientiously objects to the signing of a declaration that king Henry VIII 
wants him to sign. The aforementioned Quakers conscientiously refuse to 
take up arms when the Navy demands that they do. In these cases, the 
conscientious objector always faces (representatives of) the government. 
This need not be the case, however. A doctor who conscientiously refuses to 
apply a certain treatment does so in face of the hospital management’s 
demand – and only indirectly in face of a demand made by other parties 
(society, the government). If we cannot recognize this first aspect, the 
relationality of conscientious objection, we cannot speak of conscientious 
objection. But the relationality usually involves a third party as well: an 
audience in the (symbolic) presence of which the conscientious objector 
makes and/or justifies his or her objection. The distinction between the 
demanding party and the audience is not always clear. Committees set up to 
evaluate conscientious objections to military service indirectly represent both 
the government and society, and such a committee is often the only concrete 
audience a conscientious objector faces.79 
 The element of ultimate concern is most basic on the personal-
experiential level; in another way, the relationality of conscientious 
objections is most basic on the public level. Ultimate concern defines the 
experience; without the relationality of conscientious objections there would 
be no public level. The relation between the two is not tautological, however. 
The ‘demanding’ party may remain vague, the demand implicit, and the 
objection private. Here, however, we are concerned with the political-
juridical phenomenon of conscientious objection. With this phenomenon, 
the combination of ultimate concern and the relational nature of 
conscientious objections generates a number of other aspects that allow us 
to recognize cases of conscientious objection. These will be discussed below. 
 
13.4.2. Public reasoning 
A second identifying aspect on the public level is the aspect of justification, 
in the sense of presenting public reasons for one’s stance. I have touched on 
this aspect before, in my treatment of MacCallum’s distinction between 
conscience as explanation and as justification of behaviour. The point here is 
                                                 
78 You will recall that our focus was on conscientious objection as a political-juridical 
phenomenon. Hence the aspect of the demand. With the personal kind of 
conscientious objection (as in the case of vegetarianism), it is not at all clear that this 
second relational aspect is present, though the first, of course, is. 
79 In the Netherlands, the committee (instated by the government) that evaluated 
conscientious objections to military service advised the Minister of Defence; it did not 
decide for the government. In practice, its advice was seldom ignored. 
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that someone who, for example, conscientiously objects to military service, 
will in most countries not simply receive the status of conscientious objector, 
if he does not produce reasons for his position; in other words: if he does 
not come up with a reasonable story, that other people can understand (to a 
certain extent), even if it does not convince them. Many problems come 
together here; that of the ‘reasonableness’ of conscience itself, for instance, 
and the problem of (public policy towards) a truly conscientious objection 
that the public does not understand. I cannot look into these problems 
extensively here. Though I firmly disagree with Cohen when he states that 
“the legal provision [for conscientious objection to military service] should 
be devised to determine who is a genuinely conscientious objector, that is, who 
honestly and deeply believes (whatever his grounds for that belief) that it would be 
morally wrongful for him to participate in war”, because I do think that the 
grounds for belief matter; and although my views differ also from Childress’ 
views in that he treats the matter of justification too much from the 
subjective point of view, the public aspect of which is no more than a motive 
statement, I will have to save these problems for a later time.80 What I wish 
to emphasize here is that we expect a conscientious objector to explain 
publicly (primarily to the demanding party and indirectly to a wider audience, 
to society), to the best of his abilities, why (s)he objects to whatever is 
demanded of him or her. It is not enough to say that one is a conscientious 
objector; one has to ‘demonstrate’ the conscientiousness of one’s objection. 
In doing so, one will have made a start in adducing reasons for one’s 
position. When someone conscientiously objects to military service, he will 
be expected to explain why he objects to military service, and to do so in 
terms that are understandable to others.81 
In relation to this I can say something, though not much at this 
point, about the ‘reasonableness’ of conscience. Some people may think that 
conscience and reason are mutually exclusive, so that appealing to 
conscience is by definition something wholly different from giving reasons. 
Even worse, some people think that conscience is not a matter of thinking at 
all, but simply of feeling and intuition (both seen as completely different 
from thought). Looking at our historical examples of conscientious 
objection, however, we see that Socrates’ conscience was not opposed to 
thinking, reason and reason-giving at all. When he stated that “doing nothing 
unjust or impious” was is whole concern, he gave a reason for his refusal to 
bring in Leon the Salaminian to be killed, namely that he thought this order 
was unjust. Thomas More stated that “for the instruction of my conscience 
in the matter, I have not slightly looked, but by many years studied and 
                                                 
80 Cohen (1968), 275 (the second italics are mine); Childress (1979), 325-329. 
81 Some of the problems that occur when ‘intelligibility’ becomes problematic will be 
treated in the following chapter, where the case of conscientious objection to 
marrying gay couples is treated. 
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advisedly considered”, and also that “I had not informed my conscience 
neither suddenly nor slightly”.82 That this was not merely something he 
himself did, but something everyone ought to do, More expressed as follows: 
“[A]ny man (…) is bounden if he see peril to examine his conscience surely 
by learning and by good counsel and be sure that his conscience be such as it 
may stand with his salvation, or else reform it.” And yet More is repeatedly 
accused of obstinacy and of unwillingness to provide reasons for his 
position. This seems to fit in with Bernard Gert’s remark that “in the 
situations where you did not want a person to follow his own conscience, 
you would probably not call him ‘authentic’ if he did, but rather something 
like ‘stubborn’.”83 It is not true that More never gave any reasons supporting 
his position. He explained his position, in very careful wording, in his letter 
to Thomas Cromwell of the fifth of March 1534.84 What is true, is that More 
refused to point out particular parts of the oath the King wanted him to take, 
that offended his conscience: 
 
“[T]hey somewhat laid unto me for obstinacy, that where as before, 
sith I refused to swear, I would not declare any special part of that 
oath that grudged my conscience, and open the cause wherefore.” 
 
But More had his reasons for this refusal: 
 
“[T]hereunto I had said to them that I feared lest the King’s 
Highness would as they said take displeasure enough toward me for 
the only refusal of the oath [i.e. for the refusal of the oath alone]. 
And that if I should open and disclose the causes why, I should 
therewith but further exasperate his Highness, which I would in 
nowise do, but rather would I abide all the danger and harm that 
might come toward me, than give his Highness any occasion of 
further displeasure, than the offering of the oath unto me of pure 
necessity constrained me.” 
 
More then offered to put his reasons in writing, if they (the King’s 
Commissioners, by whom he was questioned) could guarantee that this 
would not put him in danger of any of the King’s statutes. They could not 
guarantee this. More’s willingness to accompany these written reasons (or 
‘causes’, as he called them) by an oath that “if I might find those causes by 
any man in such wise answered, as I might think mine own conscience 
satisfied, I would after that with all mine heart swear the principal oath too” 
                                                 
82 De Silva (2000), 72, 60. 
83 Gert (1988), xviii. 
84 De Silva (2000), 48-56. 
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thereby became irrelevant. More then thought, as he wrote to Margaret 
Roper: 
 
“[L]o, (…) if I may not declare the causes without peril, then to leave them 
undeclared is no obstinacy.”85 
 
This is highly important: the demand that the conscientious objector give 
(public) reasons for his stance is qualified by considerations of the objector’s 
safety.86 The objector does not need to take a greater risk than necessary. 
More explains this in a later letter to Margaret Roper: 
 
“It was also said unto me that if I had as lief [if I would as willingly] be out 
of the world as in it, as I had there said [in a previous questioning by the 
King’s Commissioners], why did I not speak even out plain against the 
statute. It appeared well I was not content to die though I said so. Whereto 
I answered as the truth is, that I have not been a man of such holy living as 
I might be bold to offer myself to death, lest God for my presumption 
might suffer me to fall, and therefore I put not myself forward but draw 
back. Howbeit if God draw me to it himself, then trust I in his great mercy, 
that he shall not fail to give me grace and strength.”87 
 
I think More is quite reasonable in this respect. In fact, this goes for the 
publicity of conscientious objection in general: publicity can hardly be 
demanded in a ‘conscientious-objection-unfriendly’ context; a state that does 
not tolerate opposition to its demands, conscientious or not, and kills or 
severely punishes those who resist the state on grounds of conscience, 
cannot expect conscientious objectors to declare themselves publicly. It is a 
testimony to their courage that many men and women in history have 
nevertheless done exactly that: declare their conscientious objection in face 
of a power that did not recognize conscientious objection as something to 
respect. In a ‘conscientious-objection-friendly’ context, the kind of context 
in which we usually speak of conscientious objection, (the opposite kind of 
context more readily inviting rebellion rather than conscientious objection), 
the demand of public justification can be deemed legitimate.88 Hence, 
conscientious objection tends to have this aspect, that it entails a justification 
in terms of reasons that others can understand (to a certain extent at least) – 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 59. 
86 Socrates also adapts his behaviour to the circumstances with a view to his own 
safety: “Do you think, then, that I would have survived for so many years if I had 
been in public life, and, acting in a manner worthy of a good man, had come to the 
aid of the just and (as one thought) had placed the highest value on that?” (Plato 
[1997], 75). 
87 De Silva (2000), 121. 
88 Note that a ‘conscientious-objection-friendly’ context does not imply a weaker 
state, but in a sense a stronger and more self-confident one. See 13.3.2.2. 
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which implies that the conscientious position is well-considered, and 
carefully thought-through.89 For H.J. McCloskey, the latter criterion provides 
a crucial reason for attaching great significance to conscientious objections: 
“Where not merely personal convenience but one’s carefully thought out, 
sincerely held moral beliefs dictate disobedience, a new factor enters, such 
that disobedience is not only morally permissible but in a sense basic to 
morality, morally necessary.”90 
 People are not equally capable of articulating their motives and 
reasons.91 Hence, the aspect of justification or public reasoning cannot be 
turned into a demand for systematic ethical argumentation.92 All that can be 
said to be part of the practice of conscientious objection is a sincere attempt 
to render one’s position intelligible to others. I will return to this subject in 
13.4.4. 
 
13.4.3. Acceptance of the consequences 
The end of the previous paragraph brings us to a third identifying aspect of 
conscientious objection on the public level: that of acceptance of the 
consequences.93 I noted just now that the demand of publicity of a 
conscientious objection (whether related to reason-giving or conceived more 
generally) is qualified by the consequences such publicity may have for the 
objector. This means that we cannot expect conscientious objectors in any 
context to publicly declare themselves, demanding for themselves the status 
of conscientious objector. In some contexts, such a status is simply not 
available, and the objector will receive a penalty instead. In Western-
European countries (among others), where a right to conscientious objection 
is recognized, a stronger case can be made for the demand that conscientious 
                                                 
89 Bernard Gert even includes this aspect in his definition of conscience. For him, 
“to go against one’s conscience” is to “act contrary to what one would publicly 
advocate”. 
90 McCloskey (1980), 542. My italics. 
91 This problem is poignantly expressed by a conscientious objector quoted in 
Goodall (1997), 102: “[H]ow can you prove you’ve got a conscience? You can’t put 
into words – anybody who’s good with words can put on an act, might get absolute 
exemption, but this is not the point, those people there are trying to get at your 
conscience but how can they, how can you explain this conscience.” 
92 Vermeulen (1989), 215. Vermeulen overstresses the emotionality and 
inarticulability of conscience a bit, to my taste, but draws the right conclusion: only 
evident thoughtlessness should lead to rejection of an appeal to conscience. 
93 Cf. Dahlke (1945), 22: “In the history of Christianity pacifism (…) expresses a 
type of social action which Max Weber has called wertrational, i.e., an adherence to a 
value for its own sake without consideration or calculation of the consequences. (…) 
For purposes of analysis the conscientious objector may be regarded as one whose 
behavior is set on a wertrational basis.” My interpretation of what the typical 
conscientious objector does is a bit weaker: that (s)he accepts the consequences does 
not mean that (s)he did not consider them. 
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objectors accept the consequences of their stand. Would a Dutch young man 
twenty years ago have tried to avoid military conscription by hiding from the 
government, even if he did so for reasons of conscience, we could not have 
identified it as an example of conscientious objection. Conscientious 
objection is not the same as dodging the state on grounds of conscience. 
 Throughout history, conscientious objectors have stood their 
ground even in outspokenly ‘conscientious-objection-unfriendly’ contexts. 
Socrates is an example (though he was on trial for other things besides his 
conscientious refusal to bring Leon in); Thomas More is another clear 
example. The aforementioned Quakers are good illustrations of this fact, too. 
In their case, however, their action provokes a change of attitude towards 
them in the people around them. Richard Seller had been sentenced to death, 
but was reprieved by the Commander. Several men on board the vessel 
spoke on his behalf, one of them stating: “[H]e [Seller] hath already declared, 
that if we take his life away, there shall a judgment appear upon some on 
board within eight and forty hours, and to me it hath appeared…”.94 Seller 
was also fortunate that his judge was a Catholic, which predisposed the 
Commander in his favour: “I say, said the Commander, he is more a Christian 
than thyself.”95 Seller then turned out to be a lucky charm for the ship and its 
crew: “Being thus preserved alive, he was made instrumental to the saving of 
the ship, and the lives of many therein: and by the exercise of an undaunted 
Christian courage and constancy, triumphed over the malice of his 
adversaries, who, conscience of his innocence, at length became his friends 
and favourers.”96 This all served to testify to the truth of Seller’s belief, of 
course. Smith’s story lacks the miraculousness of Seller’s account, but he was 
released as well. There are many ‘in-between’ cases. Given the treatment 
(some) conscientious objectors to the Vietnam War received in the United 
States, must we label that context ‘conscientious-objection-unfriendly’? 
Conscientious objection was a recognized phenomenon; there were 
regulations and procedures. And yet, nearly 600,000 men illegally evaded the 
draft. Between 30,000 and 50,000 sought refuge in Canada.97 This was not 
without reason. For example: 
 
“If the CO applications were denied, individuals were classified I-A and 
subject to being drafted. Those who were ordered for induction were 
required to report to a military induction center for a physical examination. 
Those who passed were instructed to take one step forward to signify their 
acceptance of induction. Anyone who failed to do so was informed of the 
consequences and the procedure was repeated. Inductees who refused a 
second time to step forward were subject to prosecution. Conviction for a 
                                                 
94 Brock (ed.) (1993), 18. 
95 Ibid., 20. 
96 Ibid., 29. ‘Conscience’ is here used in its meaning of ‘conscious’. 
97 Tollefson (1993), 6. 
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draft law violation meant imprisonment for up to five years and a fine of 
up to $10,000.”98 
 
Punishment, then, could be quite severe, making it quite understandable that 
many fled to Canada or went in hiding. Were such people conscientious 
objectors or not? Though I believe the term ‘conscientious objection’ does 
evoke associations of martyrdom in many of us, I do not believe that 
martyrdom is a necessary prerequisite for entitlement to the title 
‘conscientious objector’. The answer depends on more practical 
considerations. We tend to speak of conscientious objectors only in the 
context of a practice of conscientious objection. I have made a distinction 
between conscientious objection as a private phenomenon and conscientious 
objection as a political-juridical phenomenon. The term itself, however, 
derives from the political-juridical discourse. Focusing on the political-
juridical phenomenon of conscientious objection, it makes most sense to 
limit the use of the terms ‘conscientious objection’ and ‘conscientious 
objector’ to situations in which the relational aspect discussed above is 
present; that is, to situations where an actual confrontation between some 
power or authoritative party and an objector occurs – a confrontation of 
which acceptance of the consequences by the objector is simply a corollary. 
Such confrontations occur most regularly in ‘conscientious-objection-
friendly’ contexts; indeed, the term did not exist before the phenomenon 
became more or less institutionalized. Though people like Socrates and More 
can legitimately called conscientious objectors – the relational aspect is 
certainly there, as well as the conscientiousness – this is a broad use of the 
term. We must recognize this in order to avoid anachronism; we must 
beware not to smuggle into the past associations belonging to the common 
modern phenomenon and institutionalized practice of conscientious 
objection.99 People who were conscientious objectors in the private sense, but 
did not make a public stand (but instead chose to run away, for example), 
were not necessarily cowards; many of them will have had a sensible concern 
for their own well-being. The only reason why I wouldn’t call them 
conscientious objectors without qualification is the one I gave above: that 
the term usually refers to the political-juridical phenomenon of conscientious 
objection, and that this has a relational aspect that is (partially) lacking in the 
private form of conscientious objection. To withhold from such people the 
label ‘conscientious objector’, then, does not imply any judgement with 
respect to their courage or lack of it. Naturally, a grey area remains. What 
about those Americans who fled to Canada after their application for CO 
status was turned down, though their objections were genuinely 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 8. 
99 Why conscientious objection became a relatively common practice is a question 
that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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conscientious? They did confront the government, but they did not accept the 
consequences – but, on the other hand, these consequences were not those 
of being a conscientious objector, but those of being denied the status of 
conscientious objector. I cannot dissolve grey into either black or white, and 
I do not think I need to. In case of doubt, it is just a matter of stating as 
clearly as possible in what sense one thinks the person under discussion is a 
conscientious objector. At any rate, in ‘conscientious-objection-friendly’ 
contexts, it seems reasonable to ask that conscientious objectors at least 
accept the consequences of being granted the legal status of conscientious 
objector. 
 How do conscientious objectors express and demonstrate their 
‘acceptance of the consequences’? Well, we have seen some examples 
already. Socrates stated and showed that death ‘concerned him not at all’. 
Thomas More stated that “I would for the enduring of the uttermost do any 
such thing as I should in mine own conscience”.100 In one of his last letters 
to his daughter Margaret, More wrote: 
 
“That that shall follow lieth in the hand of God, whom I beseech to put in 
the King’s Grace’s mind that thing that may be to his high pleasure, and in 
mine, to mind only the weal of my soul, with little regard of my body.”101 
 
As a final consequence of the stance he took, he was beheaded on Tuesday, 
the 6th of July 1535. Both Richard Seller and John Smith suffered severe 
physical (and mental) abuse, but underwent this with resignation. Richard 
Seller told the ship’s commander, the judge, and the assembled commanders 
of the other ships of the convoy: 
 
“I do not value what you can do to this body, for I am at peace with God 
and all men, and you my adversaries; for if I might have an hundred and 
thirty years longer, I can never die in a better condition…”102 
 
Dutch conscientious objectors to compulsory military service either accepted 
alternative service, or, if they were ‘totaalweigeraars’ (Dutch for ‘absolutist 
objectors’), refusing alternative service as well, went to prison for their 
beliefs. In one report of an interview with a conscientious objector, the 
chairman of the aforementioned advisory committee noted that the 
objector’s conscience “forbids his serving in the military, whatever the 
consequences of such a refusal may be”.103 
 
                                                 
100 De Silva (2000), 106. 
101 Ibid., 115. 
102 Brock (ed.) (1993), 16. 
103 ADD. The interview was held in 1991. 
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13.4.4. Consistency 
Related to the aspect of acceptance of the consequences, to conclude, is the 
aspect of consistency. Most authors on conscientious objection emphasize 
this aspect, though the link with ‘acceptance of the consequences’ is often 
disregarded. In Niklas Luhmann’s view, the consistency that others demand 
from the individual is crucial for the development of the individual’s 
conscience. The function of conscience is to guard its owner’s integrity, in 
the sense that it prevents its owner from doing something that is (gravely) 
inconsistent with who that person is and wants to be. To recall: according to 
Luhmann, the question of conscience is: ‘Can I do this and still be me?’. 
What we expect from a conscientious objector is not just consistency in his 
or her expressions, and in the explanation of his or her position, but also 
(and maybe even more importantly) consistency in behaviour. Luhmann (like 
some other authors) suggests a test of integrity, in which the criterion is 
consistency with the objector’s biography.104 An appeal for the status of 
conscientious objector, made on pacifist grounds by a new conscript who 
had been repeatedly convicted for violent assault, the last case having 
occurred very recently, has about the same chance of success a wart-hog 
wearing heavy make-up would have of winning a beauty contest. Cain 
observes this in United States practice: “[A]nyone working in a defense plant 
has a poor claim on I-O status.”105 The principle underlying this practice 
makes sense; it becomes worrying when, as Cain reports, this principle is 
extended “to a busboy working in a military airport cafeteria”, as occurred in 
the case of Robertson v. US, in 1953.106 
 Such an example shows that the problem of (in)consistency cannot 
be reduced to that of (in)authenticity or (in)sincerity. The latter problem is 
much more often explicitly discussed than the problem of (in)consistency 
without insincerity. Cain speaks of “the perennial problem of deciding the 
quality of an applicant’s sincerity”.107 That the objector will have to be 
sincere, that his or her objection needs to be authentic, is self-evident. But 
this is not a new, added criterion. It is simply part of the demand that the 
objection be conscientious – which means that when Cohen speaks of the 
‘genuineness of the conscientious motivation’, he is guilty of using a 
pleonasm.108 Hence, we can focus our attention on the more interesting 
problem of (seeming) inconsistency without insincerity. 
                                                 
104 See also Childress (1979), 334-335. 
105 Cain (1970), 303. ‘I-O status’ meaning: “assignment to civilian work ‘contributing 
to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest as the local board may 
deem appropriate’.” (299) See also Tollefson (1993), 8. 
106 Cain (1970), 303 (footnote 66). 
107 Ibid., 303. 
108 Cohen (1968), 274. 
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 People are often inconsistent, both in speech and in behaviour, as 
well as in the relation between both. When someone seems to be 
inconsistent, because from a third-person perspective he says one thing and 
does another, or when someone acts in ways that seem inconsistent to an 
outsider, such a person’s integrity might be doubted – especially if the 
inconsistency attaches to behaviour of more than trivial significance. Bert 
Musschenga attends to this problem, emphasizing that the conclusion that 
someone lacks integrity should not be drawn too readily. It is quite often 
possible that someone can produce a plausible story that explains the 
supposed inconsistency in a satisfactory way.109 But apart from seeming 
inconsistency that may dissolve in light of a person’s narrative explanation, 
there is also real inconsistency; that is, inconsistency that resists such 
dissolution. To be inconsistent in this way, to be truly inconsistent, is not 
exceptional. Adherence to a plurality of values, inarticulacy of one’s ‘moral 
framework’, limitations of certain capacities (as shown in forgetfulness, for 
instance), and many other factors contribute to our regular inconsistencies. 
How harsh should such inconsistencies be judged?110 Should we demand 
that the conscientious objector be totally consistent, the equivalent of Hare’s 
archangel in the field of consistency? That would be to ask more of them 
than one could ask of any man. More importantly (for practical purposes at 
least): it would enhance the chances of success in the case of some applicants 
for conscientious objector status, while the chances of others would 
decrease. Too rigid an emphasis on the criterion of consistency would favour 
the more intellectually gifted, and especially the more articulate among them. 
A skilled word-juggler will be able to keep a large number of balls in the air 
at the same time, whereas the amateur attempts to juggle with two and drops 
them both. It is clear from several of the files of conscientious objectors (or 
applicants for that status) I studied that many applicants experienced 
problems in articulating what they meant. They were regularly confronted 
with questions that forced them to consider an aspect they had not 
previously thought about. Though it is certainly reasonable to ask that 
conscientious objections carefully consider their position – I take this as part 
of the meaning of ‘conscientious objection’ – it is plausible that some 
genuine conscientious objectors saw their applications turned down due to 
                                                 
109 Musschenga (2004). On integrity, see also Musschenga (2001) and (2002). 
110 Naturally, I am speaking of relevant inconsistencies. In the case of military service, 
a relevant inconsistency might be that someone is a fervent hunter and member of a 
shooting club, while at the same time he states that he cannot pick up a gun as a 
soldier (and this seeming inconsistency might still be dissolved through a plausible 
narrative); an irrelevant inconsistency would exist, for instance, between someone’s 
expressed dislike of the colour of military uniforms and the abundant presence of 
clothes of that colour in this person’s wardrobe. Though this inconsistency is indeed 
irrelevant in itself, it might raise some doubts concerning the individual’s sincerity, or 
else with respect to his mental capacities. 
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their lack of articulacy, or inconsistencies in their expressions that arose 
during interviews with the advisory committee. For this reason, I would say 
that the evaluation of both the aspect of consistency and that of ‘public 
reasoning’ ought to be appropriate to the capacities of the objector in 
question. The emphasis should lie on discovering the objector’s motivating 
experience, either in the form of an inspiration or an experienced authority, 
not on discovering (let alone provoking) verbal inconsistencies. The case of 
inconsistencies in a person’s biography is more difficult, but there, too, 
discovery of such inconsistencies should not of necessity lead to the 
conclusion that it is not a case of conscientious objection. People often do 
not relate their behaviour in one field of life to their behaviour in another 
field, or to the whole of their convictions. This is not necessarily a lack of 
conscientiousness; it might betray a ‘lack’ of reflection that is common to all 
of us. One could say that this person’s conscience was not completely 
comprehensive, but that does not mean that the mode of consciousness we 
call conscience was absent. So the issue comes to revolve around the degree 
of comprehensiveness of conscience we may require. Again, only general 
guidelines can be given – the rest depends on the phronesis of those who 
judge the case on the day. Gross inconsistencies are not compatible with a 
genuine conscientious objection; in a case like the busboy mentioned by 
Cain, I see no reason why he would disqualify for conscientious objector 
status. In between is, once again, a grey area. As in the case of verbal 
inconsistencies, where inconsistencies in a person’s biography are concerned 
the emphasis should lie on the individual’s experience of conscience, not on 
tracking down the inconsistencies in someone’s life. 
 A final problem with the criterion of consistency arises with the 
possibility of conversion. As Cain notes: “Boards take a dim view of ‘Damascus 
converts’.”111 Self-acclaimed converts will often arouse the suspicion of 
insincerity, because their conversion ‘conveniently’ precludes the possibility 
of a Luhmannian test of integrity by the standard of their biography. And 
yet, real cases of radical conversion occur now and then. After everything 
(within reasonable limits) has been done to ascertain the conscientiousness 
of an objection, some dubious cases will still remain. The number of such 
cases will be greater, however, to the extent that conscientious objections are 
dealt with in a more formal and procedural manner.112 
 I started this section stating that the aspects of consistency and 
‘acceptance of the consequences’ are related, and that this relation is often 
overlooked. The latter is true, because most authors focus on consistency in 
the past, reviewing, as it were, the evidence of a person’s (in)sincerity and 
(in)consistency. Luhmann’s test of integrity by the standard of biography is a 
                                                 
111 Cain (1970), 304. 
112 See my case study of conscientious objection to compulsory military service in 
the following chapter. 
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case in point.113 From a Luhmannian perspective, what I have here called the 
aspect of consistency (as distinguished from acceptance of the 
consequences), will most readily spring to view. But when someone like 
Cohen argues that what ought to be determined is “whether the objector is 
truly conscientious”, and elucidates: “When a man does what he honestly 
and deeply believes he ought not to do, we think him unprincipled and a 
hypocrite. The conscientious objector (…) will not tolerate that hypocrisy in 
himself…”, it is equally conceivable to focus on consistency between the 
(past and) present and the future.. 114 From such a perspective, the aspect of 
acceptance of the consequences will be primary. Most recent authors on 
conscience aim to discredit any test of the contents of conscience. What ought 
to be judged, they argue, is not whether someone is right in what he believes, 
but whether he really and deeply believes it. To ascertain whether someone 
really and deeply believes something, in Ryle’s words: whether someone has 
certain convictions ‘in an operative degree’, one can look both towards the 
past and towards the future. The latter would become operational through 
questions like: ‘Does this objector intend to stick to his position?’; ‘Is this 
(supposedly) conscientious objector willing to accept the consequences of 
his position?’; ‘If a supposedly conscientious objector says that he or she 
intends to stick by his or her conscience, no matter what the consequences 
will be, does his or her present attitude testify to the presence of such an 
intention?’ Socrates claimed: “[D]eath concerns me (…) not at all, whereas 
doing nothing unjust or impious, that is my whole concern.” Had Socrates 
not stood his ground when death turned out to be the consequence of his 
position, his behaviour would have been inconsistent both with earlier 
behaviour and with what he said. To be consistent, in his position, meant to 
accept the consequences. 
 Governments have made ample use of conscientious objectors’ 
consistency and willingness to accept the consequences of their position, 
using these traits as a criterion of conscientiousness and as a deterrent for 
fake conscientious objectors. With respect to military service, Mellors and 
McKean note: “It is usual for the term of alternative service to be longer 
than normal military service. Conscientious objectors must be seen to make 
equal sacrifices, despite their stand. Indeed some objectors have deliberately 
sought longer periods of service as a means of demonstrating the 
genuineness of their conscience. Additional periods of service in some 
countries may simply be a few months (…). In other countries, the period is 
considerably extended to act as a deterrent or punitive measure.”115 
Vermeulen states that “with the criterion of moral seriousness, manifesting 
                                                 
113 Mellors and McKean (1982), 231, note that “[d]ecisions tend to rely on previous 
lifestyle and evidence of associates and colleagues”. 
114 Cohen (1968), 270-271. 
115 Mellors and McKean (1982), 234. 
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itself in willingness to make a sacrifice, the constant in the concept of 
conscience is indeed found”.116 I would say that a constant is found, not of 
the concept of conscience, but of conscientious objection. (An experience of 
conscience does not necessarily result in willingness to make a sacrifice.) 
Luhmann’s concept of conscience is devised with the practice of 
conscientious objection in mind, which is why he, too, connects conscience 
with radical consequences, describing Freiheit des Gewissens as a Freiheit zum 
Tode.117 Vermeulen notes that both in Dutch and German legal practice and 
theory, the Bereitschaft zur Konsequenz [‘willingness to accept the 
consequences’] has become the crucial criterion in judging the 
conscientiousness of an objection.118 Though it is understandable that 
governments wish to prevent abuse of legal provisions for conscientious 
objectors, the test of objectors’ consistency in the form of willingness to 
accept the consequences does, in my view, bear a certain resemblance to 
early modern witch-finding practices. If person A is a witch, (s)he will float 
on water; if (s)he is innocent of witchcraft, (s)he will sink. Hence, innocence 
is punished.119 The same applies in the case of conscientious objectors: if you 
are a real conscientious objector, you are punished with (for example) 
alternative service that is twice as long as the ordinary military service. Once 
an objector has completed his period of service, the government can only 
admit that, in retrospect, given that the objector was genuinely conscientious, 
the deterrent (i.e. the extended period of service) was in this case useless. 
 To conclude, it is perhaps appropriate to give some evidence of the 
importance conscientious objectors themselves often attach to consistency. 
From his letters, it is clear that Thomas More’s position had been the same 
for a long time. That others called him obstinate only testifies to his 
consistency. More payed the ultimate penalty for his consistency, which 
means he remained consistent to the bitter end. Quaker John Smith 
conscientiously refused to comply with a request to appear at the town house 
in Dartmouth, where he would enter military service under captain Benjamin 
Church in defence of the country against ‘the French and Indian enemy’. 
This was on the 15th of June 1703. On January 14th, 1704, he appeared 
before two magistrates of Dartmouth, where he persisted in his position, so 
that he was fined five pounds (and three shillings charges). 
 
                                                 
116 Vermeulen (1989), 92. My italics. 
117 Luhmann (1965), 270. 
118 He also remarks that such a criterion was recognized in the thirteenth century, 
where willingness to accept martyrdom was taken as proof of the activity of 
conscience in heretics. Vermeulen, 126. 
119 The reader will pardon my use of this caricature of early modern practice. This 
particular practice was not as common as some people still think, especially in this 
radical form. People who did not float were often rescued from the water, for 
example. 
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“[H]aving a months time to consider whether to pay said fine or not, I 
found most peace in refusing, for which I was sentenced to prison till 
payment thereof, where I remained till the general sessions in the second 
month following, and was then required to pay said fine and charges: but 
still refusing for the reason aforesaid, proclamation was made in court that 
I should be hired out to work to any that wanted a hand (…) but none 
offering to accept my service (…) I was sent to prison again (…). [A]t the 
end of two weeks, the above said Benjamin Church came and commanded 
me out of prison, which I refused to comply with…”120 
 
Smith epitomizes the consistency of conscientious objectors. His attitude 
was consistent with his biography, as Luhmann would want to know, and he 
persists in his refusal no matter what. Dutch conscientious objectors to 
compulsory military service showed that they realized the importance of 
consistency both with respect to the past and with respect to the future. 
Many of them state that they will never be able to kill someone, and that they 
will persist in their present attitude. They often point out the continuity 
between their position as a conscientious objector and experiences (of 
conscience) from their past, like the uneasiness experienced while or after 
hurting another person. One of them states that he had always had a 
“revulsion from anything involving human suffering”, which resulted in a 
strong determination to alleviate people’s suffering in the world. In such 
ways, conscientious objectors attempt to point out the consistency of the 
stand they are taking with the life they have lived thus far; in other words: 
with who they are – the consistency being provided by the ultimate concern 
that shaped and continues to shape their identity, not exclusively, yet 
decisively. 
 
 
13.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Without being able to give an exact all-purpose definition of conscientious 
objection, we are now in a position to locate its core and to point out its 
identifying aspects. Most basically, conscientious objection is objection on 
grounds of conscience. This is not an appeal to a decisive authority, but 
rather, like the symbol of conscience itself, a symbolic expression of 
experiences of conscience that is always an expression of ultimate concern. 
In this respect ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ conscientious objection do not differ 
from each other. In both cases the conscientious objector cannot, in view of 
his or her awareness of the Good, or must, in view of the inspiration 
received from a vision of the Good, proceed in a certain way. In a political-
juridical context, conscientious objection entails an objection to a demand 
made by another, authoritative, party. From the conjunction of these two 
elements (the ultimate concern underlying conscientious objection and the 
                                                 
120 Brock (ed.) (1993), 34-35. 
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relationality of the objections) flow certain further aspects of conscientious 
objection that identify the conscientious objector as such: public reasoning, 
acceptance of the consequences, and consistency. 
Attending to one of the identifying aspects discussed in this chapter, 
or to a combination of them, and looking through them, as it were, we may 
discover other aspects of conscientious objection. I have looked at one of 
them in 13.3.2.2. Concentrating on the expression of ultimate concern 
through conscientious objection, and on the determination that seems to 
characterize conscientious objectors, we can see that conscientious objection 
in fact involves a combination of certainty and uncertainty. The 
conscientious objector is not typically absolutely sure about the rightness of 
his stance, but despite his or her doubt (s)he ‘can do no other’. This explains 
why conscientious objection requires courage, and why conscientious 
objectors have often commanded the respected of people who strongly 
opposed their views. Depending on the perspective taken, other aspects of 
conscientious objection may be revealed. In the following chapter, I will look 
at conscientious objection as a practice in the political-juridical domain, and 
as a legal category. The background for those discussions will be formed by 
the aspects discussed in 13.4. Chapter 14, in more concrete terms, will 
discuss some important relations between conscientious objection, the state, 
and the law. 
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14. Conscientious objection, the state, and the law 
 
“…the political philosophy of the future will tend in a direction which will 
more than ever make the appeal to conscience a necessary postulate of 
social order.” 
RICHARD ROBERTS, “The Problem of Conscience” (1919) 
 
 
14.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter highlighted a number of aspects that are central to 
conscientious objection and constitute criteria to distinguish conscientious 
objections from other kinds of objection. By no means everything of 
importance has been said about conscientious objection, however. 
Conscientious objection is familiar to us as a modern phenomenon that is 
part of a particular political-juridical constellation. In this chapter, I will 
discuss some important ways in which conscientious objection is related to 
law and to the state. I will switch between two perspectives: up to now, I 
have regarded conscientious objection primarily as a practice in a political-
juridical domain, and from this perspective we will see below that 
conscientious objection can be seen as a form of criticism or even protest. If 
we regard conscientious objection as a legal category, and look at it from a 
metajuridical perspective, a related aspect appears: legal provisions for 
conscientious objection can be regarded as a recognition of the contingent 
character of positive law. From the latter perspective, we can discern two 
further aspects of conscientious objection. The first of these relates to the 
origins of the phenomenon of conscientious objection in the increasing 
power of the state; conscientious objection can be seen as an area where the 
modern increase of state power manifests itself. The second shows 
conscientious objection to be a ‘legal pressure valve’, an aspect emphasized 
by Cohen and Luhmann. All four aspects of conscientious objection 
mentioned above are located on the public, rather than the personal-
experiential level. 
 It is important to note that the aspects discussed below are related to 
the identifying aspects attended to in the previous chapter. For instance, the 
critical function of conscientious objection may, in certain contexts, manifest 
itself most clearly through public justification of the objection; in other 
contexts, it may be most effective through the conscientious objector’s 
public acceptance of the (severe) consequences of his or her objection. It is 
especially through concentration on that aspect (acceptance of the 
consequences), too, that we may come to see conscientious objection as a 
‘legal pressure valve’. 
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14.2. THE CRITICAL FUNCTION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE 
 CONTINGENT CHARACTER OF POSITIVE LAW 
 
14.2.1. The critical function of conscientious objection 
In his discussion of faith, Tillich states that it contains doubt as an element 
of itself. “[C]reedal expressions of the ultimate concern of the community,” 
Tillich says, “must include their own criticism. It must become obvious in all 
of them – be they liturgical, doctrinal or ethical expressions of the faith of 
the community – that they are not ultimate. Rather, their function is to point 
to the ultimate which is beyond all of them.”1 He names this critical element 
the ‘protestant principle’. This is not without reason: conscience has an 
important place in Protestant faith; in a sense, it is the embodiment of the 
‘protestant principle’.2 Conscience functions as a reminder of and a vector 
pointing towards the absolute, which grounds its critical function in a 
community. Within conscience, the dual structure of faith (encompassing 
both certainty and doubt), is repeated, as we have seen above. Hence, 
conscience is critical of the individual as well, in the sense that it demands 
openness, and willingness to revise one’s principles. Of course, conscience is 
critical of the individual (its ‘owner’) in a more obvious way as well, 
‘forbidding’ all kinds of things we do, are about to do, or consider doing. (In 
psychoanalytic interpretations, this is in fact all there is to it.) This function 
has its analogue on a societal level too: conscientious objectors often appeal 
to principles to which the society of which they are members claims to 
subscribe. The implicit critique is then that a principle that is accepted in 
theory is not lived up to in practice. Below, I will discuss both above-
mentioned ways in which conscientious objection has or is a critical function, 
starting with the latter. 
 Some authors would say it is a mistake to see conscientious 
objection as embodying a critique of the state and its laws (or the company 
and its regulations); whether a critique based on more fundamental laws (the 
Constitution) or not. Childress, for instance, emphasizes that conscience is 
not a rival authority of the state, but a personal sanction. The question with 
regard to the desired policy with respect to conscientious objectors should 
be: “When should (or may) we force a person to choose between the severe 
personal sanction of conscience and some legal sanction?” In Childress’ 
view, “a state is a better and more desirable one if it puts the presumption in 
favor of exemption for conscientious objectors”.3 ‘Exemption’ is the 
keyword here. Cohen holds a similar view: “The sound principle which 
underlies conscientious objection is that, in framing its laws, the community 
should avoid creating situations in which any of its respected members are 
                                                 
1 Tillich (1957), 29. 
2 Though, naturally, it often did not and does not function that way in practice. 
3 Childress (1979), 329-330. 
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necessarily faced with an intolerable moral dilemma.”4 Needless to say, 
Luhmann takes a similar view of conscientious objection. 
 And yet, Cohen’s text also hints at another view. He states that 
“[p]rovision for conscientious objection is a mark of considerable 
sophistication in a political community. It indicates that there is a general 
awareness (...) of the depth of moral disagreements (...). It is (...) an implicit 
recognition by the community that obedience to certain of its laws might be 
held, by good and reasonable men, to be a moral evil.”5 This brings us close 
to the subject of the contingency of positive law, but I will delay that 
discussion for a while, as we are still dealing with the other kind of criticism 
that is (or may be) embodied in conscientious objection, namely: criticism on 
the basis of widely accepted principles. Cohen notes that conscientious 
objection is generally thought of in the context of military conscription, and 
limits his own discussion to that context. Conscientious objection to military 
service, or to participation in war in any way, is the most universally 
recognized form of conscientious objection. Why is this so? The most 
obvious answer seems to be that it appeals to ideas and sentiments that are 
quite widely shared. As MacCallum notes: “Reference to something as 
violence, though it suggests decisive grounds for abstinence only to rare 
persons, does suggest grounds for abstinence to most all persons.”6 
 This still does not necessarily mean that conscientious objection is 
taken to be criticism on grounds that most people can relate to. Nor does it 
mean that conscientious objectors intend their objections to entail criticism, 
rather than a plea for exemption. Below, I will produce evidence that shows 
that at least some conscientious objectors desire(d) to achieve more than that 
an exemption be made for them. First, however, I will consider the 
implications of contemporary state responses to and policy regarding 
conscientious objection for the topic under consideration. 
 In The Netherlands, in 1994, a bill was accepted that offered 
employees with a conscientious objection to certain tasks protection against 
discharge. The explanation to this bill explicitly defined a conscientious 
objection as flowing from an “individual normative awareness regarding 
good and evil”.7 German law interprets a decision of conscience as “every 
                                                 
4 Cohen (1968), 269. 
5 Idem. 
6 MacCallum (1993), 180. 
7 Burgerlijk Wetboek, art. 681. See also, for instance, the letter concerning civil servants 
with conscientious objections, sent by the municipality of The Hague to all heads of 
civil service departments in that city in 1986. Conscientious objections are there 
explained as follows: “On the basis of his internal conviction concerning good and 
evil, the person in question may with himself come to the conclusion that certain 
behaviour is immoral and should thus not be engaged in. This is a purely individual 
matter.” (Brief van de Gemeente Den Haag aan de hoofden van takken van dienst, 29 August 
29, 1986.) 
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serious ethical decision, that is: every serious decision oriented towards the 
categories of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ (…), that the individual in certain 
circumstances inwardly experiences as binding for himself and 
unconditionally obligating, so that he cannot act contrary to them without 
serious qualms of conscience”.8 This means that to be eligible for the status 
of conscientious objector, one must accept this definition of conscience as 
‘an individual normative awareness’ that is (experienced as) ‘binding for 
himself’. I know that some people do not recognize themselves in such a 
definition of conscience.9 In Walzer’s view of conscientious objection, the 
definition even fails to make sense at all, as for him “commitments to 
principles are simultaneously commitments to other men, from whom or 
with whom the principles have been learned and by whom they are 
enforced”.10 The least we can say, then, is that conscientious objections are 
socially transcendent – their meaning transcends the individual, extending to 
(and belonging to) a social group, even if it is true today that demarcations 
between such groups are less clear than they have been, and that individuals 
are often members of several groups rather than a single identity-defining 
one. 
 Richard Roberts begins his article “The Problem of Conscience”, 
published just after World War I, with an extensive quotation by Cardinal 
Newman. Newman explains that in the event of a clash between his 
obligations to the Queen and the Pope – none of which were absolute – his 
own conscience would, after ample consideration and gathering of advice, 
have to decide in the matter. Roberts contrasts this with the situation of the 
C.O. in his time: 
 
“Newman postulates a conflict of loyalties to two societies, whose 
requirements are at a given point antagonistic, before invoking the 
arbitrament of conscience. The conscientious objector is, however, 
conceived as setting his own private judgment against the will of the only 
society to which he owes allegiance. (…) But in point of fact, the 
                                                 
8 The German reads: “jede ernste sittliche, d. h. an den Kategorien von ‘gut’ und 
‘böse’ orientierte Entscheidung (…), die der Einzelne in einer bestimmten Lage als 
für sich bindend und unbedingt verpflichtend innerlich erfährt, so dass er gegen sie 
nicht ohne ernste Gewissensnot handeln könnte”. (Unless otherwise stated, 
translations are my own.) See Schockenhoff, (2003), 15-16. Compare also Sweden, 
where, in laws concerning conscientious objection, the phrase ‘conscientious doubt’ 
was replaced by ‘deeply held / serious personal convictions’ (and the further 
criterion that conscription would lead to ‘deep moral conflict within’ the C.O.), by 
which conscience loses all possible claims to objectivity. See Adelswärd (1998), 441. 
Recent concepts of conscience also tend to emphasize its subjectivity; see, for 
instance, Childress (1979), 318: “Conscience is personal and subjective (…).” 
9 See 15.3. 
10 Walzer (1967), 164. 
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conscientious objector as a rule bases his action on the ground of loyalty to 
a certain view of human relationships, that is to say, to a social ideal…”11 
 
Roberts feels that something has changed in this respect; the state in his time 
had acquired a power and authority that was unprecedented: 
 
“But it seems to be generally assumed in all popular political thinking to-
day that our loyalty to the state should be not only first but absolute over 
all the other loyalties of life. In our day, this view has received, particularly 
in democratic communities, a subtle and plausible reinforcement from the 
growing emphasis upon the fact of social solidarity with its implication that 
the consensus of the community fixes the norm of conduct. A man’s 
conscience should (…) reflect the collective conscience of the society.”12 
 
In post-modern society, the social demand that the individual conscience 
should reflect the collective conscience of society means that it should not be 
informed by the teachings of a traditional religious group, but rather be 
‘autonomous’ and personal. Much confusion is involved in such ideas, and in 
effect it means that people will simply be less aware of the factors that 
influence(d) and shape(d) their conscience. Nevertheless, popular views like 
these inevitable influence state policy.13 
With a view to the above we may consider the definition of 
conscience as ‘individual’ and exclusively binding for the subject in question 
as part of a strategy to render conscientious objection harmless. Firstly, it entails that 
the objector’s only loyalty is to the state and society as a whole. Secondly, 
what the state in fact demands is that people accept that the dictates of their 
conscience are exclusively valid for themselves. Their validity cannot reach 
beyond the subject.14 Hence, an individual’s dictates of conscience can never 
challenge the state. All they can do is forbid one particular person to obey. 
They cannot call the law itself into question; they cannot question the 
authority of the state. They cannot seriously influence other people, because 
they are accompanied by a notification: only valid for this subject. In short: 
the individual conscience, distrusted throughout history and feared for its 
supposed subversiveness, is in its modern subjective form in fact an 
                                                 
11 Roberts (1919), 334. 
12 Ibid., 336. 
13 See the following chapter for more on the popular view of conscience. 
14 I do not disagree with the fact that my conscience cannot forbid another person to 
do something; I object to the relativism that seems to lurk in the background. Too 
much emphasis is placed on the fact that it is an ‘individual’ normative awareness, 
‘inwardly experienced’, et cetera. I maintain that the ‘individual’ conscience may 
reveal moral insights that in themselves are not limited to the subject in question. 
Even apart from this possibility, however, it must be recognized that most people’s 
conscience will be ‘intersubjective’ to a high degree, in the sense that its ‘dictates’ are 
shared by others. 
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exceptionally non-revolutionary conscience.15 It is obvious, then, why states 
might want people to have such a conscience, and even define conscience 
exclusively in such terms. This strategy attempts to eliminate the critical 
potential conscience is seen to have. Dutch and German law go beyond the 
statute of French Law that “allows all those who, for religious or 
philosophical reasons, oppose in all circumstances the personal bearing of 
arms, to satisfy conscription requirements by serving either in a 
noncombatant group or a civil ‘formation’.”16 Not only are the ‘dictates of 
conscience’ exclusively binding for the individual; conscience itself is said to 
be a subjective phenomenon. Conscience cannot even be said to be 
objectively binding for an individual; it is only subjectively experienced to be 
so. Hence, conscientious objection becomes isolated, preventing it from 
becoming a social force. 
The latter has also been attempted by more material means. In 1978, 
in former West Germany, an unsuccessful attempt was made, Mellors and 
McKean write, “to militarise’ alternative service by putting objectors in 
barracks with curfew and other restrictions”.17 The United States knew such 
camps until 1951. France had them in the sixties of the previous century. 
Cain reports: “Alternative civilian services must be performed in camps. 
Authority over these camps was transferred from the military to that of the 
Ministry of Interior, but the camps are still under a military cadre of three 
officers and seven noncoms.” After a relatively lenient start, restrictions were 
tightened: “more inspections, censorship of reading material, and denial of 
participation in groups having a political or religious character.”18 Mellors 
and McKean note that “[s]ome French sceptics have argued that the (…) 
service with the Office National des Forêts is intended as a dispersal measure, to 
keep potential agitators away from sensitive city areas”.19 While Cain writes 
that “the French still consider the CO a public offender who must be 
punished in some way”, Mellors and McKean tell us that in Finland, 
“objectors are put into battalions with convicts and the socially 
                                                 
15 This is the exact opposite of the common view, which is that “[t]he new 
conscientious objection is a much more complex challenge to armed forces and 
society than the old” (Moskos and Chambers [1993], 20). The ‘new’ conscientious 
objection is hardly a challenge at all. Both society and the state have encapsulated its 
critics. On the positive side, this means that conscientious objectors are no longer 
(fully) ‘excommunicated’; on the negative side, it means that a potential stimulus to 
critical self-reflection has been removed. 
16 Cain (1970), 282. 
17 Mellors and McKean (1982), 232. 
18 Cain (1970), 283-284. 
19 Mellors and McKean (1982), 234. 
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maladjusted”.20 William Fifield, writing from an American C.O. camp in 
1945, noted the following: 
 
“Canada believes in separating CO’s rather than segregating them in 
groups, and intentionally gives them no publicity. Thus the general public is 
not aware they even exist, and they have little chance to organize for 
pacifist group action.”21 
 
In a relatively recent past, then, some countries that we generally consider to 
be quite civilized criminalized their conscientious objectors.22 Criminalization 
was not common practice in all European countries.23 The more subtle 
approach was through the individualization of conscientious objection as 
described above. Neutralization of the critical potential of conscientious 
objection, at any rate, is a desired goal of state policy, and would be the 
consequence of an entirely successful state strategy. 
 Naturally, the success is incomplete. Sometimes, conscientious 
objection is intended as criticism, and aims at reform. In some situations, it 
can be a critical force. McCloskey recognizes the critical function, not only of 
civil disobedience, but also of conscientious disobedience:  
 
“Sometimes, less often than is desirable, conscientious disobedience leads 
to changes, to reforms in the laws, to constitutional changes, to the 
establishment of a just constitution with just laws. In these cases the 
conscientious disobedience may achieve these results by preparing the 
ground for revolutionary disobedients, and the revolutionary disobedience, 
but it may achieve such results without such revolutionary activity 
occurring.”24 
  
The second sentence serves to support her claim that the popular idea that 
allowing conscientious objection will lead to instability and anarchy is 
nonsensical. Conscientious disobedience may have (or be) a critical function, 
                                                 
20 Cain (1970), 284; Mellors and McKean (1982), 233. For similar remarks about the 
French situation in the late 1980s, see Martin (1993), 94. 
21 Fifield (1945), 191. 
22 Cf. Hobhouse (1917) on criminalization of conscientious objectors in Britain 
during the Great War. In Switzerland, it took until 1987 until the government 
introduced a bill to ‘decriminalize objectors for conscientious reasons’, which was 
accepted by referendum in 1991; see Haltiner (1993), 141. On criminalization of 
C.O.’s in New Zealand in World War II, see Fifield (1945), 192. 
23 Absolutist objectors are virtually always sentenced to imprisonment, sometimes 
repeatedly and without limit to the number of repetitions. The United States, for 
instance, incarcerated 5000 objectors in World War II, more than 3000 of which 
were Jehovah’s Witnesses; thousand were also imprisoned during the Vietnam War. 
See Chambers (1993), 38 and 41. 
24 McCloskey (1980), 550. 
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but “[f]ew authoritarian governments have been reduced to anarchy as a 
result of conscientious disobedience”.25 Mellors and McKean also note that 
the political form of conscientious objection has had ‘some impact’, “since 
military authorities cannot be wholly deaf to the critical expressions of 
serving soldiers who are not convinced of the justification of the tasks they 
are called upon to perform.”26 They perceive this impact in the context of 
U.S. conscripts in Vietnam, as well as in that of British policy with regard to 
Northern Ireland, a policy that “might be difficult to pursue with a conscript 
army”.27 That at least some conscientious objectors are not satisfied with an 
exemption for their own person is evident from some of the testimonies 
recorded in Goodall’s A Question of Conscience. Eric Dott (C.O. in the Great 
War) recalls that, though he is ‘not so sure know’, 
 
“I did very much think at the time that this was the only way to help 
prevent future wars, to register my protest as a CO that war was wrong and 
that I would take no part in it and hoping that in the future that view would 
prevail and perhaps future wars would be prevented by a growing number 
of COs until they couldn’t get enough soldiers to fight.”28 
 
British conscientious objectors in World War I sometimes accepted service 
in the Non-Combatant Corps, which meant that they could communicate 
with the public. W.H. Eaton says: 
 
“Wherever we go, at first we are looked upon as some special, suspicious 
kind of beings but in due time when people know us we are generally 
respected and in some cases admired. We are certainly bearing testimony to 
our beliefs and we hope seed will fall upon good ground and bring forth 
fruit in other lives that will be determined to stand for peace – and against 
bloodshed and war.”29 
 
Similar statements occur in the Dutch C.O. files I studied. One applicant 
hopes that his decision to apply for conscientious objector status will 
contribute to the mentality change he advocates heart and soul. Another 
believes that we can realise a peaceful society through talking and 
negotiation, and though he knows that goal is still far away, he believes he 
can make a step in the right direction. In general, even when these Dutch 
applicants for conscientious objector status have no other intentions than to 
get exempted, they tend to formulate the support for their applications as 
                                                 
25 Idem. 
26 Mellors and McKean (1982), 229. 
27 Idem. 
28 Goodall (1997), 7. 
29 Ibid., 18. 
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criticism of government policy. The same arguments recur time and again; it 
is evident that they were widely shared at that time.30 
 The criticism that is sometimes implicit, sometimes also explicit in 
the examples of conscientious objection adduced above, refer to widely 
shared principles. Most people can relate to objections against killing other 
human beings, only they do not reach the same ‘radical’ conclusions. 
Especially in the case of conscientious objection against a particular war, 
however, it may very well be that it makes people think more thoroughly 
about the legitimacy of that war (and maybe of war in general). Thomas 
More also referred to principles accepted by the party he was (in this 
particular point) radically opposed to. Not only did he refer to the ‘one corps 
of Christendom’, to the authority of the Church and to natural law; he also 
specifically referred to King Henry’s own words: 
 
“[T]he first time that I ever heard that point moved, that it [the King’s 
marriage] should be in such high degree against the law of nature, was the 
time in which (…) the King’s Grace showed it me himself, and laid the 
Bible open before me, and there read me the words that moved his 
Highness and divers other erudite persons so to think…”31 
 
“[H]e [the King] graciously declared unto me that he would in no wise that 
I should other thing do or say therein, than upon that that I should 
perceive mine own conscience should serve me, and that I should first look 
unto God and after God unto him, which most gracious words was the 
first lesson also that ever his Grace gave me at my first coming into his 
noble service.”32 
 
More, then, defends himself by reference to the King’s own previous 
position, implicitly criticizing his inconsistency. In fact, it is not More who 
should be explaining and defending himself, it is the King and all those 
people who (in such a short time) changed their views upon the matter – but 
that is not something More could say, of course. More may have hoped that 
this was something the King and his advisors would be sensitive to: the 
King’s own words. Reasonable though this was, it did not work. 
 
14.2.2. Conscientious objection and the contingency of positive law 
It is not always easy to distinguish this form of conscientious objection, 
which appeals to principles that are commonly known and commonly 
and/or officially subscribed to, from conscientious objection that appeals to 
                                                 
30 By which I do not refer to the phenomenon of more or less standard letters that 
circulated, which many applicants in later years made use of, and which accounts for 
the uniformity of part of the application letters. 
31 De Silva (2000), 50. 
32 Ibid., 51. 
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less accepted principles, because it is not clear what ‘acceptance’ of principles 
means. I suppose that many Americans in Martin Luther King’s time 
subscribed to the principle of equality, while excluding Afro-Americans and 
Native Americans from its scope. Did the black woman who refused to sit in 
the back of the bus appeal to a principle that was accepted in theory, but not 
applied in practice? That seems rather far-fetched. One could argue, perhaps, 
that, were one to drive the theoretically accepted principle of equality to its 
logical conclusion, one would have to agree with the woman. It seems clear, 
at any rate, that there are situations where conscientious objectors find 
themselves relatively alone, making a stand for principles virtually no one 
seems to recognize – even if they still ‘hang around’ somewhere, covered 
under thick layers of dust. 
 In such cases, when conscientious objection really goes against the 
grain, it appears most clearly as a reminder of the contingent (in the sense of 
‘non-absolute’) nature of dominant morality and/or of positive law. A 
conscientious objector under the German Nazi regime, heeding a 
Heideggerian Call of Conscience (one that Heidegger himself, perhaps, did 
not hear or heed too well), a call to authenticity, away from the inauthentic 
life among ‘das Man’ [‘the They’], would be an example of this kind of 
conscientious objection – in a conscientious-objection-unfriendly context, 
obviously. But we must not forget that any kind of conscientious objection 
serves as a reminder of the contingent nature of positive law, being at 
variance with it by definition. It may be treasured as such by states 
themselves. It is from a detached perspective, regarding conscientious 
objection not through the eyes of the objector, but instead with a view to its 
function as a legal category, that we can see conscientious objection as a 
reminder and recognition of the contingent character of positive law. No 
objection is intended as such a reminder by the objector, even if it is 
intended as criticism. Nevertheless, from a metajuridical perspective it serves 
a more abstract purpose: to prevent legal or political absolutism – which in 
Western states is a goal they set themselves (even if they seem to circumvent 
it on other occasions).33 There is obviously a tension between this abstract 
goal and the way states have attempted and in some cases still attempt to 
deal with the concreteness which is the other side of the abstract recognition 
of the contingent character of positive law. A state that recognizes human 
rights and does not consider itself absolutist will want to and have to allow 
for conscientious objection; it will not want this to have social impact as a 
critical force. 
Cohen sees provisions for conscientious objection as ‘a mark of 
considerable sophistication in a political community’, appropriate to the 
‘complexity of human activity’, which precludes the absolute validity of all-
                                                 
33 Cf. Heisler (1952/1953), 460. 
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or-nothing ‘sweeping generalizations’ in law.34 In his view, the presence of 
provisions for conscientious objection “indicates a general awareness, in [a 
political] community, of the depth of moral disagreements”. He sees it as “an 
implicit recognition by the community that obedience to certain of its own 
laws might be held, by good and reasonable men, to be a moral evil”.35 
Cohen’s view as it is stated here allows for conscientious objection to be 
considered as a self-critical function of the political community and its legal 
system in two ways. Firstly, it may be considered as a self-critical function in 
an at first sight relatively limited sense, where only the law’s one-sidedness is 
under criticism, and conscientious objection is a recognition of moral 
plurality. Cohen takes this pluralistic stance.36 Secondly, in a stronger sense, 
conscientious objection can be seen as a recognition of the fallibility of the 
law – which means, from the side of the objector, that it would be a critique 
of law with a view to its correction. Positive law, being a human product, is in 
constant need of revision, not only to adapt to changing circumstances, but 
also to remove injustices and to correct oversights that are inevitably there. 
Again, these two poles are not too far apart. A correction may entail the 
redressing of one-sidedness in an area of law where this is possible. The idea 
that a certain law at a particular moment needs to be corrected may 
sometimes originate from the fact that primacy is given to another value than 
the value that receives primacy in this law, but it need not. To say that that is 
necessarily the case would entail a moral relativism I cannot subscribe to.37 
 We must also distinguish, with Cohen, between conscientious 
objection with recognition of the legitimacy of the law (i.e. the laws relevant 
in the context of the conscientious objection, as for instance conscription 
laws), and conscientious objection without such recognition. The first is 
‘wholly lawful’, in Cohen’s words, the second is not, and takes the form of 
civil disobedience.38 We tend to think of conscientious objection as having 
the first form, but in countries where there are no provisions for 
conscientious objectors, it necessarily assumes the second. Also, most people 
are familiar with the phenomenon of the ‘absolutist objector’ who refuses to 
comply with the procedures designed to deal with conscientious objectors to 
                                                 
34 Cohen (1968), 269, 278. 
35 Cohen (1968), 269. 
36 Walzer, as might have been expected, comes up with a pluralistic view as well: 
“The very existence of such people [conscientious objectors/nonconformists] – 
even more, their obvious moral seriousness – ought to call into question the 
conventional definition of citizenship as involving an absolute commitment (it is 
sometimes said, ‘under God’) to obey the laws. (…) For the processes through 
which men incur obligations are unavoidably pluralistic.” (Walzer, [1967], 170). 
37 Naturally, moral pluralism can be accepted without relativism. To say that the idea 
of moral correction can only derive from adherence to other (not better) values, 
however, does involve relativism. 
38 Cohen (1968), 271-272. 
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military service.39 The reason for such a refusal is usually that the objector 
does not wish to cooperate with the state in any way pertaining to the 
military. To cooperate would mean to recognize the legitimacy of the law 
they oppose, and to affirm the authority of the state in this matter.40 
Absolutist objection is thus far more critical than ‘ordinary’ conscientious 
objection, which can be said to be an affirmation of the legitimacy of the law 
and the authority of the state. Insofar as the objector demands nothing more 
than an exemption for himself, in other words: that an exception to the rule be 
made for him or her, he or she affirms the rule. 
 A final observation in this section is that there is an interesting 
paradox at work, relating to the critical function of conscientious objection. 
What allows conscientious objection to have a critical potential is not just the 
fact of its occurrence, but also the previously discussed demand for public 
reasoning. Were conscientious objectors not expected and asked to explain 
their stance, to articulate it in terms that others might understand, it could 
hardly be perceived as criticism, and neither would it do much to make 
people think about the matter in question. So with a view to concrete 
criticism, and seen from the state’s perspective, reasoned support for a 
conscientious objection might not be desirable. On the other hand, the 
demand for such reasoning serves as a criterion of selection, limiting the 
number of acceptable applications for the status of conscientious objector. 
Hence, it provides an advantage as well as a disadvantage to the state. 
 
 
14.3. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND STATE POWER 
In part II of this book, on freedom of conscience, we have seen how 
Koselleck, in Kritik und Krise, elucidates the relation between freedom of 
conscience and the rise of absolutist states. A similar connection can be 
pointed out more concretely for the phenomenon of conscientious 
objection. The Quakers I have referred to in the previous chapter, Richard 
Seller and John Smith, were victims of a state with absolutist pretensions. In 
the seventeenth century, in a time of war, they were forcibly taken aboard 
marine vessels. Richard Seller was press-ganged into the navy; in John 
Smith’s case, more elaborate procedures brought him on board. The 
methods used in Smith’s case were less crude than those adopted to ‘recruit’ 
Seller, but they required much more organization. Smith was notified to 
appear at an appointed time and place, where he would commence his 
service. His refusal led to imprisonment, and a court ruling that he “should 
be hired out to work to any that wanted a hand, for any time not exceeding 
four years, in order to satisfy said fine [a fine laid upon him by Bristol 
                                                 
39 Cain (1970), 289. 
40 Cohen (1968), 272. 
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magistrates] &c”.41 No one offered to employ him; hence, he was sent to 
prison once more, from which he was forcibly removed by captain Benjamin 
Church, without the required governor’s order. Until that removal, however, 
the whole procedure had an aura of legitimacy about it. Whereas Seller was 
simply beat up and hoisted on board a ketch that would bring him to the 
vessel Royal Prince – in other words: whereas Seller was kidnapped in bandit-
fashion, Smith was called to service, and upon his refusal treated as a 
disobedient citizen, as someone who broke the law. Seller’s ‘recruitment’ did 
not feign legitimacy; Smith was seemingly dealt with in accordance with 
legitimate procedures. The state used its power, in the basic sense of brute 
force, to get its own way in Seller’s case. With Smith, it exercised its authority. 
In another sense of the word ‘power’, this can be seen as a sign of greater 
state power: the state is not only able to recruit men for military service, it is 
also able to present this as its legitimate right, a right to control the lives of 
its subjects. In the American Civil War, both the Federal (Union) and the 
Confederal authorities introduced conscription, and got to deal with 
conscientious objectors.42 In the twentieth century, an increasing number of 
states introduced the draft.43 At the same time, conscientious objection 
became a more and more common and proportionally proceduralized 
phenomenon. 
 Whereas conscientious objection is regularly seen as a limitation, 
even an undermining, of state power, in view of the above it seems more 
appropriate to emphasize its coincidence with increasing state power.44 
Modern Western states have the power to absorb criticism into itself.45 
(From a societal point of view, and approached from a positive angle, this 
also means – in theory, at least – that conscientious objectors are not 
ostracized.) Conscientious objection constitutes the exception to the rule, 
and must therefore be considered an affirmation of the rule. Moreover, it is 
regulated by strict procedures. The fact that legal provisions for 
conscientious objectors to military service exist, does not call into question 
the state’s right to claim part of a person’s lifetime for military training. 
Instead, it affirms that right and even constitutes it as that which normally 
obtains. 
 Given the fact that modern Western states are not absolutist states, 
however, it is possible that a state’s right to call upon its subjects for military 
                                                 
41 Brock (ed.) (1993), 35. 
42 The story of a Garrisonian conscientious objector who was forced into the Union 
army is recorded in Brock (ed.) (1993), 47-63. 
43 With respect to the authority of the state at the time of World War I, see the 
quotations from Roberts (1919) in the previous subsection. 
44 Vermeulen provides a clear example of the first view. This view is strongly 
criticized by (for instance) McCloskey. 
45 Much like major companies in the music industry have absorbed much politically 
engaged and sometimes explicitly anti-capitalist music. 
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service is called into question. In the Netherlands, the draft was abolished in 
the last decade of the previous century.46 An increasing number of applicants 
for conscientious objector status played a role in bringing this about. The 
resulting change in the draft laws had more to do with the opportunities that 
procedures dealing with applicants allowed, then with a supposedly law-
undermining effect of provisions for conscientious objectors in general. 
More about this subject will follow in the next chapter. 
 
 
14.4. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS A ‘LEGAL PRESSURE VALVE’ 
The dominant perspective taken by Luhmann in his approach to 
conscientious objection is a perspective from its function in the social 
system. It is seen as a legal category, rather than as a practice of 
conscientious objectors (though Luhmann can take that perspective as well), 
and the existence of this legal category is seen as a protective device, 
ensuring the stability of the social system. Cohen expresses a similar view 
when he speaks of conscientious objection as a ‘legal pressure valve’. 
 The general idea is that provisions for conscientious objectors 
provide a way to relieve rising tensions within persons (or personal systems), 
as well as between persons and the state (but the same could hold for 
companies or other entities instead of states). For example, when a young 
man is called up for military service, but feels that he cannot in good 
conscience fulfil this legal duty, tension arises first within himself, but soon 
also in his social environment, which may be hostile towards conscientious 
objectors. Where no provisions for conscientious objectors exist, a conflict 
between the objector and the state will ensue. This will cause greater tension 
within the objector, as well as in his social environment. There will generally 
be people who criticize him, and those who care for him might also suggest 
that he comply with the state – though it might be argued that those who 
really care for him will support him in his position. Also, assuming he worked 
for an employer, this employer will know what is going on by now, and 
might fire him. All such things have happened to conscientious objectors; 
they are not uncommon. If he persists in his objection, imprisonment will 
follow. Some people in the objector’s environment will support the state in 
this; others will be embittered. This is a plausible scenario where no 
provisions for conscientious objectors exist. Where they do exist, tensions 
will not rise so high. The objector is not (or at least not so much) 
contaminated by the aura of criminality, and at any rate not by that of 
illegality. This will have its impact on the way acquaintances, employers, 
family and friends react. Instead of confinement in an uncomfortable cell, 
the state will offer the objector alternative service, that he will (possibly) be 
able to accept in good conscience. The whole procedure will in most cases 
                                                 
46 This is a simplification, but an unproblematic one in the present context. 
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still involve tensions of many kinds, and will still cause a certain unrest in the 
objector’s social environment, but it will not by far be as socially disruptive 
as in the first scenario. Hence, the legal category of conscientious objection 
functions as a mechanism to preserve the stability of the social system. 
 It does so in another way as well. We have seen that one interest the 
state has in conscientious objection lies in minimizing the critical potential of 
dissenters. A state that does not allow for conscientious objection in certain 
contexts, that is unwilling to make exceptions for individual persons, will 
have to deal with the inevitable dissenters in another way. The other way 
around: conscientious objectors will have to respond to the state in another 
way, which might be the way of dissention in the full sense of the word. The 
state will then face criticism in the form of public protest – with far stronger 
socially destabilizing effects than regulated conscientious objection.47 
 That conscientious objection has this aspect, that it can be seen as a 
‘legal pressure valve’, depends on some other aspects we have discussed 
earlier. Most notable are those of acceptance of the consequences and 
consistency, but these in turn are closely related to the ultimacy of the 
objector’s concern. Reflection on these aspects from the perspective of the 
stability of the social system – we might also say: from a metajuridical 
perspective, or, in this case, from the perspective of conflict – leads to the 
above considerations. Note that the idea of a ‘legal pressure valve’ by itself is 
not sufficient to distinguish conscientious objections from nonconscientious 
ones. It may provide an argument for accommodating certain 
nonconscientious objections as well, but if we only wish to accommodate 
conscientious objections, we need to look for the reasons why legal 
provisions for conscientious objection may serve as a ‘legal pressure valve’. 
 
 
14.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I have discussed a number of important aspects of conscientious objection, 
especially in its modern or post-modern form; conscientious objection has 
always borne a relation to state power (or occasionally the power of some 
other party), but only when the practice became institutionalized (primarily 
with regard to compulsory military service) did it become that exception to 
the rule and that affirmation of state power it is today. Only then, too, did it 
really become that legal pressure-valve of which Cohen spoke. By looking at 
conscientious objection from a different angle and with a different aim than 
                                                 
47 Cf. Roberts (1919), 337: “Even more so do the stability and growth of democracy 
depend upon its recognition of the inviolability of the individual conscience; for 
democracy cannot live except its roots be deep struck in the moral nature of man. 
(…) Even in time of war, it is safer for democracy to let a hundred shirkers go scot-
free rather than run the risk of penalising an honest conscience.” 
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in the previous chapter, I believe our understanding of the phenomenon has 
increased. The resulting picture, I think, is not fragmented but rather layered. 
 Naturally, I still have not even come close to saying all there is to say 
about conscientious objection. Other aspects might be pointed out. 
Someone might say that conscientious objection is most poignantly a last 
resort; the conscientious objector only resorts to it when he has run out of 
options, when “attempts to convince others of the objective rightness of his 
act” have failed and he “is content to assert its subjective rightness”.48 There 
may be some truth in this, though in the case of conscientious objection to 
military conscription no attempts to convince the state of the objective 
rightness of pacifism will enter into the situation. In such cases, for the 
objectors concerned, conscientious objection is not so much a last resort, but 
rather the obvious way to go about it – the beaten path, so to speak. Only 
from a macro-perspective can such provisions for conscientious objectors be 
considered a last resort.49 Moreover, the experience of conscience enters into 
the situation from the beginning. As soon as the objector-to-be is faced with 
the objectionable demand, (s)he will be thrown into the mode of 
consciousness we call conscience. This does not mean that to appeal to 
conscience will be the first thing to do, but it is important to see that the 
experience of conscience is present from the beginning, and that the appeal 
to conscience naturally flows from that experience. To recognize this 
prevents one from coming to believe it is just a dodgy artifice to get one’s 
way, or an attempt to kill all discussion of the subject in question. 
 Alternatively, it might be suggested that conscientious objection is 
best seen as a compromise between a scrupulous individual and an 
authoritative party that has to balance the importance of having individuals 
comply with their demands with that of the well-being of individuals and the 
stability of its organisation. Or, it might be seen as a compromise in the 
sense that legal provisions for conscientious objectors provide the means to 
arrive at a solution that both parties can agree with. Compromise is then the 
process by which the parties arrive at a solution.50 In some cases 
conscientious objection might be seen as a compromise in either of these 
senses. It is more likely to be a compromise in the second sense than in the 
first, however. It is certainly not necessarily the case that the result reached is 
such that both parties meet in the middle – splitting the difference, in 
Benjamin’s terms. Also, it is only a compromise in the first sense if both 
parties must concede something of what they insisted on at the beginning. A 
                                                 
48 Childress (1979), 329. 
49 Fifield (1945), 191, provides an indication that states may consider conscientious 
objection as a last resort: “The total number [of conscientious objectors] in the 
country [i.e. the United States] cannot be determined because CO classification is 
not considered until all deferring classifications have been exhausted (…).” 
50 See Golding (1979), esp. 7; Kuflik (1979), 39; Benjamin (1990), 4-8. 
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‘conchy’ that could in good conscience fulfil noncombatant service may still 
not have liked doing so, but he did not have to ‘dilute’ his conscience in any 
way. So there is no moral compromise here, but only a compromise between 
the interests of both parties. To absolutist objectors, the notion of moral 
compromise rings like a third kind of compromise: to compromise one’s 
integrity, to betray one’s principles. The notion of a moral compromise is in 
itself not contradictory, however, even if one has to know with which 
principles one can compromise and with which one cannot.51 Benjamin 
enumerates various circumstances of compromise: factual uncertainty, moral 
complexity, the need to maintain a continuing cooperative relationship (a 
circumstance that is not present in the case of many conscientious 
objectors), the need for a more or less immediate decision or action, and a 
scarcity of resources.52 Many of these tend to be present in cases of 
conscientious objection. 
Just after World War I, T.H. Procter noted that “[p]acifism was 
much more widely spread in pre-war England than the number of 
Conscientious Objectors would indicate. (…) One of the extraordinary 
things about the war is the large numbers of really conscientious pacifists, 
who, whilst preserving to the end their condemnation of war, enlisted, not 
from compulsion but from motives that can rightly be called moral.” Procter 
distinguishes between two such motives: “One was the feeling that a man 
ought to enter into the brotherhood of suffering. (…) This was the less 
exalted of the two motives that determined the pacifist to lay aside his 
philosophy. (…) The others joined because they did not think they had 
earned the right to be pacifists in wartime. They had been convinced in 
theory that war is wrong, but had never actively opposed it.”53 This 
exemplifies the moral complexity of certain situations. If it could lead some 
men to join up despite their pacifism, is it strange if there were conscientious 
objectors who accepted noncombatant service, even if they still felt scruples 
about supporting the war effort in this way? There were surely have been 
such cases; such moral compromise is a genuine possibility, incomparable, 
for instance, to those sixteenth-century Polish Brethren who refused military 
service but gladly paid war taxes with which others could be hired in their 
stead. This was already unmasked as hypocrisy by contemporary critics.54 
 Even if conscientious objection can be seen, in some cases at least, 
as a last resort, or as a compromise, it seems to me that these are not the 
most central aspects of the phenomenon, whether regarded as a practice or 
as a legal principle. The fact that not all conscientious objection can be seen 
as a last resort or a compromise aside, there is still a clear difference between 
                                                 
51 Kuflik (1979), 48-52; Benjamin (1990), ch. 1 (12-20) and chapter 2.
52 Benjamin (1990), 26-32. 
53 Procter (1920), 30. 
54 Brock (1992), 675. 
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the aspects discussed in the course of this and the previous chapter, and 
these two (suggested) aspects. Whereas the former either are crucial in the 
identification of conscientious objection, or go to the heart of the 
phenomenon in some way or another, the latter do not. Nor are they 
meaningfully related to the ultimate concern that is at the core of each 
conscientious objection. 
 We have seen, in chapter 13, what distinguishes conscientious 
objections from ‘ordinary’ ones: they express ultimate concern in its aspect 
of the Good; they are articulations of what gives meaning and direction to 
someone’s life, of someone’s conception of what it is to be a good person. In 
this chapter, I have broadened the perspective to get into view the relations 
between conscientious objection (as a practice and as a legal principle), the 
state, and the law. Undoubtedly there are matters of relevance to the topic 
that have remained undiscussed. The connection between conscientious 
objection and personal and moral integrity is one of them; I will attend to 
this in the next chapter, in which at the hand of two case studies I hope to 
deepen the understanding of conscientious objection gained so far. 
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15. Two case studies 
 
 
15.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains two very different case studies. One concerns 
conscientious objections to military conscription in the Netherlands, the 
other focuses on one individual’s conscientious objections: those of a 
registrar, who refused to marry a gay couple.1 The first case is an instance of 
far-reaching institutionalization, the second one of improvisation. 
Conscientious objections to military conscription, especially in conscription’s 
later years, were often secular in nature; the registrar’s objections were 
outspokenly religious. Despite these differences they fall under the same 
heading: conscientious objection. Salient features of both cases will be 
discussed, particularly (though not exclusively) with a view to the question as 
to the distinction between conscientious objections and other (‘normal’) 
objections. In both cases, I have allowed myself to be led by their peculiar 
characteristics as they struck me from the perspective of my approach to 
conscience and conscientious objection. For the case of military 
conscription, this meant that my attention was drawn to aspects of 
proceduralization and their implications for the perception and evaluation of 
conscientious objections. It can be considered as an illustration to, and a 
development of, the theme of chapter 14. In the case of the conscientious 
objector to marrying a gay couple most interest lies in her own story. It 
brings us as close as we can get to her experience of conscience; it shows us 
a conscientious objection ‘from the inside’. Also, it allows us to see how the 
approach to conscience offered in this book differs from other approaches 
with respect to the attention paid to people’s self-interpretation. 
Both cases relate to the problem of the legitimacy (or the 
foundation) of conscientious objection in their own way. The development 
of legal provisions for conscientious objectors to military service and the 
large increase in appeals to conscientious objector status in the last decades 
of conscription in the Netherlands problematized the concept of 
conscientious objection and the underlying concept of conscience. In the 
second case, the legitimacy of conscientious objection (by civil servants) to 
gay marriage was under discussion. Moreover, reactions to the case regularly 
questioned the legitimacy of the contents of the conscientious objections put 
                                                 
1 Both are Dutch examples, but for practical reasons only. The Dutch situation is 
not remarkably different from that of other Western democratic societies. Moskos 
and Chambers (1993) rightly note that conscientious objection to military service 
follows the same pattern in all such societies. There are national differences, of 
course – a case of conscientious objection to gay marriage can only occur where 
such a marriage is legal, for instance – but the conceptual difficulties relating to 
conscientious objection are not peculiar to the Netherlands. 
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forward. These were often not understood; in part, people may have been 
unable to see why conscientious objections in general, if they could be such 
objections, should receive any privileged treatment. Even if such questions 
were not openly asked, both cases provide enough reasons for philosophers 
to reflect on the legitimacy of conscientious objection as such, which is what 
this book is about. I use these case studies – of cases that indirectly 
problematized the legitimacy of conscientious objection – to get closer to a 
philosophical foundation of conscientious objection. 
 The chapter falls into three parts: 15.2 concerns the case of the last 
ten years of military conscription in the Netherlands; 15.3 deals with a case 
of conscientious objection to gay marriage; 15.4 draws together the main 
insights gained from the foregoing discussions, and places them in the 
context of the general problematic with which this book is concerned. 
15.2 starts with a brief overview of the Dutch history of 
conscription and conscientious objection. Then, in 15.2.1, I focus on the 
‘filter of the law’, the criteria on the basis of which the law distinguishes 
between conscientious objections eligible for recognition (or conscientious 
objectors eligible for exemption) on the one hand, and both conscientious 
and nonconscientious objections that are ineligible for recognition on the 
other. In 15.2.2 I discuss problems of institutionalization (like, for instance, 
proceduralization). 15.2.3 draws attention to the influence of psychologizing 
conceptions of conscience on the way conscientious objection to military 
service was dealt with both in practice and in theory. Psychologization of 
conscience (and hence, of conscientious objections) entails that the 
intentionality of conscience (in my broad sense of the term) recedes into the 
background. That conscience is in the world and concerned with it goes 
unrecognized; instead conscience is thought to be concerned with the self 
alone. As a result, the importance of conscientious objection is either missed 
or mislocated. I contrast psychologizing views with my own, in order to 
recover what was lost from sight. 
 15.3 begins with an introduction into the subject of gay marriage in 
the Netherlands, and (discussions about) conscientious objection to gay 
marriage. It summarizes the juridical background of the case; that is, it gives 
an overview of all juridically relevant documents and statements to which 
parties in the conflict could appeal. I then zoom in on the Eringa-
Boomgaardt case. I start with an overview (15.3.1), and then I zoom in 
further on her own story (15.3.2). In 15.3.3 I discuss Eringa-Boomgaardt’s 
conscience and conscientious objection, drawing on her story, and using the 
approach to conscientious objection developed in chapter 13. Finally, I use 
Eringa-Boomgaardt’s case to make a point I touched upon earlier, but did 
not explore as thoroughly: that the primary concern of the conscientious 
objector is not to protect his or her integrity, but rather lies with the moral 
quality of what is demanded of them. I propose an alternative view of 
integrity, which brings it in line with Polanyi’s theory of symbols, and use 
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that theory to explain the common reduction of conscience to the protection 
of integrity. 
 
 
15.2. MILITARY CONSCRIPTION IN THE NETHERLANDS; THE LAST TEN 
 YEARS 
Military conscription was introduced in the Netherlands by the French, in 
1811, and was not abolished when the French left in 1813. There 
undoubtedly were conscientious objectors, but there were no provisions 
especially for them. Those with money could (if they felt they could 
conscientiously do so) make use of the replacement system that allowed 
individuals to have someone else fulfil their military obligations. This system 
was abolished in 1898, when a system of personal military conscription was 
introduced. This was an important step in the development of the 
phenomenon of conscientious objection to military service. Other influential 
factors were the rise of socialism and anti-militarism.2 The first law providing 
for conscientious objectors came in existence in 1923. It did not speak of 
conscientious objectors, but of ‘principiële dienstweigeraars’, that is: draft 
resisters, who resist on principle. The conscientious objections had to apply 
to ‘killing a fellow human being’ in general. In the Wet Gewetensbezwaren 
Militaire Dienst (WGMD) [Law on Conscientious Objection to Military 
Service] of 1964, this formulation was abandoned and replaced by 
‘participation in any war violence’. A final specification (and thereby 
broadening of the provision for objectors) was made in 1979. The WGMD 
then stated that to be eligible for conscientious objector status, one had to 
have “insurmountable conscientious objections to the personal fulfilment of 
military service, relating to the use of means of violence in which one can 
become involved through service in the Dutch military”.3 So one did not 
have to oppose war in general to be able to apply successfully for the status 
of conscientious objector. 
 These changes in the law were made, in part at least, under pressure 
of certain groups in society, and certain (groups of) conscientious objectors. 
Numbers of C.O.’s also rose, though not dramatically until about 1990. In 
1965, 0.25% of 97,101 conscripts applied for C.O. status. In 1970, this 
number had risen to 0.9% of 114,791 conscripts.4 “In 1989,” Van de Vijver 
reports, “2,900 persons were granted CO status out of a conscript class of 
45,000 which in turn was drawn from some 120,000 young men liable for the 
                                                 
2 Van den Boom (1971), 62-63; Van de Vijver (1993), 220-221. 
3 WGMD 1979, art. 2.; cf. Van de Vijver (1993), 222, for a slightly different 
translation. Article 99 of the Dutch Constitution states that “the law regulates 
exemption from military service due to serious conscientious objections”. 
4 Droesen (1972), 8. 
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draft.”5 A strong rise in the number of applicants occurred from the late 
1980’s on. This was related to the end of the Cold War, and to increasing 
debate about the need for compulsory military service, which was itself 
related to the end of the Cold War and the ‘red danger’. The rise in the 
number of applicants did not entail a (significant) rise in the number of true 
conscientious objectors. Many applicants applied for conscientious objector 
status with the express purpose of not being recognized; instead, they hoped 
to find other reasons for total exemption while they were in the procedure, or 
to drag the procedures on until compulsory service was abolished, in which 
case they hoped to be dismissed as well. These applicants were often assisted 
by specialized bureaus (lawyer collectives), which promised to keep people 
out of military service against a fee of 3,000 guilders (1,365 Euro). A 
common name for these applicants was weigeryuppen, meaning: ‘refusal 
yuppies’, because an important number of them were ‘young urban 
professionals’, at the beginning of their career, unwilling to endanger this 
career by spending a year in military service. 
 I will not be concerned with the history of Dutch military 
conscription and conscientious objection to it as a whole, but focus on the 
last 10 years (roughly), until its suspension (not abolition) in 1997. One 
reason for this is that the phenomenon of the ‘weigeryuppen’ exposes 
problems inherent in institutionalization of conscientious objection. Another 
is more practical in nature: the only conscientious objector files left in the 
Defence Archives are from this period (1986 and later). 
 
15.2.1. The ‘filter’ of the law 
Applications for C.O. status were evaluated by an advisory committee, the 
Commissie van Advies Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst (CvA GMD) [Advisory 
Committee Conscientious Objections Military Service]. On the basis of their 
own impression of applicants and aided by psychiatrists’ reports, they 
advised the Minister of Defence either to recognize or not to recognize the 
objections, and, in the latter case, supported their advice by referring to that 
legal criterion or those criteria that remained unfulfilled.6 It was the 
committee’s task to judge, not only whether the applicants’ objections were 
conscientious, but also whether they were so in the sense that the law required. 
                                                 
5 Van de Vijver (1993), 223. See also Figure 1-1 in Moskos and Chambers (1993), 4, 
reprinted from Karl W. Haltiner, Milizarmee – Bürgerleitbild oder angeschlagenes Ideal?, 
Frauenfeld (Switzerland), 1985, 14; this figure shows how the absolute number of 
conscientious objectors increased exponentially from the mid-sixties to 1980, to 
some 3,500. It then dropped again to swerve around 3,000 until the late eighties. 
6 Van de Vijver (1993), 223 notes that the appointed psychiatrist questioned not only 
the applicant but also “his family, neighbors, and others to determine the sincerity of 
his beliefs and the consistency of his behavior”. Such questioning of the applicant’s 
relations may have occurred in earlier years, but did certainly not occur in the last ten 
years of the draft. 
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The objections had to be conscientious; they had to be insurmountable 
[‘onoverkomelijk’]; they had to relate to the use of means of violence of the 
kind in which one could become involved through service in the Dutch 
military. This was the filter that the law provided, a filter that was intended to 
sift out all non-conscientious objections, all ‘surmountable’ conscientious 
objections, and all insurmountable conscientious objections that did not 
relate to the use of means of violence as referred to in the law. A negative 
advice (in the period under discussion, at least) had the following standard 
format, reflecting the legal filter: 
 
“After study of the file and taking into account that which applicant stated 
during the session, may the member of the committee advise you not to decide 
for recognition of the objections to the fulfilment of military service as grave 
conscientious objections, because it has not (yet) or not (yet) sufficiently been 
shown that applicant’s objections: 
 
1. are to be labelled as conscientious objections; 
 
2. are to be labelled as insurmountable objections; 
 
3. are related to the use of means of violence as intended in the law.”7 
 
The applicable criterion/criteria was/were simply marked with a cross or with a 
circle around the number. Let us look at the criteria one by one. 
 
15.2.1.1. Conscientious and non-conscientious objections 
Disregarding the problem of authenticity for the moment, we may ask 
whether the committee was able to distinguish conscientious from non-
                                                 
7 ADD (Archief Directie Dienstplichtzaken); such a letter can be found in virtually 
any ‘Not Recognized’ file, as I have labelled them for myself. Files often included 
(and older files always did) a psychiatrist’s report; all files included a written 
elucidation of the objections, provided by the applicant. Reisner (1967/1968), 701 
(footnote 88), reproduces a memorandum “sent by the Director of the Selective 
Service of the City of New York to all appeal boards in that area”, in which it is said 
that “an Appeal board when it reaches a conclusion to deny a claim should be able 
to point to one or more of the following critical elements as the basis in fact: a) 
Registrant does not sincerely hold the beliefs he sets forth. (…) b) The registrant is 
not opposed to war in all forms (…). (…) c) The registrant is not opposed to war 
based upon his religious training and belief (as defined by U.S. v. Seeger) but is 
motivated purely out of political, sociological, racial or economic considerations; or 
disavowing religious training and belief he bases his objection to war on a purely 
personal moral code, or philosophical view.” I mention this because it shows a 
structurally similar ‘filter’ to that of the Dutch WGMD, though somewhat different 
in content due to the different American context. At any rate, the example shows 
that the formal filter that was to sift out ineligible objections was not peculiar to the 
Dutch situation. 
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conscientious objections. This was a hard task, Van den Boom observes, 
because precise conceptual clarity was lacking.8 (Note that when Van den 
Boom wrote this the author of the present book was still to be born, and 
therefore had not been able to look into the matter yet.) 
 We have seen in the previous chapter that all core elements of the 
symbol of conscience can be found in the C.O. files I studied, though not all 
files of (apparently) authentic conscientious objectors explicitly contain all 
three elements. They do all express the element of ultimate concern in one 
way or another. I will not elaborate on this anymore – that would be a 
repetition of what I did in the previous chapter. What matters here is that (in 
the sample of files I studied) I have not seen what appeared to be true 
expressions of conscience in what I for practical purposes have called ‘Not 
Recognized’ (NR) files.9 Nor have I seen the opposite: expressions that 
cannot properly be considered expressions of conscience were not, in the 
sample I have studied, mistaken for expressions of conscience by the 
committee. That means that on the level of the expressions applicants used the 
committee managed to separate the wheat from the chaff.10 Arguments like 
‘the army destroys the environment’ and ‘military service is undemocratic’ 
were not accepted, and rightly so (given the legal requirements), because they 
do not express conscientious objections. In my terms, they lack the element 
of intimacy; they lack an intimate connection to the person of the objector, 
and in these cases this sheds doubt on the ultimacy of the expressed concern 
as well. The committee did not accept ‘I have a good job’, and I would agree, 
because it does not express ultimate concern. And so there are many more 
examples.11 
 
15.2.1.2. Insurmountability 
To demand that objections are not only grounded in conscience, but also 
insurmountable, may look a bit odd. Many authors have defined conscience in 
terms suggestive of such insurmountability, for instance by linking 
conscience closely to personal or moral identity and integrity. The phrase 
‘insurmountable conscientious objections’, therefore, deserves further 
consideration. 
                                                 
8 Van den Boom (1971), 69. 
9 Such cases did occur, however; I give an example in 15.2.1.3. But the non-
recognition was not the result of a failure to recognize conscientiousness; it resulted 
from the committee’s judgement that the objections did not relate to the use of 
means of violence as intended in the law. 
10 I will return to the problem of (in)authenticity in a later section. 
11 I am not saying that the adduced examples can under no circumstances be true 
expressions of an experience of conscience; what I am saying is that in practice, they 
(generally) are not, and they would have to be supported by a very good story to be 
able to function as expressions of conscience. 
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 At first sight, such a phrase may seem to lead us into the 
psychological terrain of what we might call ‘conscience management’. 
Everybody knows (and some people have studied the phenomenon) that 
most people are able to ‘deal’ with their conscience in all kinds of ways: 
circumventing it, soothing it, manipulating it, deceiving it.12 That people are 
able to do so is not surprising, if we look beyond the (virtually unavoidable) 
reifying language employed in the previous sentence and call to mind that 
conscience can be understood as a mode of consciousness, not as a solid 
presence in the mind, let alone our bodily make-up. Viewed from this 
perspective, we are drawn to the conclusion that there may even be no such 
thing as insurmountable conscientious objections. In the end, people will 
virtually always find a way of living with the knowledge of having neglected a 
conscientious objection of their own. 
 This is not how we should interpret ‘(in)surmountability’, then, and 
this cannot have been the intended meaning of the term in the WGMD. 
Insurmountability must be seen as a qualitative criterion, rather than as 
denoting the extreme of a quantitative scale from easy surmountability to 
complete insurmountability. It is intended to set apart a class of objections 
that is qualitatively different from all other objections; whereas the latter are 
‘surmountable’, the former are not. This is not the say that there is no grey 
area between them; the point is simply that we are not dealing with a scale of 
psychological surmountability to psychological insurmountability – for on a 
psychological scale of this kind objections would possibly be quite evenly 
spread from one end of the scale to the other – but rather with a qualitative 
difference between two kinds of objections, with some cases in between for 
which it is hard to decide to which category it belongs. 
For this qualitative difference I would prefer to speak of objections 
that express ultimate concern, and objections that do not. There is a practical 
reason for this. For what is the objector to do in case his or her objections 
are judged to be nonconscientious, yet insurmountable? Should (s)he 
surmount them anyway? That is impossible on a non-psychological 
interpretation of (in)surmountability. I assume that objections may be said to 
be insurmountable when, as in Thomas More’s case, no reasons can be 
found that will make the objector change his or her mind about the course 
of action (s)he is to take, despite the fact that (s)he is open to such reasons. 
That is the case when the element of ultimate concern is present in the 
experience of the objector. Its most poignant expression is the moral 
‘cannot’ discussed in chapter 13, but there are other expressions, and the 
experience need not be moral. The WGMD does not provide for 
nonconscientious, yet insurmountable objections. On my view, any objection 
that expresses ultimate concern would be eligible for recognition. These will 
generally be conscientious objections, but their importance lies in the fact 
                                                 
12 See, for instance, Micelli and Castelfranchi (1998), and Ramsay (2000), 12-13. 
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that experiences of conscience are also experiences of ultimate concern, and 
that conscientious objections therefore express ultimate concern. 
 The WGMD also does not grant exemption to conscientious 
objectors whose objections, though judged to be conscientious and 
insurmountable, do not relate to the use of means of violence as referred to 
in the law. Again, it is clear that ‘insurmountability’ must be a non-
psychological criterion, for else the law would demand people to accomplish 
the impossible. What it does in fact mean is that a moral imperative of the 
kind ‘here I stand, I can do no other’ is simply overruled because the 
objections are held to be misdirected. The law only recognizes those 
conscientious objections that are directed against military service qua military 
service. I will comment on this in the next subsection. 
 There is also a theoretical reason for preferring to speak of ultimate 
concern rather than insurmountability. The former is conceptually connected 
to conscience, whereas the latter is not. The law deliberately distinguishes 
between the conscientiousness of objections and their insurmountability. 
This may be because not every experience of conscience is extremely serious, 
or it may be because of the possibility that reasons are found that make the 
objector change his or her mind. In the latter case, there are no conscientious 
objections anymore, so there is still no need to distinguish between the 
conscientiousness of objections and their insurmountability. With respect to 
‘minor’ experiences of conscience, I would say that it is highly unlikely that 
conscientious objections will be grounded in ‘everyday guilt’. The final 
criterion ought to be whether the objections truly express ultimate concern. In 
that case, the objector has a strong experience of conscience that demands 
expression – but ‘strong’ is not really the right word; it is not the strength of 
an impression that is at issue, but a qualitative difference between 
experiences. The experience of conscience that underlies conscientious 
objections is not simply a stronger experience than a nagging feeling at the 
back of one’s mind; it is not even, strictly speaking, an isolated experience at 
all, but it is the whole of one’s experience. Conscience in this full sense is a 
mode of consciousness one enters into as a whole; everything is experienced 
in its light, so that we can then speak of experiences of conscience.13 This 
situation is clearly different from that in which minor scruples trouble the 
mind somewhat. These still point beyond themselves, however, to ultimate 
                                                 
13 To some extent, then, the difference resembles that between Buber’s primary 
words, I-Thou and I-It, the former of which “can only be spoken with the whole 
being”, whereas the latter “can never be spoken with the whole being”. Buber uses 
the term ‘experience’ in a somewhat depreciatory way; I do not. Nevertheless, for 
those who are familiar with the work, his contrast between ‘experience’ and the 
‘meeting’ that comes about in the I-Thou relation (which is a true relation) may help 
understand the difference between conscience as a mode of consciousness one 
enters as a whole person and isolated experiences of ‘conscience’ that only hint at 
that. See Buber (2004). 
 557 
concern. Though the object of the scruples is not itself a matter of ultimate 
concern, it is in a sense symbolic for it, as it is still an instance of right and 
wrong. The experience is an experience of conscience, even if it is a weak 
one. It is not singled out as an experience of conscience by Luhmann’s 
question: “Can I do this and still be me?”, because this question awaits a ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ – the kind of answer that can only seldom be given without 
qualification. So identity plays a role in conscientious objections. Where 
ultimate concern demands expression, someone’s identity is at stake in a way 
that it is not in cases of ‘everyday guilt’. This is because conscience, in the 
full sense of the word, entails the involvement of the whole person. In other 
words: there is a difference between merely having an isolated experience of 
conscience, and invoking the symbol of conscience. The former is an 
experience that points towards the possibility of fully entering the mode of 
consciousness we call conscience; it presents itself as a door opening to that 
mode of consciousness – but it is such a small door that we cannot enter 
through it. The C.O., on the other hand, enters into conscience and invokes 
the symbol of conscience. The best way of expressing the link between 
conscience on the one hand and identity and integrity on the other is via the 
symbol of conscience: the symbol integrates not merely what Polanyi called 
the subsidiaries, but through the subsidiaries it integrates the person. Someone 
who invokes the symbol of conscience integrates himself in the symbol at 
that moment; hence, this person’s identity and integrity are indeed at stake – 
he puts them at stake. Of course, this is only the case when someone truly 
invokes the symbol, surrendering himself to it – not when someone invokes 
it opportunistically, relying on its power to sway people. 
 Instead of using two criteria, then, namely conscientiousness and 
insurmountability, we can make do with one: do the objections express the 
experiences of someone who fully entered the mode of consciousness we call conscience? If 
so, they express ultimate concern, and this is what we need to know. This 
does not mean that I silently introduce the criterion of the strength of the 
experience of conscience as a criterion besides conscientiousness itself. I 
mean to point out a qualitative difference between ordinary experiences of 
conscience (the nagging feeling when you promised to call someone but keep 
postponing it) and those experiences of conscience that underlie true 
conscientious objections. In the latter case, there is not a nagging feeling in 
some corner of the brain, to put it metaphorically, but instead the whole 
person is intimately involved in the experience; the mode of consciousness 
we call conscience has been fully entered, and everything is perceived in its 
light. This is what we should be looking for in conscientious objections, 
rather than that they are both conscientious and insurmountable. 
 
15.2.1.3. Conscientious objections as intended in the law 
Not all (insurmountable) conscientious objections could pass through the 
filter of the law. There was a substantial criterion, stating what the objections 
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had to relate to, what they had to be about. First, we see that the context is 
defined: the law relates to conscientious objections to military service. A 
second specification is that the objections have to relate to the personal 
fulfilment of military service, the idea being (obvious pragmatic 
considerations aside) that no one’s conscience can speak for another 
person.14 The third, most substantial criterion is that the objections have to 
relate to the use of means of violence (et cetera). This clause is probably intended 
to make sure that the objections are objections to something intrinsic and 
essential to service in the military. 
 There are many possible conscientious objections to military service. 
One of them (granted, one that comes to mind without significant 
brainstorming) is the objection against the use of means of violence. But 
there are others, such as the objection against the suspension of personal 
autonomy in the military; as a soldier, one is required to obey instantly, 
without questioning the reasonableness or any other aspect of the command. 
It can be argued that to adopt such an attitude, even more: to acquire such a 
disposition, would be morally corrosive, and go against what one personally 
(and society as a whole generally) considers to be an important value. There 
are also more private conscientious objections against the personal fulfilment 
of military service that do not relate to the use of means of violence. For 
instance, one of the files I studied was from a Frisian C.O., who argued that 
to uphold his Frisian identity was so important to him (not in the least as a 
responsibility towards his parents, and as something he owed them), that he 
could not in good conscience take part in something that would entail his 
speaking Dutch instead of Frisian.15 In an address to all members of the 
advisory committee, the last chairman, Arend Soeteman, referred to the case 
of a man who had spent his youth in numerous children’s homes, and had 
had many negative experiences with this. By the time he was called up for 
                                                 
14 Of course, my conscience may tell me that if I do not intervene in another’s 
fulfilment of his military service, I will be guilty of letting a great evil occur under my 
eyes. That way, my conscience relates to other person’s behaviour: via my non-
intervention and required intervention. It stands to reason, however, that there can 
be no law allowing people to intervene with other people’s behaviour whenever his 
conscience suggests that this is the required course of action. 
15 One of the two most northern provinces of the Netherlands, Friesland, retains its 
own language (though Dutch is generally spoken there, especially in the larger towns 
and cities). ‘Fries’ (Frisian) is the only other recognized language in the Netherlands, 
besides Dutch. Yet the official language, which is used in all communication 
between the government at various levels, and which is spoken in the army, is 
Dutch. In defiance of this, the C.O. in question wrote his first letter to the Minister 
of Defence in Frisian. He was subsequently summoned to write in Dutch; otherwise, 
his application would not be considered. From then on, all his letters came both in 
Dutch and in Frisian; the Dutch version, he explained, was a friend’s translation of 
his own Frisian letter. 
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military service, he was a father himself, and felt that it was his conscientious 
duty to personally take care of his children, Soeteman reports. Soeteman 
remembers that the committee judged that this was indeed a conscientious 
objection, but not one of the kind eligible for recognition, as it did not relate 
to the use of means of violence.16 
 Given the dominance of functionalistic and formalistic concepts of 
conscience in the second half of the twentieth century, especially in the 
sphere of legal theory, and given the influence of increasing formalism on 
the development of conscientious objection in the twentieth century, it is 
odd that the law contains such a substantial criterion. In my view, there is no 
justifiable ground for the rejection of truly conscientious objections against 
the personal fulfilment of military service that do not relate to the use of 
means of violence (et cetera). The use of means of violence may be a salient 
feature of the military, but it does by no means sum up the whole of military 
service; nor does it exhaust the set of objectionable features of military 
service. With respect to the case of the conscientious father it can hardly be 
said that the time he would have to spend away from his children in military 
barracks was merely contingently related to military service. There is no such 
service without it. 
The criterion that the objections had to relate to the use of means of 
violence may have sprouted from fear of a situation in which ‘anything goes’, 
but this would have been irrational. Objections would still have needed to be 
conscientious (and, naturally, related to the personal fulfilment of military 
service). The use of the criterion under discussion in no way makes it easier 
to distinguish between real and faked conscientious objections, so in the end 
it seems to constitute a rather arbitrary limitation of the number of 
recognized objections. Moreover, there is a danger that references to this 
criterion by applicants acquire the function of a ‘shibboleth’, a kind of 
password; the question of authenticity then recedes into the background – I 
will look into this problem later. Or, the other way around: given that 
applicants know what the criteria are, if an applicant does not refer to the use 
of means of violence, but expresses other conscientious objections, (and 
assuming that the applicant in question is not stupid), this seems to suggest 
honesty – and hence the authenticity of the conscientious objection. For this 
reason, too, it would be (or would have been) preferable to allow other 
conscientious objections than merely those relating to the use of means of 
violence. 
 
15.2.2. Problems of institutionalization 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the institutionalization of 
conscientious objection, entailing the introduction of legal provisions and 
procedures designed to deal with applications efficiently, can be seen as a 
                                                 
16 Soeteman (1997). 
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result – and as a legitimation – of increasing state power. From a more 
practical viewpoint it is also the result of societal pressure – that is, of the 
appearance, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, of pamphlets urging 
people to refuse military service, of manifestos, and of petitions to 
parliament.17 It turned out that there were a fairly constant number of people 
who conscientiously objected to military service. In the seventies, however, 
the number did increase enough to create a reservoir of cases to be dealt 
with, which took an increasing amount of time per case.18 As a result, many 
cases were dealt with without a meeting between the advisory committee and 
the applicant. This was done when the committee judged that the application 
would very probably result in an advice for recognition; no negative advices 
were produced in this way. The 1979 revision of the law enabled the ‘single 
chamber’ sessions, in which only one member of the committee would speak 
with the applicant. Thus, the procedure was sped up. This brings us to the 
normal situation in the last ten years of the draft: the applicant would speak 
to one member of the committee; if this did not resulted in a positive advice, 
the applicant would be seen a second time, but now by three representatives 
of the committee. In case of a negative advice, appeal to the Raad van State 
(the highest advisory organ of the Dutch state, and the oldest state organ, 
instituted in 1531) was possible. After that, if the application was still 
rejected, the procedure could be started all over again, if the applicant was 
able to come up with new and significant support for his case. Such was the 
procedure in outline; some problematic features of (more detailed aspects of) 
the procedure will be considered below.19 
 
15.2.2.1. Persons and numbers 
Inevitably, the procedural character of the way applications (the term itself is 
significant) were dealt with led people to feel they were treated, not as 
persons, but as numbers. This was especially frustrating for those for whom 
part of the objectionableness of military service lay in the de-personalization 
that it (to their mind) involved. One C.O. file from the ADD provides a very 
eloquent illustration of the problem. It concerned a man who was called up 
for revision exercise. The summary report of the meeting with the advisory 
committee notes his statement that during his military service he was treated, 
not as a human being, but as a number. The report of a later session consists 
of 35 paragraphs, 28 of which start: “Applicant [says/answers/is asked]...” 
Many of them are single sentence paragraphs; paragraphs with more than 
one sentence often contain several sentences starting the same way. After a 
                                                 
17 Droesen (1972), 6-7; Van de Vijver (1993), 220-221. 
18 Soeteman (1997). Van de Vijver (1993), 223, writes that in the early seventies, 
numbers ‘soared to 2,000 or 3,000 a year’. 
19 An example of awareness of problems related to the proceduralization of 
conscientious objection in the United States is Reisner (1967/1968). 
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long row of paragraphs starting in this manner (Applicant is asked, Applicant 
says, Applicant has, Applicant is asked, Applicant says ... Applicant answers, 
Applicant says) we reach a paragraph ending with the now almost comical 
phrase “applicant wishes to remain human”.20 
 Thus, paradoxically, what was at least partly intended as a way of 
showing respect for persons, of making room for individuality, evolved into 
a procedure that dealt with numbers. 
 Persons and numbers are relevant in another way: the same persons 
have evaluated the applications of C.O.’s for many years. Both members of 
the committee and psychiatrists reporting on the personality of applicants 
did their work for a very long time (sometimes twenty years or more). So the 
same persons evaluated the objections of large numbers of people. The 
objections were often the same, and so, superficially, were the people. The 
majority had received higher education. If lesser-educated people applied for 
C.O. status, they often worked in nursing or something similar. Hearing 
‘similar’ convictions expressed by ‘similar’ people time and again, it must 
have become harder for psychiatrists and members of the advisory 
committee to focus on the real meaning those convictions had to the people 
expressing them. Now and then, reports (both by psychiatrists and the 
committee) betray a sense of irony. In one case, I found evidence of 
undesirable involvement on the part of the psychiatrist. In the letter 
accompanying his report, he writes: “Maybe we [the psychiatrist and the 
member of the committee to which the letter was addressed] should not let 
this man go on via the multiple chamber after all...”21 The psychiatrist, whose 
only job it was to report on the personality of the applicant, acts as if he were 
a party in this, and as if the decision as to the nature of the advice given to 
the minister was a matter between him and the committee. In fact, it was (or 
ought to have been) no concern of his. Furthermore, the advice the 
psychiatrist gave is an example of ‘bargaining’; that is, he does not consider 
the (non-)recognition of objections to be a matter of attaching the proper 
advice to each application, but feels it is a matter of negotiation, of balancing 
the pros and cons of recognition and non-recognition. This is a perversion 
of the procedure, at least partly engendered by the extensive period in which 
the same persons were asked to evaluate applications and applicants. 
 
15.2.2.2. The problem of authenticity 
The problem of establishing the authenticity of statements may arise 
whenever someone reports on his inner life, especially when the person in 
question may benefit from saying certain things rather than others. Hence, 
while it is not unique to the context of conscientious objection, it is also a 
                                                 
20 It is possible that irony was intended in this case. 
21 ADD; the letter is from 1991. The psychiatrist suggested instead that the man be 
declared unfit for service for psychiatric reasons (i.c. severe adaptability problems). 
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problem there. How do we know that a self-proclaimed C.O. is really a C.O? 
How do we know he is not someone who in fact does not mind killing 
people so much, and does not really have any scruples with respect to 
military service, but instead uses the legal provisions for conscientious 
objectors to avoid something he just would not like to do? After all, we 
cannot look into his mind, can we? 
 First of all, the distinction between ‘inner life’ and ‘outer life’ is 
artificial. What someone feels and thinks and desires does not remain locked 
in his mind, but shows itself in actions, in behaviour, in what someone does 
and does not do. In fact, part of the feeling, thinking and desiring in a sense 
consists in bodily action – they are not ephemeral processes going on 
independently in their own mysterious sphere. Hence, we are allowed to 
expect a certain degree of consistency between what someone says to feel 
and think on the one hand, and what this person does and has done, and 
how (s)he behaves in everyday life on the other. A hooligan that has been 
arrested for violent assault on several occasions will have a hard time 
convincing the advisory committee that he is in essence a non-violent 
person, who conscientiously objects to military service because of the 
violence in which he, as a conscript, might be required to participate. Hence, 
a Luhmannian test of integrity is in order. 
 This takes us only so far, however. Many people’s lives show no 
signs of (abnormal) violence, but that does not mean those people are all 
pacifists. Most of them will not conscientiously object to military service. Of 
those who do, we still do not know for sure whether their objections are 
authentic. The test of integrity based on the criterion of someone’s 
biography can only rule some people out with reasonable certainty; it cannot 
do the opposite. But how big is this problem? 
 In the case of conscientious objection to military service, it was 
bigger than it needed to be. Due to thoroughgoing proceduralization, the 
chance of inauthentic objections being recognized as true conscientious 
objections did inevitably increase. The filter of the law led members of the 
committee to focus especially on expressions regarding the use of means of 
violence (et cetera). Many negative advices were based on lack of reference 
to the use of means of violence. This meant, however, that someone feigning 
to have conscientious objections, who did specifically refer to the use of 
means of violence, focusing his objections on this aspect of military service, 
had a greater chance of ‘passing the test’ than someone with truly 
conscientious objections who did not specifically refer to the use of means 
of violence. Almost inevitably, where the authenticity of objections is 
extremely hard to establish, the criterion becomes: did he mention the use of 
means of violence? 
 But the problem must not be exaggerated. ‘Weigeryuppen’ were 
usually identified as such. Also, the committee often saw the difference 
between relatively disinterested or interested but nonconscientious reasoning 
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and concern springing from conscience. I do believe, however, that the 
problem of authenticity would have been smallest, had there been only one 
criterion: given that the objection relates to the personal fulfilment of 
military service, is the objection truly conscientious? This must be judged in 
terms of the elements of the symbol of conscience found in the expressions 
used by the objector. Many non-verbal signs must corroborate the 
impression that someone truly invokes the symbol of conscience; otherwise, 
it is likely that no ultimate concern is expressed, and that the element of 
intimacy is lacking. These elements are analytically distinguishable, but in 
practice usually inseparable. The element of intimacy pertains to the way a 
person is related to the reasons he puts forward and the convictions he 
expresses; they must be expressions of his person, not merely expressions 
used by him. The problem of (in)authenticity is minimized by penetrating as 
closely as possible to the experience(s) that move the objector. This cannot 
be done through procedures. 
 
15.2.3. The intentionality of conscience22 
The law (WGMD) states that conscientious objections should relate to ‘the 
use of means of violence in which one can become involved through service 
in the Dutch military’. This seems to entail that the conscience of the 
objector should be concerned with (and about) the moral quality of this use 
of means of violence. Thus, the intentionality of conscience comes into view. 
It would seem logical, then, that this aspect of conscience would figure in 
evaluations of the conscientiousness of objections. However, this was not so. 
It has proven to be quite easy, both in theory and in practice, to forget the 
intentionality of conscience. The functionalist concepts of conscience of 
Luhmann and others have greatly contributed to this forgetfulness. The 
focus of these concepts is on the function of conscience, the way it operates, 
and why it operates the way it does.23 The content of conscience, or what it 
is about, is irrelevant. What also contributed to the forgetfulness of the 
intentionality of conscience was a one-sided focus on integrity. 
Conscientious objections are often held to be indications that the objector is 
trying to protect his or her integrity.24 The importance of conscientious 
objection is then said to lie in the value of integrity – not in what is of 
                                                 
22 Recall that this is not the Voegelinian ‘intentionality’, but my broader notion; see 
8.5. 
23 The ‘why’-question could also, and I would say better, be answered in a way that 
involves reference to the intentionality of conscience, but this is not the kind of 
explanation functionalists are looking for. 
24 See especially Childress (1979), 327, and Wicclair (2000), 213-214; the emphasis on 
integrity is also strong in Luhmann’s work on conscience, and particularly in that of 
Hannah Arendt; see, for instance, Arendt (1971). 
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primary importance to the objectors themselves, namely what their 
conscience is about.25 
 Vermeulen has pointed out (as we have seen in earlier chapters) the 
influence of functionalist concepts on Dutch legislation. The concept of 
conscience that underlies earlier versions of the WGMD is more substantial, 
the further one goes back in time; the last version (of 1978) is based on a 
formalistic (functionalist) concept of conscience.26 The government, 
Vermeulen writes, holds the view that a conscientious objection is 
characterized by two essential features: its gravity (seriousness), and its 
universality. ‘Universality’, in this context, means that the objector cannot, 
for instance, object to specific wars, but must oppose all wars; she cannot 
object to particular types of insurance, to take another example, but must 
reject all kinds of insurance. In practice, in 1978, the criterion of universality 
had already eroded to the point of being virtually non-existent. Hence, 
Vermeulen notes, ‘gravity’ remained as the only criterion by which to judge 
the conscientiousness of an objection.27 This found clear expression in 
parliament; Vermeulen paraphrases as follows: “Such a ‘deeply’ grounded 
conviction must be at stake, that to act contrary to the norms this involves 
leads to a crisis of conscience [gewetensnood].”28 To act contrary to a 
conscientious objection would lead to ‘a conflict of conscience that cannot 
be coped with’.29 
 Earlier in this chapter I interpreted the term ‘insurmountability’, 
used in the WGMD, sympathetically; that is, though on first sight it aroused 
the suspicion that it might be a psychological criterion, I chose to interpret it 
otherwise, because the psychological interpretation would lead to the absurd 
consequence that certain people would be required to surmount objections 
they could not, psychologically, surmount. Associations with psychological 
difficulties and possible mental damage are still easily aroused by the term 
‘insurmountability’, however – which is another reason for preferring to 
speak of ultimate concern – and this may be one reason why Vermeulen 
speaks in terms of ‘coping with’ conflicts of conscience. Another reason may 
be that by speaking in such terms he reflects the psychological focus of 
functionalist concepts of conscience. At any rate, this kind of language 
diverts attention away from the intentionality of conscience. 
 Here is another example of the psychologization of conscience and 
conscientious objection. Van den Boom, in his article on conscientious 
objection to military service, notes that the 1962 formulation of the WGMD 
was intended to exclude ‘objections on political grounds, emotional 
                                                 
25 See 15.3.4 for more on this point. 
26 Vermeulen (1989), 91. 
27 Ibid., 92. 
28 Idem. 
29 Idem. 
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considerations, intellectual considerations and considerations from 
expediency’. He goes on to say that in the discussion of the bill it was said 
that these objections could ‘condense’ to conscientious objections. Van den 
Boom elucidates as follows: “This means, that these objections move the 
interior of the man in such a way, that, were he forced to fulfil his military 
obligations, he would experience severe mental damage.”30 About the 
difficult work of the advisory committee, Van den Boom says that it is 
greatly facilitated by the reports made by psychiatrists, regarding the 
formation or development of a person’s conscience, dealing especially with 
those aspects ‘that might be the cause of the stirring of conscience’.31 The 
implication is that one can explain why someone’s conscience bothers him 
by elements from this person’s past. Useful as this may be, I would hold that 
the intentionality of conscience should feature in any such ‘explanation’. 
 In my concept of conscience, the intentionality is expressed in the 
terms ‘awareness of’; conscience is a concerned awareness of something, it is 
about something. There is an objectivist element in my formulation, but this 
should not be overestimated. I do not imply that conscience is simply an 
awareness of something that ‘exists’ independently of the subject; in a sense, 
I hold the opposite: the subject is concerned, interested, and the object of 
experience is an object for that subject. The object is only analytically separable 
from the subject – in practice they constitute each other, and are interwoven 
with each other.32 This is especially true in the case of conscience, in which 
neither the object nor the subject dominates the experience, but rather the 
relation between the two. Conscience is a concerned awareness of the moral 
quality of my own contribution to the process of reality. It should not be reduced 
to a concern for (the integrity of) the self. 
 Had the law (WGMD) and its interpretations been informed by my 
concept of conscience, the intentionality of conscience would not have been 
                                                 
30 Van den Boom (1971), 69. 
31 Ibid., 70. The fact that psychiatrists were asked to report on conscientious 
objectors is itself a telling sign of the psychologization of conscience. It is also 
suspicious in the sense that it might suggest that there is something ‘wrong’ with 
conscientious objectors; cf. the formulation used in the United States in World War 
II when someone was classified 4-F: “not acceptable for military duty for physical, 
mental, or moral reasons” – moral reasons are mentioned in one breath with 
physical and mental unfitness. See Heisler (1952/1953), 442. In First-World-War 
Germany, psychiatrists were involved in the evaluation of conscientious objections, 
due to the general opinion that there had to be something wrong with someone who 
did not wish to fight for Kaiser and country (Brock [2006a]). It would be interesting 
to find out whether the involvement of psychiatrists in such evaluation procedures 
today (or, as in the Dutch case, in the recent past) has a similar historical 
background. 
32 See the second part of the general introduction on the Whiteheadian elements 
underlying my view of conscience. 
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so easily forgotten. Not only does this mean that conscience would have 
been more fairly represented and better understood; it also means that 
people would not have lost sight of what is most important in conscientious 
objection: that it expresses ultimate concern. There is a tendency in the 
literature on conscientious objection, as well as in the institutionalized 
practice of conscientious objection to military service (as evidenced by the 
role of psychiatrists) to mislocate the source of the importance of 
conscientious objections. Their importance is then thought to lie either in 
the potential damage resulting from non-recognition of the objections, or in 
the value of (moral) integrity. In both cases, the importance is judged by the 
likelihood of severe mental damage. All this is a misconception, however. 
Severe mental damage may be the result when nonconscientious objections 
are laid aside by the state (or the authoritative party concerned). Objections 
may be extremely serious, without being conscientious. Moreover, they may 
reach into the core of a person (assuming there is such a thing), without 
being conscientious. To bring in (the strength of) the relation between 
feelings or convictions and a person’s identity is not enough. What if 
someone ‘cannot’ fulfil his military obligations because he loves his wife so 
much and she loves him so much that they cannot be apart for such a long 
time (or for so many days every week)? This is serious (to the point of 
psychological insurmountability); it has everything to do with his identity – 
his identity is perhaps even defined in terms of his relationship with his wife. 
Yet, (as long as we do not qualify the example by adding specific elements), 
it is not a matter of conscience; nor will such a case usually qualify as an 
example of ultimate concern.33 
 ‘Identity’ is not the keyword, then, nor is ‘integrity’, or it would have 
to be in the alternative sense in which I have used it.34 Integrity (both 
personal and moral) is then the result of a symbolic integration, in which the 
individual integrates him- or herself in the symbol of conscience. 
 The symbol of conscience, we have said, is engendered by a certain 
class of experiences, which someone has in the particular mode of 
consciousness for which I have also used the term conscience, and from 
which I have derived my fluid concept of conscience. The main element of 
the symbol of conscience is that of ultimate concern, but we can also say that 
conscience is the mode of consciousness that receives its characteristic 
quality from this ultimate concern. In this mode of consciousness, everything 
is experienced in the light of this ultimate concern. This is where the most 
significant difference lies between conscientious objections and other 
objections, a difference that is qualitative in nature: conscientious objections 
stem from an ultimate concern; they are rooted in the kind of experience that 
                                                 
33 Which is not to say that love is not a possible manifestation of nonconscientious 
ultimate concern, of course. 
34 I will elaborate on this notion of integrity in 15.3.4. 
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has engendered the symbol of conscience.35 Ultimate concern manifests itself 
in a concrete concern about a particular matter; hence the intentionality of 
conscience. For the conscientious objector, it is in this concrete concern 
about the moral quality of (usually) a particular course of action demanded 
of him or her that the importance of his or her objections lies. I agree that 
this is the locus of the importance of conscientious objections, though in the 
sense that I interpret the objector’s ‘this is wrong’ or ‘I cannot do this’ as 
expressing an experience of conscience and thereby ultimate concern. 
 
 
15.3 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS AND GAY MARRIAGE 
The Dutch public debate about gay marriage arose in the 1990’s, leading to 
the introduction of a registered partnership for gay couples in 1998, and 
finally to the institution of marriage being opened up to gay men and women 
in 2001. The process started in 1990, when the Court of Justice in 
Amsterdam referred the case of a gay couple that had requested a civil 
marriage (which was denied to them in a lower court) to parliament. The 
road to gay marriage came to lie open in 1994, when the first ‘purple’ cabinet 
was installed, a coalition of the (red) social-democrats (PvdA), the liberal-
democrats (D’66), and the (blue) liberals (VVD) – a cabinet without 
Christian input. Certain Christian groups and all Christian political parties 
had opposed the idea of gay marriage from the beginning of the debate.36 
The difference between the Christian viewpoint and what we might call, for 
convenience sake, the secular viewpoint, is illustrated quite clearly by the 
following. Christian political parties argued for the right of civil servants to 
conscientiously object to gay marriage; that is, for the right of registrars to 
refuse to perform the ceremony. Within the CDA (the largest Christian 
political party in the Netherlands, and one of the three largest parties 
overall), when the time came when members of parliament had to vote for 
or against a law enabling gay marriage, M.P.’s of that party had to convince 
the chairman of the CDA’s parliamentary fraction of their conscientious 
objections to a ‘no’, before they were allowed to vote with ‘purple’, for the 
law.37 So here it was the world (or actually, the Netherlands) upside down. 
 Christian political parties argued for the civil servants’ right to 
conscientious objection in this matter, because they knew that among their 
supporters would be civil servants with religiously grounded conscientious 
                                                 
35 Once again: there can be non-conscientious objections that express an ultimate 
concern; I would say that they deserve the same treatment. But the relevant thing 
here is that conscientious objections deserve special respect because they express 
ultimate concern. More about this will follow in the final chapter. 
36 Other groups (certain Muslims, for instance) also oppose(d) gay marriage, of 
course, but they were not or less visible in the debate. 
37 “CDA-leider keurt gewetensbezwaren”. 
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objections to gay marriage (and before that, the registered partnership). In 
the parliamentary discussion about the bills concerning gay marriage, Job 
Cohen, Minister of State in the department of Justice, conceded that civil 
servants with conscientious objections to gay marriage would not be required 
to perform the ceremony. The municipality in question would have to find 
another registrar to do the job, if necessary (that is, if all of their own 
registrars conscientiously refused) one from another municipality. So 
Cohen’s view was that a practical solution would have to be found; that the 
problem, if it arose, would have to be dealt with in a pragmatic way. He did 
not think it necessary to make legal arrangements for such an occasion. If 
only he had thought otherwise, we might say in retrospect; it could have 
prevented a lot of trouble. But on the bright side: I would have had less to 
write about – in fact, this whole book might not have been written, for it was 
the case of a civil servant conscientiously objecting to gay marriage that 
occasioned it. 
 It is this case, that of Nynke Eringa-Boomgaardt, registrar in 
Leeuwarden, that this section is about. Hers was the first case of an actual 
clash between a municipal council and a civil servant on the issue of gay 
marriage. Three years earlier, in 1998, Igno Osterhaus was in a similar 
position in Amsterdam, but it never came to a real clash. The Christian 
Union RMU mediated between him and the city of Amsterdam. The result 
was a transfer within Amsterdam, and the concession that partnership 
registration would no longer be part of his task set.38 In 2000, alderman 
Geert Dales (VVD), concerned with personnel and organisation, stated that 
there was no room in Amsterdam for registrars who refuse to marry a gay 
couple. Such registrars would be fired, and there could be no pragmatic 
solutions in this matter. He took a ‘principled’ point of view, then. He issued 
his statements on the gay day for civil servants in Amsterdam, an invitation 
for which had been included with the civil servants’ paychecks. Some civil 
servants took offence, and reacted in, let us say, unequivocal terms. They 
were reprimanded and made to apologize by Dales.39 But Dales’ remarks 
formed a ‘pre-emptive strike’; Eringa-Boomgaardt was the first to run into 
trouble with her conscientious objections. 
 The juridical background of the case is formed by a variety of 
elements: constitutional rights, legal articles, government reports, ministerial 
statements, jurisprudence, and conclusions formed by the Commissie Gelijke 
Behandeling (CGB) [Committee Equal Treatment – an important advisory 
committee]. Relevant constitutional rights and principles are: freedom from 
‘discrimination on grounds of religion, conviction, political allegiance, race, 
gender, or any other grounds’ (first article of the Dutch Constitution); the 
right of all Dutch citizens to equal access to public offices (third article); the 
                                                 
38 “Gewetensbezwaren tellen niet”. 
39 “Ambtenaar moet homo in de echt verbinden”. 
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principle of freedom of conscience (sixth article). The explanation 
accompanying the Constitution in the version of 2000 states that “[t]he 
constitutional rights apply in any relation to the government, so that the civil 
servant and the soldier can appeal to them too”.40 The Civil Servants Law 
states that civil servants cannot be compelled to work on days that, on 
grounds of their religion or philosophy of life, for them count as festival days 
or resting days (art. 125b). Rouvoet and Koppelaar (both from the Christen 
Unie, a small Christian political party) pointed this out as an illustration of 
the traditional Dutch way of dealing with conscientious objections.41 They 
also invoked the support of the third article of the Dutch Constitution. 
Besides that, they drew attention to a statement by Health Minister Borst 
concerning equal treatment in the case of IVF for lesbian women. She stated 
that clinics cannot a priori refuse to allow IVF to lesbian women, but added: 
“This leaves untouched the freedom of choice of the individual care-giver to 
refuse a treatment on religious grounds (…) and possibly aid in finding 
alternative possibilities of assistance.”42 Analogously, Rouvoet and Koppelaar 
argued that civil servants should be allowed the same freedom of choice. 
Further, there is Minister of Integration Van Boxtel’s statement that 
registrars with conscientious objections to gay marriage cannot be fired.43 
Cohen’s concession to Christian parties was already mentioned; but Cohen 
made another important statement, namely that the case of gay marriage is 
one of equal treatment in unequal cases.44 This is relevant in connection with 
the conclusions reached by the CGB, which, in 2002, focused on the issue of 
religious discrimination rather than that of discrimination on grounds of 
sexual disposition. The CGB stated that two municipalities that compelled 
their registrars to contract all kinds of marriage were in the wrong, because 
they were guilty of indirect discrimination on grounds of people’s religion.45 
An important document is the 1983 interdepartmental government report De 
Ambtenaar met Gewetensbezwaren [The Civil Servant with Conscientious 
Objections]. This report takes a pragmatic line: if a civil servant’s 
conscientious objections can be accommodated for by changing the civil 
servant’s task set or by a transfer, this should be done. A discharge is only 
possible when no pragmatic solution can be found, or when the civil servant 
refuses to cooperate in finding one. A 1989 circular of the Defence Minister 
of State is based on the 1983 report and affirms it, pointing out that the 
‘ambtenarenrechter’ [civil servants judge] based his verdicts on the report 
                                                 
40 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 2002, 35. 
41 Rouvoet and Koppelaar (2001). 
42 Idem. 
43 “‘Na weigeren homohuwelijk geen ontslag’; standpunt Van Boxtel”. 
44 Rouvoet and Koppelaar (2001). 
45 “Ambtenaar mag homohuwelijk weigeren”; “Ambtenaar mag sluiten 
homohuwelijk weigeren”; “Ambtenaar mag weigeren homohuwelijk te sluiten”. 
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when such cases as the report deals with arose. (So jurisdiction followed the 
1983 report.) Finally, there is the letter (of the 6th of November 2000) from 
the VNG (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten) [Association of Dutch 
Municipalities] to all Dutch municipalities. The VNG stated that there could 
be no municipal regulations enabling civil servants to refuse to marry gay 
couples; this would be unconstitutional.46 However, the VNG also advised 
that a pragmatic solution be found in occurring cases.47 It is interesting to 
note that it was VVD alderman A. Brok from Leeuwarden who, in 1998, 
pointed out the ‘illegality’ of municipal regulations accommodating for civil 
servants’ conscientious objections to gay marriage to the VNG.48 Trouw even 
reports that the VNG withdrew a lenient advice at the intercession of 
Leeuwarden.49 
 Besides all these laws, reports, advices, et cetera that both parties 
could pick and choose from to support their case, there was the public 
debate, and there were lobbies. An important representative of the gay 
(marriage) lobby was the COC.50 The regional COC department Midden-
Gelderland wrote a letter to 23 municipalities in the province of Gelderland, 
stating that civil servants refusing to marry gay couples should be fired. It 
was the chairman of COC Leeuwarden, Robert Grossnickel, who started the 
Eringa-Boomgaardt case, by requesting her for his own gay marriage.51 
Christian unions (like the RMU and the GMV) are part of the opposing 
lobby. The RMU called upon civil servants to appeal to the ‘law on 
conscientious objection’.52 The majority of the Dutch people were in favour 
of the possibility of gay marriage, but of course that does not mean they 
were also in majority against the civil servant’s right to conscientious 
objection in this matter. A survey by the NIPO (Nederlands Instituut voor 
de Publieke Opinie en het Marktonderzoek) [Dutch Institute for Public 
                                                 
46 “Homohuwelijk principezaak in Leeuwarden”; “‘Geen gewetensbezwaren’; 
ambtenaren moeten meewerken aan homohuwelijk”. 
47 “Ambtenaar Leeuwarden moet homo’s huwen”. 
48 “Homohuwelijk principezaak in Leeuwarden”. 
49 “Ontslag wegens niet huwen homo’s”. 
50 COC, in full: Federatie van Nederlandse Verenigingen tot Integratie van 
Homoseksualiteit COC Nederland [Federation of Dutch Associations for the 
Integration of Homosexuality COC the Netherlands], stands for Cultureel 
Ontspanning Centrum [Cultural Relaxation Centre], founded in Amsterdam, in 
1946. 
51 “Homohuwelijk principezaak in Leeuwarden”; “Ontslag wegens niet huwen 
homo’s”. Trouw (in the latter article) erroneously writes ‘Grosswinckel’ instead of 
‘Grossnickel’. 
52 “Goed voor de zaak; De Overtuiging”. I am not sure which law they mean; it 
might be the ‘Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling’ (General Law on Equal 
Treatment), which forbids discrimination on grounds of religion or beliefs, race, 
gender, and so on. 
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Opinion and Market Research] from September 2000, commissioned by the 
Reformatorisch Dagblad (a Protestant newspaper), showed that 62% of the 
Dutch population had no objections against gay marriage. For the non-
church-going population this number was 72%.53 
 
15.3.1. The Eringa-Boomgaardt case in outline 
The Eringa-Boomgaardt case lasted three years, from 2001 until 2004. 
Newspapers reported regularly on the latest developments. One moment it 
seemed that she would be discharged, or, to be more precise: that her 
contract would not be renewed; another moment Eringa-Boomgaardt 
seemed to have gained the upper hand. The city of Leeuwarden, bent on 
discharging her, had made a mistake with her appointment; her contract 
ended January 1st 2000, but this was only discovered in 2001. She was then 
hastily re-appointed until September 1st 2001.54 This raised severe problems 
for Leeuwarden, because now Eringa-Boomgaardt was in function as a 
registrar at the time of the coming into force of the changed law enabling gay 
marriage. Had Leeuwarden realised that her contract ended on the first of 
January 2000, they could have decided not to reappoint her then, in view of 
the coming law. In that case, Leeuwarden would have had a much bigger 
chance of success.55 Things like this played an important role in the case, 
which was finally resolved in Eringa-Boomgaardt’s favour. I will not go into 
all the procedural details. Of much more interest is the foundation Eringa-
Boomgaardt offered for her conscientious objection. Of equal interest is the 
religious zeal of those defenders of gay marriage that opposed the possibility 
of conscientious objection to gay marriage. Those topics will receive the 
most attention. But first, I will give a rough outline of the case and its 
development. 
 On the second of April 2001 (so one day after gay marriage became 
a legal possibility), Robert Grossnickel and his boyfriend requested to be 
married by Eringa-Boomgaardt. “The person behind the counter, who 
knows me from the COC, asked me if I was joking,” Grossnickel told the 
press. He was told that Eringa-Boomgaardt experienced great difficulties in 
marrying a gay couple, and asked whether he did not want someone else to 
perform the ceremony. He did, but he also took the case to the Court of 
Mayor and Aldermen.56 Eringa-Boomgaardt herself felt that she was 
deliberately chosen from amidst eight registrars, seven of which had no 
                                                 
53 Nipo-enquete Homohuwelijk; see also “Homohuwelijk haalt de eindstreep”. 
54 “Gewetensbezwaren tellen niet”. 
55 However, in 1999 gay marriage was not yet possible. Leeuwarden knew a 
registered partnership for gay people since 1995 (so before it was introduced 
nationally), and a pragmatic solution had been found for Eringa-Boomgaardt, so that 
before the introduction of gay marriage there was no reason for Leeuwarden not to 
reappoint her. 
56 “Ontslag wegens niet huwen homo’s”. 
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problems with gay marriage whatsoever. This seems plausible for a number 
of reasons. One is that the matter had already been debated in theory for 
some time, and the COC would have liked clarity in the matter – clarity that 
could be gained in court.57 Another reason is that Eringa-Boomgaardt had a 
gay brother, who was active in the national COC, making it less likely that 
Grossnickel did not know about Eringa-Boomgaardt’s views. Grossnickel 
himself stated that while he knew appearances were against him, he 
nevertheless told the truth. “We picked her because her life description 
appealed to us.”58 Grossnickel acquired the services of G. Spong, one of the 
best-known Dutch criminal lawyers, to prepare legal charges against 
Leeuwarden and Eringa-Boomgaardt. 
Another gay couple asked for the services of Eringa-Boomgaardt, 
this time a couple from Amsterdam. One of the men was born and raised in 
Leeuwarden and knew Eringa-Boomgaardt.59 He figured, the NRC reports, 
that while Eringa-Boomgaardt had a homosexual brother who was active in 
the COC, she might feel sympathetic towards gay people.60 Eringa-
Boomgaardt let them know that she had religiously grounded objections 
against gay marriage. 
A long period of heated discussion within the city council and 
between the city council and the Court of Mayor and Aldermen followed. 
Eringa-Boomgaardt was supported by one Christian party in the city council 
(with one seat), but not by CDA (and therefore Christian) alderman B. 
Bilker, or the rest of that party. After the elections of 2002, Chairman of the 
CDA fraction in the council G. Krol took Eringa-Boomgaardt’s side, but 
later, when he had become alderman himself, he switched sides, stating that 
his being an alderman obliged him to execute all council decrees. For 
himself, although he had formerly argued for respect for civil servants’ 
conscientious objections, conscience was either not an issue, or his was a 
‘Hobbesian’ conscience, for which his duty as an alderman necessarily took 
precedence over ‘private’ moral considerations.61 
 At the end of 2002, Eringa-Boomgaardt had three important 
sentences and statements on her side: one from the CGB (which I 
mentioned before), one by the municipal committee of appeals and petitions, 
and one by the administrative judge. The latter concluded that Eringa-
Boomgaardt was, contrary to what the city of Leeuwarden held, a civil 
servant, and not an extraordinary civil servant; this meant that she had a 
                                                 
57 Similarly, it was suggested by Justice Minister of State Kalsbeek (PvdA) that with 
its principled stance Leeuwarden was trying to draw out a test trial. 
58 “Homohuwelijk principezaak in Leeuwarden”. 
59 Eringa-Boomgaardt did not remember him, though; they had gone to the same 
school 17 years earlier. 
60 Idem. 
61 Idem; “Homohuwelijk blijft twistpunt”. 
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normal contract, and could legitimately appeal against the Court of Mayor 
and Aldermen’s decision not to prolong her contract. 
 In 2003, after a long legal procedure, Eringa-Boomgaardt’s 
suspension (which had started in 2001) was overruled by the court. In 
February 2004, the Court of Mayor and Aldermen unanimously decided that 
Eringa-Boomgaardt could stay on until 2015, without having to marry gay 
couples. The decision was based on legal advice, according to which they 
would have a 50% chance only to get rid of the registrar. The costs so far 
(114.000 Euros), and the court’s ruling that the municipality had made a 
procedural error regarding the earlier prolongation of Eringa-Boomgaardt’s 
contract (she had deliberately been reappointed for a shorter period than the 
normal five years), will also have played a role in the decision process.62 With 
their decision, the Court of Mayor and Aldermen disregarded a motion by 
the city council, which acquiesced in the decision in the end. The Court of 
Mayor and Aldermen drew their conclusions after Eringa-Boomgaardt’s final 
decision not to put the case before the court together, which had been the 
Court of Mayor and Aldermen’s intention, with the purpose of drawing out a 
judgement on principle. In the end Eringa-Boomgaardt chose the safety of 
her juridical position, to the disappointment of CDA alderman G. Krol, who 
stated: “If you’re fighting for your principles, ask the judge for a clear 
sentence, too.”63 
 
15.3.2. Eringa-Boomgaardt’s story 
The papers tell us nothing about Eringa-Boomgaardt’s reasons for refusing 
to marry gay couples; they give us no clue as to the source or the precise 
nature of her objections, except that they have to do with her religious 
background. This makes sense, because she never sought, or actually avoided 
the press, even while one newspaper or radio station after the other called 
her at home. She agreed to an interview with me, however, in which she was 
very open about her reasons, feelings, doubts and scruples. The following is 
a condensation of this interview, which I hope still shows the complexity of 
the case, and of Eringa-Boomgaardt’s experience in particular. 
 Eringa-Boomgaardt long put off making her mind up on the subject 
of gay marriage. Before gay partnership registration was introduced, she had 
no (articulate) opinion on the subject. To have an opinion, she felt, would 
lead to discord. “The clearer you define your own position, the clearer your 
enemies are.” Vagueness was easier. When gay partnership became possible, 
                                                 
62 “Leeuwarden overstag in trouwkwestie”. 
63 “Trouwambtenaar mag toch blijven”. On this point, Eringa-Boomgaardt said that, 
had she wanted a judge to issue a statement on principle, she would have had to start 
a new, this time civil, procedure (the case had appeared before a civil-servant judge) – 
something she did not really feel up to. 
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she wished to steer clear from it. Meanwhile, when her own gay brother 
stayed at her house, he slept together with his boyfriend. 
 The relationship with her brother was severely disturbed when the 
first gay couple presented itself to Eringa-Boomgaardt, and she was forced 
to take a position. Her Christian identity came into play here. Until her 
marriage, she had belonged to the ‘Gereformeerde Kerk’, which took a more 
principled stance, she said, than the ‘Nederlands Hervormde Kerk’ she now 
belonged to with her husband.64 Some people there advised her to just make 
it a two-minute ceremony, so that it would be over very quickly. Her reaction 
to that pragmatic suggestion was: “That is what I call discrimination.” If you 
make a serious effort for heterosexuals, you cannot agree to perform the 
ceremony for gay couples, and then get it over with in flash.65 The distinction 
between a civil marriage and a church marriage, Eringa-Boomgaardt pointed 
out, has gradually faded. For many non-church-going people, the civil 
marriage has taken over many of the functions of the religious ceremony. It 
is a meaning-giving ritual. Hence the role of the registrar has increased in 
importance. The registrar and the couple plan the ceremony in advance; it 
requires active participation on the part of the registrar. Eringa-
Boomgaardt’s troubles lay here: she felt that she could not in good 
conscience participate with the happy couple in the planning and the 
ceremony itself. She would then be holding back a part of herself, and be 
feigning her true support and participation. In other words (her own words): 
she would be a hypocrite. To emphasize that it was the full participation that 
constituted the problem for her, and that she was not bent at standing in the 
way of gay people, she said that she had no problems taking notice of (that 
is: registering) an intended marriage, as that is a mere formality. But to 
participate in the full ceremony would be to betray God. 
 To define her own position, Eringa-Boomgaardt sought to inform 
herself on the subject of homosexuality. She did so mostly from a religious 
point of view. Her sister, working for an evangelical organisation that, as 
Eringa-Boomgaardt explained it to me, helps students read the Bible and 
develop leadership, provided material. Eringa-Boomgaardt valued her sister’s 
opinion, especially because she lived abroad, and when she came to the 
Netherlands, she ‘had a clear view of cultural developments’. In the car one 
day (in the late nineteen-nineties, so before the law enabling gay marriage 
                                                 
64 The ‘Gereformeerde Kerk’ is the ‘Reformed Church’; the ‘Nederlands Hervormde 
Kerk’ is the Dutch Reformed Church – both ‘gereformeerd’ and ‘hervormd’ must be 
translated as ‘reformed’. 
65 Interestingly, an archive article on the COC Internet site argues that the registrar 
should simply do his or her job, that is: check whether the papers are in order and 
the autographs in the right place; “the couple can find someone to make a nice 
speech themselves”. Apparently, they would welcome a different treatment for 
homosexuals, if it meant that the legal obligations were fulfilled. See “Eindelijk kans 
op principiële uitspraak rechter”. 
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came into view), her sister brought up the subject of gay marriage, which 
gave Eringa-Boomgaardt a serious fright. Then, while they were still driving, 
she had an experience that was very significant to her: enormous showers 
were followed by a rainbow, and maybe even (she was not sure anymore) a 
second rainbow. To her mind, this was no coincidence; it was a sign. We will 
see further on that Eringa-Boomgaardt consistently interpreted her situation 
in religious terms. As to her views on homosexuality: in essence, she 
thought, it was an identity problem. Homosexuality comes in percentages; 
the percentage is completely dependent on societal influences. Heredity does 
come in, though: one’s posture and (the height of) one’s voice may more 
readily give rise to identity problems, because in our society a low voice is 
seen as masculine, and a high voice as feminine, for instance. Damaging 
factors may play a role (and often do): abuse of children by their parents, a 
licentious life, indulging in free sex, or a combination of such elements will 
easily lead to identity problems in our society. After this explanation of her 
views on homosexuality, she said she had learned more about what God 
meant with marriage and sexuality. It was a solution for loneliness. The 
Bible, she said, was very clear on this point. She said she could understand 
homosexuality, but did not consider it an alternative. She already accepted 
the phenomenon, because of her brother’s homosexuality. While 
homosexuality, in her view, was itself (the result of) an identity problem, in 
society it could lead to even greater identity problems. In combination with 
the ‘fact’ (as she saw it) of the greater promiscuity of gay people, this led 
Eringa-Boomgaardt to the conclusion that gay couples would turn out to be 
very unhappy. This, she said, was her final criterion: will gay people be 
happy? God wants us to be happy. It is his love, she said, that imposed these 
limits. “Homosexuality is very damaging.” If she were not convinced of this, 
she would have nothing against gay marriage. She hated it when people (who 
were publicly silent about or supportive of gay marriage) conspiringly came 
up to her and said something like: “I understand; I think it’s gross too.” She 
did not think it was gross in any way; she just believed it was a mistake, and a 
damaging one at that. It may be thought paternalistic, but this was her line of 
thinking. 
 Was she open-minded? Was the ‘information’ she acquired 
unbiased? It does seem to have been selective. She did not mention genetic 
differences between gay people and heterosexuals, for instance (but then, 
many homosexuals prefer not to mention that either). Her views on 
homosexuality were deeply embedded in her Christian point of view, so 
much is clear. But on the other hand, she told me she had also read a book 
on ‘gay theology’, as she called it; a book written from the ‘other’ 
perspective. This made her doubt her views. Her brother did so too. Her gay 
brother and another sister, both lawyers, told her she was ‘a danger to the 
state’, that ‘young gay people commit suicide because of her’, and that she 
was a fundamentalist. People around her (apart from this brother and sister) 
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did not fully understand her position, she said, but they did respect it. 
Doubts notwithstanding, she felt there was only one course to take. She 
drew support from a number of things, as will be explained below. 
 Her view of the development of the case is as follows: before gay 
marriage was legally enabled, her gay brother (who, as I said before, was 
active in the COC) told her that the COC would do research regarding 
registrars that refused to marry gay couples. Her brother made it clear to her 
which side he was on, saying that they would get Spong to argue their case 
for them in court, if necessary.66 The papers reported that there were no 
registrars in Leeuwarden who would refuse to marry a gay couple. Eringa-
Boomgaardt thought this convenient and left it like that. Then, on April 2nd 
2001, only one day after the law was adapted so as to allow gay marriage, 
Robert Grossnickel (chairman of COC Leeuwarden) requested to be married 
to his boyfriend by Eringa-Boomgaardt. I have described the reaction of the 
person behind the counter in the previous subsection. 
 Leeuwarden, Eringa-Boomgaardt felt, wanted to present itself as a 
progressive city. The immediate reaction was: how do we get rid of Nynke? 
‘Law is law’ became the adagium in Leeuwarden, which was rather 
hypocritical, Eringa-Boomgaardt commented, because anyone could open a 
coffee shop (where cannabis is sold and used) or a brothel. 
 “In such a situation,” Eringa-Boomgaardt said, “you discover the 
kind of network you’re in.” Her husband was a lawyer; she knew the chief 
editor of the Friesch Dagblad [Frisian Daily] well, and so on. She saw God’s 
directing hand herein. She felt as if she were passing through the Red Sea, 
with on the one hand the trembling wall of water which was the gay 
community and the press, and on the other the wall of the Christian 
community and the ‘gebedsbeweging’ [‘prayer movement’, a Christian revival 
movement] She was led across between these two enormous forces, her feet 
remaining dry. 
 Then there was another sign, when she opened the Bible and found 
this text in Isaiah: “...he made me into a polished arrow and concealed me in 
his quiver. He said to me, ‘You are my servant...’ ”67 She took this as a 
warning of what was coming, as an indicator of the role she was to play. 
 After the first publicity about the case, an alderman asked her how 
she was going to formulate her position. He pointed out the political 
importance of calling it a conscientious objection or not, and asked for an 
explanatory letter. She wrote such a letter, without ever explicitly speaking of 
conscientious objections. She sent her gay brother a copy, and to her 
                                                 
66 If it is true that this was premeditated, it is all the more unlikely that it is was 
merely a coincidence that Grossnickel picked just that one registrar with scruples 
regarding gay marriage. It would then seem that they were expecting trouble, and 
deliberately heading for it. But I cannot corroborate Eringa-Boomgaardt’s story. 
67 Isaiah 49: 2-3 (New International Version). 
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surprise, he was devastated. She did not understand this, for her 
formulations had been very cautious, in terms of a very personal judgement, 
something she could not do. The Bible formed her conscience. “With 
everything I said or did, I had my brother at the back of my mind,” she told 
me. This, she also interpreted as God’s work; this way she could never judge 
harshly about homosexuals. But she also said: “I could not get around my 
conscience.” 
 What did this term ‘conscience’ mean to her? She spoke of a truth 
for herself – this truth held for others as well, but she had no influence on 
others. “We live in a democracy.” She would not impose this truth on 
anyone, not even her children. “What they do with their upbringing is their 
own responsibility.” She said she had never wanted to be on the barricades. 
She was chosen for it. Being God’s servant, she wanted to do this. She 
gradually grew to her standpoint. Her conscience was sharpened. She 
doubted a lot: are things really the way I think they are? There was criticism 
from theologians and others. “There were many doubts,” she repeated. In 
her letter to the city of Leeuwarden she did not use the term ‘conscientious 
objection’. “The Bible is the norm.” 
 Things changed (for the better, from Eringa-Boomgaardt’s point of 
view) when (on May 1st, 2004) Geert Dales, formerly alderman in 
Amsterdam, became mayor in Leeuwarden. It may come as a surprise that 
his appointment benefited Eringa-Boomgaardt, and indeed it came as a 
surprise for her as well. Dales was the one who made the ‘pre-emptive strike’ 
against registrars with scruples about marrying gay couples. He had protested 
against Minister of State Cohen’s pragmatic stance, taking a principled stance 
himself. Moreover, he was partner in a gay marriage himself. Yet now, after a 
good talk with Van der Staaij, MP for the SGP fraction in parliament, he felt 
that a pragmatic solution ought to be found.68 At the same time, the 
aforementioned VVD alderman A. Brok (also in the opposite camp, from 
Eringa-Boomgaardt’s point of view), left Leeuwarden to become mayor of 
Sneek. “The atmosphere,” Eringa-Boomgaardt told me, “changed 
completely; the Court of Mayor and Aldermen was now open to legal 
advice.” 
 Meanwhile, Eringa-Boomgaardt read a book about Daniel (the 
Daniel from the Bible, famous for being thrown in the lion pit, and 
remaining unharmed). It was about how Daniel dealt with his conscience, 
she said. There were three phases. The first phase was a phase of adaptation 
to and education in Babylonian customs. The second phase was one of 
troublesome adaptation and conditional cooperation (he had difficulties with 
food laws, for instance). In this phase, he went along with things to a certain 
point, to see what God thought about it. In the third phase, he was 
forbidden to pray. Cooperation then became impossible for his conscience. 
                                                 
68 The SGP is the smallest Christian political party represented in parliament. 
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Eringa-Boomgaardt used this example to illustrate that Christians, nowadays, 
go very far in what they agree with and go along with. I already said that she 
would even register the marriage of a gay couple; she used that example here. 
To participate in the meaning-giving ritual of a gay marriage would be 
comparable to Daniel’s agreeing not to pray – the third phase. This would be 
a betrayal of God. Conscience, according to Eringa-Boomgaardt, is like 
identity in that it is shoved and pushed this way and that. There is much 
room, she said, in how you deal with it; even with a very strict conscience 
there is room for choices. 
 Seeing that she had come to the end of her story, I asked her to say a 
bit more about conscience and conscientious objection. About the difference 
between a conscientious objection and an ‘ordinary’ objection, she said: 
“Now it was: ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’, whatever the consequences. 
One can overcome a normal objection.” Of course, she was asked to support 
her conscientious objection (which she had not labelled as such herself). For 
this purpose, she used an article about marriage (and gay marriage in 
particular) by the ‘Evangelisch Werkverband’ (an evangelical reform 
movement within the Dutch Protestant Church). This was also sent to the 
judge at that time. Finally, I asked her a bit more about the (supra-
)individuality of her conscience. She said that conscience can never be an 
individual ‘truth’; it has a basis, also in others who are of the same mind. 
“Had I been the only one who thought this way, I would have just left.” But 
truth, for Eringa-Boomgaardt, is supra-individual. She would not recognize 
herself in a description of conscience as something purely individual, in the 
sense that it was based in and valid for the individual alone. “This is not an 
individual thing.” She would not be blown away by the COC, she said. “I 
have too many roots for that. This tree does not fall over that easily.” The 
only thing she did was to keep standing, to stay put – nothing more, she did 
not seek publicity or anything. “I received the strength to do so.” 
 
15.3.3. Eringa-Boomgaardt’s conscience 
We have seen, not so much in this chapter, but rather in the previous, that all 
core elements of the symbol of conscience can be found in conscientious 
objections to military service, whether they are religious (in a narrow sense) 
or not. I have not yet asked whether Eringa-Boomgaardt’s objections are 
indeed conscientious objections in all respects. This section, then, will analyse 
her story in terms of the core elements of the symbol of conscience: ultimate 
concern, intimacy, and the element of the witness. 
 The element of ultimate concern is clearly present in Eringa-
Boomgaardt’s case, both on the level of symbolization and on the 
experiential level. Eringa-Boomgaardt appeals to a superior moral-religious 
standard: the Bible, and, ultimately, God. She wishes to avoid a betrayal of 
God, and there is reference to God and the Bible throughout her story. The 
element of ultimate concern appears in both of its two guises: in that of 
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authority, as when she says that ‘the Bible is the norm’, but also in that of 
inspiration. The latter figures even more prominently than the former. It 
shows up in her account of the appearance of a rainbow, in her experience 
of crossing the Red Sea, in her reading of the words from Isaiah 49: “...he 
made me into a polished arrow and concealed me in his quiver. He said to 
me, ‘You are my servant...’”, and in the conclusion of her story: she received 
the strength to persevere. Sometimes, both elements are present 
simultaneously, as in her reading of and about Daniel: the Bible both tells her 
what to do (as an authority), and strengthens her resolution by presenting her 
with an example that she can hold on to, which is a form of inspiration. The 
way she spoke about the rainbow, the Red Sea, Isaiah, and Daniel, convinced 
me that the inspiration was genuine; moreover, that it had not left her. 
 The element of intimacy, like that of ultimate concern, is a pervasive 
presence in her story. Given the importance of inspiration, it could hardly be 
otherwise. While ultimate concern in the guise of authority may seem (but no 
more than that) to be relatively detached from the person (in the sense that it 
seems to come from without), with ultimate concern in the form of 
inspiration this is virtually inconceivable.69 The images of inspiration Eringa-
Boomgaardt uses suggest an involvement of the whole person; her crossing 
the Red Sea, and her being a polished arrow and God’s servant, do so in 
particular. There is clearly an intimate connection between her person and 
her conscience and conscientious objections. She explicitly connects 
conscience and identity where she says that her Christian identity came into 
play, and also where she compares conscience and identity in that they both 
leave room for different ways of dealing with them. Conscience, in her eyes, 
is a matter of ‘Here I stand...’ (et cetera). Furthermore, she links conscience 
with her social identity: the network she is in. In no way does she try to 
shield part of herself from the matter – something that was perhaps made 
impossible by her having a gay brother. Finally, in several places, she 
emphasizes that her objections are very personal, in that she would not 
impose them on others. This is the form of the element of intimacy I have 
called ‘privacy’. 
 The element of the witness is often only implicitly present in more 
contemporary expressions and experiences of conscience, and this is the case 
here, too. It is implicit in her references to God, especially where she speaks 
of a betrayal of God. Not only is God an authority, he is also someone who 
would know, if she were to do otherwise than he could approve of. The story 
of Daniel, as she tells it, is that of someone who acts with the knowledge that 
his actions are witnessed – by God. He was trying to see how far he could go 
in the eyes of God (and in a sense he was trying to see with the eyes of God). 
She compares herself to Daniel; hence, she, too, feels ‘watched’ by God. 
                                                 
69 Recall that the element of the witness is more likely to occur in combination with 
that of ultimate concern in the form of authority. 
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 It is clear enough, then, that Eringa-Boomgaardt’s objections are 
conscientious. But are they conscientious objections in the sense of the 
previous chapter? Can we discern other aspects of the practice of 
conscientious objection in her case? The first thing that attracts attention is 
that she does not speak of conscientious objections herself; others came up 
with the label. She does interpret her objections in terms of conscience, 
though, and the label is certainly not misplaced. Her objections are a reaction 
to a demand: the local government demanded that she marry a gay couple. 
Then there is the aspect of public reasoning. Eringa-Boomgaardt explained 
her views in a letter to the Court of Mayor and Aldermen; the letter 
contained both an explanation of her views on homosexuality and an 
explanation of what the implications of these were for her work. Her reasons 
were not public in the sense that she made them public to the press, for she 
deliberately avoided the press, but this is not what public reasoning entails. It 
is merely the attempt to give reasons for one’s stance in terms that others 
can understand; Eringa-Boomgaardt made this attempt (successfully, I 
believe), and with reasons that were the result of long and hard reflection. 
Her opponents may not have understood her in the sense of being able to go 
along with her reasoning, but they did understand what her position was and 
how it was supported. The problem was that they did not accept it as a valid 
ground for exemption. Finally, on the formal side of her conscientious 
objection, there are the aspects of acceptance of the consequences, and 
consistency. Some people may think it inconsistent that she would let her gay 
brother and his partner sleep in the same room of her house, while at the 
same time objecting to gay marriage. The charge of inconsistency should not 
be made too soon, however. Whether her behaviour is inconsistent with her 
beliefs or other behaviour can only be established on the basis of an 
evaluation of the story she can tell that incorporates these seemingly 
inconsistent elements. In this case, her story makes sense of these elements 
in a way that resolves any supposed inconsistency. The key factor here is 
Eringa-Boomgaardt’s statement that she does not want to impose her beliefs 
on others, and has always refrained from attempting it. The charge of 
inconsistency would have been on firm ground, for example, if she had agreed 
to marry her brother and his partner, while refusing to marry other gay 
couples. In general, her position appears to be consistent with her 
‘biography’. Acceptance of the consequences is a more difficult point. There 
were no legal arrangements for this kind of case, as there were for 
conscientious objection to military service. Hence, there were no 
predetermined consequences that she knew she would have to accept. What 
consequences she would have to accept was a matter that she could exert 
influence on. Hence, it was only to be expected that she would try to 
minimize the consequences for herself. Furthermore, to do the opposite 
would have cast doubt on the firmness of her stance. Had she simply 
resigned, people would not have considered her to be the model of a 
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conscientious objector. In this case, the major consequence that she had to 
accept was that she had to go through a long period of uncertainty, involving 
all kinds of juridical procedures, media coverage, and problems in the private 
sphere. Had she come off worst in the end, she would have had to accept 
her discharge. She knew this, but there is no reason why she should not have 
tried to prevent this from happening. 
 As to the further aspects of conscientious objection: on the 
personal-experiential level we see exactly that mixture of certainty and doubt 
that I enlarged upon in the previous chapter. Eringa-Boomgaardt’s case 
demonstrates (once again) that it would be a mistake to assume that 
conscientious objectors are people who are extremely certain of their views, 
and hence willing to go to great lengths in defending them. Eringa-
Boomgaardt’s doubt is characteristic, but in the end a position has to be 
taken, and though her concrete beliefs can never attain the certainty of 
ultimacy, she has to stand by them if not to do so would to her mind 
constitute a betrayal of what she is ultimately concerned about, in other 
words: of the ultimate that she is concerned about. The most interesting 
substantial aspect on the public level in the context of this case is that of the 
legal pressure valve, and this is so exactly because Eringa-Boomgaardt 
presents an example of the practice of conscientious objection in a context 
where conscientious objection does not exist as a legal principle. That means 
that conscientious objections as a legal pressure valve did not exist in this 
case. What makes this interesting is that the case shows how much tension 
could have been prevented (and how much time and money saved) if there 
had been this legal arrangement, if conscientious objection in this context 
had been institutionalised, and could therefore have operated as a legal 
pressure valve. Had such legal arrangements been made, this would probably 
have resulted in tensions with the opponents of such an arrangement, but it 
is doubtful whether this would have acquired comparable dimensions to the 
tensions that were allowed to build up now. Nor is it likely that anyone 
would have been harmed so much, personally, as in this case. 
 
15.3.4. Integrity 
Many people would say that Eringa-Boomgaardt was trying to protect her 
integrity. Indeed, most of the more recent authors on conscience would say 
more or less the same thing.70 I would not say it is untrue, but I think it is 
not the most fortunate description of her intentions. The phrase draws 
attention to the (wholeness of the) person, and away from experienced truth. 
Once again, it is the intentionality of conscience that is lost sight of. To say 
that conscientious objectors are, in the final instance, trying to protect their 
                                                 
70 See 15.2.3. 
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integrity, ignores the self-understanding of many of them.71 Eringa-
Boomgaardt speaks of a ‘betrayal of God’, not of a betrayal of herself or her 
integrity. Besides that, in so far as it diverts attention away from the contents 
of beliefs, it does not help us in understanding why different people object to 
different things. Of course, to explain conscientious objections in terms of 
the protection of one’s integrity does not logically preclude an investigation 
into the beliefs of the person involved. In fact, it should entail such an 
investigation. In practice, however, protection of integrity tends to come to 
serve as the final explanation of conscientious objection, instead of the 
ultimate concern at which the person aims, and which thus constitutes the 
wholeness, the integrity, of the person. 
 Instead of abandoning the popular notion of integrity, then, I prefer 
to use it somewhat differently.72 Eringa-Boomgaardt’s case shows very 
clearly that a person’s integrity is not something fixed and ready at hand. 
When the time came that she had to make up her mind, Eringa-Boomgaardt 
did not have her fixed integrity already there, asking for protection. She was 
not ‘whole’ yet, but had to become so. Not only was her integrity not given, 
it could also not simply be discovered – it had to be constructed. So we see 
that, when Eringa-Boomgaardt could not avoid the question that had been 
                                                 
71 Indeed not all of them; Childress (1979), 316, adduces an example of a 
conscientious objector who says: “I am trying to, and I will, protect my sense of 
myself.” Still, this man, Arthur Miller, also expressed himself in terms such as: ‘I 
could not…’, and ‘my conscience will not permit me’. At any rate, that someone 
expresses himself in terms suggesting the will to protect his integrity does not mean 
that this is in fact his primary motivation. It might be, for instance, that he thought 
this would arouse more sympathy in his audience than the contents of his 
conscience. The other two examples Childress adduces mention the self, but are 
modern expressions of the element of the witness, rather than of the need to protect 
the moral integrity of the self. It is interesting to note that Wicclair, who writes that 
“appeals to conscience can be understood as efforts to preserve or maintain moral 
integrity”, proceeds to interpret this as implying that 1) the objector has core ethical 
values; 2) these are part of her understanding of who she is; 3) to perform a certain 
action would be incompatible with them. In other words: Wicclair builds the 
intentionality of conscience into his understanding of integrity. (Wicclair [2000], 213-
124.) I believe he has misjudged which of these takes priority; protection of integrity 
is secondary. 
72 See 1.5.2 and 15.2.3. A.W. Musschenga rightly pointed out to me that the notion 
of integrity for which I propose an alternative is a defensive concept, as distinct from 
the notion of integrity as an ideal. My own view of integrity as presented here is not 
necessarily an example of the latter. It stays close to the original meaning of the 
word, and is intended to point out what the defensive notion easily obscures: that 
persons (or their thoughts, beliefs, memories, feelings, and so on) may show varying 
degrees of integration, and that certain situations are calls to moral integrity rather 
than occasions for demonstrating one’s moral integrity. On the latter point, cf. 
Childress (1979), 322. 
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lurking at the back of her mind for some time any longer, a process of integration 
started. This process coincides with the process of symbolic integration that 
constitutes the symbol of conscience. In the process of symbolic integration, 
the person becomes whole as well. Polanyi explained that it is not just the 
‘subsidiaries’ that become integrated (‘thrown together’, in the literal 
translation of symballein) in the symbol, but (with them) the person as well.73 
Eringa-Boomgaardt, in this case, integrates herself in the symbol of 
conscience. From that moment on, as long as the (symbolic) integrity 
endures, this determines how she interprets her situation, herself, and 
everything she experiences.74 Paul Tillich, in the section “Faith and the 
integration of the personality” in Dynamics of Faith, stated that “[t]he ultimate 
concern gives depth, direction and unity to all other concerns and, with 
them, to the whole personality.”75 Whether Eringa-Boomgaardt was made 
into a ‘polished arrow’ I cannot say, but her surrender to the symbol of 
conscience did turn her into a vector aimed at (an) ultimate concern – in fact, 
the vector is the concern for the ultimate.76 
 An interesting effect in such a process of integration is that the 
person in question turns to a symbol that is ready at hand, the ‘obvious’ 
symbol to turn to. We may draw an analogy here to what historian Pierre 
Nora has called ‘lieux de mémoire’ (places of memory, or sites of memory). 
A ‘lieu de mémoire’ is a symbolic place where ‘memory crystallizes and 
secretes itself’. ‘Lieux de mémoire’ call forth a past that is no longer there. 
They are coagulations of experiences, and (as partly artificial constructs) they 
represent certain values. Moreover, ‘lieux de mémoire’ have the power ‘to 
carry people away’. Analogously, the symbol of conscience functions (though 
now less, and for fewer people, than it has done) as what we might call a ‘lieu 
de conscience’ – where ‘conscience’ means consciousness, not conscience! The 
symbol of conscience was most obviously a ‘place of consciousness’ in the 
seventeenth century, when ‘conscience’ seems to have sprung to mind 
almost whenever someone defended something important to him. The 
                                                 
73 Polanyi’s phrasing was that “not only the symbol becomes integrated but the self 
also becomes integrated as it is carried away by the symbol – or given to it”; Polanyi 
and Prosch (1975), 75. 
74 So there is a two-way movement: from subsidiaries to symbol, but also from 
symbol to subsidiaries. Polanyi expressed this in the loop in the arrow between 
subsidiaries and focal target. 
75 Tillich (1957), 105; see also the whole section from which this quotation stems: 
“Faith and the Integration of the Personality” (105-111). 
76 Magnetism provides a useful analogy for what happens here; a magnetic field 
changes the orientation of the particles in certain materials, having them all ‘face the 
same way’. There is an important situational influence, but it only works on materials 
with certain characteristics. (I owe this analogy to K. Schinkel.) For ultimate concern 
as concern for the ultimate, see Tillich (1957), 9-11. Cf. Murdoch (1974c), 100 and 
102, who writes of ‘Good’ as a ‘magnetic centre’. 
 584 
appeal to conscience functioned similarly to the appeal to a ‘lieu de mémoire’ 
then, and to a certain extent, it still does. Not only is ‘conscience’ what 
springs to a person’s mind when he or she finds himself in a certain 
situation, it is also still quite generally recognized, it helps others to order the 
situation, it canalizes publicity concerning the case, et cetera. It can do so, 
because it is part of the political and ethical consciousness of the 
community.77 
From the view of integrity taken here, it is no less to be expected 
that people will tend to associate it with the self than on a more traditional 
view. When conscience is explained in terms of integrity, we may expect the 
self to take centre stage there as well. Polanyi’s schematic representation of 
the symbolic relation is illuminating here. The symbolic relation, we saw, 
looks like this: 
 
S+ii  F-ii. 
 
The subsidiaries are those experiences that together engender the symbol of 
conscience – experiences of ultimate concern, in part, and experiences of 
various kinds; ‘immediate’ and ‘ordinary’ experiences, is a distinction Tillich 
would make, for instance, the first relating to ultimacy, the second to 
concreteness.78 The experiences are ‘thrown together’ in the symbol, thus 
integrating the self. So at the place of the F, the point of focal awareness, we 
find not only the symbol, but also, simultaneously, the self!79 It is not 
surprising, then, that the self in its integrity figures so prominently in 
concepts of conscience. But this holds true for the symbolic relation in 
general. This means, on the one hand, that one could find the self in other 
symbols as well, but on the other hand, that there is indeed a peculiar 
relation of the conscience to the self. In many symbols, the self that is 
integrated ‘covers’ a much less significant (and much smaller) part of a 
person’s life experience than in the case of conscience. Moreover, by 
necessity, some of the experiences that engender the symbol of conscience 
                                                 
77 See Nora (1989); I realize, of course, that the analogy is imperfect if we take into 
account other aspects of what Nora means by ‘lieux de mémoire’, but I think the 
analogy is helpful here. 
78 Tillich (1957). 
79 This is most easily discerned by others, who either have an overview of the 
symbolic relation, or simply witness how the self of someone who appeals to 
conscience manifests itself. The person integrating him- or herself in the symbol of 
conscience will not have him- or herself in focal awareness; yet because (s)he 
integrates him- or herself in the symbol that is in focal awareness, and because of the 
reflexive nature of both conscience and the process of integration, (s)he will 
probably find him- or herself attending to him- or herself more than usual, and at 
any rate (consciously or unconsciously) put themselves forward as they make their 
appeal to conscience. 
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are of a self-reflexive nature – otherwise there would be no experience of 
conscience. So in the case of conscience, both experience and symbolization 
tend towards unification and wholeness of the self, that is: towards integrity. 
 But Polanyi’s rendering of the symbolic relation also explains what 
goes wrong when conscience is dissolved in self and the protection of 
integrity; for the figure above shows that intrinsic interest lies not with F, 
hence not with what lies in focal awareness, but with S, with the experiences 
integrated in the symbol! The self and its integrity may be in focal awareness, 
but they are not of intrinsic interest. That honour goes to the experiences, 
and with them to ultimate concern. This way, Polanyi’s schematic 
representation of the symbolic relation, too, draws attention to the 
intentionality of conscience.80 When the symbol is seen as intrinsically 
interesting, loss of meaning occurs because the intrinsically interesting 
experiences that are integrated in the symbol are forgotten.81 
 I have spoken of integrity in terms of a process of integration. To 
some, this may sound too much like constructivism, and they are partly right. 
There is an element of situation-dependent construction in such a process of 
integration. But it is seldom the case that a person’s conscientious objections 
to something come as a total surprise to those who know him or her. Much 
depends on the degree to which someone has made up his or her mind on 
the subject. Moreover, conscientious objections can be ‘predictable’, given 
someone’s background. So there is something ‘already there’ before the 
process of integration starts. But seldom, if ever, is integrity in a very full 
sense a given. Most people have reached acceptable levels of integrity in 
various areas, which means that feelings, beliefs, and actions in a certain area, 
or relating to a certain topic, have reached a fair level of integration. This 
does not mean that there are no inconsistencies at all, especially if we would 
take into consideration the feelings, beliefs, and actions belonging to other 
areas. In practice, only very few people are designated as ‘persons of 
integrity’; assuming that this designation is sometimes correct, these would 
be people for whom conscience is not a mode of consciousness in which 
they are occasionally thrown, but a relatively stable presence, a habit of mind 
– perhaps the habit, the home, of mind. In that case, the intensity of 
conscience is lower than when conscience is a mode of consciousness in 
which we are temporarily thrown by the force of the circumstances as 
experienced by us; if it were not, pathology would be the likely result.82 
 
                                                 
80 Note that ‘intentionality’ here includes Voegelin’s ‘intentionality’. 
81 See 1.5.2. 
82 James Hogg’s novel The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824) 
explores the pathology resulting from the combination of a puritan’s oppressive 
belief in his own sinfulness and the conviction that he was one of the elect, and 
hence predestined to go to heaven. Cf. also Arendt (1971), 418. 
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15.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Distrust and fear of the subjective conscience (or the subjectivity of 
conscience, on some views of conscience), of merely ‘private opinion’, are 
deeply rooted in Western thought. States in particular have shown 
themselves insecure in their dealings with the conscience of individuals that 
opposed them on some point. Conscientious objection to military service is 
the best-known example of such a situation. Traditionally, only members of 
small religious sects, the ‘Peace Churches’, conscientiously refused to take up 
arms. This situation was not experienced as particularly problematic by 
Western states.83 In the twentieth century, the group of conscientious 
objectors became more diverse. Not all of them came from the traditional 
Peace Churches, and what is more: there were agnostics and atheists among 
them as well. At first, many states held on to the demand that conscientious 
objections be religiously grounded. They could not keep up this attitude, 
however, and both governments and theorists of conscientious objection 
became concerned that conscientious objection was becoming a dangerous 
or at least inapplicable concept. A ‘new’ conscientious objection is discerned: 
secular, subjective, private, and a far greater challenge to the state than the 
‘old’ conscientious objection. 
 What should we make of this picture? We have seen that there is no 
justification for making a radical distinction between ‘religious’ and 
‘nonreligious’ conscientious objections. They are all religious in the sense 
that they all express ultimate concern. Has the individual conscience become 
‘boundless’, as has been claimed? This is not reflected in the number of 
conscientious objectors to military service in the Netherlands. Nor can just 
anything pass as a conscientious objection. The only way in which 
conscience is boundless is in its field of application. So far, however, there 
has been no sign of an unstoppable surge of idiosyncratic conscientious 
objections to a limitless number of practices. In fact, the plurality of beliefs 
with which the subjectivity of conscience is supposed to be connected, and 
which is supposed to be a defining characteristic of post-modern society, 
appears to hide itself behind unprecedented conformity. The term 
‘conscientious objection’ itself is quite telling in this respect: it testifies to the 
fact that there is general agreement about something, but that there may be 
the odd exceptional individual who conscientiously disagrees. 
 It may be this general conformity of beliefs that problematizes a case 
like Eringa-Boomgaardt’s. From the point of view of the secular majority, 
her conscientious objections to gay marriage are incomprehensible. They are 
not the secular, subjective objections supposed to be so problematic. Rather, 
they are very traditional conscientious objections. They have ‘stayed behind’ 
with respect to public opinion. In the eyes of some, this makes them suspect. 
                                                 
83 Absolutist objectors were considered a problem, however. Jehovah’s Witnesses are 
the paradigmatic example. 
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For that reason, such people take a hard line, stating, for instance, that 
legislation regarding marriage is not interpretable.84 They feel that if we allow 
this kind of conscientious objections, we will undermine the law. But this 
could then be argued for conscientious objection as such. What is more, we 
would start on the slippery slope of judging conscientious objections by the 
acceptability of their contents. It might also be argued that conscientious 
objections should only be accommodated in certain areas, as for instance in 
that of military service. However, to limit the number of areas in which 
conscientious objection is recognized is to impose limits on the field of 
application of conscience – and this is impossible. If the legitimacy of 
conscientious objection in one area is in doubt, it is in doubt generally, for the 
simple reason that conscience knows no borders. 
That conscience knows no borders does not to mean that 
conscientious objections must always be accommodated. A doctor who 
conscientiously refuses to perform operations that are generally accepted and 
uncontroversial parts of modern medicine, which they have been since long 
before the time (s)he started studying medicine, should not have become a 
doctor in the first place. If the objections are the result of a conversion, this 
conversion has rendered him or her unfit to be a doctor. But the legitimacy 
of conscientious objection in the field of medicine is not as such in question 
here.85 
 The legitimacy of conscientious objection, we should accept, does 
not depend on the contents of particular objections. It is a mistake to think 
that conscientious objections should only be accommodated when they 
reflect the generally accepted view on the subject; the whole point is that 
they do not.86 It would also be a mistake to think that conscientious 
objection as such is problematic because it entails that sometimes 
‘unacceptable’ conscientious objections will have to be accommodated. The 
importance of conscientious objections, whether ‘secular’ or ‘religious’, lies 
not in the concrete reasons adduced, but in the ultimate concern that 
expresses itself through them. That means that we do need to know what an 
objector’s conscience is about; that is, we need to establish that the 
objections are indeed conscientious, that the objector’s concern is with the 
moral quality of his or her own contribution to the process of reality. This 
means that the intentionality of conscience must not be forgotten, as is likely 
                                                 
84 Then mayor of Leeuwarden Van Maaren-Van Balen is reported to have said this 
in “Ambtenaar Leeuwarden moet homo’s huwen”. For such literalism on the side of 
the COC see “Intolerantie COC staat haaks op oude Nederlandse traditie; 
Gewetensbezwaren”, and “Homohuwelijk principezaak in Leeuwarden”. 
85 See Wicclair (2000) for an insightful article about conscientious objection in 
medicine; see Savulescu (2006) for a poor defence of the idea that conscientious 
objections have virtually no place in medicine. 
86 Although they may be based in generally accepted (if not lived up to) moral 
principles. 
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to happen if conscientious objection is taken to be, exclusively or primarily, 
an indication of a desire or need to protect the (moral) integrity of the self. 
The problem of authenticity arises here: how do we know that a 
person truly has the conscientious objections (s)he claims to have? It should 
first be noted that the extent of the problem is easily exaggerated. It is only 
likely to arise in the context of compulsory military service. And even then 
there are still many reasons that might put off people considering to fake 
conscientious objections, public opinion being the most important one. 
Proceduralization enhances the problem, because it shifts attention away 
from the personal expression of experiences of conscience – paradoxically, 
given the stress on the individual and private nature of conscience in law and 
its interpretation. When every reasonable effort has been made to probe 
towards the experiences underlying a person’s objections, there will still be 
some successful fakers. But it is better for a few of those to go undetected 
than for true conscientious objectors to see their appeal rejected. 
 I hope to have shown in this chapter (as in the foregoing chapters) 
that the best understanding of conscientious objections is gained when we 
stay close to the experiences from which they spring. The core of this 
understanding is the insight that conscientious objections express ultimate 
concern. This allows us to see the limitations of common interpretations of 
conscientious objection. Rather than interpreting them as indications of the 
need to protect one’s integrity, I interpret conscientious objections in a way 
that does more justice to the self-understanding of (most) conscientious 
objectors, by locating their importance where they themselves would locate 
it.87 The final conclusions to be drawn from all this for the philosophical 
foundation of conscientious objection will be presented in the following, 
final chapter. 
                                                 
87 See Wicclair (2000), 211, for an example of the importance of doing justice to 
people’s self-understanding in this way. 
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16. Philosophical foundations of conscientious objection 
 
 
16.1. THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION 
This book is the result of a search for (a) philosophical foundation(s) of 
conscientious objection. I interpreted the question as to such a foundation as 
follows: 
 
is there some characteristic of conscientious objections that sets them apart from other kinds 
of objection, such as to earn conscientious objections a special respect and corresponding 
treatment? 
 
This question could be analysed into the following three: 
1) what are conscientious objections? (This question will be discussed in 
 16.2.) 
2) is there something about them that sets them apart from other kinds of 
 objection? (16.3); if so, 
3) is this something that calls for a special respect and treatment, or can 
 justify such respect and treatment? (16.4)1 
 
Here, I wish to draw attention to a feature of the approach I have taken that 
might easily be missed. 
 My interpretation of the question as to the philosophical foundation 
of conscientious objection places the burden of justification on the side of 
those who would argue that there is such a foundation, and that 
conscientious objections are qualitatively different from other kinds of 
objection in a way that earns them, we might say: V.I.O. status (Very 
Important Objection). On the one hand this is not surprising, since the 
present study was occasioned by a case of conscientious objection, the public 
discussion of which underlined what was already clear in theory: that the 
legitimacy of conscientious objection is not self-evident. Specific cases of 
conscientious objection may lead to doubts about the legitimacy of 
conscientious objection in general. On the other hand, we see that the 
legitimacy with which the state makes its demands on citizens is seldom 
questioned.2 But is the legitimacy of the specific demands made by ‘the other 
party’ always self-evident? A registrar conscientiously objects to marrying gay 
couples. She adheres to beliefs in this regard that some 50 years ago could 
have counted on the support of the majority of the population. But public 
                                                 
1 Once these questions have been answered, we will have arrived at a foundation 
both for the practice of conscientious objection and for legal provisions for 
conscientious objection. The answer to the main question should establish the 
legitimacy of the former, and thereby the requiredness of the latter. 
2 The case may be somewhat different for other demanding parties, like employers. 
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opinion has changed and the law has changed with it, and now the registrar 
is in the position that she has to justify living up to beliefs that were once 
self-evident to the majority but have ceased to be so. Another example: a 
man does not want to spend a year of his life learning how to kill other 
people most efficiently, learning blindly to obey orders, becoming skilled in 
the handling of weapons. Not to want these things are virtues in civic life. 
However, in many countries the legitimacy with which the state demands 
that young men do just this is still taken to be self-evident by a majority of 
the people. Such a situation would only have figured in the most blissful of 
dreams of seventeenth-century rulers. Simply because you are male and born 
within certain borders, the state has the right to demand that you serve a year 
in the military. I am not saying that this cannot (under certain circumstances) 
be justified. But is it self-evident? Is it a matter of reason that the burden of 
justification lies with conscientious objectors, or is it a matter of power?3 I 
am inclined towards the latter, but to argue for it would require another 
book. I have chosen to accept the defensive position, which assumes the 
prima facie right of the state to make certain demands of its citizens or civil 
servants; of employers to make certain demands of its employees, et cetera. 
But it is good to keep in mind that this is not a matter of course. My taking 
this approach does not mean that I see conscientious objection as a privilege 
granted by the state, rather than a civil right.4 It just means that I accept that 
the right to conscientious objection needs to be justified. 
 
 
16.2. WHAT CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS ARE 
There are many useful dictionary definitions of conscientious objection, but 
in the foregoing chapters I chose to go beyond them, to an understanding of 
conscientious objection in a number of its aspects, viewed from different 
perspectives. Most important with a view to the question I set myself the 
task of answering here is that conscientious objection is a practice of people 
we call conscientious objectors – a practice that presupposes a context, for 
conscientious objection is a relational concept. The concept arose to indicate 
                                                 
3 Some words spoken in 1916 by Mr. Herbert Samuel, member of the British House 
of Commons, draw attention to the fact that the duty to fulfil compulsory military 
service ought not to be ‘naturalized’ too easily: “Are you, in the case of these 
conscientious objectors, to arrest them and bring them before the Court, and impose 
fines, and if the fines are not paid, proceed to imprison them? Is it really 
contemplated that now, when for the first time you are making military service 
compulsory in this country, it should be accompanied by the arrest and 
imprisonment of a certain number of men who unquestionably, by common 
consent, are men of the highest character, and, in other matters, good citizens?” 
Quoted in Hobhouse (1917), 2, from Hansard, Wednesday, January 19, 1916. 
4 This difference is of crucial importance to absolutist objectors. Cf. Hobhouse 
(1917), 4. 
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a practice in the context of powerful modern Western states imposing 
certain demands on their citizens as a matter of right; a right that was not 
contested by the majority of citizens, but challenged by a small minority. 
One form the latter took was conscientious objection. To object is to throw 
something in the way, in this case in the way of the objector’s taking a 
demanded course of action. What is thrown in the way is not simply, as 
many would have it, the objector’s conscience, so that the individual 
conscience and the state would have to fight it out. The objector, thrown 
into the mode of consciousness we call conscience, throws him- or herself in 
the way. The state (or the demanding party in question) is then left with the 
choice to tread over the objector or to take an alternative route, as it were, 
which means that an exception is made in this individual case. 
 Focusing too much on the origins of the concept of conscientious 
objection might obscure the fact that objections on grounds of conscience 
have been made throughout history – objections that in all relevant respects 
compare with modern conscientious objections. Socrates saw the need for 
‘public reasoning’, for consistency, for acceptance of the consequences even 
if it meant his death. So did Thomas More, and so did all the other pre-
modern conscientious objectors I have referred to. This justifies the use of a 
broader concept of conscientious objection, which does not limit it to a fairly 
recent practice in a narrowly specified context. 
 The most essential characteristic of conscientious objections lies in 
the first word. Objections may have all the formal characteristics on the 
public level that also pertain to conscientious objections, but this would not 
make them eligible for the same treatment.5 It is to ‘conscientiousness’ that 
we must look if we wish to find a philosophical foundation of conscientious 
objection. 
 
 
16.3. WHAT SETS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS APART FROM OTHER 
 KINDS OF OBJECTION 
An argument for a philosophical foundation of conscientious objection may 
take different aspects of conscientious objection as its point of departure. A 
Luhmannian foundation would start from the aspect under which we see 
conscientious objection as a ‘legal pressure valve’, as Carl Cohen so aptly put 
it. The legal principle of freedom of conscience and legal provisions for 
conscientious objection would then be justified by the fact that they function 
to preserve the stability of the social system. This would, on the face of it, be 
a pragmatic justification and hence a pragmatic foundation of conscientious 
objection, but it could have principled grounds; it could rest on a concern for 
                                                 
5 The likelihood of this increases when the consequences to be accepted are less 
severe (in comparison with the consequences of the alternative of complying instead 
of objecting). 
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the stability of the social system that might in turn depend on concern for 
the well-being of the people. Principled or pragmatic, this Luhmannian line 
of reasoning does provide conscientious objection with a philosophical 
foundation. Its immediate point of departure is the aspect of conscientious 
objection as a legal pressure valve, but this ultimately depends on the 
conscientiousness of the objections. A Luhmannian approach, then, does not 
belie the conclusion of the previous section. 
 However, what Luhmann would call ‘conscientiousness’ is not what 
I (and many others, though for different reasons) would call thus. Because he 
makes personal identity central to the concept of conscience, the latter 
becomes too broad a notion. Not everything that is constitutive of a person’s 
identity is a matter of conscience; nor, therefore, a suitable ground for 
‘conscientious’ objection. The other way around, we cannot dismiss 
objections as nonconscientious simply because we disagree with them; nor 
can we deny the name ‘conscience’ to someone’s concerned awareness of the 
moral quality of his or her contribution to the process of reality if and 
because we cannot, in Smithian terminology, ‘enter into’ that awareness. This 
means that a certain degree of formalism in the approach of conscience and 
conscientious objection is necessary. An objection is conscientious when it is 
grounded in conscience; conscience is not to be identified with a particular 
set of moral principles. I have conceptualized it as a concerned awareness of 
the moral quality of one’s own contribution to the process of reality, 
including one’s own being. This is a rather formal concept of conscience, but 
only up to a point. It is about the moral quality of one’s own contribution 
(etc.) – ‘moral’ in the broadest sense of the word, but it is still a limitation. 
The concerned awareness pertains to an (often poorly articulated) 
conception of what it means to be a good person and to live a good life.6 
Such things can also be contemplated in a disinterested manner, but that is 
not conscience. Conscience implies concern; in conscience we experience 
things in a concerned manner. Behind this is ultimate concern in its aspect of 
the Good. We perceive (better would be: ‘prehend’) that there ‘is’ such a 
‘thing’ as goodness, and on certain occasions at least it becomes clear to us 
that this matters ultimately. The appeal to conscience that the conscientious 
objector makes must be understood primarily as a symbolic expression of a 
certain class of experiences – experiences of conscience – in which ultimate 
concern is the key element.7 The experience of conscience is typically either 
an experience of authority, in which a person feels strongly bound to obey a 
moral command that is addressed to him or her personally, or one of 
                                                 
6 See 8.6 about ‘morality’. 
7 This means that the objections put forward by a conscientious objector must not 
simply be seen as propositions to be judged on their truth-value; they are the 
concrete embodiment and the public translation of the symbol of conscience. It is 
from this fact that they derive their importance. 
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inspiration, in which the subject feels empowered and inwardly compelled to 
contribute ‘goodness’ to the world. Of course, the experience of conscience 
often lies somewhere between these ideal-types, and it includes other 
elements (in particular the elements of the witness and of intimacy). 
 All this makes conscientious objections qualitatively different from 
other kinds of objections, and in a way that differentiates them from 
(virtually) all other kinds of objections. On one side of the divide are 
objections that flow from ultimate concern; on the other side are those 
objections that do not. Conscientious objections find themselves in the first 
category, and although they seem in practice to be alone in it, it is 
theoretically possible that someone could put forward nonconscientious 
objections that do flow from and express ultimate concern.8 In my view they 
would deserve equal treatment, but I need not argue for that here. That the 
divide of which I speak suggests a neatness and clarity that is seldom if ever 
present in reality (and perhaps particularly in moral matters) needs no 
argument. It will not always be easy to classify an objection as one kind or 
the other. Nevertheless, I believe that by focusing on experiences of 
conscience in the manner described in this book it will generally be possible 
to determine whether objections are conscientious or not. In unclear cases, 
the objector should receive the benefit of the doubt, especially since the 
demanding party usually has alternatives available that the conscientious 
objector must do without. 
 
 
16.4. WHY CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS DESERVE SPECIAL RESPECT AND 
 TREATMENT 
Conscientious objections differ from other kinds of objection in being 
conscientious; that much is obvious. But objections on grounds of 
conscience – I leave other characteristics of conscientious objection aside for 
the moment – differ from objections, say, on grounds of expediency in 
another way than the latter differ from, for instance, objections grounded in 
(non-moral) preferences.9 Conscientious objections differ from virtually all 
other objections in being expressions of ultimate concern. It is this 
observation that supplies the reason why conscientious objections deserve a 
special respect and exceptional treatment not granted to other kinds of 
objection. By such respect and treatment I refer simply to legal provisions 
made for conscientious objectors, to committees set up to evaluate them, 
and so on. In Western democratic societies conscientious objections to 
compulsory military service tend to be treated with this kind of respect; 
                                                 
8 Because the notion of ultimate concern is not exhausted even by the broad notion 
of morality I use. 
9 Bij non-moral preferences I here mean preferences without relation to the moral 
quality of their objects. 
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sometimes this extends to other areas of objection as well. But on what 
grounds are conscientious objections granted this ‘privilege’? Better put: 
what would constitute a legitimate ground? 
 The conclusion towards which this study has been moving from the 
beginning is that conscientious objections deserve special respect because 
they are expressions of ultimate concern. Ultimate concern gives meaning 
and direction to people’s lives. Not to take conscientious objections into 
account would mean that people are (on certain occasions) denied the right 
to live up to their conception of the good life, their conception of what it 
means to be good.10 Moreover, it would mean that people are punished for 
their search for meaning in life. Where no legal provisions for conscientious 
objectors exist, an essential element of what it means to be human is denied. 
Locke held that people could not be denied the right to care for their own 
soul, and this argument is still valid. But ‘care for one’s soul’ is not a strictly 
internal affair; one’s ‘soul’ cannot be separated from one’s actions. To be 
able to ‘care for one’s own soul’, to live up to one’s own conception of a 
morally good and meaningful life, is a (non-moral) good, a value to be 
realized. It becomes hard to argue beyond this point: if this kind of meaning 
is not a good, it is unclear what is; as a result, ‘moral good’ would be a 
meaningless notion, too. 
 In the above I have provided positive reasons for allowing 
conscientious objection. There are also negative reasons, relating to the 
consequences of denying the right of conscientious objection. We have seen 
that conscientious objection involves a risk for the objector, a risk of a 
spiritual rather than material nature. A state that does not recognize 
conscientious objection – that does not allow freedom of conscience, except, 
perhaps, in the most minimal sense – takes a risk as well, of both a spiritual 
and a material nature. Suppose that it denies the right of conscientious 
objection on the basis of a supposedly objective vision of the good. The risk 
taken in that case is obvious: the vision might be wrong – in fact, the very 
notion that there might be a definitive vision of the good is problematic, if 
not perverse. The state would make the mistake of absolutizing itself. Other 
traditional arguments, like those pertaining to the problem of hypocrisy in 
enforcing outward conformity, are also still pertinent. There is no need to 
repeat them here. No civilized state can deny people the right to pursue a 
meaningful life, a life shaped not merely by force and circumstances, but also 
                                                 
10 For instance, when Thomas More stated that he could not in good conscience sign 
the oath he was requested to sign, he expressed his awareness that if he did, he 
would break his connection with the ultimate. Signing the oath was irreconcilable 
with his conception of the good. Even if he was frequently in doubt about what was 
good, he knew that this was conflict with it. This is the element of risk, and therefore 
of courage, involved in conscientious objection: the certainty that pertains only to 
the absolute is coupled with the uncertainty of its concrete embodiment. 
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by ultimate concern. Not to recognize a right to conscientious objection is to 
do just that. That other rights limit this right is self-evident; no right is 
absolute. But the question was whether a philosophical foundation for 
conscientious objection could be provided; in other words: whether we 
could point out some characteristic of conscientious objections that provides 
a good ground for assigning them a special status. In the foregoing, I have 
answered this question in the affirmative. 
 
 
16.5. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MY APPROACH TO CONSCIENTIOUS 
 OBJECTION AND OTHER APPROACHES 
Having stated my case for the foundation of conscientious objection, it is 
worth considering in which respects my approach differs from other 
approaches to the subject; more particularly: to review the advantages of my 
approach over others. 
 The ‘standard’ approach today tells us that when someone appeals to 
conscience in the form of a conscientious objection, (s)he indicates that the 
matter in question is of great importance for him or her. So much is true. 
But when this importance is explained in terms of the psychological 
problems that would arise if the conscientious objection were not recognized 
(and/or exemption not granted), the core of the importance of conscientious 
objections is missed. A somewhat better common suggestion is that the 
conscientious objector is concerned to preserve his or her own (moral) 
integrity.11 In this view, conscientious objections matter because (moral) 
integrity matters. But this view is also problematic. First of all, moral integrity 
is not a given. It is not something ready-at-hand, simply there to be 
protected when necessary. In the symbolic integration through which the 
symbol of conscience arises, the person expressing him- or herself is also 
integrated, and in particular: morally integrated. Secondly, what is at stake for 
the conscientious objector is not primarily his or her own integrity, but 
rather whether he or she will be involved in something that is irreconcilable 
with his or her own conscience. The conscientious objector is not primarily 
saying that (s)he wants to preserve his or her integrity, but rather that (s)he 
does not want to comply with the demand made on him or her, because this 
involves what they believe is a moral wrong. That it is one’s own contribution 
to the process of reality with which conscience is concerned does indeed 
matter, but through a one-sided emphasis on integrity the intentionality of 
conscience is forgotten. And it is what conscience is (and conscientious 
objections are) about that matters most in the experience of the conscientious 
objector. A theory of conscientious objection is not obliged to accept the 
                                                 
11 Cf. Arendt, Luhmann, Childress. 
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objectors’ self-understanding, but I take a theory that does justice to people’s 
self-understanding to be preferable over one that does not.12 
 According to my approach, conscientious objections are expressions 
of ultimate concern; they relate to people’s conceptions of what it means to 
be a good person, to their search for meaning in life. Not to recognize the 
right of conscientious objection is to deny people an essential part of what it 
means to be human; I take this to be both a non-moral and a moral evil. 
 Conscientious objections matter for substantial reasons; they matter 
because they are conscientious objections, not because of factors ultimately 
contingently connected with them (like possible psychological damage). To 
acknowledge this means for my approach that it recognizes the importance 
of conscientious objections in a way that does justice (as much as possible) 
to objectors’ self-understanding. I locate their importance in the same place 
as they do. That does not mean that I adopt the concrete reasons brought to 
the fore by conscientious objectors, or that I derive the importance of 
conscientious objections from the ‘quality’ of those reasons. I derive that 
importance from my interpretation of those reasons as expressions of 
experiences of conscience and thereby of ultimate concern. 
I recognize what makes conscientious objections so important in a 
way that does justice to the self-interpretation of conscientious objectors, 
because I interpret the adduced grounds for their objections 
‘sympathetically’. That means, for instance, that I do not attempt a 
psychological reduction of those objections. Nonetheless, conscientious 
objectors will not always agree with my interpretation. For some, conscience 
is the Voice of God in man, no more and no less; to such people, the idea 
that in these terms they symbolically express ultimate concern will not be 
equivalent. I still believe, however, that they would have to acknowledge that 
my approach respects their self-understanding in a way that reductionist 
approaches do not. 
 In the seventeenth century, freedom of conscience was sometimes 
held to obtain with regard to ‘adiaphora’, ‘indifferent things’. What was of 
ultimate concern to the one was allowed by the other because to him it did 
not matter at all. Freedom of conscience was then not grounded in the 
importance of conscience, but in the supposed unimportance of things about 
which only the overly scrupulous were concerned. Somewhat analogously, 
the importance of conscientious objection(s) is often located theoretically in 
something that is ‘besides the point’ for conscientious objectors themselves; 
what the objectors say is supposedly irrelevant. In my approach, what 
conscientious objectors say does matter, because I want to know whether 
something is a symbolic expression of experiences of conscience (and thus 
of ultimate concern) or not. If it is, this is what lends the objections their 
                                                 
12 Assuming that the explanatory power of the theory is not diminished in other 
respects, of course. 
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importance – the same thing that gives them their importance for the 
conscientious objectors themselves, though in my case interpreted in terms of 
ultimate concern. 
 To locate the importance of conscientious objections in their 
conscientiousness seems to me more intellectually satisfactory than to have to 
adduce some other factor on which their importance would have to depend. 
That doing so corrects a one-sidedness (relating to the focus on integrity) 
and an oversight (with respect to the intentionality of conscience) of other 
approaches to conscientious objection is an added advantage. But there is 
another: to focus on experiences of conscience underlying conscientious 
objections, and to interpret these in terms of ultimate concern, greatly 
nuances the difference between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ objections. Many 
historical discussions of the subject elaborate extensively on the 
secularization of conscientious objection in the twentieth century. It is 
argued that we are confronted with a ‘new’ kind of conscientious objection, 
radically different from the ‘old’ or ‘traditional’ kind.13 One of the main 
differences is that the ‘new’ conscientious objection is not religiously 
grounded. Atheists appeal to conscience as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses; 
Quakers conscientiously object to military service, but so do some agnostics. 
This situation has often been experienced as problematic, both by states and 
by theorists of conscientious objection. If ‘secular’ objections must be 
recognized as well, are there any limits to what may pass as a conscientious 
objection? In my view, such reactions are overblown, such concerns 
unwarranted. All conscientious objections are religious in a broader sense of 
the term; they are all expressions of ultimate concern. This criterion is no 
less clear than the criterion that conscientious objections need to be 
religiously grounded.14 Nor does it open the door to all sorts of objections. 
The advantage of my approach in this respect is that it offers a down-to-
earth interpretation of conscientious objection that does not make too much 
of differences between various conscientious objections, and does not make 
a fuss where there is nothing to fuss about. At the same time, it furthers 
understanding between ‘religious’ (in the narrow sense) and ‘secular’ people, 
which is particularly relevant today, when ‘religious’ conscientious objections 
are poorly understood by the ‘secular’ majority. 
 The abovementioned advantages of my approach flow from my 
combination of (or my taking a middle road between) a formalistic and a 
                                                 
13 The prime example is Moskos and Chambers (ed.) (1993), who expressed this 
view in the title of the book they edited: The New Conscientious Objection; but the view 
is omnipresent. 
14 That such a criterion also requires interpretation is especially evident from 
jurisprudence regarding conscientious objection to military service in the United 
States. 
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substantialist account of conscience and conscientious objection, as 
explained in 16.3. 
 
 
16.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The previous sections form the conclusion of this book. Many questions 
have remained unanswered, or even unasked. In saying that conscientious 
objections are qualitatively different from objections grounded in, say, strong 
(non-moral) preferences, interests, or some other nonconscientious basis in a 
way that justifies their privileged treatment, I have said nothing about the 
potential seriousness of those other kinds of objection. If we take military 
conscription as an example, we can imagine cases in which objections 
grounded in nonconscientious moral reasons could lead to exemption for the 
objector. For instance, if it is evident that a certain war entails that war 
crimes are (and will continue to be) committed, this may provide a moral – 
and certainly not necessarily conscientious – reason for someone to object to 
his induction in the military. Moreover, the strength of such an objection 
would be evident to a great number, if not the majority, of people.15 This 
kind of objection need not be conscientious, simply because a more abstract 
form of moral reasoning that is not characterized by the particular kind of 
concern involved in experiences of conscience may lead to this point of 
view; in other words, the objector need not enter the mode of consciousness 
we call conscience.16 Even if he does, however, he still might not need to 
appeal to conscience in this case, given the likelihood (or the possibility at 
least) that his reasoning will draw the support of a sufficient number of those 
who evaluate his case. 
 When conscientious objections are confronted with reasons 
(conscientious or not) concerning life and death, it is not a priori clear which 
will have precedence over the other. In the Netherlands for instance, when a 
child will die because its parents (and sometimes also the child itself), being 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, conscientiously refuse to allow a blood transfusion, 
parental authority is usually temporarily suspended so that the child can be 
                                                 
15 This example is provided by Donald A. Peppers in Peppers (1974). 
16 It is still possible, even likely, that ultimate concern is at the background of this 
kind of objection; but the prominence of ultimate concern in relation to one’s own 
contribution to the process of reality is lacking. The objector, even though his 
objections are occasioned by the threat of his own induction in the military, argues 
that participation in this war entails participation in obvious wrongs for anyone. The 
moral quality of his own contribution to the process of reality is not in the focus of 
his attention. Whereas in moral reasoning, the focal point of attention lies solely with 
the object of the reasoning, an experience of conscience places the relation between 
an object and a subject (the self) in the foreground. So the focus of attention is 
different, and with that the subjective form of the awareness. 
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treated.17 A case like this may also be construed as a case where the 
conscience of the patient (and his parents) meets the conscience of the 
doctor, as Jehovah’s Witnesses acknowledge. This complicates the matter 
even further. Where a child’s life is in the balance, the doctor’s arguments, 
which are shared by the majority of people, are likely to prevail. 
 When conscientious objection is approached in a way that precludes 
evaluation of objections with regard to their contents, people will be tempted 
to comment that this would open the door to any kind of objection, however 
absurd or even ‘dangerous’. They might want to define conscience in such a 
way that only ‘agreeable’ objections can be labelled conscientious, or 
alternatively to make a distinction (a priori) between acceptable and 
unacceptable conscientious objection. I understand the problem. It is 
tempting to reserve the label ‘conscientious’ for those objections for which 
one feels, or at least can summon, respect. The problem is quite similar to 
that of the ‘tolerant nazi’ in McKinnon’s book on toleration. On what she 
calls a weak interpretation of toleration, anyone who disapproves of or 
merely dislikes others on whatever prejudiced grounds, but (for whatever 
reason) refrains from acting on this prejudice (while having the power to do 
so) must be called ‘tolerant’. So there might very well be tolerant racists 
around. Now imagine that the racist acquires a new prejudice, but again 
refrains from acting upon it. Did (s)he become even more tolerant? This is 
an unsatisfactory conceptualization of toleration, so McKinnon tries a strong 
interpretation first, which she rejects for certain reasons, and then comes up 
with what she calls the ‘wide’ interpretation. “On this account, a person is 
tolerant when she refrains on principled grounds from acting on her 
disposition to oppress or interfere with another person or group in order to 
prevent them from engaging in practices or exhibiting properties to which 
she is responsibly opposed.” Responsible opposition entails that one has 
taken the time to think about one’s position, open-mindedly considered 
counterarguments, finally to come to a position that one genuinely takes to 
be justified. McKinnock plausibly asserts that not many racists will fit this 
description.18 The same goes for conscientious objection; an objection 
                                                 
17 Mat (1999). It should be noted that Jehovah’s Witnesses would not agree that the 
child would die because of their refusal to allow a blood transfusion. Life is held to be 
the gift of God; hence it is also for him to take. That does not mean that one should 
not try to prevent illness, accidents, and so on. Many medical treatments are also 
unproblematic for Jehovah’s Witnesses, including certain organ transplantations. 
The refusal of blood has a Biblical background, but medical reasons are also adduced 
with references to academic journals. Jehovah’s Witnesses point out the risks 
involved in blood transfusion, as well as equivalent alternative ways of treatment that 
do not involve blood transfusion. See 
http://www.watchtower.org/medical_care_and_blood.htm. 
18 McKinnock (2006), chapter 2. McKinnock also notes that a belief that is genuinely 
taken to be justified differs from (and entails more than) a sincere belief. 
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grounded in mere prejudice is not a likely candidate for the label 
‘conscientious’. (Note that the objections put forward by the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses mentioned above differ clearly from mere prejudice.) 
Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible that extremely unpleasant objections 
must be recognized as conscientious. Should we exclude them because they 
are unpleasant to us? Unless their recognition and a subsequent exemption 
from whatever obligation would clearly constitute an unacceptable harm or 
violation of other civil or human rights, they should be treated like any other 
conscientious objection.19 This means, in fact, that they should always be 
treated like other conscientious objections, for consideration of other rights 
and of possible harm is always pertinent. It is a prima facie principle that 
conscientious objections should be accommodated; it is not an absolute 
right. 
 Reservations like the above have always been made with regard to 
conscientious objection. A common argument is that there will be frauds, 
people who wriggle out from under their obligations. Margaret Hobhouse 
answered this objection in 1917: “It is said that if the genuine men are let out 
of prison, some shirkers will go free. Even if this were so, it is not the 
custom of our law to punish one man for another’s offence.”20 Besides, 
could an argument like this not be advanced for any government regulation 
and any law? 
 Worries about absurd or dangerous conscientious objections, or fake 
ones, reflect the primordial connection between freedom of conscience and 
the problem of order. But we have seen that to make provisions for 
conscientious objection is in fact a way of dealing with the problem of order. 
The problem of subjectivity, rather than posing a problem for states, might 
actually be a blessing. The more subjective conscientious objections are, the 
less likely it is that they are backed by organized opposition. Although 
conscientious objection is a common phenomenon in Western democratic 
societies, it remains the exception to the rule. The plurality (of beliefs, 
opinions, life-styles, et cetera) that is supposed to be a defining characteristic 
of post-modern society is nothing compared to the religious plurality of 
seventeenth century Europe. The latter was fundamental; it was organized; it 
was political, and as such constituted a continuous threat to political order. 
The plurality of today is by and large a private phenomenon, limited to a few 
restricted spheres and spaces. The authority and legitimacy of state power is 
not seriously questioned. Conscientious objectors, unless they are absolutist 
objectors, affirm rather than challenge the authority of the state. In a sense, 
then, post-modern Western societies exhibit an unprecedented uniformity; 
the people in them display a stunning level of conformity. Many factors have 
                                                 
19 It is impossible to define a priori what would constitute unacceptable harm, or an 
unacceptable violation of rights. 
20 Hobhouse (1917). 
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contributed to this situation; the Protestant and Enlightenment projects of 
the education of conscience are probably among them. 
 In this situation, if the right of conscientious objection is not self-
evident, if its legitimacy is questioned, this has not so much to do with the 
uncontrollable subjectivity of conscience, but rather with a stifling demand 
for conformity that threatens the foundations of the constitutional state 
precisely as it tries to protect them.21 
                                                 
21 Cf. Roberts (1919), 337. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
 
 
Doel van dit proefschrift is te komen tot een wijsgerige (filosofische) 
fundering van gewetensbezwaren. Ook al is de dienstplicht in Nederland 
opgeschort (niet afgeschaft), gewetensbezwaren hebben mensen ook hier 
nog steeds, in allerlei verschillende contexten. (En in veel andere Westerse 
landen bestaat de dienstplicht natuurlijk nog wel.) Deze term, ‘context’, 
kunnen we op verschillende manieren opvatten. We kunnen spreken van 
gewetensbezwaren in de medische context, de militaire, of die van de 
ambtenarij. Maar we kunnen ook spreken van gewetensbezwaren in de 
context van abortus, dienstplicht, of het homohuwelijk. Er zijn mensen die 
menen dat er geen plek is voor gewetensbezwaren in bepaalde contexten, in 
de eerste zin van het woord. Er wordt bijvoorbeeld gezegd dat artsen of 
verpleegkundigen geen beroep zouden moeten mogen doen op 
gewetensbezwaren. Anderen betwisten de legitimiteit van gewetensbezwaren 
in specifieke contexten, in de tweede zin van het woord. Dan wordt 
bijvoorbeeld beweerd dat een gewetensbezwaar nooit een grond mag zijn 
een homo-stelletje niet in de echt te verbinden, of een abortus uit te voeren. 
Deze zaken worden gezien als sociaal geaccepteerd, zelfs als iets waar 
mensen recht op hebben. Er zou dan geen plaats zijn voor 
gewetensbezwaren tegen participatie in deze zaken. 
Hoewel dit soort argumenten niet de legitimiteit van 
gewetensbezwaren in het algemeen betreft, ondermijnt het deze indirect wel. 
Want kunnen we gewetensbezwaren beperken tot specifieke terreinen? 
Willen we dat mensen hun geweten inschakelen als ze het ene gebied 
betreden en weer uitschakelen als ze het andere binnengaan? Zelfs als we 
erkennen dat gewetensbezwaren in sommige contexten (in de eerste zin van 
het woord) problematischer zijn dan in andere, kunnen we dan a priori 
zeggen dat er in sommige contexten geen plaats voor is? Ik geloof dat dat in 
strijd zou zijn met de aard van het geweten en gewetensbezwaren. Wanneer 
op voorhand bepaalde gebieden worden aangewezen als gebieden waarin 
gewetensbezwaren geen plaats kunnen hebben, staat de legitimiteit van 
gewetensbezwaren in het algemeen op het spel. Dit geldt ook wanneer de 
legitimiteit van gewetensbezwaren tegen een specifieke zaak (bijvoorbeeld 
het sluiten van een homohuwelijk) in twijfel wordt getrokken. De gedachte 
dat op voorhand kan worden aangewezen door een maatschappelijke 
meerderheid of dominante groep tegen welke zaken mensen 
gewetensbezwaren mogen hebben en tegen welke niet, miskent de aard van 
het geweten, alsmede de functie van de accommodatie van 
gewetensbezwaren in wetgeving. Wanneer iemand een beroep doet op 
gewetensbezwaren, heeft hij of zij per definitie bezwaar tegen iets dat 
maatschappelijk geaccepteerd is en algemeen gezien wordt als iets dat 
redelijkerwijs van mensen verlangd mag worden. Een onderscheid tussen 
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acceptabele en onacceptabele objecten van gewetensbezwaren zou 
gewetensbezwaren overbodig maken. 
 Tenslotte zijn er mensen die zich zorgen maken over bepaalde 
‘gewetensinhouden’. Er is al vaak opgemerkt dat zich in de twintigste eeuw 
een nieuw soort gewetensbezwaren heeft ontwikkeld, die een totnogtoe 
ongekend probleem vormt voor de staat. (Deze observatie is zeer 
betwistbaar, maar dat laat ik hier terzijde.) De ‘nieuwe’ gewetensbezwaren 
zouden nieuw zijn op drie manieren: 1) ze zijn in het algemeen seculier, in 
plaats van religieus; 2) ze komen op veel grotere schaal voor; 3) ze blijven 
niet beperkt tot de context van de dienstplicht, maar komen overal voor. Met 
name het eerste punt baart bepaalde auteurs zorgen. Er zijn nog steeds 
mensen die menen dat een ‘seculier gewetensbezwaar’ een contradictio in 
terminis is. De meesten die de (vermeende) seculiere kwaliteit van 
gewetensbezwaren als problematisch beschouwen, doen dit echter omdat zij 
er een probleem in zien voor de definieerbaarheid van gewetensbezwaren. 
Ze zijn in hun ogen moeilijker te onderscheiden van andersoortige bezwaren. 
Dit moeten we tegen de achtergrond zien van historische ontwikkelingen in 
het denken over het geweten. In de negentiende eeuw werd het geweten 
door mensen als Bentham, Darwin, Nietzsche en Freud ontmythologiseert. 
In de twintigste eeuw lieten psychologen en filosofen het begrip grotendeels 
vallen. Dit betekenisverlies van het gewetensbegrip heeft zeker bijgedragen 
aan twijfel over de status van gewetensbezwaren. 
 Dit alles vraagt om een filosofische fundering van 
gewetensbezwaren. Ik wil weten of de praktijk van het zich beroepen op zijn 
of haar geweten filosofisch gelegitimeerd kan worden, maar ik wil dit ook 
weten voor de juridische accommodatie van gewetensbezwaren. Het tweede 
vloeit voort uit het eerste. Ik heb de vraag naar een filosofische fundering 
van gewetensbezwaren als volgt geoperationaliseerd: 
 
hebben gewetensbezwaren een bepaald kenmerk dat hen onderscheidt van andere typen 
bezwaren, van dien aard dat gewetensbezwaren een bijzonder respect en een 
overeenkomstige behandeling verdienen? 
 
Als ik een dergelijk kenmerk vind, heb ik een filosofische fundering van 
gewetensbezwaren gevonden. Ik probeer bovenstaande vraag te 
beantwoorden door een antwoord te vinden op de volgende drie deelvragen: 
 
1) wat zijn gewetensbezwaren? 
2) hebben gewetensbezwaren een kenmerk dat hen onderscheidt van andere 
typen bezwaren? zo ja, 
3) vraagt dat kenmerk om een bijzonder respect en een bijzondere 
behandeling van gewetensbezwaren, of kan het zulks rechtvaardigen? 
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Om de eerste vraag te beantwoorden (welk antwoord mij ook het materiaal 
aanreikt om tot antwoorden op de tweede en derde vraag te komen) is het 
van essentieel belang (zo beargumenteer ik in het boek) inzicht te hebben in 
het geweten en gewetensvrijheid. Derhalve bestaat het boek uit drie delen, 
één over het geweten, één over gewetensvrijheid, en tenslotte één over 
gewetensbezwaren. In het derde deel bevindt zich het afsluitende hoofdstuk 
van het boek, waarin ik mijn antwoord formuleer op de vraag naar de 
filosofische fundering van gewetensbezwaren. 
In het eerste deel van mijn proefschrift geef ik een overzicht van de 
historische ontwikkeling(en) van gewetensuitdrukkingen en –opvattingen, 
van het Oude Egypte en de Klassieke Oudheid tot in de (eenen)twintigste-
eeuws Westerse wereld (Europa en de Verenigde Staten), vanuit het 
gezichtspunt van het betekenisverlies dat zich in deze ontwikkeling(en) heeft 
voorgedaan. De gedachte die aan de basis van dit overzicht ligt, is dat 
‘geweten’ primair dient te worden opgevat als een symbool dat uitdrukking 
geeft aan een bepaalde klasse van ervaringen, en niet als een begrip dat 
simpelweg verwijst naar iets in de tastbare werkelijkheid. 
Aan de hand van (onder andere) Michael Polanyi’s symbooltheorie 
laat ik zien hoe een symbool zijn betekenis kan verliezen. Polanyi maakt 
onderscheid tussen tekens (‘signs’) en symbolen (‘symbols’). Hierbij horen 
twee typen betekenis, die op verschillende manieren tot stand komen. 
Polanyi noemt deze manieren ‘indicatie’ en ‘symbolisering’. Een eenvoudig 
voorbeeld van het eerste is het met de vinger ergens naar wijzen. De 
wijzende vinger geldt hier als teken. We hebben, zo zegt Polanyi, een 
‘subsidiary awareness’ van de vinger; dat wil zeggen: een ondersteunend 
bewustzijn. De vinger bevindt zich echter niet in het centrum van onze 
aandacht, want we kijken vanzelf van de vinger naar datgene waarnaar hij 
wijst. Van dat laatste hebben we een ‘focal awareness’ (focaal bewustzijn). 
Betekenisgeving heeft dus een ‘from-to structure’ (van-naar structuur). 
Datgene (vaak meerdere dingen) waarvan we een ondersteunend bewustzijn 
hebben, integreren we in het ‘focal target’, in het doel, het geheel, waarin de 
‘subsidiaries’ betekenis krijgen. De wijzende vinger is betekenisvol als teken 
van iets anders. Hij is zelf niet interessant. Vandaar dat wanneer iemand strak 
naar de vinger blijft kijken, in plaats van naar het aangewezene, betekenis 
verloren gaat. Doordat de van-naar structuur wordt opgeheven, treedt 
betekenisverlies op. Dit gebeurt bijvoorbeeld ook wanneer iemand een 
woord heel vaak achter elkaar herhaalt, zoals Mr. Bean in één aflevering van 
de comedy-serie doet met het woordje ‘big’. Na verloop van tijd wordt het 
een betekenisloze klank. Ook symbolen kunnen hun betekenis verliezen, 
maar hier verloopt dit anders. Polanyi beschrijft symbolische betekenisgeving 
ook als een relatie tussen ‘subsidiaries’ en een ‘focal target’. Er zijn echter 
belangrijke verschillen. Een teken staat niet in het centrum van de aandacht, 
maar een symbool wel. In het geval van ‘indicatie’ is het aangewezene, 
datgene waarop onze aandacht gericht is, ‘intrinsiek interessant’. Het teken is 
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dat niet. In het geval van symbolisering staat het symbool in het brandpunt 
van de aandacht, maar zonder dat het intrinsiek interessant is. Het 
interessante zit hem juist in de zaken waarvan we een ondersteunend 
bewustzijn hebben en die geïntegreerd worden in het symbool. Een nationale 
vlag, bijvoorbeeld, is in zichzelf een oninteressant stukje stof; maar omdat het 
de nationale vlag is, is het toch veel meer. Mensen integreren al hun 
ervaringen die op de één of andere manier met hun land (hun ‘natie’) 
verbonden zijn in dat ene symbool: de vlag. Hierdoor is de vlag bijzonder 
betekenisvol, zonder dat het ding op zich interessant is. Nu kunnen 
symbolen hun betekenis ook verliezen, en wel op verschillende manieren. Ik 
noem hier alleen de belangrijkste: betekenisverlies treedt hierbij op, wanneer 
een symbolische relatie wordt aangezien voor een relatie van indicatie; dat wil 
zeggen: wanneer mensen een symbool aanzien voor een teken. Wanneer dat 
gebeurt, verliest het symbool zijn betekenis, omdat er geen ‘subsidiaries’ 
meer in geïntegreerd worden. In plaats daarvan gaan mensen zoeken naar 
datgene waarnaar het veronderstelde teken verwijst. Misschien komen ze uit 
bij de ‘subsidiaries’ van het symbool, maar een symbool verwijst daar niet 
naar – want een symbool verwijst überhaupt niet. Twee mogelijkheden zijn 
zeer waarschijnlijk: dat verschillende mensen heel verschillende 
‘verwijzingen’ vinden, en dat mensen helemaal geen ‘verwijzing’ vinden. Dat 
laatste is in zekere zin consistent, want een symbool verwijst nergens naar. 
 Welnu, in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift laat ik zien hoe het 
symbool ‘geweten’ zijn betekenis verloor, doordat mensen de symbolische 
relatie waarom het ging, op zijn gaan vatten als een relatie van indicatie. Dit 
heeft precies de twee gevolgen gehad die ik hierboven als belangrijkste 
mogelijkheden noemde: sommigen kwamen tot de conclusie dat er niet 
zoiets is als het geweten, dat ‘geweten’ een leeg begrip is. Jeremy Bentham is 
hiervan het mooiste voorbeeld. Anderzijds heeft het betekenisverlies van het 
symbool ‘geweten’ geleid tot het ontstaan van een enorme veelheid aan 
verschillende, soms tegenovergestelde, gewetensconcepten. Wanneer we 
willen weten wat gewetensbezwaren zijn, kunnen we niet tevreden zijn met 
een keuze uit één van de bestaande concepten; evenmin kunnen we volstaan 
met er simpelweg een eigen concept aan toe te voegen. We moeten eerst 
teruggaan naar een symbolisch verstaan van het geweten. Aan de hand van 
‘vroege’ gewetenservaringen, uit het Oude Egypte en uit de Klassieke 
Oudheid (namelijk die van Socrates, zoals weergegeven in Plato’s Apologie), 
analyseer ik het symbool ‘geweten’ – een symbool dat ook bestaat zonder de 
term ‘geweten’ of een voorloper ervan zelf. Ik onderscheid drie 
kernelementen: 1) het element van ‘ultimate concern’ (ultieme of absolute 
betrokkenheid; een betrokkenheid op het absolute); 2) het element van 
‘intimacy’ (intimiteit); en 3) het element van ‘the witness’ (de getuige). 
Hiervan is het element van ‘ultimate concern’ het meest fundamenteel. Kort 
gezegd gaat het hierbij om de (symbolische uitdrukking van) een ervaring van 
een superieure standaard, in de vorm van een te gehoorzamen gebod, of een 
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inspirerend ideaal. Mensen geven hieraan verschillende concrete inhouden, 
maar bij een beroep op het geweten gaat het altijd om een beroep op iets dat 
van absoluut belang is. ‘Ultimate concern’ verleent betekenis en richting aan 
menselijk handelen en het leven in het algemeen. Het symbool ‘geweten’ is 
één mogelijke (en een belangrijke) uitdrukkingsvorm van ‘ultimate concern’. 
Op basis van dit inzicht en het bredere inzicht in het symbool ‘geweten’, 
kom ik in hoofdstuk 8, het laatste hoofdstuk van deel I, tot de formulering 
van een eigen ‘fluid concept’ (vloeibaar begrip) van het geweten – een 
concept dat geïnformeerd wordt door het inzicht dat het symbolische 
verstaan primair is en het conceptuele secundair, en dat daardoor een 
verabsolutering van zichzelf onmogelijk maakt. In het algemeen neigen 
gewetensconcepten ertoe één aspect van het ervaringscomplex waaraan het 
symbool ‘geweten’ uitdrukking geeft te verabsoluteren, en zichzelf daarmee 
tot het concept uit te roepen dat de essentie van het geweten te pakken heeft. 
Met mijn ‘fluid concept’ probeer ik dat te voorkomen. Mijn gewetensconcept 
luidt als volgt: het geweten kan worden opgevat als een concerned awareness of 
the moral quality of our own contribution to the process of reality, including our own being 
(een betrokken/bezorgd bewustzijn van de morele kwaliteit van onze eigen 
bijdrage aan het proces van de werkelijkheid, inclusief ons eigen wezen). Met 
de beperkingen van het conceptuele verstaan in ons achterhoofd, kunnen we 
profiteren van de relatieve scherpte die dit concept oplevert in vergelijking 
met een symboolanalyse, en die het spreken over het geweten 
vergemakkelijkt. 
 In deel II onderzoek ik allereerst de conceptuele relaties tussen 
geweten en gewetensvrijheid. Vervolgens (in hoofdstuk 10, dat de kern van 
deel II vormt) behandel ik de tweedimensionale problematiek die in de kern 
van de theorie en praktijk van gewetensvrijheid ligt. Het gaat hierbij om het 
probleem van de orde, waarbinnen de politieke orde en de orde in de 
menselijke geest (in het denken) van elkaar onderscheiden kunnen worden. 
Het tweede kan ook het probleem van de subjectiviteit genoemd worden. In 
eerste instantie (in de vroegmoderne tijd) wordt dat als een probleem in 
zichzelf beschouwd: mensen die niet het juiste geweten hebben zijn 
verdoemd; hun ziel gaat verloren. Langzamerhand raakt dit motief op de 
achtergrond en is het probleem van de subjectiviteit vooral nog van belang in 
zoverre het de politieke orde betreft. Met het oog op de stabiliteit van de 
politieke orde kan gewetensvrijheid wel of niet worden toegestaan; beide 
mogelijkheden zijn uitgeprobeerd. Na verloop van tijd, als kerk en staat 
gescheiden belangen worden en het denken in termen van religieuze 
waarheid en zieleheil plaatsmaakt voor dat in termen van belangen en 
belangengroeperingen, krijgt de eerste optie (gewetensvrijheid wel toestaan) 
de overhand – zij het eerst in zeer minimale vorm. De vrijheid die aan het 
individuele geweten wordt toegekend wordt ideologisch ondersteund door 
natuurrechtelijk denken, maar ook door met name radicaal Protestants 
gedachtegoed, waarin de heiligheid van het individuele geweten en 
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individuele autonomie centraal staan. Mede onder invloed hiervan groeit 
‘gewetensvrijheid’ ook uit tot een krachtig symbool, waarmee de Westerse 
wereld zich graag identificeert. 
 Wetgeving die ruimte maakt voor gewetensbezwaren is één van de 
meest tastbare belichamingen van gewetensvrijheid in onze tijd. Het is 
voortgekomen uit de ‘dynamiek van de orde’ waarin ik in deel II aandacht 
besteedde. Terecht merken auteurs als Carl Cohen en Niklas Luhmann op 
dat deze juridische ruimte voor gewetensbezwaren functioneert als een 
‘pressure valve’ (de term is van Cohen), een uitlaatklep die opengaat als de 
druk te hoog wordt. Ruimte voor gewetensbezwaren komt de stabiliteit van 
de politiek orde, of in Luhmanns termen: van het sociale systeem, ten goede. 
Voor Luhmann is de (vermeende) subjectiviteit van het geweten geen 
probleem. Het gaat er volgens hem niet om welke ‘inhoud’ een 
gewetensbezwaar heeft, maar of het werkelijk om een gewetensbezwaar gaat. 
Volgens Luhmann is dat het geval wanneer iemands identiteit op het spel 
staat; de gewetensvraag is: “Kan ik dit doen en nog steeds mezelf zijn?” 
Wanneer iemand hiermee in problemen doet (bijvoorbeeld als hij in dienst 
moet), levert dit spanningen op binnen die persoon, in de omgeving van die 
persoon, en uiteindelijk in het sociale systeem als geheel. Wetgeving die 
gewetensbezwaren accommodeert voorkomt, aldus Luhmann, dat mensen 
tot het bittere eind volgens hun geweten moeten handelen; dat wil zeggen: 
het voorkomt dat het einde bitter is, bijvoorbeeld door alternatieve 
dienstplicht aan te bieden, of een ander alternatief, al naar gelang de context. 
Op deze wijze neemt de spanning af en blijft de stabiliteit van het sociale 
systeem gewaarborgd. Zo beschermt het sociale systeem zichzelf dus. 
 Het probleem van de subjectiviteit, zei ik zojuist, speelt bij Luhmann 
geen rol. In een andere zin keert het echter toch terug: de confrontatie met 
de staat (of een andere organisatie) kan leiden tot ‘wanorde’ in iemands geest; 
mensen komen onder druk te staan. Het gaat hier dus om psychologische (in 
plaats van epistemologische) ‘wanorde’. Daarom speelt de stabiliteit van het 
persoonlijke systeem ook zo’n belangrijke rol in Luhmanns denken. Het 
theoretische gevolg hiervan kan zijn dat de stress die iemand ondergaat de 
maat wordt van diens gewetensvolheid. Bij veel recente, door de psychologie 
beïnvloedde opvattingen van geweten en gewetensbezwaren zien we dat 
gebeuren. Evenals Luhmanns theorie zijn veel recente gewetensconcepten 
functionalistisch; ze beschouwen het geweten veelal als een functie van het 
persoonlijke systeem, een functie die in werking treedt als dat systeem op een 
specifieke wijze bedreigd wordt. Vandaar dat gewetensbezwaren 
tegenwoordig vaak worden opgevat als pogingen de eigen identiteit en 
integriteit te beschermen – dat wordt gezien als de functie van het geweten 
(of de functie die we ‘geweten’ noemen). Hoewel ik het goed vind dat 
functionalistische gewetensopvattingen formalistisch zijn, in de zin dat ze 
abstraheren van de inhoud van het geweten, geloof ik dat ze daarin te ver 
gaan. Iemands identiteit kan op het spel staan, zonder dat dit een 
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gewetenskwestie is. Bovendien: te zeggen dat een gewetensbezwaarde erop 
uit is zijn of haar eigen identiteit te beschermen miskent het zelfverstaan van 
gewetensbezwaarden. Het gaat een gewetensbezwaarde er primair om dat 
datgene wat van hem of haar verlangd wordt, slecht is. De morele kwaliteit 
van de van hem of haar verwachte bijdrage aan het proces van de 
werkelijkheid wordt negatief beoordeeld. We moeten dus niet vergeten dat 
het geweten ergens over gaat, dat het geweten intentionaliteit kent. Het geweten 
is niet slechts een functie binnen de grenzen van een persoonlijk systeem, 
maar betreft de relatie tussen een persoon en de werkelijkheid daarbuiten, en 
in het bijzonder de morele kwaliteit daarvan. ‘Morele’ kwaliteit moet zeer 
breed worden opgevat; het kan niet volledig ‘gezuiverd’ worden van het 
religieuze. Het geweten is in zekere zin altijd religieus. Vandaar dat ik de term 
‘ultimate concern’ gebruik om het voornaamste kernelement van het 
symbool ‘geweten’ mee aan te duiden – een term die Paul Tillich gebruikte 
om de essentie van religieus geloof mee aan te duiden. 
 Gewetensbezwaren doen er niet primair toe vanwege eventuele 
psychologische schade die gewetensbezwaarden zouden kunnen oplopen. Ze 
doen ertoe omdat het gewetensbezwaren zijn. Hierin onderscheiden ze zich 
van andere typen bezwaren, hoe serieus ook. Een essentieel onderdeel van 
gewetensbezwaren is hun relatie tot ‘ultimate concern’. Terwijl andere typen 
bezwaren uiteindelijk altijd zaken van relatief belang betreffen, gaat het bij 
gewetensbezwaren om een uitdrukking van ‘ultimate concern’ met 
betrekking tot het Goede. (Theoretisch is het denkbaar dat een bezwaar 
‘ultimate concern’ uitdrukt zonder een gewetensbezwaar te zijn, maar ik 
geloof dat dat vrijwel niet voorkomt. Wanneer het wel voorkomt, verdient 
zo’n bezwaar mijns inziens een zelfde behandeling als gewetensbezwaren.) 
Hiermee komen we bij de fundering van gewetensbezwaren, bij de 
legitimiteit van de praktijk en de juridische accommodatie ervan. De reden 
dat gewetensbezwaren een bijzonder respect en een navenante behandeling 
verdienen is dat ze, in tegenstelling tot ‘gewone’ bezwaren, uitdrukking geven 
aan ‘ultimate concern’, aan dat wat betekenis en richting geeft aan het leven 
van mensen. Hier geen ruimte voor te maken betekent dat mensen een 
essentieel element van hun mens-zijn wordt ontzegd. 
  
